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Abstract 
 
 
 
Xenophon of Athens probably did not write his Anabasis until thirty years or 
more after the events which it describes. This remarkable gap, taken together 
with the absence of a prologue, the presence of a number of prominent themes 
and authorial concerns, and the complex literary construction of the work, has 
made the task of explaining it problematic. Situating the text in the context of 
Xenophon's later life and wide-ranging literary output, in this dissertation I argue 
that apologia is the defining element in the work. Through his elaborate 
narrative structure and representation of his own character, Xenophon is 
defending himself, his social class, and his teacher, Socrates. In Books 5 and 7 
(of 7) he is occupied with a rigorous defence of his conduct on the retreat, 
answering charges of deceiving the soldiers, hubris, corruption, and mercenary 
service, while in Books 3 through to 7, he is defending the memory of Socrates. 
For from the point of his introduction into the text at the opening of Book 3, 
following the decapitation of the Greek High Command at the Greater Zab 
River, Xenophon the character is acting as a pupil of Socrates would have done 
had he found himself in similarly dire circumstances. His actions, counsel, and 
moral bearing during the course of the retreat are a testimony to the value of his 
teacher's training, and powerfully undermine the charges of impiety and 
corrupting the youth levelled against Socrates in 399. At the same time, the 
outstanding leadership performance on the retreat of Xenophon's character 
reflects on himself as the historical figure behind the exemplar. By highlighting 
its different forms and bringing out its pervasiveness, the dissertation 
demonstrates that apologia is the major factor in the formation of the text. 
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Notes 
 
 
Referencing 
 
The author-date system has been used for referencing. Works cited have been 
arranged largely in accordance with the Chicago Manual of Style (14th edn.). 
 
 
Texts and translations 
 
Thesaurus Linguae Graecae texts have been used throughout: for Xenophon, 
these are all based on Marchant's Oxford Classical Texts 1900-1921. In cases 
where a textual dispute or uncertainty impinges on an argument alternative 
readings are taken into account. 
 
Passages cited are in translation, with the original supplied alongside the 
English in the main body or in the footnotes in all instances where a key 
argument is being made; any apparent arbitrariness in the application of this 
method is down to oversight on my part. Key words and terms are in the 
original, usually with an accompanying translation. 
 
Translated passages from Xenophon's Anabasis are from W. Ambler's Agora 
2008 edition. Where I have chosen to supply a modified translation this is 
indicated. The translations used for other ancient authors are cited in the 
Translations of Ancient Works section of the bibliography. Any modifications to 
these are noted in the text. 
 
 
Spelling 
 
Greek words have been transliterated, except where their Latinised or 
anglicised forms have a marked currency. All peculiarities and inconsistencies 
are my responsibility. 
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Possessives with Greek names of more than one syllable are marked by an 
apostrophe alone when they end with 's': e.g. Socrates' teaching, Pericles' 
speech. Cyrus takes possessive 's'. 
 
 
Dates 
 
All dates are 'B.C.' unless otherwise stated. 
 
 
Abbreviations 
 
Xenophon's works are abbreviated as below (Latin abbreviations in square 
brackets). References to Anabasis in the dissertation are given by book, 
chapter, and paragraph, and are preceded by An. only in cases where 
ambiguity may arise. Ancient authors and their works, where abbreviated, are 
done so according to standard conventions; for a listing of these see the Oxford 
Classical Dictionary (revised 3rd edition, 2003). For journal title abbreviations 
see L'Annee Philologique. Note further: 
 
CAH Cambridge Ancient History. 2nd edn. 1961-. (1st edn. 1923-1939). 
 
DK  H. Diels and W. Kranz. Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. 6th edn. 
1952. 
 
FGrH F. Jacoby. Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker. 1923-. 
 
IG Inscriptiones Graecae. 1873-. 
 
LGPN A Lexicon of Greek Personal Names. 1987-. 
 
LSJ  H.G. Liddell, R. Scott, H. Stuart Jones. A Greek-English Lexicon. 9th 
edn. with revised supplement 1996. 
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XENOPHON'S WORKS: 
 
Ages. Agesilaos [Ag.] 
 
An. Anabasis Kyrou [An.] 
 
Apol. Apologia Sokratous [Ap.] 
 
*Ath. Athenaion Politeia [Ath. Pol.] 
 
Hell. Hellenika [Hell.] 
 
Hipp. Hipparkhikos [Eq. mag.] 
 
Hie. Hiero [Hier.] 
 
Kyn. Kynegetikos [Cyn.] 
 
Kyro. Kyroupaideia [Cyr.] 
 
Lak. Lakedaimonion Politeia [Lac.] 
 
Mem. Apomenmonegmaton (Memorabilia) [Mem.] 
 
Oik. Oikonomikos [Oec.] 
 
P.H. Peri Hippikes [Eq.] 
 
Por. Poroi [Vect.] 
 
Symp. Symposion [Symp.] 
 
 
* Pseudo-Xenophon. This work was included in Xenophon's output in antiquity 
but is not thought to be his. 
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A classic is a book that never finishes saying what it has to say. 
Italo Calvino 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
Xenophon's Anabasis is the major surviving account of a journey by a classical 
Greek. Beginning at Sardis, where Cyrus the Younger began assembling his forces 
for an attempt on the Persian throne, it chronicles the march of the expedition to 
Babylonia, and thence the retreat of the Greek mercenary force down country to 
the Black Sea, along the coast to Byzantium, around Thrace, and finally back to 
the coast of Asia Minor. The story recalls the dangers and obstacles the Greeks 
had to overcome on their long circumambulation, and provides a firsthand report of 
places and peoples in the western Persian Empire. In this latter regard it is a 
unique repository of ethnographic detail, an important source of information on the 
Achaemenid administration, and one of the earliest surviving records of the 
physical landscapes, climates, and natural environments of the regions reported 
on. For example, the author names and provides the width of rivers; he describes 
in detail the date harvest in Mesopotamia, and names animals, such as ostriches 
and antelopes, which are no longer present in the area. On the Black Sea he 
describes phenomena such as 'mad honey', and whistled speech, a practice still 
alive today in the appropriately named settlement of Kuşköy, 'bird village'. 
 
Yet for all the valuable information which he provides, it is evident from attentive 
reading of the text that the author had additional concerns to travel description and 
war reportage. There is manifest interest in military leadership, Socrates and the 
ethical life, Sparta and its suitability to govern empire, and a strong concern with 
apologia: self-defence and defence of Socrates, especially. Significantly, we glean 
from internal evidence — a flash-forward in Book 5 — that Anabasis was probably 
not completed until 30 years or more after the event; that is, no earlier than the 
370s. This raises the question why Xenophon decided to write his account then, 
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after such a gap. Clearly, he had specific motivations, even what we might term a 
writing agenda. The fact that major themes and concerns in Anabasis recur 
prominently in other of his writings indicates that the corpus is likely to be the 
product of a single, if evolving, literary project. The principal goal of this dissertation 
is to come to a more informed understanding of Xenophon's writing aims, and in 
particular his reasons for sitting down to write a book based on the expedition of 
Cyrus the Younger and his own experiences in the years 401-399.1 
 
The enduring problem of characterising Anabasis, and of trying to fit it into a 
generic category, stems in part from its author's artful integration of thematic 
strands into the travelogue, in part from the absence of a prologue to the work or 
any indication of purpose, and in part from the complex literary construction of the 
narrative. In this latter regard, Xenophon has two distinct presences in Anabasis: 
as the author and historical participant in the march, and as a character in the 
story; however, he furthermore disguises his own voice by engaging a 
pseudonymous author, who is not mentioned in the text but is referred to 
elsewhere as one Themistogenes of Syracuse (Xenophon, Hellenika 3.1.2).2 
 
The difficulty in describing the work is apparent from the number of different 
descriptions which have been applied to it by scholars in modern times. These 
include: a response to other accounts of the expedition; a work of personal 
apologetics; a polemic against other generals on the retreat; a didactic work on 
leadership and military practice; an eyewitness campaign narrative; guidebook; 
travelogue; traveller's memoir; literary travel; reflective autobiographical travelogue; 
panhellenism, and a historical work built around the characters of individuals; non-
                                            
1 Erbse (2010: 477, 501 - translation of 1966 paper), in his important analysis of the text, 
emphasised the paramount need to address Xenophon's writing motivation. More recently 
John Dillery (2009: 406), criticising the scope of a new monograph on Anabasis, has 
written: 'Should not one of our duties as readers and interpreters of an ancient text be to 
determine what the author of the text in question hoped to achieve by writing it? To be 
sure, we may want to stress other avenues of approach, other outcomes of our research, 
but not to situate the work in the world, and specifically the thought, of the author, seems 
to me to be a mistake'. 
2 Bradley (2001: 60) extends this arrangement to have three Xenophons, so speaking of 
'the author Xenophon, the extradiegetic historical actor Xenophon, the character called 
Xenophon in the text, and the anonymous narrator created to mediate this relationship'. 
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standard work of history; military handbook; military memoir; military theory; 
autobiography; novelesque autobiography; political philosophy; philosophical self-
discovery; study of social organisation and action; and story of trust and deceit.3 
Notably the ancient reception of the text was less complex, with writers generally 
taking it as a narrative of the events on the march (see Arrian, Periplus passim; 
Aelian, De Natura Animalium 6.25; Diodoros 14.19-31, 37; Diogenes Laertios 2.50; 
and Strabo 8.7.5). On the other hand, those coming to the book from a more 
literary perspective showed awareness of still waters: Lucian berates Xenophon for 
omitting a preface (De historia conscribenda 39), while Plutarch, owing to the fact 
that Xenophon attributes the work to another, saw a personal agenda behind the 
text (De gloria Atheniensium 345e).4 
 
The argument of this dissertation is that the pre-eminent concern in Anabasis is 
apologia. In a variety of different ways, through the course of the text, Xenophon is 
defending himself and his teacher, Socrates, and to a less comprehensive degree, 
                                            
3 A response to other accounts of the expedition, Tarn 1927, Breitenbach 1967, Cawkwell 
1972 (restated 2004); work of personal apologetics, Erbse 2010, Anderson 1974, Azoulay 
2004, Gray 2008; polemic against other generals, Calvino 1999; didactic work on 
leadership and military practice, Tuplin 1991; eyewitness campaign narrative, Gwynn 
1929, Waterfield 2006; guidebook, Bell 1924; travelogue, Adams 2007; traveller's memoir, 
Roy 2007; literary travel, Higgins 1977; reflective autobiographical travelogue, Cartledge 
2002: 59; a historical work built around the characters of individuals, and with a 
panhellenic orientation, Dillery 1995; irregular work of history, Lendle 1995; military 
handbook, Boucher 1913; military memoir (at least in formal terms this designation is 
problematic as Xenophon attributes authorship to another), Westlake 1987, Gera 1993, 
Pomeroy 1994, Luce 1997, LaForse 2005, Lee 2007, Macleod 2008; military theory, 
Spaulding 1937; strongly autobiographical, Momigliano 1990, Humble 1997, Thomas 
2009; novelesque autobiography, Bradley 2001 (or more specifically, a shift from history to 
this form, which he defines as 'a prose narrative that exhibits narrative structures and 
characteristics typical of the novel in presenting the author as a fictively wrought character 
at the centre of recent historical events'); political philosophy, Ambler 2008, Buzzetti 2008; 
a story of philosophical self-discovery interwoven with a military adventure, Howland 2000; 
study of social organisation and action, Nussbaum 1967; story of trust and deceit, Hirsch 
1985. Rood (2006: 48) writes that 'historiography is the genre with which the experimental 
Anabasis has the greatest affinity'; see Marincola 1997 on the development of 
historiographical genres and the difficulty of fitting Anabasis into a category. Cartledge 
(1987: 67) holds that Xenophon was not 'a historian in the proper sense'. With the 
exception of Kyroupaideia, the genre assignment of Xenophon's other works present fewer 
challenges to modern scholars (see Gera 1993: 1-13 for a discussion of the problems of 
describing Kyroupaideia). The number of explanations for Anabasis makes an evaluation 
of each here impractical, though many of them are engaged with in the course of the 
dissertation. 
4 For analyses of Xenophon's writings in the Second Sophistic see Rutherford 1998. 
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the hippeis, the elite cavalry institution at Athens to which he had been affiliated. 
While the presence of apologia in the work has long been widely recognised by 
modern scholars, the extent to which it informs the structure of the narrative and 
determines its content has not been fully appreciated. In the first edition of the 
CAH, W. Tarn articulated the prevailing, and still current, view thus: 'Sophainetos 
wrote the first story of the expedition, and Xenophon probably wrote his own 
account, the Anabasis, largely because he thought Sophainetos had overlooked 
his merits'.5 This hypothesis, however, covers only one apologetic element, and, 
moreover, the dissertation demonstrates that it is based on a tenuous premise: the 
evidence for an Anabasis by Sophainetos is slight, and later published versions of 
the expedition are traceable to Xenophon's. The departure point of this study is 
that Xenophon's motivations for writing are better sought for in the evidence of the 
text itself. A close reading of Anabasis exposes a number of lengthy speeches by 
the author answering specific charges — of deceiving the soldiers, hubris, and 
corruption — and reveals evidence of a concerted attempt to address matters 
related to his involvement in the expedition: service as a mercenary, service with 
Cyrus the Younger, and intimate association with Sparta. These issues, as we 
learn from Xenophon himself late in the text, are set against the background of his 
exile from Athens, and it is argued that it is this very public stain on his character 
which is the prime driver of his personal apologia. 
 
Analysis of the text reveals furthermore that as a part of his own defence 
Xenophon defends an aristocratic institution, the hippeis, whose reputation had 
declined severely following its role in the brief reign of the Thirty at Athens in 
404/403. Xenophon himself was a hippeus and, judging from the apologetic 
character of his account of the Thirty in Hellenika, is likely to have had some active 
involvement in their rule. Poignantly, as he led the Cyreans into the Spartan 
campaign in Asia in 399, Xenophon would have met up with the force of 300 
horsemen sent out to Thibron by the democracy that year. In Hellenika he writes: 
'The Athenians sent those who had served in the cavalry under the Thirty, for they 
                                            
5 Tarn 1927: 5. In recent time the flag for the Sophainetos hypothesis has been held most 
staunchly by George Cawkwell (1972, 2004). 
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thought that it would be advantageous to the people (τῷ δήμῳ) if these men went 
abroad and died there' (3.1.4). 
 
One of the key research outcomes of this study is the presentation of evidence for 
Anabasis as a defence of Socrates. By representing his own character in the story 
as a model pupil of Socrates, Xenophon defends the Athenian philosopher against 
the charges brought against him in 399 and at the same time highlights the worth 
of his education to the city. The case for Anabasis being a Socratic work receives 
support from the fact that several of Xenophon's other books are devoted to 
defending the memory of his teacher, and others still, such as Kyroupaideia, have 
been shown to bear distinctive imprints of the philosopher's influence. 
 
The apologia thesis does not negate the importance of other themes and concerns 
in the work, although it is argued that a number of these, in one way or another, 
serve the underlying apologetic agenda. For example the problem of leading in a 
military context is unquestionably a major preoccupation in the work: in the 
dissertation it is maintained that three leadership styles are presented in 
succession, with the most effective being that which Xenophon himself practises. 
Although his outward intentions in this arrangement are to offer guidance on the 
comparative efficacy of different leadership approaches on the one hand, and to 
defend Socrates by highlighting the value of his training on the other, the 
outstanding performance of the model student of the philosopher also reflects on 
the historical figure behind the exemplar. 
 
The dissertation is structured around four chapters. The first, with the aim of 
establishing a context for his later literary career, focuses on Xenophon's personal 
background and the circumstances of his early adult life. His tendency towards 
apologia is flagged by an analysis of his account of the reign of the Thirty at Athens 
in Hellenika. Xenophon is likely to have been active on the non-democratic side 
and it is argued that he uses his history to exonerate his youthful self from serious 
wrongdoing. An incidence of intertextuality between the historical work and 
Anabasis is remarked upon, with the latter, set after the restoration of the 
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democracy, at pains to emphasise both Xenophon's immaturity (3.1.6) and his 
youthfulness (3.1.25). In similar apologetic vein, in his treatment of the Thirty in 
Hellenika, Xenophon takes the opportunity to call attention to the courage of 
Socrates in the face of pressures from the tyrants. The chapter concludes with an 
examination of evidence for the dating of Anabasis. The aim of this section is to 
mark a window of time for authorship, so enabling the text to be situated in a 
personal and historical context. 
 
Addressing the question of Xenophon's writing motivations, the second chapter 
builds up a picture of his agenda in Anabasis. Part 1 highlights the agenda's 
didactic leaning by looking at the extensive use of exemplars, a key feature in the 
literary construction of Anabasis and of other of his works. Part 2 focuses on one of 
the author's major interests — the problem of how to lead a military force. It is 
demonstrated that in addition to a range of instructional episodes, Xenophon 
presents three different leadership styles, and leads his reader to conclude that the 
one which he represents is the optimal. It is shown that Xenophon is particularly 
interested, and insightful, in the matter of managing mercenaries, a subject topical 
through much of the fourth century. The examination of his treatment of leadership 
brings out the strong didactic flavour in the work and at the same time 
demonstrates that it serves the author's encompassing apologetic aims. 
 
The third chapter turns to look in detail at Xenophon's defence of himself. Having in 
Part 1 re-evaluated the traditional apologetic hypothesis — that Xenophon wrote 
his account in response to another, Part 2 traces accusations made against him in 
the text and his responses to these. In Part 3 it is shown how Xenophon distances 
himself from both Cyrus the Younger and the Spartan state, and the argument is 
made that his purpose in so doing is to demonstrate that there is no basis for 
questioning his polis loyalty on these grounds. In the same part his defence of the 
hippeis, a prominent institution of his social class, is highlighted. The analysis of 
this chapter brings out the extent to which personal apologia — to include his 
hippeis defence — pervades and shapes the text. 
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In the final chapter it is argued that in Anabasis, as he is in what are widely 
regarded as his Socratic works — Memorabilia, Apologia, Symposion, and 
Oikonomikos — Xenophon is defending the memory of Socrates. The introduction 
of Socrates into the narrative in a flashback which forms part of the introduction of 
Xenophon's character signals to the reader the start of a special relationship; in the 
course of the journey this is revealed as being between a teacher whose presence 
is not tangible but felt, and an outstanding pupil putting his learning into practice. 
The significant degree to which the pupil's fate, and indeed that of the army as a 
whole, depends on this relationship is reflected by the dire circumstances in which 
the scene is set. Now adrift in Asia, and without possibility of further firsthand 
guidance, the pupil faces the ultimate test of his learning. Xenophon the character 
duly exemplifies key (Xenophontic) Socratic virtues in his execution of leadership 
responsibility; and in doing so, by underlining his own piety, he rebuts the charge of 
impiety against Socrates, while the fact of his young age answers the second 
charge of corrupting the youth. Xenophon's success in bringing the army out of 
Asia testifies above all, in an eloquent and original way, to the quality of the training 
he has received from Socrates. 
 
Each chapter contains a detailed final conclusions section and the dissertation is 
completed by a summary set of conclusions. The principal ones are that 
Xenophon's Anabasis realises an extensive apologetic agenda which is centred on 
himself, but with substantial attempts as well to defend the memory of Socrates 
and the reputation of the hippeis. This writing motivation is the prime shaper of the 
narrative and ultimately accounts for the major part of its contents; for instance a 
strong didactic element in the work — on the familiar Xenophontic theme of 
leadership — is regarded as serving the apologetic theme. 
 
* 
 
This study is part of a wider revival of interest in Xenophon and his writing which 
has been ongoing for the past three to four decades. The seminal work of William 
Higgins, Xenophon the Athenian, published in 1977, can be identified as a catalyst 
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for initiating reappraisal, as can the important contribution of Hartmut Erbse, 
'Xenophon's Anabasis', in 1966. Reflecting on the dramatic decline in Xenophon's 
reputation in the modern era, Erbse identified the eminent 19th century historian, 
Barthold Niebuhr, as instrumental in setting aside the high reputation which 
Xenophon had enjoyed for most of the preceding two millennia. According to 
Erbse, Niebuhr sought to establish a more scientific, less amateur, image of the 
author, and his influence was notable. Erbse excerpts Niebuhr's somewhat 
emotional assessment of his subject: 'Truly no state has ever expelled a more 
degenerate son than this Xenophon. Plato too was not a good citizen; he was not 
worthy of Athens, he has taken incomprehensible steps and stands like a sinner 
against the saints, Thucydides and Demosthenes, but yet how altogether 
differently from this old fool!'6 
 
The nineteenth-century decline continued well into the twentieth. Eminent, and less 
well-known, authorities continued to highlight faults in Xenophon's writings and 
person. In his History of Western Philosophy (1946), Bertrand Russell described 
him as a man 'not very liberally endowed with brains, and on the whole 
conventional in his outlook'. As recently as 1987, in his monumental Agesilaos, 
Paul Cartledge summed up his judgement of the man: 'All that can and should, I 
think, be salvaged from the case for Xenophon the thinker is a handful of banal 
platitudes which sort only too well with the kind of plain man's guide to Socratic 
thinking that he provides in the Memorabilia'. But generally, across a broad range 
of scholarship, negativity has been replaced with a more sympathetic and balanced 
assessment of his intellectual achievements and abilities. In the introduction to his 
paper on 'Xenophon and Socrates' at the first Liverpool Xenophon conference in 
1999 (proceedings 2004), Robin Waterfield, I think, touched on the core of the 
writer and his unflattering modern reception: 'He [Xenophon] is a quieter writer than 
Plato, if I may put it that way, and so it is easier to miss the fact that a great deal of 
thought has gone into what he says, that he has and pursues his own agenda, and 
                                            
6 Niebuhr 1828: 467, cited in Erbse 2010: 500. On Niebuhr's article and its reception see 
further Tuplin 1993: 13 and Kelly 1996: 157-158. 
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that much of that thinking has arguably been coloured by his conception of 
Socrates'. 
 
The level of general and scholarly interest in Anabasis allow it a fair claim to be in 
the vanguard of Xenophon's rehabilitation. Its current popularity in the Western 
world is testified to by the fact that there are five English-language translations in 
print (with a further two forthcoming), a Hollywood screenplay in progress, and 
numerous recent books on the subject. Internet interest is also vibrant, with 
networking sites featuring pages, and bloggers offering opinions and reviews. One 
recent satisfied reader records on his weblog: 'I've got very little to add to what's 
here [Wikipedia]. Xenophon sounds like a bad ass. One thing I'm always struck by 
when reading old books is how much less masculine modern men are. The book is 
great on leadership as well.' I feel Xenophon would have been quietly pleased with 
this 21st-century endorsement, and with the apparent banishment of Niebuhr's 
ghost.7 
 
In coming to a more informed understanding of Xenophon's thought and literary 
output, a clearer picture of the times in which he lived emerges. Areas in which our 
                                            
7 Translations. The March Up Country, W.H.D. Rouse, 1947, in Ann Arbor paperbacks 
since 1964; The Persian Expedition, Rex Warner, 1949, Penguin; Xenophon: Anabasis, 
John Dillery, 1998, Loeb (revised edition); The Expedition of Cyrus, Robin Waterfield, 
2005, Oxford World's Classics; The Anabasis of Cyrus, Wayne Ambler, 2008, Cornell. 
Forthcoming: a new Penguin edition from Christopher Tuplin, and a Landmark (Pantheon 
Books) translation from David Thomas (due 2014). See Appendix II for a full list of editions 
and translations. 
Hollywood. Robert Schenkkan has been commissioned by Sony Pictures to write a 
screenplay of Xenophon's Anabasis. 
Recent books. The Ten Thousand (Historical novel), Michael Curtis Ford, 2001, London; 
Xenophon's March (History and travel), John Prevas, 2002, Cambridge, Mass.; The Long 
March (Academic), Robin Lane Fox (ed.), 2004, New Haven; The Sea! The Sea! 
(Academic), Tim Rood, 2004b, London; In the Tracks of the Ten Thousand (Travel), 
Shane Brennan, 2005, London; Xenophon's Retreat (History and travel), Robin Waterfield, 
2006, London; A Greek Army on the March (Academic), John Lee, 2007, Cambridge; The 
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knowledge is increased include: the development of prose writing, and the context 
for literary production in the first half of the fourth century; the role and influence of 
Persia in Greek affairs; rivalry between Athens and Sparta; and the impact of 
Socrates' legacy in the decades immediately following his death. Detailed analysis 
of Anabasis in particular yields important evidence for the emerging significance of 
mercenary soldiers in the Greek world and shines a revealing spotlight on the early 
stages of Spartan hegemony in the same sphere. Finally, in bringing out the 
extraordinary inventiveness and subtlety of this work, it is implied that not only 
does its author deserve continued and still more careful attention, but other writers 
too of the same epoch need to be read with marked alertness and openness of 
mind. 
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Xenophon and a History of His Times 
 
 
 
 
 
What enchanted me most about Xenophon's personality and 
makes me feel him as a contemporary of ours are his 
contradictions, his solitariness. 
 Takis Theodoropoulos, The Novel of Xenophon 
 
 
Xenophon was the son of Gryllos, an Athenian who owned land in Spata in the 
east of Attica, the present-day location of the city's international airport. The 
year of his birth is not known, nor is there reliable information on when, or 
where, he died. For the more than seventy years that he may have lived, there 
are few solid biographical details, and most of these derive from his own works. 
But if his own life is sparsely documented, knowledge of Classical Athenian life 
is comparatively rich, and by examining aspects of the social, economic, and 
political history of the city, this chapter conveys a sense of the world in which he 
lived, and which defined who he was and became. Supplementing this by sifting 
the autobiographical content of his writings, and what survives from the ancient 
biographical tradition, the chapter builds up a picture of Xenophon's life with the 
overall aim of establishing a context for the dominant themes and concerns that 
arise in his writings. As with other portraits of this author, the picture of him that 
emerges is to a large degree subjective, and the conjectures arising from it here 
are accordingly qualified. 
 
The main focus in this treatment is on Xenophon's early years in Attica, and in 
particular on widening the perspective on the circumstances of his departure 
from the polis in 401. His relationship with Socrates and with the Thirty Tyrants 
is explored, as is the important question of his exile. In varying degrees each of 
these subjects is returned to in later chapters. 
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A remarkable feature of Xenophon's Anabasis is that it was almost certainly 
written at a considerable remove in time from the events it describes. The 
question as to why he chose to write his account after such a lapse imposes 
itself.1 To approach an answer to this important Xenophontic question, in the 
final section of the chapter an attempt is made to mark a window of time for 
authorship, so enabling the text to be situated in a circumscribed personal and 
historical context. A tentative dating to the years following the King's Peace 
(387/6) connects elements in the work, such as Spartan hegemony and 
panhellenism, with pressing issues of the period, although a conclusion is that 
these are not paramount concerns in the author's agenda. 
 
 
1. BACKGROUND 
 
1.1. Sources for Xenophon's life 
 
Xenophon was the author of fourteen complete works, a number of which 
furnish evidence for his life.2 In some cases the detail seems transparently 
autobiographical, while in others, although not signposted as such, reasonable 
arguments can be made that he is referring to personal experience. However, it 
                                            
1 The question is formulated in the following terms by two of Xenophon's keenest 
analysts. Delebecque (1947: 43): 'Il est vrai que les intentions de notre auteur ne sont 
pas toujours apparentes. Pourquoi et pour qui écrit-il l'Anabase? Est-ce pour le plaisir 
de rédiger des souvenirs personnels ou avec le souci de tirer de son expérience un 
enseignement pour autrui, pour ses compatriotes, pour ses fils? Cherche-t-il à se faire 
lire d'un public lacédémonien, ou athénien, ou simplement grec? Se met-il à la tâche 
pour charmer le lecteur par un récit d'aventures ou pour célébrer les soldats hellènes 
habiles à se tirer des griffes barbares? Songe-t-il à répandre des idées socratiques ou 
à faire oeuvre de propagande en faveur de Lacédémone? Ou bien Xénophon veut-il 
glorifier Xénophon?' 
Erbse (2010: 477): 'One might well think that the solution to this straightforward 
problem ("What was Xenophon attempting to achieve through his composition of the 
Anabasis?") must have been found long ago, at least before it was thought to hand out 
a grade to the author. But as so often happens…judgement was quickly passed before 
a justified reason for the judgement had been found. In fact research has dodged the 
question of the point of the work; where it has felt itself compelled to give an answer, 
opinion has been divided'. 
2 A Constitution of the Athenians was also attributed to Xenophon in antiquity, but the 
work, though it is alleged to express his sentiments, is by dint of its early dating almost 
certainly not his. Most commentators believe it was written before 411, and probably 
during the Archidamian War (431-421). For a thorough recent treatment of issues 
surrounding the text see Marr and Rhodes 2008. It is possible that Xenophon wrote 
other works of which there is no surviving record. 
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may not always be the case that the detail so provided can be taken at face 
value. As is shown in the course of the dissertation, Xenophon's self-
representation is invariably affected by his purpose(s) in writing and is not 
primarily intended to be autobiographical. This is particularly apparent in 
Anabasis, his account of Cyrus the Younger's march up-country in 401 and the 
subsequent retreat homeward of his Greek mercenaries; while many regard this 
as the most important source for his life, it is argued here that the Xenophon we 
see in the text is an exemplary figure, a young Athenian and a pupil of Socrates 
who applies the lessons of his teacher to the extreme situation in which he has 
found himself.3 The question of the historical veracity of his self-representation 
is sharpened by his notable absence in other putative accounts of the 
expedition,4 and by the fact that he attributes authorship of the work to another.5 
 
The only surviving biography of Xenophon from antiquity is that written by 
Diogenes Laertios in the third century AD (Lives of the Philosophers 2.48-59). 
Diogenes seems to have derived his material from a variety of sources (he 
names ten in the biography and alludes to several others), though not all of 
these are regarded as reliable, and neither is Diogenes himself.6 Badian, in a 
thorough critique of this Life, uses the date he gives for Xenophon's death to 
illustrate the problem.7 Citing a Ktesikleides, Diogenes (2.56) states that 
Xenophon died in 360/59, 'the year in which Phillip, the son of Amyntas, came 
to the throne of Macedon'. While Ktesikleides is accurate on the year that Phillip 
                                            
3 Anabasis as an important source for Xenophon's life: Due 1989: 203; Momigliano 
1990: 45; Gera 1993: 6; Humble 1997: 3, 46 and 2002: 69, 76; Dillery 1998: 3; Nails 
2002: 301; Rood 2005: xiii-xiv and 2006: 48; Roy 2007: 66; Macleod 2008: 7; Gray 
2010a: 6. 
4 In the Diodoros/Ephoros version of the march Xenophon is only referred to once, this 
in Thrace at the end of the journey (14.37.1-4). For discussion see Chapter 3.1. 
5 At Hell. 3.1.2 Xenophon writes that the story of Cyrus's campaign was told by 
Themistogenes of Syracuse, a figure otherwise unknown except for a short entry in the 
Souda. See further Chapter 3.1.2. 
6 See Pomeroy 1994: 1; Humble 2002: 69. The latter argues that Diogenes makes use 
of 'recognisable biographical topoi which often contain patently false information'. Of 
the writers Diogenes uses, one in particular, Dinarkhos, deserves notice for being a 
source that may not ultimately derive from Xenophon himself. Dinarkhos wrote a 
speech for a freedman against (probably) the grandson of Xenophon, and in this it is 
believed, as was the custom in Attic oratory, a potted history of the family was 
provided. Diogenes (2.52) cites Dinarkhos as his source for the names of Xenophon's 
sons – Gryllos and Diodoros – and his statement that the Spartans provided him with a 
house and land. Lipka (2002: 3) speculates that Dinarkhos was personally acquainted 
with Xenophon. 
7 Badian 2004: 33-34. 
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II became ruler, he had evidently not surveyed important literature of the period: 
Diodoros/Ephoros associated Phillip's rise with the death of Alexander of 
Pherai, and Xenophon writes in Hellenika (6.4.37) that he was working on his 
excursus on Thessaly when Tisiphonos, Alexander's successor, was in power. 
Diogenes is not aware of any discrepancy and apparently does not have any 
system in place to check the information from his sources. 
 
While Diogenes, whose interest was philosophers, will doubtless have read 
Xenophon's Socratic works, as indicated above, he does not seem to have 
studied his subject's historically-orientated writings. Furthermore, there is some 
evidence that he may have adapted passages in the oeuvre for his biography. 
Anderson marks two such instances, the first relating to Xenophon's famous 
first encounter with Socrates (Lives 2.48), which he speculates may have come 
from Memorabilia 4.4.5;8 the second is where Diogenes (2.48-9) talks of 
Xenophon's fondness for a Klinias: he cites a profession of love by Xenophon 
that he attributes to a work of Aristippos, but in fact the quote is from 
Xenophon's Symposion (4.12) and the speaker is Kritoboulus.9 A degree of 
caution is therefore required when using Diogenes. 
 
1.2. Family 
 
Xenophon's father's name is given as Gryllos the Athenian by Diogenes (2.48). 
He writes that he belonged to the deme of Erkhia, which was an agricultural 
district some 20 kilometres from the city.10 Xenophon provides virtually no 
                                            
8 Anderson 1974: 9. Another possible framing source for this meeting is Oik. 2.16-18, 
where Socrates declares his interest in 'learning who in the city are most 
knowledgeable about each occupation'. Waterfield thinks that the incident was part of 
an anecdotal tradition, 'consonant with conversion stories throughout the ages' (2006: 
45). 
9 Anderson 1974: 30. Humble (2004a: 233) uses this example to show how 'invented 
facts could make their way into the biographical tradition'. The case is a clear example 
of the biographer failing to read his subject, the Symposion being a work one would 
have expected Diogenes to be familiar with. See Brunt 1980 for a treatment of the 
transmission by ancient authors of earlier writers. 
10 See Vanderpool (1965: 21-6) for details of Erkhia's location. According to Stronk 
(1995: 3) neither Gryllos nor his son figure on the lists of officials functioning in this 
deme. Interestingly, Isokrates was also from Erkhia, and his father, a landowner, is 
named by Plutarch as a khoregos (Moralia 836e). But see further note 13 below. 
Depending on one's view about whether Iskhomakhos in Oikonomikos is a version of 
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information about his parents, though the fact that he named one of his sons 
Gryllos seems to provide support for Diogenes' statement.11 Anderson 
considers that there is no evidence that Xenophon had brothers or sisters.12 
One of the pieces of information that Xenophon does provide about his family 
comes in Anabasis, and concerns a religious practice of his father. 'On the next 
day, going to Ophrynion, Xenophon sacrificed and burnt whole piglets, 
according to his father's custom' (ηῇ δὲ ὑζηεξαίᾳ Ξελνθ῵λ πξνζειζὼλ εἰο 
὆θξύληνλ ἐζύεην θαὶ ὡινθαύηεη ρνίξνπο ηῶ παηξίῳ λόκῳ, 7.8.5). While it is not 
possible to infer the extent, and bearing in mind that patrioi nomoi could also 
mean 'Athenian custom', the information could indicate that Xenophon grew up 
in a religiously observant oikos. 
 
Xenophon's writings, in particular Peri Hippikes, Hipparkhikos, and Anabasis, 
suggest that he was an experienced cavalryman and something of an authority 
on equine matters. From his own evidence it seems reasonable to infer that his 
family owned an estate, and that he served in the Athenian cavalry, a rite of 
passage for many young aristocrats.13 That membership of the hippeis was 
necessarily confined to the class of well-off landowners becomes clear from a 
consideration of the costs involved. According to Spence's study of cavalry, a 
mount in the fourth century would have cost a minimum of 100 drachmas, with 
most paying in the order of 500.14 'The minimum was equivalent to ten months' 
wages for a skilled craftsman (or over two years' fairly generous wheat ration for 
an adult male) while the average would have bought nearly twenty months' 
                                                                                                                                
Xenophon, the former's statement at 20.22-24 could suggest that Xenophon's father 
was an agricultural property developer. 
11 The norm in Classical Athens was for a son to be named after the grandfather, 
though it was not unknown for a son to be given the father's name (cf. Golden 1990: 
25, and Pomeroy 1994: 267). In Dinarkhos' speech Against Xenophon (note 6 above) 
the defendant is thought to be the author's grandson. 
12 Anderson 1974: 14. 
13 While there is no mention of the family in Davies' propertied class, the Register, as 
the author is at pains to point out, is 'not to be taken as adequately representing this 
class, let alone as anything even remotely approaching a complete roster of upper-
class Athenians' (1971: xxx). Xenophon (no. 192) and his sons, Diodoros (no. 55) and 
Gryllos (no. 72), are included in Spence's prosopography of Athenian Hippeis (1993). 
On horse ownership as a sign of wealth see Xenophon P.H. 2.1, Thucydides 6.15.3, 
Isokrates 16.33, Lysias 24.11-12, Aristotle, Politics 1289b34-36. 
14 Spence 1993: 183. Evidence from the late fifth century indicates that, at the high 
end, sums in excess of 1000 drachmas were paid. Cf. An. 7.8.6; Aristophanes, Clouds 
21-3, 1224-5. 
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wheat supply for a family of six'.15 Running costs were similarly high. In addition 
to the need to have slaves to groom and exercise them, if they were to be in 
good condition the horses needed to be fed on grain, a produce never in ready 
supply in Attica. Other costs included riding tackle, veterinary expenses, and, 
where necessary, the leasing of grazing pasture. In the case of the cavalry — 
which the landowning citizens were required to form — the state, at least from 
the middle of the fifth century, did provide subsidies: a sitos payment for part of 
the year, and a katastasis, a loan towards the purchase cost of the horse 
repayable on the cavalryman's retirement.16 But this support seems to have 
defrayed only a small part of the costs. As Spence writes: 'membership of the 
equestrian milieu was an expensive pastime which few citizens could afford'.17 
 
There is other evidence pointing to Xenophon's aristocratic status. In Anabasis 
(3.1.4) he informs us that he was a long-standing μέλνο of Proxenos of Boiotia; 
guest-friendship was, by and large, an aristocratic institution, and at the least 
the relationship suggests his family was well-connected.18 Then there are 
Xenophon's writings, a number of which are didactic in style and tone. In his 
works he sometimes portrays oligarchic Sparta in a favourable light, and he 
shows, for example, the characteristic aristocratic disdain for sedentary labour 
(see Oik. 4.2-3, 6.5).19 
 
1.3. Age 
 
Diogenes (2.55) writes that Xenophon 'flourished in the fourth year of the 
ninety-fourth Olympiad [401/0], and he took part in the expedition of Cyrus in 
the archonship of Xenainetos in the year before the death of Socrates' (ἤθκαδε 
δὲ θαηὰ ηὸ ηέηαξηνλ ἔηνο ηῆο ηεηάξηεο θαὶ ἐλελεθνζηῆο ὆ιπκπηάδνο, θαὶ 
ἀλαβέβεθε ζὺλ Κύξῳ ἐπὶ ἄξρνληνο Ξελαηλέηνπ ἑλὶ πξόηεξνλ ἔηεη ηῆο 
                                            
15 Spence 1993: 183. 
16 See ibid. 279-80. 
17 Ibid. 272. See also Anderson's monograph (1961) on ancient Greek horsemanship. 
18 Badian (2004: 39) speculates that the relationship was an inherited one, a view 
which Xenophon's usage of ἀξραῖνο in the context – he would probably still have been 
in his 20s – supports. On Xenophon and guest-friendship see further Chapter 3.2.3. 
19 Gray (2010a: 10), envisaging Xenophon maintained in 'Socratic idleness' by his 
family, comments that 'it would be exceptional to find any writer of humble origins in the 
ancient world'. 
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Σσθξάηνπο ηειεπηῆο). While references to the high-point of a subject's life often 
imply the fortieth year (the second century chronographer Apollodoros, for 
instance, uses such a scheme), in this case, on account of the next clause 
stating that Xenophon marched with Cyrus, it is considered that it is his most 
famous exploit which is being referred to as his acme.20 On the basis of a 
reference to the age of Proxenos at 2.6.20 (see below), several writers have 
placed Xenophon's birth in the early 420s, which would make him just under 
thirty when he joined Cyrus in 401.21 
 
While Xenophon makes no direct reference to his age in his writings, at several 
places in Anabasis he does touch on the matter. At 3.1.14, after the Greeks 
have been shorn of several senior commanders by Tissaphernes on the banks 
of the Greater Zab River, he awakens from a fitful dream and poses himself a 
series of questions about his fate and that of the army: 
 
As for defending ourselves, no one is making preparations or 
showing any care; rather, we are lying here as if it were 
possible to stay at peace. From what city do I expect a general 
who will carry out these measures? And as for myself, what age 
am I waiting for? (3.1.14). 
 
When he subsequently addresses the captains of Proxenos, he tells them that 
'if you assign me to lead, I will not cite my young age as an excuse' (εἰ δ' ὑκεῖο 
ηάηηεη' ἐκὲ ἡγεῖζζαη, νὐδὲλ πξνθαζίδνκαη ηὴλ ἡιηθίαλ, 3.1.25). Greek states 
frequently laid down minimum ages for various offices; at Athens, for a 
strategos or other high-ranking military official it was thirty, so it does seem 
reasonable to put Xenophon under that age at this time.22 Supporting this is the 
fact that Proxenos, who was a guest-friend of Xenophon's, was around thirty at 
                                            
20 Cf. Anderson 1974: 9, Pomeroy 1994: 2. 
21 Breitenbach 1967: 1571; Cawkwell 1972: 143, n.2; Anderson 1974: 9-10. 
22 Minimum ages. See Dover 1965: 50 (on Thucydides 6.36.5), Rhodes 1981: 510. In 
his writings Xenophon does touch on his concept of age. At Mem. 1.2.35 he has 
Socrates ask Charikles about the age limit 'below which a man is to be accounted 
young', to which he is told, 'under thirty'. While this is in line with what seems to be a 
generally held view of age, in Agesilaos Xenophon writes that the Spartan king, who 
was 40 when he came to power in 398, was 'still a young man when he gained the 
throne' (1.6). 
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the time of his seizure by Tissaphernes (2.6.20). However, as Badian remarks, 
offering the example of Alkibiades and Pharnabazos, 'there is no reason why 
xenoi must be of the same age'.23 
 
At the conclusion of his Xenophon, Diogenes (2.59) writes that he has 'found it 
stated in some places that [Xenophon] flourished in the eighty-ninth Olympiad 
[424-20], at the same time as the rest of the disciples of Socrates'. The origin of 
this is probably the story passed down through Strabo (9.2.7), repeated by 
Diogenes in his Socrates (2.22), of how Socrates saved Xenophon's life at the 
Battle of Delion in 424. However, placing Xenophon's birth in the 460s would 
put him into his 100s when he wrote his final work. Badian dismisses the idea, 
and thinks Diogenes did too by virtue of his placing of the information at the end 
of the biography, almost as a 'footnote'.24 Nonetheless there are reasons why 
this possibility cannot be completely discounted. Isokrates, who was born in the 
same deme in the 430s, lived to be almost a hundred, and was writing into his 
eighties.25 Then there is the fact that putting Xenophon's birth back to the 460s 
would permit him to be the author of the Ps.-Xenophon tract, dated most 
recently to 423/4.26 As to the objection of 3.1.25 above, an argument of the 
dissertation is that Xenophon in Anabasis is an exemplary figure, and a part of 
his literary persona is the youth he emphasises in the work. So a centenarian 
Xenophon born in the middle of the fifth century is not out of the question, 
though the evidence for this is not compelling.27 
 
1.4. Youth 
 
If Xenophon's birth is placed in the early 420s, as the weight of evidence 
indicates, it was into interesting and dangerous times that he was born. With the 
                                            
23 Badian 2004: 39. 
24 Ibid. 36. But the same writer systematically undermines the credibility of Diogenes. 
25 'With these thoughts in mind I set myself to write this discourse — I who am no 
longer in the prime of youth but in my eighty-second year' (Ταῦηα δὲ δηαλνεζεὶο 
ἔγξαθνλ ηὸλ ιόγνλ ηνῦηνλ, νὐθ ἀθκάδσλ, ἀιι' ἔηε γεγνλὼο δύν θαὶ ὀγδνήθνληα), 
Isokrates, Antidosis 9. 
26 See Marr and Rhodes 2008. 
27 Dillery (1998: 4) argues that 7.2.38 furnishes evidence for an older Xenophon: 'For 
Seuthes to imagine that Xenophon had a daughter of roughly marriageable age (which, 
of course, could be as early as twelve or thirteen), he could not have been quite as 
young as 3.1.25 implies.' But Seuthes is surely imagining a future scenario - θαὶ εἴ ηηο 
ζνὶ ἔζηη ζπγάηεξ - rather than a present one. Cf. 7.6.34. 
31 
 
outbreak of the Peloponnesian War in 431, Attica was subjected to annual raids 
by Sparta, the aim of which was to disrupt the supply of food into Athens. As 
landowners, Xenophon's family would have suffered directly, and what wealth 
they had stored (in whatever form) must have gradually been depleted as one 
prospective harvest after another was destroyed.28 Attendant on this disruption 
would have been seasonal dislocation, the oikos moving into the city at least for 
the duration of the raiding season. On account of the war Anderson contends 
that Xenophon was in fact raised in Athens,29 though the intimate knowledge of 
the countryside which he shows in several of his works (notably Oikonomikos, 
Kynegetikos, and the opening chapters of Poroi) would seem to point to a 
substantial experience of rural life. In any case, from 425, following the capture 
of several hundred Spartans at Sphakteria, the countryside was safe from 
attack. 
 
The sons of wealthy fifth-century Athenians were educated in private schools, 
where they were taught literacy, arithmetic, music, and physical education.30 
Plato (Protagoras 325e-326a) paints a picture of the literary classroom: 
 
The children, when they have learnt their letters and are getting 
to understand the written word as before they did only the 
spoken, are furnished with works of good poets to read as they 
sit in class, and are made to learn them off by heart: here they 
meet with many admonitions, many descriptions and praises 
and eulogies of good men in times past, that the boy in envy 
may imitate them and yearn to become even as they. 
 
                                            
28 Gryllos may have had a stake in the silver mines at Laureion (see Anderson 1974: 
10), but as Xenophon himself implies in Poroi (4.25), income from this resource 
dwindled following the Spartan seizure of Dekeleia (in 413. Dekeleia was situated in 
the north of Attica and was visible from the city: see Thucydides 7.19.2, and Hell. 
1.1.35). Waterfield (2006: 38-9) speculates that Gryllos had interests in colonies 
abroad, though again, as he acknowledges, revenues from these would have dried up 
as the Athenian empire disintegrated. Yet as Xenophon's departure from Athens in 401 
with at least one horse shows, the family did not become impoverished. See further 
note 83 below. 
29 Anderson 1974: 10, 18. 
30 Cartledge (1987: 57) considers that the education would have been 'decidedly 
athletic'. On the subject see further B. Strauss 1993. 
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In their music classes the boys learned how to sing and often how to play one 
or more instruments, the aulos, and the lyre, for instance. Music was an integral 
part of Athenian life, featuring in the major festivals and in performances of 
plays, so ability in the art was a cultural asset for the state and the individual 
alike.31 As a child Xenophon may have participated in processions or choirs; in 
later life he certainly shows an appreciation for dance (see An. 6.1.5-13), and a 
flair for choreography is evident in his advice to cavalry commanders on public 
displays (see Hipp. 3.10-12). 
 
Physical education, likewise, brought benefits to both the individual and his 
polis. In a world where war was more common than peace, an army needed 
soldiers who were in the habit of training and knowledgeable about combat 
techniques. Pursuits taught to the boys in the gymnasion included running, the 
long-jump, discus and javelin, boxing, and wrestling. There is reason to believe 
that Xenophon acquitted himself well in this sphere for in his prime he 
represents himself as hardy (for example, in freezing winter conditions, rising at 
dawn without his cloak to chop wood, An. 4.8.12), and fit (racing up a hillside 
fully accoutred, An. 3.4.47-49). In his writings Xenophon stresses the 
importance of physical fitness and preparedness for an army (cf. Kyn. 13.11, 
Kyro. 8.1.34-35). 
 
In addition to this formal education, Xenophon would have learned how to hunt 
and to ride. 'The first pursuit, therefore, that a young man just out of his 
boyhood should take up is hunting, and afterwards he should go on to the other 
branches of education, provided he has means' (Kyn. 2.1). Xenophon is 
effusive in his praise for hunting: 'For it makes the body healthy, improves the 
sight and hearing, and keeps men from growing old; and it affords the best 
training for war' (Kyn. 12.1). The cavalry, which the landowning class was 
obliged to provide, tended to have a young age profile, so it would have been as 
a youth that Xenophon was introduced to the art of horsemanship. He gives a 
full account of the training of men and horses in his works, and it is apparent 
                                            
31 Davies 1967 has estimated that in the fourth century around 97 festival liturgies were 
performed in Athens, this rising to 117 in a Panathenaic year. In the fifth century the 
number may have been higher: see Jones 1984: 118. 
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from these that he himself was an accomplished cavalryman.32 It is clear too 
that he had a great passion for riding. Early in Hipparkhikos (1.11) he writes that 
'by dwelling on the brilliancy of horsemanship, you might fire some of the young 
men with ambition to serve in the cavalry'. It is hard not to see in this an 
autobiographical reference, a remembrance by the author of the circumstances 
of his own initiation. One can imagine him as an adolescent being taught the 
basics of equestrianism, perhaps by his father, and the thrill of his first ride 
across the Mesogeian Plain. 
 
 
2. COMING OF AGE 
 
2.1. Philosophy 
 
Beyond his schooling there is evidence that Xenophon pursued an interest in 
higher thought. Much of his corpus bears a philosophical stamp, and the fact 
that Socrates figures prominently in four of his works — Apologia, Memorabilia, 
Oikonomikos, and Symposion — suggests that, even if he was not a part of his 
circle, he was an ardent admirer of the teacher. He may also have attended 
sophist lectures by Prodikos in Boiotia (see below). It is to be noted too that 
Xenophon was known first and foremost as a philosopher by the ancients.33 
 
The degree to which Xenophon was a participant in Socrates' circle, and by 
extension his ability as a thinker, has been much debated. Although he only 
appears once in a conversation, Mem. 1.3.9-12, elsewhere in this work he gives 
the impression that he was often in attendance at talks ('For I myself never 
heard Socrates indulge in the practice…' [of making the worse appear the better 
                                            
32 The role and importance of the cavalry in ancient Greek warfare has been the 
subject of much debate. Traditional views that it played a minimal role in the age of the 
hoplite especially (see for instance Snodgrass 1999: 85 and Brereton 1976: 16) have 
been questioned in monographs by Bugh, Spence, and Worley. On its use by Athens in 
the Peloponnesian War the latter writes (1994: 3): 'cavalry was employed in a variety of 
tactical roles: to serve as the first and principal line of defence against invasions or 
incursions; to gain victory by surprise; to prevent the envelopment of a phalanx; and to 
defeat a withdrawing foe'. 
33 See Tuplin 1993: 28 for a full list of the antique references to Xenophon as 
philosopher. Pomeroy (1994: 22) notes that Diogenes places Xenophon immediately 
after Socrates in his catalogue of philosophers. 
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argument], 1.2.31; cf. also 1.4.2, 2.4.1, 2.5.1, 4.3.2). In the opening of 
Oikonomikos (1.1) he claims to have been present at the events about to be 
related, though it is improbable, for example, that he was on hand when 
Socrates referred to the death of Cyrus the Younger (4.18). If the view that he 
was born in the early 420s is right, it is similarly unlikely that he was in 
attendance at the Symposion (1.1), dramatic date 422.34 
 
The most interesting piece of evidence pertaining to the relationship comes 
from Anabasis. Recalling how he came to leave Athens, Xenophon recounts 
that he consulted Socrates about whether he should accept an invitation to join 
Cyrus the Younger in Asia. Socrates, 'suspecting that [his] becoming a friend of 
Cyrus might bring an accusation from the city, because Cyrus had seemed 
eager in joining the Lakedaimonians in making war against the Athenians, 
advised Xenophon to go to Delphi and take common counsel with the god about 
the journey' (3.1.5). In the Memorabilia (1.1.6) Xenophon writes that this was 
how Socrates dealt with 'intimate friends' (πξὸο ηνὺο ἐπηηεδείνπο), so there is 
an implication that he himself was one of these. Famously, Xenophon 
disregarded the advice he was given and instead asked to which god he should 
sacrifice in order to ensure the success of the journey he had in mind (3.1.6). 
Socrates' response — annoyance, and acceptance (3.1.7) — indicates a type of 
paternal relationship between the men, an impression which is reinforced in the 
account given by Diogenes of their first meeting (Lives 2.48).35 In Chapter 4 it is 
argued that this episode is one of the keys to reading Anabasis, even though 
the encounter may not in fact be historical. 
 
The views of modern scholars on Xenophon's relation to Socrates are 
frequently, as Noreen Humble has asserted, dictated by their own pre-
determined attitudes towards him and his work.36 The dearth of solid evidence 
facilitates the making of inferences that fit with preconceptions. In the past 
century portraits of Xenophon as a philosopher especially were often negative, 
                                            
34 Kahn (1996: 32) argues that Xenophon is using the first person narrative in a 
consciously fictitious way and was not present when he says he was. 
35 Whidden (2008: 52) remarks that on the only two occasions which Socrates and 
Xenophon meet, 'the philosopher scolds him for his behaviour'. Gray (2010a: 9) 
comments that he 'depicts himself in the starring role of Socrates' ignorant pupil'. 
36 Humble 2002: 66-67, and 1997: 19. 
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often with the aim of venerating Plato. Bertrand Russell's view of a man 'not 
very liberally endowed with brains, and on the whole conventional in his outlook' 
is not untypical.37 Vlastos finds it almost inconceivable that Xenophon could 
have been part of the Socratic circle, though he sees fit to respond to Russell's 
claim of a stupid Xenophon.38 Cawkwell for his part does not imagine Xenophon 
in any regular attendance at Socratic gatherings: 'His philosophy is second-
hand and second-rate…He was at his happiest when far removed from what he 
regarded as the debasing trivialities of sophists' talk'.39 In more recent times, M. 
Grant and D. Nails are even more damning,40 and although more fair-minded, 
Paul Cartledge does not manage to conceal distaste, opining that while he did 
receive 'a kind of higher education' from Socrates, there is a question about 
'whether this affected his intellectual development and moral outlook as deeply 
as Xenophon clearly wanted others to believe'.41 
 
The defenders of Xenophon's status as a philosopher can be similarly prone to 
reactionary impulses. Leo Strauss, for instance, argues fervently that Xenophon 
                                            
37 Russell 1946: 89. He goes on: 'There has been a tendency to think that everything 
Xenophon says must be true, because he had not the wits to think of anything untrue. 
This is a very invalid line of argument. A stupid man's report of what a clever man says 
is never accurate, because he unconsciously translates what he has heard into 
something that he can understand. I would rather be reported by my bitterest enemies 
among philosophers than by a friend innocent of philosophy. We cannot therefore 
accept what Xenophon says if it either involves any difficult point of philosophy or is 
part of an argument to prove that Socrates was unjustly condemned' (90). Moving on to 
Plato, Russell informs us that, 'in addition to being a philosopher, [he] is an imaginative 
writer of great genius and charm' (90). 
38 Vlastos 1991: 99 and 103 for Xenophon not part of Socrates' circle, 101-102 for his 
response to Russell: 'But Xenophon is anything but a stupid man. His Cyropaedia is as 
intelligent a venture in belletrist didactic fiction as has come down to us from classical 
antiquity. Both in that work and copiously elsewhere Xenophon displays shrewd 
judgment of the world and of men. If I had been one of those ten thousand Greeks, left 
leaderless in the wilds of Anatolia, casting about for a commander we could trust to 
lead us safely back to civilization, I doubt if I could have hit on anyone better than 
Xenophon for the purpose; my vote would certainly have gone to him over Russell'. 
39 Cawkwell 1972: 26. 
40 Grant (1989: 203) writes: 'Xenophon was very proud to have known Socrates, 
although, since his philosophical capabilities fell short of his pretensions, he must have 
been one of the great man's more or less uncomprehending, intermittent hangers-on, 
rather than a serious student. What he later had to say about his hero, therefore, is just 
a rag-bag of second-hand hearsay and reading and invention'. Nails (1995: 20): 'The 
way I employ Xenophon's texts is as a sort of layman's appendix to Plato. Xenophon 
shows not the slightest inclination or talent for philosophy in anything that he writes'. 
41 Cartledge 1987: 59. In a similar vein Kahn (1996: 30) sees Xenophon as being 
'rather like a sponge, soaking up ideas, themes, and even phrases from Antisthenes, 
Aiskhines, and Plato'. 
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is the primary source for our knowledge of Socrates.42 That he should not be 
considered so, he writes, is the result of 'a powerful prejudice which emerged in 
the course of the nineteenth century and is today firmly established. According 
to that prejudice Xenophon is so simple-minded and narrow-minded or philistine 
that he cannot have grasped the core or depth of Socrates' thought.'43 He does 
not say what or who the source of the prejudice is, but it is reasonable to 
assume that he is referring to the shadow of Plato, the Socratic par excellence 
for modern philosophers.44 
 
From Xenophon's concern with virtuous action and the moral value of labour, it 
is apparent that underlying his own philosophy are the basic principles taught by 
his Socrates: self-discipline (enkrateia), self-sufficiency (autarkeia), and 
endurance (karteria). To his way of thought, practical endeavour is the true path 
to virtue. 'For the beautiful and good man,' he has Socrates say in Oikonomikos, 
'the best line of work and the best branch of knowledge is farming' (6.8, trans. 
Pomeroy, modified). It is arguably in this grounded direction which Xenophon 
sought to lead his readers in his ambitious literary programme.45 
 
2.2. War 
 
While he makes no mention of it in his works, it is quite likely that Xenophon 
fought for his city in the Peloponnesian War, probably, given his family 
                                            
42 Strauss 1970: 83-6. Strauss's conception of an ironic Xenophon, influential in W. 
Higgins' seminal 1977 work, has again begun to draw the interest of readers. See 
forthcoming Liverpool 2009 Xenophon conference proceedings edited by C. Tuplin. 
43 Strauss 1970: 83. 
44 For this audience Xenophon's interest in practical morality is much less appealing 
than Plato's investigations into the nature of the soul. There is a longstanding debate 
as to which of the two writers, if either (see Higgins 1977: 22), paints the more realistic 
picture of Socrates. For an overview see Pomeroy 1994: 22-26. I find appealing her 
view that the length of Socrates' life and his range of interests make it permissible for 
the portraits of both men – Plato's thinker and Xenophon's practical man – to have a 
claim of historicity. See further Kahn 1996, Waterfield 2004, Dorion 2006. What both 
writers do have in common is that they each strove to rescue the memory of Socrates 
from the injustices directed at him during his trial and in the years that followed; 
Waterfield (2009: xiii) considers that for both men Socrates was a 'moral hero'. On the 
Socratic Question see further Chapter 4.2. 
45 Although the sort of world view espoused by Xenophon became unfashionable in 
Western intellectual circles in modern times, a strong echo of it, notably in emphasis on 
the moral value of toil and land, is found in the work of one of the greatest writers of the 
last century, Alexander Solzhenitsyn. See especially Russkii vopros k kontsu XX veka 
(1995), and Arkhipelag GULAG (1973–1978). 
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background, as a cavalryman. Even had he been born as late as the mid-420s, 
he would have been eligible for military service in the later stages of the war. 
Some evidence to support this may be found in passages from his Hellenika 
which seem to convey a sense of autopsy. An example is the detailed account 
he gives at 1.2.1-13 of a campaign by the Athenian general Thrasyllos in Ionia 
in 409;46 notably, he writes of a Persian commander who 'managed to capture 
one Athenian alive and kill seven others' (ἕλα κὲλ δσὸλ ἔιαβελ, ἑπηὰ 
δὲἀπέθηεηλε, 1.2.5). There is furthermore a strong possibility that he was part of 
the fleet sent to Mytilene in 406 to rescue the blockaded Athenian force: 'When 
the Athenians learned of the events at Mytilene and the siege, they voted to 
bring help with 110 ships, manning them with everyone — both slave and free 
— who was of age. The ships were manned and departed in thirty days. Even 
many of the Knights [hippeis] went on board' (1.6.24). 
 
Xenophon is still more likely to have been involved in the stasis at Athens that 
followed the war. The group who took power after the defeat to Sparta were 
predominantly of the aristocratic class, and they found natural support from 
those who formed the cavalry (cf. Hell. 2.4.2).47 Xenophon may indeed have 
been obliged to take his orders, although given his background it seems not 
unreasonable to suppose that he participated willingly; if this was the case, his 
hostility to the actions of the Thirty recorded in Hellenika would suggest that not 
long into their tyranny he withdrew, or became an unwilling participant. Or at 
least, as argued in Section 3.1 below, this is the impression which he wishes to 
give in his history of the period. 
 
Turning to his evidence in Hellenika, and again pushing the autopsy argument, 
some of his descriptions do seem to show that he played a part in the rule of the 
Thirty. Green, commenting on the role of the horsemen in the rule of the Thirty, 
thinks that it is clear from the way Xenophon describes an ambush at Phyle 
                                            
46 Cawkwell 1979: 9, Stronk 1995: 4, and Thomas 2009: xx, among others, share this 
view. But as Humble (1997: 7) points out, 'detail is not necessarily a sign of autopsy'. 
47 As Bugh points out (1988: 126), it is significant that Thrasyboulos on the democratic 
side could only acquire about seventy hippeis (see Hell. 2.4.25). The Thirty oligarchs 
are named at Hell. 2.3.2; Krentz (1989: 191) thinks this list is an interpolation but 
nonetheless that it is accurate. At least one of the Thirty, Khairelaos, was apparently 
closely associated with the cavalry (see Spence 1993: 189); their leader, Kritias, was 
an intimate of Socrates. 
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(Hell. 2.4.6) 'that he was an eyewitness — his description of the noise the 
grooms made as they curried their horses is particularly revealing — and 
probably an active participant'.48 There is, too, a palpable sense of anger in his 
account of the murder of a group of citizens who were on their way to their 
farms to get provisions (Hell. 2.4.26); awful as they were, such incidents cannot 
have been uncommon during a civil war, yet it is clear that Xenophon had been 
affected by the fate of these 'people from Aixone'. 
 
Diogenes has nothing to say of Xenophon's military record prior to his joining of 
Cyrus's expedition, but another third century AD writer, Philostratos, says that he 
was captured before the Battle of Arginousai in 406 and held prisoner in Boiotia 
(Vitae Sophistarum 1.12). In a somewhat unexpected twist to this tale he writes 
that Xenophon secured release on bail in order to attend lectures by Prodikos, 
the eminent Khian sophist.49 If this was the case, as Anderson points out, 
Proxenos, a Boiotian and guest-friend of Xenophon's, could have arranged the 
release.50 It was Proxenos who, in 402/01, invited Xenophon to join Cyrus the 
Younger in Asia. 
 
2.3. Politics 
 
Under the democracy, through the course of the fifth century, the aristocracy 
saw its power steadily eroded: as she grew as a sea power, Athens came to 
rely more on her rowers — drawn predominantly from the urban poor (ζῆηεο) — 
than on her infantry (δεπγῖηαη) and cavalrymen (ἱππεῖο).51 If not originating with 
him, the strategy gained significant momentum under Pericles, who sought to 
degrade the power of his political opponents (see Plutarch, Pericles 7.3, 7.6, 
9.2-4). Naval power was ideally suited to democracy: a large navy required 
                                            
48 Green 1994: 222. See also Erbse 2010: 488. 
49 Perhaps not unrelated is that the fact that the only surviving version of Prodikos' 
famous lecture, the Choice of Herakles, is in the Memorabilia (2.1.21-34). 
50 Anderson 1974: 18. 
51 See Ps.-Xenophon, Ath. 1.2; cf. Hell. 6.1.11. The ζῆηεο, lowest of the four Solonian 
property classes at Athens, comprised all those who were unable to afford to arm 
themselves as hoplites, the third class. The horse was the defining symbol of the 
aristocracy, being at once a mark of wealth, mobility, and power. The ἱππεῖο (second 
class) therefore was a term that, to all Athenians, would have denoted more than 
simply the cavalry corps or a narrow economic class. Xenophon, from the evidence of 
his outstanding performance on the retreat of the Ten Thousand, was an exemplary 
figure of this group. 
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large numbers of rowers — 170 per ship —, whose equipment was 
comparatively basic and could be supplied by the state as part of its fleet 
construction. When Athens put a hundred ships to sea, it had 20,000 citizens at 
sea.52 
 
Two impacts in particular of this change are notable. Firstly, the democratic 
system was more liable than others to empower men less capable of exercising 
authority and so it endangered the effectiveness of the polis; secondly, the 
pursuit of empire, whose wealth was needed to help maintain the huge cost of 
running the fleet, inevitably brought Athens into conflict with others, and 
ultimately it was those in the countryside who would have to bear the brunt of 
attacks on the country.53 That the war that came was against Sparta made it all 
the more unpalatable, for the Spartans, with their ideals of rule by the best and 
self-sacrifice for the public good, represented a model of what many Athenian 
aristocrats would have wished their state to be.54 In many ways Xenophon was 
one of these; that his writings frequently display a positive attitude towards 
democracy needs to be taken in the light of his interest in political philosophy on 
the one hand, and on the other as part of his attempt in his extensive apologetic 
agenda to make himself appear not hostile toward the democratic power at 
Athens. 
 
                                            
52 Potts (2010: 55) questions the view that 'virtually all the rowers (except in times of 
acute national emergency) were Athenian citizens', suggesting that alongside the 
poorest citizens there were in the fleet 'significant numbers of foreign mercenaries, 
slaves and immigrants newly settled in the city'. However the essential point, that the 
economically less well off were harnessed as a powerful political tool, still holds. As 
Finley writes of the naval system (2004: 172): 'The citizens who served in the navy 
were drawn from the poor and they were known to be the staunchest supporters of the 
democratic system in its late fifth-century form'. 
53 See Ps-Xenophon, Ath. 2.14; Bugh 1988: 114-15. Aristotle (Ath. Pol. 24.3) estimated 
that over twenty thousand people were supported by 'the money the empire brought in'. 
At Oik. 2.6 Xenophon outlines the obligations that the state imposed on large 
landowners, noting that in time of war these became more onerous; for costs see 
Davies 1971: xxi-xxii. 
54 It is not intended to give the impression that the aristocracy at large was indifferent to 
the economic benefits that empire brought. Armed with the capital needed to exploit the 
resources of new territories, many of the wealthier citizens of this class doubtless 
benefited to a comparatively greater degree than the less well off. It was only when the 
enterprise began to falter, through what was seen as poor management, that the 
aristocratic body became disgruntled. See Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 29.1. 
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Dissatisfaction fuelled by failures in the war led, in 411, to a short-lived 
oligarchic revolution, in which the cavalry was certainly involved.55 After the 
capitulation to Sparta in 404 the cavalry again played a role in revolutionary 
events, this time as enforcers of the rule of the Spartan-backed Thirty (Aristotle, 
Ath. Pol. 38.2). As Bugh puts it, the fact that the democratic leader, 
Thrasyboulos, was only able to field seventy horsemen 'says much to confirm 
that the Athenian cavalry overwhelmingly supported oligarchic rule'.56 Though 
he was probably too young to be involved in the events of 411, as argued 
above, Xenophon was probably a participant in the later upheaval. If so, judging 
from his own account of the period, this was a reluctant involvement, for in his 
reports of events he often expresses sympathy for the victims of the Thirty's 
tyranny (see, for instance, Hell. 2.4.13 ff). The question of Xenophon's positive 
attitude to democracy is looked at in more detail in the next chapter (2.2.4). 
There is no reason, however, to suppose that his core political convictions were 
different to his peers, nor is there compelling evidence to show that these 
convictions underwent transformation in the course of the stasis; it is 
furthermore the case, as argued in the next section, that Hellenika strikes a 
discernible note of personal apologia and Xenophon's narrative needs to be 
considered in this context. 
 
With the restoration of the democracy in 403, and the city coming to terms with 
its defeat to Sparta and the loss of its empire, Xenophon cannot have been 
greatly optimistic about his future in Athens. When a letter arrived from 
Proxenos inviting him to travel to Asia to meet a Persian prince, he must have 
felt that a unique opportunity was at hand. In the circumstances, it is perhaps 
understandable that he disregarded the advice of Socrates and put a leading 
question to the god at Delphi. 
 
 
3. DEPARTURE FROM ATHENS 
 
The circumstances of Xenophon's departure from Athens are traditionally 
framed in the terms above. Given his presumed involvement with the harsh rule 
                                            
55 On this episode see Bugh 1988: 114-119. 
56 Ibid. 126. Cf. Hell. 2.4.25. 
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of the Thirty, and the ambition to which his subsequent adventures and writings 
testify, this explanation seems very reasonable. As Cawkwell memorably wrote, 
'it was time for a young man with a taste for war and a distaste for democracy to 
be off'.57 In this section and the following, I attempt to deepen and broaden the 
perspective on Xenophon's departure. First, I look critically at his evidence for 
the period 404-401 in Hellenika, and then, widening the focus to take in a range 
of contemporary materials, try to assess the political climate in Athens in this 
period and how this impacted on citizens of Xenophon's class. It is suggested 
that in his case, from his evidence in Hellenika and Anabasis, there are grounds 
for arguing that he left the city out of fear for his life. In Section 1.5 some of the 
factors in his personal background are reconsidered with a view to coming to a 
better understanding of how these might have influenced his decision to go or 
stay. 
 
3.1. Xenophon and the Thirty 
 
In the spring of 404 Athens surrendered to Sparta and, probably in September, 
under Lysander's gaze, a body of 30 was elected to 'codify the ancient laws as 
a basis for a new constitution' (Hell. 2.3.2).58 Xenophon's initial judgement on 
the work of this group is negative (Hell. 2.3.11-12), and it continues in this vein 
as he recounts events in the short but bloody reign of the oligarchs. 
Nonetheless, it seems apparent from the circumstances of his age and 
background, and his evidence in Hellenika, that he was one of their enforcers. 
The cavalry was part of the armed wing of the Thirty and, as argued above, 
several of Xenophon's descriptions suggest that he himself was involved in 
actions. The extent to which he was involved in the most 'unjust' episodes 
would, as is shown, have been an important factor in determining his future 
                                            
57 Cawkwell 1972: 13. 
58 See note 64 below on the chronology of events in the period 404-03. There are four 
major historical sources for this period: Xenophon, Hell. 2.3-2.4.43; Diodoros 14 
passim; Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 34.2-41.1; and Justin's epitome of Trogus 5.8.5-10.11. 
Rhodes (1981: 419), on the basis of differences in content and arrangement, considers 
that the accounts are independent of one another. Krentz (1982: 9) argues that 
Aristotle drew on the Oxyrhynchos Historian and that his account, 'especially in its 
order of events', is more accurate than Xenophon's. Other sources include Plutarch's 
Life of Lysander, Nepos's Life of Thrasyboulos, and the Lysianic corpus, especially 
Against Eratosthenes, a speech delivered by the orator himself in 403 against a 
member of the Thirty. 
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following the restoration, although membership of the cavalry was in itself a 
determining factor. Before getting to his point of departure, however, the nature 
of his evidence for the period is considered. 
 
The Hellenika, Xenophon's history of Greece from 411-362, was probably 
written in two parts, the first a continuation of Thucydides down to 404, the 
second from 404 to 362 (1-2.3.10 and 2.3.11-7.5.27 respectively).59 His account 
of the Thirty comes in the second part and is the focus of its opening. This was 
probably written in the early 350s and was very likely one of his last works. A 
major question concerning Xenophon's Anabasis is why, 30 years or more after 
the event, he wrote his account of the march of the Ten Thousand. The same 
(type of) question is equally pressing with this part of Hellenika, composed at an 
even greater distance from the events described. In the case of Anabasis it is 
argued in the dissertation that the work is shaped to a significant degree by an 
apologetic agenda, and it seems to be that the same essential characterisation 
can be applied to this part of Hellenika. As Tuplin remarks of 2.3.11-7.5.27: 'it 
would be singular if it were written entirely without thoughts about Athens and 
what Athenians might learn from it. Indeed it is a virtually inescapable 
assumption that Xenophon expected the work to have, at least inter alia, an 
Athenian audience.'60 As apologia, it is to Athenians and their posterity he is 
writing, his intention being to present his own participation in the regime of the 
Thirty Tyrants as comparatively benign. An examination of selected passages 
from Hell. 2.3.11-2.4.43 provides support for this case. 
 
                                            
59 See Cawkwell 1979: 18, Tuplin 1993: 11. Delebecque (1957: 39 ff.) believes that 
Xenophon was employed by Thucydides as a secretary in the last years of the fifth 
century and that the first two books of Hellenika, except 2.4.43, were written in this 
period, a suggestion which Higgins (1977: 169) dismisses as 'pure fantasy'. Neither 
does Cawkwell (1979: 28) regard favourably the idea that Xenophon began Hellenika 
while he was still in Athens. For arguments for a unitarian view, see Higgins 1977: 99-
101, and especially Gray 1991. The chronology of Xenophon's works is considered in 
Section 1.6. 
60 Tuplin 1993: 33. See also Cuniberti 2009: 7. Dillery (1995: 139), who notes that 
Xenophon wanted to re-examine the events surrounding the Thirty at Athens, and that 
he did not have to, quantifies the extent of his treatment: 'Not counting the brief 
mention of their installation at 2.3.2–3, the Thirty's story extends (from 2.3.11 to 2.4.43) 
over twenty Oxford pages or more than a tenth of the entire history which covers 
almost fifty years; assuming that their rule extended from the summer of 404/3 to the 
summer of 403/2, no other year is covered in such detail in the Hellenica.' 
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2.3.15. This, at the outset of his defence, establishes two parties within the 
Thirty: one fronted by the extreme ideologue, Kritias, the other by the more 
moderate Theramenes.61 'It is not reasonable,' he has the latter say to the 
former, 'to execute a man simply because he has been honoured by the 
democracy and when he has done no harm whatsoever to the aristocracy' 
(2.3.15, trans. Marincola, modified). (The division is reinforced through 
Theramenes at 2.3.38.) As becomes clear from his narrative — specifically his 
persistent criticism of the actions of Kritias — it is the moderate camp to which 
Xenophon is allied. The fact that he is not warm to Theramenes either (cf. 1.7.8, 
2.2.16 ff.) underscores his self-representation as a man driven by justice and 
not self-interest. 
 
2.4.20-22. In this speech, which he attributes to an esteemed herald, 'a man 
with an especially beautiful voice', Xenophon gives expression to the injustice 
that has befallen the city. Immediately following the appeal he writes that, 'the 
remaining leaders of the Thirty, affected by his words, led those who had 
marched out with them back to the city' (νἱ δὲ ινηπνὶ ἄξρνληεο θαὶ δηὰ ηὸ ηνηαῦηα 
πξνζαθνύεηλ ηνὺο κεζ' αὑη῵λ ἀπήγαγνλ εἰο ηὸ ἄζηπ, 2.4.22). At this stage at 
any rate, after eight months of the tyranny, the majority of the anti-democratic 
party was coming to the view that they were in the wrong, and there is little 
doubt that Xenophon is one of them. 
 
2.4.26. A cavalry contingent led by Lysimakhos came upon a group on their way 
to collect provisions from their farms, and, in spite of their pleas for mercy, and 
strong opposition from many of his men, the commander had them put to death. 
This can be read as Xenophon alerting us to an oppositional structure within the 
                                            
61 The presentation of characters and events in oppositional terms is characteristic of 
Xenophon's writing style, although the reality behind his stories is usually less 
straightforward. The apparently bloodthirsty Kritias, for instance, was a friend of 
Socrates, a student of oratory, and the author of two works on Sparta (DK 88 B 6-9, 32-
7). Munn (2000: 218 ff.) argues that he had a vision to create a 'Spartan Athens'; 
Pownall 2009 re-examines Xenophon's portrait of Kritias in Hellenika, taking as her 
departure point recent positive reassessment of the fragments of his writing. Aristotle, 
while favourable towards Theramenes, points at the complexity of assessing his legacy 
(Ath. Pol. 28.5). For a consideration of the speeches of Kritias and Theramenes in 
Hellenika see Usher 1968. 
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corps: the few, at the top, are cruel and distant, while at the base the members 
are compassionate and have not lost touch with morality.62 
 
Episodes involving Socrates in Hellenika, Memorabilia, and the works of Plato 
which relate to this period are also deserving of attention, as is an example of 
intertextuality. At the opening of Mem. 4.4, writing of Socrates' unwavering 
commitment to the law, Xenophon tells of how he refused to obey any unlawful 
command of the Thirty, notably their ordering of him to arrest a citizen on a 
capital charge: 'when they commanded him and certain other citizens…he alone 
refused' (4.4.3). On the same incident Plato (Seventh Letter 324e-325a) writes: 
'they [the Thirty] tried to send him, along with others, after one of the citizens, to 
fetch him by force that he might be put to death — their object being that 
Socrates, whether he wished or no, might be made to share in their political 
actions; he, however, refused to obey and risked the uttermost penalties rather 
than be a partaker in their unholy deeds. So when I beheld all these actions and 
others of a similar grave kind, I was indignant, and I withdrew myself from the 
evil practices then going on.' Xenophon is more reserved, but through his 
recounting of the episode he, too, as a disciple of Socrates, is dissociating 
himself from the rule of the Thirty. He is, furthermore, defending Socrates in this 
episode (as is Plato) by highlighting his concern for legality. 
 
The episode in Hellenika (1.7.1-16) is still more concerned to defend Socrates. 
In it, Xenophon provides a dramatic account of the Arginousai trial, his purpose 
being, as Henry argues, to accentuate the extraordinary courage of Socrates' 
action in refusing to admit an illegal motion.63 Again, in marking the probity of 
his teacher, Xenophon creates an implication about his own. Xenophon's 
elaborate defence of Socrates in Anabasis is argued for at length in Chapter 4. 
                                            
62 Support for this indication of a division within the cavalry body may be found in an 
epitaph at the Kerameikos which records the years of birth (414/3) and death (394/3) of 
a cavalryman, Dexileos, killed at the Battle of Corinth (IG II2 6217). The detail of his 
life's span is unique in Attic epigraphy, and one explanation offered is that his family 
sought to emphasise that he would have been too young to have served in the cavalry 
under the Thirty. For details of the Dexileos dedication see Bugh 1988: 136-9. 
63 Henry 1966: 197. 'Now the development of this entire scene was obviously contrived 
with no other object in view than to set off the adamant refusal of the great philosopher 
in the face of overwhelming constraint. All objections that Xenophon in according 
Socrates only this one line is slighting him or that he does not recognise the meaning of 
his life are intolerable and can only arise from a profound misconception of the artistry 
of the description'. 
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The presence of Xenophon's apologetic agenda can be detected in a notable 
case of intertextuality between Hellenika and Anabasis. At two junctures in the 
latter, set in time (roughly) two years after the restoration of the democracy, he 
is at pains to emphasise both his immaturity (3.1.6) and his youthfulness 
(3.1.25). In so doing he furnishes a sympathetic contextualisation for his actions 
under the Thirty, whatever these may have been in fact, as a hippeus. 
 
As in the case of Anabasis, what we have in Hellenika is scarcely an historical 
account at all, but rather an interlayered work of apologia, moral philosophy, 
and didacticism. The version of the events of 404-401 that Xenophon gives us 
needs, therefore, to be taken in this light. With the aim of gauging the political 
atmosphere in the city following the restoration in 403 I now turn to consider 
what Xenophon's account, and other contemporary documents, tell us about the 
status of the hippeis in this period. 
 
3.2. Return of the Democracy 
 
By September 403 the Thirty were marginalised and democracy restored.64 
Pausanias, the Spartan king, and a delegation sent from Sparta by the ephors, 
brokered a settlement on the following terms: 'that there was to be peace 
between both sides; that the men of the city and the men of Piraeus were each 
to depart to his own home, except for the Thirty and the Eleven and the Ten 
who had ruled in the Peiraieus' (Hell. 2.4.38). It was permitted as well that any 
of those who had been involved with the city party (η῵λ ἐμ ἄζηεσο) and were 
concerned about their security should be free to settle in Eleusis, to where the 
Thirty had gone in late 404 (Hell. 2.4.38, Diodoros 14.33.6). 
 
Agreement to these terms by the democrats, the victors, seems to have been a 
magnanimous gesture. Large numbers of them had suffered injustice and 
                                            
64 Xenophon's chronology of events is vague at best, as it is in the rest of Hellenika 
(see Cawkwell 1979: 21, 154 note; Munn 2000: 340 ff.). Anderson (1974) holds the 
following broad datings for the events of 404-03: 404 spring – surrender of Athens; 404 
autumn – Thirty assume power; 404-03 midwinter – Thrasyboulos seizes Phyle; 403 
spring – defeat of Thirty (Kritias killed), the Thirty replaced by the Ten; 403 late summer 
– Restoration. The September terminus is given by Hornblower 1991: 183. Krentz 
(1982: 147-52), in a detailed consideration of the chronology, argues that the 
restoration occurred in October. See also Munn (2000, appendix D), and Rhodes 1981: 
462 ff. 
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violence at the hands of the oligarchs; by the reckoning of the herald in the 
speech mentioned above, in the eight months of their reign, the Thirty had come 
close to killing more Athenians than the Peloponnesians did in ten years of war 
(Hell. 2.4.21).65 Episodes reported by Xenophon include the arrest and 
execution of those 'least likely to submit to being pushed out of politics' (Hell. 
2.3.14, 17), the execution of the male citizens of Eleusis (Hell. 2.4.9),66 and the 
murder of people from Aixone (Hell. 2.4.26). Yet much of the evidence relating 
to the period, including Xenophon's, gives the distinct impression that the 
Pausanias amnesty was effective.67 On the basis of these testimonies, some 
modern scholars appear to hold up the reconciliation as a proof of democracy's 
inherently more civilised nature. Finley writes: 
 
In those two centuries [the fifth and fourth] Athens was, by all 
pragmatic tests, the greatest Greek state, with a powerful 
feeling of community, with a toughness and resilience 
tempered, even granted its imperial ambitions, by a humanity 
and sense of equity and responsibility quite extraordinary for its 
day (and for many another day as well). Lord Acton was one of 
the few historians to have grasped the historic significance of 
the amnesty of 403. 'The hostile parties,' he wrote, 'were 
reconciled, and proclaimed an amnesty, the first in history.' The 
first in history, despite all the familiar weaknesses, despite the 
crowd psychology, the slaves, the personal ambition of many 
leaders, the impatience of the majority with opposition.68 
 
There is cause to believe, however, that the reality may have been different, 
and certainly not as straightforward. Green writes: 
                                            
65 Aristotle says that the Thirty killed no less than fifteen hundred men (Ath. Pol. 35.4). 
See further Isokrates Pan. 113, Areop. 67, In Lochitem 11; Diodoros 14.5.6-7; Nepos 
8.1.5. 
66 Lysias, Against Eratosthenes 52, gives three hundred as the number arrested and 
executed. He says as well that citizens of Salamis were among these victims. 
67 See, for example, Hell. 2.4.43; Lysias, Mantitheos 8; Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 40; Nepos 
8.3.3. Rahn (1981: 111) concludes from a study of speeches delivered to Athenian 
juries in the period that there is evidence of 'a continual committal on the part of the 
audience (i.e., the jury), to the amnesty and the agreements made with the Spartans in 
403 BC'. 
68 Finley 2004: 183. Sato 2008 makes a quieter and more convincing case for the 
effectiveness of the amnesty. 
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Scholars tend to overestimate the impact of the official amnesty 
between factions orchestrated by Pausanias in 403. Wars, and 
civil wars above all, are not so easily written off. Greeks and 
Irishmen have always had a special talent for κλεζηθαθία, the 
nursing of ancient wrongs.69 
 
McKechnie expresses a similar view, seeing recriminations against those 
involved with the Thirty in the speeches of Lysias: 'The reason must be that, 
amnesty or no amnesty, the upheavals of 404/403 were not easily forgotten by 
the Athenians'.70 The democracy, moreover, had shown itself during the war 
with the Peloponnesians to be capable of brutality and mercilessness in equal 
measure:71 a backlash was certainly expected by some if not all of those 
involved with the Thirty (see Hell. 2.4.23). And the first act of the victors, as 
Xenophon describes it, has a menace that is inconsistent with the view of 
humanity and tolerance suggested by some. Led by Thrasyboulos, carrying 
their arms, the democrats ascended the Akropolis and sacrificed to Athena; 
thereafter convening an assembly, the leader addressed the ἐθ ηνῦ ἄζηεσο 
ἄλδξεο in what can only be characterised as uncompromising terms: 'Men of the 
city [he said] I advise you to know yourselves. And you would especially know 
yourselves if you attempted to define those qualities on which you pride 
yourselves so much that you would attempt to rule over us. Do you believe you 
are more righteous than we are?…Do you base your pride on the friendship of 
the Spartans? How can that be now, when they have handed you over, just as 
people collar and hand over vicious dogs, to the common people here, whom 
you have wronged — and having done that, they then turned and went home?' 
(Hell. 2.4.40-41).72 It seems likely, then, that vengeance was almost certainly 
                                            
69 Green 1994: 223. 
70 McKechnie 1989: 23. For an analysis of the post civil war trials see Wolpert 2002. 
71 E.g. execution in 421 of adult males in Skione, enslavement of women and children, 
land given to Plataians (Thucydides 5.32.1); execution of Melian males in 416/5, 
women and children sold (Thucydides 5.84-116); execution of the six generals after 
Battle of Arginousai in 406 (Hell. 1.7); Assembly decree to cut off the right hand of 
every man taken alive after naval showdown with Sparta in 405 (Hell. 2.1.31). See also 
Hell. 2.2.3, 2.2.10. 
72 The historicity of the speech has been questioned. B. Strauss (1986: 92), cited by 
Munn (2000: 418), dismisses it, along with the democrat's earlier speech at Mounykhia, 
as 'rather conventional…what Xenophon would have said had he been Thrasyboulos'. 
But Anderson (1974: 59) considers that the speech represents 'the substance of what 
Thrasyboulos actually said'. Gray (1989a: 103-106) too considers it authentic. Firm 
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taken. As Plato wrote of the restoration: 'it was not surprising that in some 
instances…men were avenging themselves on their foes fiercely' (Seventh 
Letter 325b). 
 
We might make sense of the evidence if we speculate that the takeover was 
attended by a short burst of retribution, but that then the spirit of the 
reconciliation took hold. Yet there is striking evidence of enmity several years 
after the restoration. In 399, for instance, the Spartan commander Thibron, 
beginning campaigning in Asia Minor, asked Athens for 300 horsemen, whom 
he said would maintain himself.73 The Athenians, Xenophon writes, 'sent those 
who had served in the cavalry under the Thirty, for they thought that it would be 
advantageous to the people if these men went abroad and died there' (νἱ δ' 
ἔπεκςαλ η῵λ ἐπὶ η῵λ ηξηάθνληα ἱππεπζάλησλ, λνκίδνληεο θέξδνο ηῶ δήκῳ, εἰ 
ἀπνδεκνῖελ θαὶ ἐλαπόινηλην, Hell. 3.1.4). In isolation this might be dismissed as 
Xenophon's gloss — it could be argued that the Athenians were honouring their 
treaty obligations to Sparta and that Xenophon's comment is personal bias 
rather than objective report74 — but as is apparent from a speech of Lysias (26), 
even down to the late 380s cavalry service under the Thirty was regarded as a 
mark of untrustworthiness by the democracy.75 
 
                                                                                                                                
evidence for a belligerent atmosphere comes from a speech delivered shortly 
thereafter by Lysias. He opens Against Eratosthenes: 'The difficulty that faces me, 
gentlemen of the jury, is not in beginning my accusation, but in bringing my speech to 
an end: so enormous, so numerous are the acts they [the Thirty] have committed'. On 
the subject see further Usher 1968. 
73 Diodoros in his summary does not mention this, although even in a more 
comprehensive account it need not have been included. Diodoros and his method are 
discussed in Chapter 3.1.1. 
74 Gray (2007: 17-18) characterises these men as criminals, though there seems to be 
no basis for such a judgement, certainly not in Xenophon's account. 
75 In his speech, On the Scrutiny of Evandros, dated to 382, Lysias writes: 'Suppose 
that he were now under scrutiny for admission to the Council, and he had his name 
registered on the tablets as having served in the cavalry under the Thirty: even without 
an accuser you would reject him' (26.10). See further the Panegyrikos (esp. 110-114) 
of Isokrates, dated to 380 or later. On animosity towards the cavalry following the 
amnesty see Green 1994: 223, Bugh 1988: 151, McKechnie 1989: 23, Spence 1993: 
217, 219. Krentz's (1982: 145-6) suggestion that hardcore supporters of the Thirty 
could have escaped blame and condemnation 'by claiming that they had been forced to 
submit to a cruel and oppressive government' seems to me to be somewhat naïve. For 
a terminus to the hostility we might look to Xenophon's Hipparkhikos, which was 
probably written in the 360s (see Section 1.6). 
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What might be the truth of all this? Undoubtedly in the democratic faction 
agreeing to and, according to several contemporary reporters, upholding 
(broadly) the reconciliation of Pausanias, there was a strong element of 
realpolitik. The democrats could not afford to irritate Sparta, who showed her 
intentions in subjecting democratic Elis in the Elean War (403/01), and they 
needed stability if their system was to flourish again. Relevant to this last point 
is the fact that the oligarchs maintained a base at Eleusis and with or without 
Spartan support they remained a threat to stability in Attica.76 That the 
democrats were alive to this danger is clear in the action of Archinos, who, in 
clear contravention of the Pausanias peace, moved to limit the numbers from 
the city party who were apparently readying to go there pursuant to the amnesty 
(Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 40.1). Nonetheless, Eleusis was a credible centre of 
opposition and as such acted as a check on the excesses of the democracy, 
whose supporters lived now in the knowledge that pogroms could provoke a 
renewed civil war or even a full-scale Spartan invasion.77 More from 
circumstance than by choice, then, did they confine their collective retribution to 
recalling the katastaseis from the cavalry, now the symbol for democrats of 
oligarchic repression.78 The hippeis, together with those from the city party who 
'chose' to remain under the democracy, and who had not been involved in 
atrocities during the war, can have felt a degree of security, though not much. 
 
The political landscape was to change somewhat in 401 when the remnants of 
the Thirty — supposedly recruiting mercenaries for a campaign (see further 
below) — were lured out of their bolthole in Eleusis to attend a meeting with the 
                                            
76 Eleusis was the Attic stronghold nearest to the Peloponnese. The link between the 
oligarchic faction and Sparta (or at least Lysander) was strong throughout. It was 
Lysander who effectively installed the Thirty (Diodoros 14.3.4-7), and Xenophon has 
their leader, Kritias, express loyalty to Sparta (Hell. 2.3.25). When the oligarchs began 
to run into trouble late in their reign they sent for, and received, assistance from Sparta. 
Rahn (1981: 113) argues that the democrats looked to Pausanias as a counterweight 
to Lysander, though he may overplay the significance of the schism between the two 
men in terms of its effect on Spartan foreign policy. Sparta was not traditionally known 
for a fondness towards democracies. 
77 Bugh (1988: 130-31) offers a different view on the oligarchs continued presence in 
Eleusis, namely that it 'served as a constant reminder of the troubled times but a few 
years past'. It surely did, but its significance was more than just symbolic. 
78 For a consideration of social attitudes to the cavalry before and after the Thirty see 
Spence 1993: 211 ff., especially 216-218. On the recalling of the katastaseis see 
Lysias, In Defence of Mantitheos 6-7; a fragment from another of his speeches, Against 
Theozotides, dated to 403/2, suggests that the sitos allowance given to the cavalrymen 
was reduced at this time. On this see Bugh 1988: 131-133. 
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democratic side. In an episode strikingly similar to events involving the 
leadership of the Ten Thousand in Mesopotamia in the same year (cf. An. 2.5), 
they were seized and put to death. A reconciliation with those inside the town 
was initiated by the democrats and the civil war formally came to an end. 'Both 
parties then swore not to remember past doings, and to this day they live as 
fellow citizens and the people abide by their oaths' (θαὶ ὀκόζαληεο ὅξθνπο ἦ κὴλ 
κὴ κλεζηθαθήζεηλ, ἔηη θαὶ λῦλ ὁκνῦ ηε πνιηηεύνληαη θαὶ ηνῖο ὅξθνηο ἐκκέλεη ὁ 
δῆκνο, Hell. 2.4.43). With this pocket of radical oligarchs removed, the 
immediate check on the democracy was lifted. Its show of making an amnesty 
was doubtless intended to succour Sparta — a public gesture of reassurance 
now that its foothold in Attica had been removed. As Xenophon's subsequent 
revelation about Thibron and the Athenian cavalry shows, it was not wholly 
genuine.79 
 
It was in the year of the Eleusis amnesty that Xenophon left Athens.80 His 
departure — probably in April — may be unconnected, but it may not have been 
coincidental that he left the city in the period that this last pocket of the faction 
he was associated with was eliminated.81 His statement in Hellenika that 'both 
parties then swore not to remember past doings, and to this day they live as 
fellow citizens and the people abide by their oaths' (2.4.43) could have been 
written to avoid any suspicion by posterity that he had fled the city out of fear for 
his own life. In Anabasis, when he recalls the reason for his leaving Athens to 
join Cyrus, he pointedly makes no reference to the political situation in the city 
                                            
79 To be added to this are the trials of influential anti-democrats which took place in the 
same year (399). Green (1994: 225) writes: 'the suppression of the Eleusis faction 
seems to have encouraged the democrats to take further covert action against their 
opponents: it is in this atmosphere that the different yet related trials of Andokides and 
Socrates – both early in 399, each in its own way politics masquerading as religion – 
should be evaluated'. A speech of Aiskhines (1.173) shows clearly that the official 
charges against Socrates – impiety, and corrupting the youth – were not the reasons 
why everyone thought he had been put to death. The 'sophist', he says, was put to 
death 'because he was shown to have been the teacher of Kritias, one of the Thirty 
who put down the Democracy'. 
80 The 401 dating of the Eleusis amnesty is given by Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 40.4, by way of 
Xenainetos' archonship. See also Hornblower 1991: 183, Spence 1993: 217, and 
Waterfield 2006: 50. Munn (2000: 284) suggests the beginning of Xenainetos' year 
(June 401) for the fall of Eleusis. Green (1994: 224-5) stretches the date to 401/0, so 
allowing him to suggest that the mercenaries the Thirty were recruiting could be those 
being commanded by Xenophon in Thrace in the winter of 400. See further Section 
1.5.2 below. 
81 For starting dates for Cyrus's expedition see Brennan 2008. 
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at this time, other than giving us the reason why Socrates was concerned with 
his plan — that involvement with Cyrus could cause him trouble with the 
authorities (ὁ Σσθξάηεο ὑπνπηεύζαο κή ηη πξὸο ηῆο πόιεσο ὑπαίηηνλ εἴε Κύξῳ 
θίινλ γελέζζαη, 3.1.5). There is no reason to suspect that this advice was not 
given, and it would be unfair to imply that Socrates was invoked by Xenophon to 
better obscure some other reason(s), but Anabasis may not tell the whole 
story.82 (On the matter of the democracy's attitude to Xenophon joining Cyrus, I 
am inclined to think that it rather would have been glad to see another hippeus 
live and die in a foreign land, though of course Socrates is correct in seeing that 
joining the prince could also provide grounds for action against him in the future. 
One of the ironies here is that had Xenophon stayed in Athens, there is every 
chance he would have ended up where he did, fighting with Thibron in Asia in 
399.)  
 
The strongest argument against this hypothesis is the presence of at least 300 
horsemen in Athens in 399. Clearly, if the decapitation of the Eleusis opposition 
had caused serious unease among the hippeis, most would have left in 401.83 
                                            
82 What does seem to be true, or at least admissible to say, is that Xenophon is content 
to have readers associate the cause of his exile with his involvement with Cyrus the 
Younger. This is a sense strengthened only a few paragraphs on (3.1.10) when, in 
what might be a defence to a charge of association with the prince, he asserts that he 
was not aware of his true purpose when he joined the expedition. Whatever his 
intention was, later writers – Diogenes Laertios 2.58 (but cf. 2.51), Dio Chrysostom 8.1, 
Pausanias 5.6.5 – cited his association with Cyrus the Younger as the reason for his 
exile from Athens. 
83 Anabasis provides some evidence for a departure of Athenian officers, though not for 
an exodus, and of course some or all of these men may already have been exiles. 
Amphikrates, Kephisodoros, Phrasias, and Polykrates are named as captains, and 
Lykios is the commander of the cavalry; an Ariston is one of three ambassadors 
chosen by the army at Kotyora to sail to Sinope; Gnesippos and Theopompos appear 
in situations that suggest them to be senior figures. There may well have been other 
Athenians in the force not mentioned by Xenophon. The presence of these men in a 
mercenary enterprise may be unusual; it is tempting to imagine that they thought 
service with a prince, even a barbarian one, was preferable to life in a democracy (see 
further below on Cyrus recruiting at Eleusis, and also Bugh 1988: 151, and Roy 1967: 
307-308), though it is equally likely that they could have joined for financial reasons; 
Delebecque (1957: 90-92) thinks that Xenophon did. Rahn (1981: 104), and Green 
(1994: 222), argue that Xenophon had had his property confiscated. The latter argues 
that his sale of his horse in 399, 'a truly desperate measure for a hippeus', is evidence 
that he 'clearly had no home funds on which to draw'. But aside from the practical 
reason that drawing on home funds from abroad would have been difficult (an 
anachronism?), the key point must be that Xenophon was able to leave Athens with 
one or more horses of his own, together with his groom and his mount, and that he was 
capable of supporting this entourage for several months at least (cf. 4.2.20, where 
Xenophon refers to his shield-bearer deserting him in Kurdistan). Owning just one 
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Clearly too, if Xenophon had been guilty of a serious crime during the terror of 
the Thirty, he would have left the city considerably earlier, or else risked coming 
to a bad end. So we can probably conclude that his links with the Thirty were 
not the main reason for his departure in 401. But there is another possibility: 
that he was one of those who went to Eleusis in accordance with the 
reconciliation brokered by Pausanias. Large numbers of the city party 
apparently intended to do so, and only extreme actions by the democrats 
prevented an exodus (Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 40.1-2). Some support for this might 
be found at Hell. 2.4.43, where there is an apparent temporal lacuna: with the 
words ὑζηέξῳ δὲ ρξόλῳ he moves from the victory speech of Thrasyboulos in 
403, to the showdown with the oligarchs at Eleusis in 401. Although omissions 
are not at all uncharacteristic of Xenophon, there are at the same time grounds 
here to argue that his knowledge of life in Athens in the interval was limited. 
 
In this scenario Xenophon's actual role in the tyranny could have been more 
compromising, in which case he would have been primed to leave Attica when 
there were signs that the democracy was setting its sights on Eleusis. His 
statement in Hellenika that 'the men at Eleusis were trying to hire foreign 
soldiers' (2.4.43) is indicative of an escalation in tension which, notwithstanding 
his own consecutive linking of the hiring and the marching out of the 
democracy, will probably have built over a period of time. It can now be 
remarked that by early 401, Cyrus the Younger was drawing together his forces 
for his attempt on the Persian throne. Recruitment of Greek soldiers was his 
priority, and Eleusis, populated with disenfranchised anti-democrats, must have 
been regarded as fertile ground. Notably, as Munn points out, it was the place 
where 'less than two years earlier Lysander had assembled a mercenary force 
to protect his allies in Attica'.84 What this could reveal, then, is Xenophon 
disguising the real reason why, and how, he came to join the expedition. As a 
compromised junior figure in the tyranny, he felt obliged to leave Attica when 
the end for the anti-democratic pocket seemed in sight; and rather than it being 
                                                                                                                                
horse, Spence (1993: 193) comments, 'marked an Athenian as possessing 
considerably larger financial resources than those of the average citizen'. See 3.3.19 
(Xenophon has a number of horses – ὁξ῵ δὲ ἵππνπο ὄληαο ἐλ ηῶ ζηξαηεύκαηη, ηνὺο 
κέλ ηηλαο παξ' ἐκνί), and 1.2.12 (Cyrus's first payment to the men came 4 months after 
they had set out, and wages thereafter were irregular). 
84 Munn 2000: 283. The friendship between Cyrus the Younger and Lysander may be 
significant here. See Hell. 1.5.1-7; Oik. 4.20-5. 
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an invitation and a visit to Delphi which saw him on his way to Cyrus, it was the 
latter's agents circulating about Eleusis who provided the incentive. This reading 
of events does not necessarily imply that his account of how he consulted with 
Socrates about the expedition (An. 3.1.5) is a fiction, though the historicity of the 
episode does become more suspect.85 
 
 
4. SHOULD I STAY OR SHOULD I GO? 
 
With the democracy resurgent, Xenophon may, then, have felt it prudent to 
leave Attica in 401. On the other hand, Hell. 2.4.43 could be taken at face value, 
and whether he had been living at Athens, Eleusis, or elsewhere in Attica, there 
was — as he wanted us to believe — no threat to his life at this point. In this 
case, and with the aim of broadening the perspective on his departure, this 
section considers other reasons or causes which could have lain behind his 
decision. 
 
4.1. The Influence of Socrates 
 
Xenophon's writings on Socrates point to a meaningful connection between the 
men; his revelation that he consulted with him on the subject of Proxenos' 
invitation to join Cyrus the Younger in Asia is indicative of a confidential 
relationship by 401.86 Xenophon's writings, through their more or less didactic 
character, furthermore leave the impression that he saw himself as an active 
pupil of the teacher, himself imparting through his corpus the wisdom he 
considers he has benefited from. 
 
Though Socrates himself had no need for it, the idea of travelling to learn — the 
journey to knowledge conceived of as an outward movement — was a long-
                                            
85 According to the terms of the original amnesty, 'those living at Eleusis were not 
allowed to visit the city of Athens, nor were those living at Athens allowed to visit 
Eleusis' (Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 39.2). Socrates is supposed to have rarely set foot outside 
of the city, and he was an opponent of the Thirty, so the meeting is not likely to have 
happened at Eleusis. 
86 For such a momentous decision, it would have been normal for a young man to take 
advice from his father, a fact that prompts Anderson (1974: 79) to believe that Gryllos 
had died. Xenophon, at various junctures in the oeuvre, stresses the importance of the 
paternal relationship: see Kyro. 8.1.1, and note An. 7.6.38. 
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established way of broadening the mind.87 Exemplary wise men were often 
interminable travellers, as for instance Solon, Thales, Hekataios, and 
Pythagoras. For young men, moreover, it was something akin to a rite of 
passage, a returning home in a state of maturity.88 Set alongside this is the 
impression from his treatises and travelogues that Xenophon preferred to be 
putting his learning into practice rather than sharing in the types of activities that 
earned Socrates the reputation of 'being an idle chatterer who measures the air' 
(Oik. 11.3).89 Xenophon, then, may have decided that travel — seeing places, 
meeting people, and informing himself about different nomoi — offered the most 
suitable path towards self-improvement (see the epigram of Diogenes Laertios, 
2.58). There is evidence for this, I suggest, in his account in Anabasis of how he 
came to join Cyrus in Asia. In this he is at pains to stress that he did not join in a 
military capacity, balancing this statement with a strong conjunction, ἀιιά, in 
order to emphasise what his reason was — to become friends with Cyrus, who 
was highly regarded by Proxenos, a guest-friend of Xenophon's and also a pupil 
of Gorgias (2.6.16; Diogenes Laertios 2.49). 
 
Among the Greeks there was one Xenophon, an Athenian, who 
followed the army neither as a general nor a captain nor a common 
soldier. But rather Proxenos, an old guest-friend of his, had sent for 
him from his home, promising if he would come to make him friends 
with Cyrus, whom he said he considered to be better for himself than 
his fatherland was (3.1.4, trans. Ambler, modified).90 
 
                                            
87 Socrates apparently never set foot outside of Athens except on military service. See 
Plato, Krito 52b; Diogenes Laertios, 2.22. 
88 Cf. Whitmarsh 2001: 280-81. Howland (2000: 878) remarks that the ascent - the 
journey from death to life, darkness to light, confusion to clarity - is by this time a well 
established paradigm of education. 
89 See further Aristophanes, Clouds 1485. In what some take as an important 
revelation of his writing aims, at Kyn. 13.7 Xenophon writes that he wishes his work 
'not to seem useful, but to be so' (νὐ γὰξ δνθεῖλ αὐηὰ βνύινκαη κᾶιινλ ἢ εἶλαη 
ρξήζηκα). The authenticity of this book has been a subject of discussion, though Gray's 
1985 study has dampened most of the speculation. 
90 Ἦλ δέ ηηο ἐλ ηῇ ζηξαηηᾷ Ξελνθ῵λ Ἀζελαῖνο, ὃο νὔηε ζηξαηεγὸο νὔηε ινραγὸο νὔηε 
ζηξαηηώηεο ὢλ ζπλεθνινύζεη, ἀιιὰ Πξόμελνο αὐηὸλ κεηεπέκςαην νἴθνζελ μέλνο ὢλ 
ἀξραῖνο· ὑπηζρλεῖην δὲ αὐηῶ, εἰ ἔιζνη, θίινλ αὐηὸλ Κύξῳ πνηήζεηλ, ὃλ αὐηὸο ἔθε 
θξείηησ ἑαπηῶ λνκίδεηλ ηῆο παηξίδνο. 3.1.4. 
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We may presume that Proxenos' high estimation of Cyrus is related to his 
character, the high quality of which is attested to by Xenophon in his later 
obituary of the prince (1.9).91 From the obituary we are led to understand that 
Cyrus was a desirable model for young aristocrats aspiring to excellence in 
rulership, and as such we can imagine that Socrates — whom Xenophon 
famously consulted about whether or not to join Cyrus (3.1.5) — would have 
supported the initiative of the young philosophers.92 This argument is developed 
in Chapter 4.1 when this key introductory passage is considered more fully. 
 
4.2. Other factors 
 
We do not know what Xenophon did in the years 403-01, though it is probable 
that he kept a low profile. The family estate in Erkhia would have been a logical 
place for him to be based. Following years of disruption, no doubt there was 
much work to be done, and there is ample testimony of Xenophon's concern for 
estate management in his writings. It is possible that in this period he began 
writing. The first part of Hellenika, a continuation of Thucydides, is, by general 
consensus, believed to have been written earlier than the rest of the work and 
some think it may have been authored in Athens.93 Doubtless, he also kept his 
horses and his horsemanship skills sharp. He may also have married, twenty-
five to thirty being the normal age to do so for upper-class Athenians.94 Yet for 
all that he may have come to feel a sense of under-achievement: a hippeus 
groomed for government (see P.H. 2.1), he was too young to have played any 
significant role in the Peloponnesian War and may now have been permanently 
tainted by his association with a badly failed regime. The requirement for 
candidate office-holders to undergo dokimasia meant that he faced the prospect 
                                            
91 Although the obituary is written in glowing terms, in the preceding narrative 
Xenophon paints a more complex picture of Cyrus, which in the end does not add up to 
a model of an ideal leader. See further Chapter 3.3.2. 
92 See Oik. 4.18, where Socrates declares: 'Yes, by Zeus, to be sure, if Cyrus had 
lived, he would, I think, have proved himself an excellent ruler'. Socrates is sceptical in 
this case because Cyrus had been a key factor in the defeat of Athens in the 
Peloponnesian War and Xenophon's association with him could provoke a reaction 
from the government. The fact that neither Xenophon nor Socrates seem concerned 
about the Persian's role in their city's defeat may reveal something about their attitude 
towards the democracy. 
93 Delebecque (1957: 39 ff.) believes that Xenophon was employed by Thucydides as a 
secretary in the last years of the fifth century and that the first two books of Hellenika, 
except 2.4.43, were written in this period. 
94 Cf. Hesiod, Erga 695-697. See Pomeroy 1994: 3, Roy 2004: 272. 
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of having his conduct during the reign of the Thirty scrutinised by unsympathetic 
officials. More generally, for Xenophon's generation there must have been a 
sense of living, literally, in the shadow of the city's golden age. The grand 
architecture of the Akropolis was now as much a reminder of lost power and 
status as once it had been the symbol of those things. In the circumstances, it 
would be understandable if he was alert for opportunities beyond Attica to forge 
a fulfilling life for himself. 
 
At the same time, there were attractions outside of Athens, more accessible 
now that war was suspended. As a youth on visits to the city, Xenophon would 
have glimpsed a world of strange sounding tongues and wares, and from 
multiple vantage points about Attica he would have seen boats trailing in and 
out of the Peiraieus.95 The Athenians, doubtless because of their links to the 
sea and the consequent open nature of their economy and society, were more 
inclined towards travel than other Hellenes.96 Though this was driven by 
commerce, theoria as an added-value part of the experience came to be 
increasingly emphasised. Describing the momentous decision of his 
countrymen to sail on Sicily, Thucydides writes that, 'the young men of military 
age longed for foreign travel and the sights abroad, quite confident of a safe 
return' (ηνῖο δ' ἐλ ηῇ ἡιηθίᾳ ηῆο ηε ἀπνύζεο πόζῳ ὄςεσο θαὶ ζεσξίαο, θαὶ 
εὐέιπηδεο ὄληεο ζσζήζεζζαη, 6.24.3).97 
 
                                            
95 In his autobiography, W.B. Yeats (1955: 15) reminisces of childhood summers spent 
in the port city of Sligo. 'All my dreams were of ships; and one day a sea-captain who 
had come to dine with my grandfather put a hand on each side of my head and lifted 
me up to show me Africa.' 
96 See Montiglio 2005, chapter 6, especially 119-120. Montiglio sees in Aiskhylos' 
Suppliants and Prometheus Bound a reflection of the 'growing fascination with 
"spectacles" of foreign lands' among Athenians (120). (Casson (1994: 85) maintains 
that Athens itself, with its architecture and glorious history, developed into a major 
tourist attraction from the second half of the fifth century, though one imagines that not 
many visitors came during the war.) 
97 The principal reasons for travel were trade, pilgrimage, war, health, tourism, and 
philosophy. An important factor in the growth of tourism from the fifth century was the 
development of infrastructure, roads and inns in particular (modern economists note a 
positive relationship between new roads and the number of cars on the road). 
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There was no shortage of possible destinations for Xenophon to consider. 
Egypt, with its ageless monuments, was apparently a favourite of the Greeks.98 
Anatolia will also have held strong appeal. Realm of the Great King and of great 
kingdoms past, the landmass was a source of intrigue and fascination for the 
Greeks. In an examination of their social life, Mahaffy wrote: 'There seems no 
doubt that even about Solon's time educated Athenians considered a visit to 
Asia Minor, and to the splendid court of Lydia, just as necessary as our young 
noblemen once considered a visit to the French court, then the perfection of 
refinement and elegance.'99 If not quite how it may have been, certainly no 
small number of Greeks made their way to the eastern Mediterranean and 
beyond to travel and seek fame and fortune. Ktesias, a wanderer from the port 
of Knidos who became the physician of the Persian King, may be an exception, 
but the fact that, on his own account, he became a member of the Royal Court 
and a confidant of the Queen underlines what possibility existed for the 
adventurous and the ambitious.100 
 
4.3. Stay 
 
Granted there were a number of reasons why Xenophon might have chosen to 
leave Athens, it is the case, too, that there would have been forces pulling in the 
opposite direction. In this final part of the section I touch briefly on some of 
these factors. 
 
As the later biographies of other hippeis demonstrate (see especially Lysias, In 
Defence of Mantitheos 8), a political future in the city cannot have been 
completely ruled out. Xenophon himself is at pains to advertise the efficacy of 
the amnesty (Hell. 2.4.43), though his subsequent revelation about the 300 sent 
                                            
98 Herodotus 3.139. Aristotle, writing of Solon (Ath. Pol. 11.1), says that he 'went 
abroad to Egypt for trading purposes and also to see the country'. See also Herodotus 
1.30. 
99 Mahaffy 1875: 147. 
100 Successful Greeks abroad. Xenophon reports that Tissaphernes, the Persian 
satrap, employed a Greek as a military adviser (An. 2.1.7); Greek sculptors are said to 
have worked on the mausoleum at Halikarnassos (Hornblower 1982: 240 names six); 
Greek learned men found audiences in high places (see Herodotus 1.30), though they 
often had to engage in trade to pay their way (cf. Plutarch, Solon 2.4. The career of 
Ktesias tends to polarise commentators, some believing his account of his life and 
times accurate, others that he never in fact left the environs of Knidos. See further 
Chapter 3.1.3. 
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out to Thibron (Hell. 3.1.4) somewhat undercuts the 'oaths' statement. What 
comes across in some of his later works, especially Hipparkhikos and Poroi, is 
his concern for the welfare of Athens; it could be speculated that if he was 
moved to act so after he had been exiled, it would follow that he had a desire as 
a younger man to help get his city back on its feet. A strong hint of this, or at 
least of a non-hostile attitude toward the democracy on his part, is his repeated 
stated desire to return home in Anabasis.101 
 
The family estate in Erkhia might have been another reason for staying put.102 
As remarked above, by this time his father may have passed away and no 
siblings are mentioned in the sources. In any event, with his avid interest in 
land, we might expect that he would have welcomed the opportunity now to 
apply and develop his knowledge. At this stage, too, he may already have been 
married and wished to begin a family, although in contemplating a venture 
abroad he presumably did not imagine he would be away for as long as turned 
out.103 Last but not least there was Socrates, whose wisdom and humanity 
seems to have instilled in all of his followers a singular devotion. In short, there 
were ties of family, land, and friendship which Xenophon will not have 
contemplated severing lightly. 
 
 
5. XENOPHON THE TRAVELLER 
 
5.1. On the Road 
 
However he came to his decision, in spring 401 Xenophon sailed for Ionia from 
the Peiraieus with his horse and attendant. For the next two years they would 
                                            
101 Gray 2007: 17 makes this point with reference to his view of democracy. Against 
this, it could be argued that his wish to return home was to support, or be a part of, the 
surviving opposition to the restored regime. See note 183 below for instances of 
Xenophon's airing of his desire to go home in Anabasis. 
102 Green (1994: 222) believes that the estate was confiscated after the death of 
Theramenes, citing in support of his view the fact that Xenophon had to sell his horse 
in 399 to pay for his planned return home. However, the very fact that he was able to 
leave Athens with at least one horse is good evidence that he had resources to draw 
on in 401 (cf. note 83 above). 
103 An. 7.6.34 indicates that Xenophon had no children when he left Athens, but that he 
did wish to have a family. 
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travel through Anatolia, Syria, Mesopotamia and European Thrace (see map, 
Appendix I).104 These are said to be the most illuminated years of Xenophon's 
life, for he records major events concerning himself in this period in his 
Anabasis. However, as has already been noted, there are problems with taking 
the work as an autobiographical source. Although his movements are closely 
tracked in this intense period, and he is the focus of attention from the third 
book onwards, it is not certain that we get a true insight into Xenophon's 
personal life and his experiences on the march. As argued in the course of this 
dissertation, the Xenophon of Anabasis is an exemplary figure, a young 
Athenian and pupil of Socrates behaving as a pupil of Socrates would have 
done had he found himself in similar circumstances. 
 
Xenophon remained in mercenary service when his journey with the Cyreans 
concluded in Ionia in 399. Hired by the Spartans to lead the same mercenaries 
in a war of liberation against Persia, he served first under Thibron, then 
Derkylidas, and Agesilaos. Xenophon deals with the events of this period in 
Hellenika but does not make any explicit mention of himself. In Anabasis (5.3.6) 
he informs us that he returned to Greece with Agesilaos.105 Judging from the 
detail of his account (Hell. 4.3.15-23), he seems to have been at the Battle of 
Koroneia that summer (394) though there is disagreement about whether or not 
he fought.106 Xenophon, as is apparent from his encomium of the Spartan king, 
                                            
104 Xenophon sold his horse in Lampsakos for lack of funds to return home, though it 
was returned to him again in Ophrynion (An. 7.8.6). He refers to a shield-bearer 
(ὑπαζπηζηήο) who deserted him in Kardouchia (4.2.20), and he may have had other 
attendants who accompanied him through his travels. The shield-bearer may have 
been on horseback or, perhaps like Xanthias in Aristophanes' Frogs, he rode a donkey. 
105 Agesilaos was recalled to assist Sparta in 394 (Ages. 1.36). It seems likely that this 
was the first occasion on which Xenophon returned to Greece since his departure in 
401. Humble (2002: 78) unearths the view of Grote (1865: 565) that he returned to 
Athens after the death of Socrates, and then went back to Asia Minor to continue his 
service with Sparta, but this scenario has no modern support. Xenophon gives an 
account of the march home at Hell. 4.3 and Ages. 2.1 ff. 
106 From Hell. 4.3.15, 17, it seems likely that the Cyrean force ('the foreign contingent 
that Herippidas commanded') fought. Plutarch, Agesilaos 18.2, believes Xenophon did 
as well, an assertion accepted by Cawkwell 1976: 63, and Tuplin 1998b: 781. Krentz, 
on the other hand, writes (1989: 2): 'this is only Plutarch's interpretation of An. 5.3.6. 
Xenophon implies that he was present out of friendship for Agesilaos rather than 
hostility for Athens, and twice states that Herippidas (not he himself) commanded the 
Cyrean unit (Hell. 4.2.4, 3.15-18; [Xen.] Ages. 2.10-11)'. But Xenophon never mentions 
himself at all in Hellenika, and if he was not involved in some way in the combat, what 
was he doing on the battlefield? It is striking that in Anabasis he states that he was not 
following Cyrus in a military capacity (3.1.4), yet he rides out to meet him from the 
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was a great admirer of Agesilaos. His close association with him over many 
years can be understood in the same way as his relationship with Socrates and 
with Cyrus the Younger. Here again, Xenophon was following an exceptional 
character in order to learn and to develop himself. 
 
5.2. Exile 
 
At some time in 399 or later, a decree was passed in Athens banishing 
Xenophon.107 The reason(s) for the order is not known, though if the date of the 
decree of Euboulos (Diogenes Laertios 2.59) could be established, the matter 
would be clearer. Broadly, an earlier banishment would point to Xenophon's 
associations with Cyrus, and Socrates, while a later one would suggest that his 
continued involvement with the Spartans was the cause. In any case, some 
form of prodosia is likely to have been the basis of the charge laid against 
him.108 The question of Xenophon's exile, impinging as it does on the 
interrelationships between Athens, Sparta, and Persia on the one hand, and on 
his personal writing motivation on the other, is an important one. 
Notwithstanding the paucity of ancient evidence for his exile, there has been 
much written in modern times on the subject.109 In this section I provide an 
overview of the main scholarly positions and argue that the matter was bound 
up with the efforts of the restored democracy to re-establish itself at home and 
abroad. The important matter of Xenophon's response to his exile is dealt with 
in Chapter 3.3. 
 
                                                                                                                                
Greek line so as to learn 'if he had any announcement to make' immediately prior to the 
battle at Kounaxa (1.8.15). 
107 The terminus post quem for the decree is provided by a passage in Anabasis 
(7.7.57): Xenophon is in Thrace getting ready to return home and remarks, νὐ γάξ πσ 
ςῆθνο αὐηῶ ἐπῆθην Ἀζήλεζη πεξὶ θπγῆο. Several scholars have interpreted the 'not 
yet' as meaning that the decree was then imminent (Erbse 2010: 483, Anderson 1974: 
148, Higgins 1977: 23), though Tuplin (1987: 60) does not think the term carries this 
meaning: 'Xenophon is merely giving an incidental explanation (for the benefit of 
readers who know him as "the Athenian exile") of how he could even think of going 
home'. See also Rahn 1981: 118. For the process of how decrees were voted on and 
passed see Woodhead 1981: 39; for the terminology of exile see Dillery 2007: 52. 
108 Undesirable political associations were a common basis for exile; professional 
failure, as seems to be the case with Thucydides, was another. 
109 Ancient writers referring to Xenophon's exile: Diogenes Laertios 2.51, 58, 59; Dio 
Chrysostom Or. 8.1; Plutarch, On Exile 10; Pausanias 5.6.5. 
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Tuplin lists seven postulated combinations of date and cause for Xenophon's 
exile. According to him, the most common are (1) Date — 399, Cause — 
association with Cyrus's rebellion against Artaxerxes, and (2) Date — 394/3, 
Cause — association with the Spartans, especially participation in the Battle of 
Koroneia in August 394.110 His own study leads to: Date — late 395/4 or 
beginning 394/3, Cause — supporting Cyrus and laconism.111 While the cause, 
or one of them, is likely to be true, this dating, as is argued below, is less 
persuasive. 
 
Subsequent studies of the problem by Badian and Green are worth noting.112 
Badian dismisses Xenophon's joining Cyrus as the cause of exile on the implied 
grounds that the decree would have been passed when, or soon after, he had 
left for Asia in 401.113 In his view, 'it was only when it became clear that 
[Xenophon] intended to stay at Sparta, after his going there with Agesilaos, that 
the Athenians were seriously upset'.114 His establishment of the Battle of 
Koroneia as a terminus post quem for the exile decree rests on the belief that 
Xenophon could not have made an offering at the Athenian treasury at Delphi, 
where he (probably) went with Agesilaos following the battle in August 394 
(Hell. 4.3.21), had he been an exile.115 I disagree with this view on the practical 
grounds that no one was likely to stop Xenophon enriching the sanctuary, all the 
more so as he was in the company of a victorious Spartan king;116 as argued 
                                            
110 Tuplin 1987: 59-60. 
111 Ibid. 68. This view is shared by Dillery 1998: 4-5. 
112 Green 1994 and Badian 2004. Other treatments include: Erbse 2010 - argues that 
the cause of exile was taking part in the march against the Persian King; Rahn 1981 - 
political circumstances at Athens the cause, date 394/3; and more briefly Lipka 2002 - 
participation at Koroneia, and devotion to Sparta in general, the causes, and date 394. 
David Thomas believes that the decree dates to the outbreak of the Corinthian War in 
395: not wishing to antagonise the King, Athens recalled her horsemen, and Xenophon 
failed to comply, so earning his exile (conversation with author). Bradley (2001: 77) 
identifies what may be an authorial hint on the cause of exile at 7.6.35, but the 
reference - that he had incurred the hatred of people more powerful than him - is too 
vague to make anything of it. 
113 Badian 2004: 41, as Breitenbach 1967: 1575. 
114 Badian 2004: 42. This view is echoed by Lesky 1963: 664, and Lipka 2002: 3-4. 
115 Badian 2004: 41. See Plutarch, Agesilaos 19. 
116 For comparison see Hell. 3.2.22, 26: Agis prevented from sacrificing at Olympia by 
the Eleans and his return to the sanctuary as victor. M. Scott (2010: chap. 2 passim) 
discusses the control and management of Olympia and Delphi and suggests that 
dedicators had greater flexibility as to the placement of their votives in the latter place. 
On Xenophon's offering at Delphi, it is notable that Diogenes implies that he had 
already made it by the time of his visit with Agesilaos: of the money which he had in 
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later in the dissertation, Xenophon was contemptuous of the decree against 
him, and his dedication may be seen as a symbolic expression of this. 
 
Green opts for the earlier date, 399. He takes a broader view on the problem, 
rightly asserting that 'if any progress is to be made, it must be through careful 
scrutiny of context and background'.117 However, his resulting hypothesis is, as 
regards cause if not date, flawed on the basis of his argument that the 
democracy believed Xenophon might lead the Cyreans to Attica to support the 
remnants of the oligarchic faction.118 To the best of our knowledge the radical 
pocket at Eleusis was eliminated in 401 — Munn thinks at the beginning of the 
archonship of Xenainetos, June 401119 — upon which, as Green notes, 'the 
separatist movement collapsed'.120 Unless he intends the elimination to have 
taken place a full year later than this (he places the attempt of the Eleusis 
diehards to raise mercenaries to '401/0'), it is not clear whom he is referring to 
when he subsequently writes: 'it would be extraordinary if an approach was not 
[sic.] made to Xenophon at this point'.121 In any case, the earliest point at which 
deployment of the Cyrean force could have been considered as a possibility 
was June 400, after they had arrived in Byzantium. To come at the matter from 
the other end, as it were, it might not have been unrealistic for the oligarchs to 
approach Xenophon in late spring 401, possibly before he left Attica for Asia, 
with their plans. However it is very much open to question whether Xenophon 
would, and could have, led the army back out from under Cyrus's nose in his 
own satrapy. 
 
But Green is nonetheless correct to emphasise the link between the political 
climate at Athens in the tumultuous period following the rule and removal of the 
Thirty and the decree issued against Xenophon. He concludes: 
 
                                                                                                                                
Ephesus in 399 (see below), Diogenes (2.51) writes that he gave half to the temple 
priest for safekeeping, and with the remainder 'he sent in votive offerings to Delphi' 
(ἔπεκςελ εἰο Δειθνὺο ἀλαζήκαηα). 'Next,' he continues, 'he came to Greece with 
Agesilaos.' (On the use of temples for the safe depositing of objects and funds see 
Casson 1994: 73.) 
117 Green 1994: 219. 
118 Ibid. 224-5. Humble (2002: 80) thinks that this was 'certainly possible'. 
119 Munn 2000: 284. Cf. Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 40.4. 
120 Green 1994: 224. 
121 Ibid. 225. 
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Xenophon's exile thus falls into the same general category as 
the exactly contemporaneous trials of Andokides and Socrates, 
as part of a vengeful anti-oligarchical backlash that sought to 
circumvent the terms of the amnesty, and was fuelled by a very 
real fear (whether justified or not) of a military-backed counter 
revolution.122 
 
I do not think that the exile was part of a backlash, but rather that it was part of 
a systematic exercise in uprooting the long-standing anti-democratic tradition at 
Athens. To the famous trials Green mentions is to be added the infamous 
dispatch of cavalry to Asia. Three hundred who, at least as Xenophon saw it, 
were sent away to die fighting in a foreign land (Hell. 3.1.4). Since the 
restoration Athens had been following a course of compliance with Sparta,123 
but while doing so, she patently had an eye to taking opportunities to lessen the 
hold which the Spartans exerted. My view, then, is that the decree was passed 
in 399 as part of an ongoing drive by the democracy to re-establish itself and 
remove threats permanently from within. Its elimination of the Eleusis faction in 
401 was a major step towards this end, and it in turn paved the way for action 
against prominent anti-democratic figures and movements, such as the 
Socratics. By early 399, as news of the Cyreans' remarkable retreat and their 
exploits in Thrace filtered back to Greece, Xenophon's profile ceased to be 
obscure. The decree against him in that 'cathartic' year was a message from the 
democracy, not only to him, but to all his aristocratic fellows in arms, that they 
were not welcome home. 
 
As to the official cause of the decree, clearly, the amnesty ruled out pro-
oligarchic sympathies, and laconism was politically awkward;124 association with 
Cyrus, whose cause was lost, would have been the most convenient charge. 
Xenophon, not untypically, sheds little light on the matter in his writings, though 
as has been argued earlier, the impression from Anabasis is that he is content 
to have his involvement with Cyrus to be thought of as the reason. There may 
                                            
122 Ibid. 226. See also Higgins 1977: 23-24. 
123 Hell. 3.1.4, 3.2.25: supplying troops to Sparta. 
124 Rahn (1981: 115) writes: 'the evidence from the law courts, the politics of Athens' 
leading men and the accounts of the ancient historians all imply that between 403 and 
395 BC no one could be or was condemned for pro-Spartanism'. 
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be a good case to be made that what (he has) Socrates say at 3.1.5 (ὁ 
Σσθξάηεο ὑπνπηεύζαο κή ηη πξὸο ηῆο πόιεσο ὑπαίηηνλ εἴε Κύξῳ θίινλ 
γελέζζαη) is close to the truth of this matter: Socrates is the embodiment of 
virtue in Xenophon's writings and his wisdom is proverbial (cf. Mem. 4.8.11).125 
 
5.3. The Settled Life 
 
Following the Battle of Koroneia, Xenophon went with Agesilaos to Sparta 
(Plutarch, Agesilaos 19-20). For his services to the polis, and presumably in 
light of his exile from Athens, he was awarded an estate in Elis, near 
Olympia.126 This area had only in recent years come under Spartan control 
(following the Spartan-Elean War of 403-01), and as Tuplin stresses, 
Xenophon's establishment in the frontier region should be taken in this 
context.127 On account of a lack of evidence, there is some debate about 
whether Xenophon went immediately to live on the estate at Skillous or 
continued to campaign with Agesilaos;128 the two possibilities need not be 
mutually exclusive and the matter of when he took up residence must remain 
inconclusive.129 
                                            
125 On the date of exile see further Chapter 3 (3.3.3). For the largely unchanged 
reception in antiquity of Socrates as moral exemplum, see for instance Cicero, 
Tusculan Disputations 1.42. 
126 Cf. An. 5.3.7, and Diogenes Laertios 2.52, citing Dinarkhos. For the lot of the exile in 
Classical Greece see McKechnie 1989. Montiglio (2005: 31) writes: 'Many historical 
exiles do find a haven soon after their expulsion. In the social reality of classical 
Greece, exile does not generate permanent movement. Normally, it was not very 
difficult for an exile to relocate, since many cities, from the end of the archaic period, 
became increasingly open to foreigners, including exiles, in the hope of binding the 
newcomers to themselves'. 
127 Tuplin 2004b: 266 ff. See Hell. 3.2.21 ff. for Xenophon on the Elean War. Tuplin 
(2004b: 255-57) provides details of the estate and a description of its probable location; 
Cartledge (1987: 60) and Lendle (1995: 316) respectively show the site on sketches of 
the north-west Peloponnese. See also the Barrington Atlas map 58 (Talbert 2000), and 
the bibliography provided by Bowen (1998: 3, n. 11). 
128 Wood (1964: 36-37) thinks that after Koroneia, Xenophon was 'without doubt 
engaged in military missions for his foster city over the next six or seven years'. Lee 
(2005: 44) believes that he was granted the estate in 387, but does not explain where 
the date comes from. Arguments for Xenophon continuing in active service, like those 
deployed to support his participation in earlier wars, tend to be based on the detail of 
his descriptions, here of campaigns in the Corinthian War: see Hell. 4.5, 6. 
129 Anderson (1974: 165) thinks that by about 393 Xenophon was settled in Skillous 
with his wife, but continued in Spartan service. On a reading of An. 5.3.7, Green (1994: 
217) assumes that Xenophon was living at Skillous in 392. 'All we know for sure from 
this passage is that Megabyzus visited Xenophon at Skillous in 392...The date is 
certified by the fact that Megabyzus was in Olympia…to attend the Games: the first 
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There is somewhat less uncertainty about when Xenophon left Skillous, 
although he does not make reference to leaving his estate in his writings. The 
Battle of Leuktra in 371 ended Spartan hegemony in Greece and the Eleans 
duly moved to reclaim their former territory, a situation that probably obliged 
Xenophon to leave.130  
 
On his own account, given as a flash-forward in his narrative of the parabasis 
(5.3.5-13), Xenophon's time at Skillous seems to have been idyllic. Out of his 
share of money from a sale of slaves on the Black Sea, he built a temple to 
Artemis (a smaller scale copy of the one at Ephesus), and he organised an 
annual festival in her honour; together with his sons, he hunted wild animals 
and cultivated fruit trees. This view, reproduced affectionately by Diogenes 
Laertios (2.53), may be overly romantic, for there would have been hard work 
done too. Making a success of the land will have required an efficient oikos and 
constant attention from the landowner (we might suppose that the material for 
Oikonomikos, Xenophon's essay on estate management, is based at least in 
part on his experience here);131 moreover, it seems probable that it was at 
Skillous that Xenophon sat down to write in earnest.132 Then again, there may 
be a more serious problem with the description. It is, as remarked, idyllic, and 
with Anabasis replete with exemplars this raises the question whether this, too, 
is not a form of ideal representation. In Part 1 of the next chapter I suggest that 
it is, and that the fruits described are to be understood as the result of a well-
lived life. Xenophon's fortune in receiving this bounty at once confirms him as a 
just and good person, and holds out the same prospect for others who would 
follow a virtuous path (cf. An. 3.1.43).  
 
                                                                                                                                
Olympiad after the year 394 was the 97th, which fell in 392.' However if we give any 
credence to the arguments that Xenophon did not move to Skillous following Koroneia 
and campaigned with Agesilaos into the 380s (see Underhill 1900: lxxxi), then the visit 
could have taken place in 388, or even later. 
130 See Diogenes Laertios 2.53. Pausanias (5.6.6) says that the Eleans tried Xenophon 
for receiving land from the Spartans, but that they pardoned him, and he remained on 
the estate for the rest of his life. Badian (2004: 38) suggests that Xenophon might later 
have been given the chance to return to his estate, and that he would 'certainly have 
accepted such an offer if it was made'. 
131 See Pomeroy 1994: 5-8; Macleod 2008: 14. Wood (1964: 65) thinks that 
Iskhomakhos in the philosophical text is Xenophon himself. 
132 As a notable comparison, it was in mature years that another contemporary 
traveller, Ktesias of Knidos, commenced his literary career. On Ktesias see further 
Chapter 3.1.3. 
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In Anabasis Xenophon speaks of returning to Athens on a number of occasions 
yet there is no evidence that he ever did so.133 Diogenes says that after being 
forced to leave Skillous he travelled to Corinth and that he died there at an 
advanced age (2.53, 56).134 However he also writes that the decree of exile 
against Xenophon was repealed (2.59),135 and on this basis, and in light of the 
Atheno-centric character of Poroi and Hipparkhikos, both written not earlier than 
the 360s, it has been argued that Xenophon did return to his home city.136 
Additional support for this view is said to be furnished by the outpouring of 
eulogies to Xenophon's son after his death at Mantinea in 362, this marking 'a 
strong link with Athens at this time'.137 But it does not seem to be safe to infer 
that: (i.) the aforementioned works had to be written in Athens; (ii.) praises for 
Xenophon's sons would not have been written had he been absent from the city 
and no longer an exile; and (iii) Xenophon returned home when the decree of 
banishment was lifted (if indeed there was ever a formal repeal). If in his 
departure from Athens there was a hint of haste, there was every reason for his 
return to be on his own terms. It is also the case, as Anderson remarks, that 
had Xenophon moved back to Athens we would expect to have anecdotes 
about his personal contact with prominent individuals in the city.138 
 
                                            
133 Returning home: 3.2.26, 6.2.13, 7.1.4, 7.6.11, 7.6.33, 7.7.57; and see note 183 
below. 
134 Passages in Hellenika, notably 7.1.18-19, are taken by some to furnish evidence 
that Xenophon was present in Corinth in the 360s (see e.g. Cartledge 1987: 61), 
although others counter that the same work shows it was unlikely he was there (see 
Higgins 1977: 128). 
135 This is thought to have happened either after the King's Peace c. 387 or at some 
time in the early 360s; in any event not later than 362, when his sons were fighting for 
Athens in the Mantineian War. There is some question about whether or not a decree 
would have been needed to rescind the exile: see Tuplin 1987: 67-68. For discussions 
on the issue and possible dates see further Cawkwell 1972: 15, Cartledge 1987: 61, 
Higgins 1977: 128, 175, Waterfield 1990: 7, Green 1994: 218-9, Bowen 1998: 3. 
136 See Delebecque 1957: 334, Wood 1964: 37, Higgins 1977: 128, Waterfield 1990: 7, 
Badian 2004: 42, Macleod 2008: 11, and Thomas 2009: xx. Contra Breitenbach (1967: 
2501) who considers it inconceivable that Xenophon ever returned to Athens. 
137 Humble 2002: 84. 
138 Anderson 1986. Note as well Worthington (1999: 20) on the case of Dinarkhos, 
which is similar except in inverse: 'we do not know when, how or where Dinarkhos died. 
A move back to Corinth would, one might expect, have prompted a reference in 
Dionysius' careful account, as indeed would a violent end to his life or disgrace in a 
trial, so Dinarkhos may well have died of old age while still living in Athens.' I am 
personally inclined to the view of Breitenbach above. 
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In the end what we have is the account of Diogenes and the doubtful story by 
Pausanias about the Eleans inviting Xenophon back to Skillous.139 In the 
absence of any evidence to the contrary, there is no compelling reason why 
Diogenes should be lightly disregarded. 
 
The last dateable event in Xenophon's works is the Third Sacred War (Por. 5.9), 
which broke out in late 356. It is widely believed that he died shortly after this. 
Assuming that he was born around the start of the Peloponnesian War, he 
would have been in his seventies. 
 
 
6. DATE OF COMPOSITION OF ANABASIS 
 
It seems probable that, notwithstanding its vividness, Anabasis was composed 
long after the events of 401-399 which it describes. Notably the author's 
description at 5.3.7-13 of life at Skillous, nostalgic in tone, and using the 
imperfect tense, suggests that it was written after he had left his estate (c. 371), 
though it might as well have been a work in progress when he left. This gap in 
time between authorship and event is one which needs to be central to 
considerations of the work's character. In broad terms, it marks the text as a 
product of mature years and provides support for a view argued for in the 
dissertation that it is part of a single literary project — rather than, as an 'early' 
date would suggest, a work of reportage centring on a personal adventure. 
More specifically, as Lee has pointed out, the probability of late authorship 
draws attention to the presence of a strong, indeed a pressing, writing 
motivation.140 In this final section of the chapter I examine evidence for the 
dating of Anabasis and seek to establish a window of time for its composition.141 
Before this, the chronology of Xenophon's other writings is briefly looked at. 
                                            
139 Pausanias 5.6.6. On this see Humble 2002: 85. 
140 Lee (2005: 45) points out that there were many things going on in Greece in the 
360s (as there were in the preceding decades), and Xenophon, too, had other writing 
projects: 'Why bother with the Anabasis?' 
141 Sekunda (2009: 1) suggests that Xenophon may have been continuously writing 
down and revising his thoughts, publishing particular works as profitable opportunities 
arose. While this hypothesis does reasonably in explaining incongruities in individual 
works, it does not take sufficient account of dominant themes and interests which 
underpin the corpus, and which probably render it the product of a more closely defined 
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Xenophon is known to have written fourteen books, all of which are extant 
(although it is unlikely it cannot be excluded that he wrote additional pieces of 
which no traces survive). The task of establishing a chronology for these has 
proved to be difficult, and not uncontroversial. The internal evidence, and the 
limited biographical information, rarely allow for any solid assertions on the date 
of authorship of individual works; several of these, moreover, are thought to 
have been written spasmodically.142 Specific historical references and 
circumstances do, nonetheless, enable some works to be loosely dated — or at 
least the passages in question to be so. Thus, mention of the Theban 'Sacred 
Band', formed around 378, and unfavourable comparison of the same to elite 
Spartan warriors, assigns the Symposion (8.34-35) to a window closing at 
Leuctra, 378-371. Hipparkhikos, with its particular Athenian interest, has been 
linked to the post-Leuctra period and improved Atheno-Spartan relations, 
perhaps to the period 366-362. Kyroupaideia 8.8.3-4 was certainly written after 
399, and probably after the Satraps' Revolt of 361. Hellenika 6.4.37 was written 
after Tisiphonos took power in 357/6; Agesilaos postdates the Spartan king's 
death in 362/1, and the Poroi 5.9 reference to the Third Sacred War indicates 
an authorship date (shortly) after 356. The picture which emerges is of a mature 
body of work inspired and shaped by the author's extensive life experiences, 
and in particular his early association with Socrates the Athenian.143 
 
                                                                                                                                
timeframe. With most writers, I consider that Anabasis was written as a whole; see 
Humble 1997: 26-27. 
142 Delebecque 1957 made one of the earliest attempts to set down a chronology, 
though his effort has not met with wide approval. Higgins (1977: 131-3) asserts that 
most of Xenophon's works were written between 368-354, which I think is not unlikely, 
except it is somehow counter-intuitive not to see him taking advantage of conditions in 
Skillous to write. Most scholars are of the view that Xenophon composed his works late 
in life, even if they disagree on the relative chronology. See for instance Humble 1997, 
Krentz 1989, Cawkwell 2004. As remarked in Chapter 1 Hellenika is widely believed to 
have been composed in two separate parts — 1-2.3.10, and 2.3.11-7.5.27: see 
MacLaren 1934b, Cawkwell 1979: 18, Cartledge 1987: 65 ff., Tuplin 1993: 11. For 
unitarian arguments see Higgins 1977: 99-101, and Gray 1991. 
143 Tuplin (1998: 781) remarks on the intimate relationship between Xenophon's works 
and his personal experiences. Studies which consider the dating of particular works 
include Aalders 1953 on Hiero, and Humble 2004b on Lak. Lipka (2002: 4) thinks the 
question of chronology is 'not so essential for the understanding of Xenophon's writings 
as is sometimes claimed'. 
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6.1. Internal Evidence 
 
An. 5.3.6. Agesilaos: After 394 
 
Accounting for the share of the money he received from the sale of slaves on 
the journey, Xenophon explains that he left the portion due to Artemis with the 
sacred officer at Ephesus, 'when he went away from Asia with Agesilaos on the 
march against the Boiotians' (ὅη' ἀπῄεη ζὺλ Ἀγεζηιάῳ ἐθ ηῆο Ἀζίαο ηὴλ εἰο 
Βνησηνὺο ὁδόλ, 5.3.6). Agesilaos, if not Xenophon himself, fought at Koroneia 
in 394, so the text (or at least this part of it) cannot be dated before this point. 
 
An. 1.8.26. Ktesias: After 393/2 
 
There is particular, and arguably some circumstantial evidence, to show that 
Xenophon drew on the Persika of Ktesias of Knidos. At 1.8.26 he cites a battle 
report by Ktesias, who was the king's physician at Kounaxa; at 1.8.27 he refers 
to him again, now as a source for casualty numbers on the King's side. Some 
consider as well that Xenophon's account of the events surrounding the 
accession of Artaxerxes to the throne (1.1.3) is based on Ktesias,144 and 
Cawkwell has argued that Xenophon used a rudimentary route-guide contained 
in Book 23 of the Persika in the construction of his march record.145 There is to 
be added to this the fact that Plutarch was in no doubt that Xenophon had read 
the work of Ktesias: 'for he makes mention of him, and had clearly read his 
books' (κέκλεηαη γὰξ αὐηνῦ θαὶ ηνῖο βηβιίνηο ηνύηνηο ἐληεηπρεθὼο δῆιόο ἐζηηλ, 
Artaxerxes 13.6, trans. Perrin, modified). His assertion may have been on the 
basis of the textual evidence cited above, although he may also have been privy 
to another ancient source now lost. 
 
Ktesias' Persika covers events down to 397; given its substantial size (twenty-
three books, to compare with the two of Hellanikos and nine of Herodotus), it is 
unlikely to have been published until some years after.146 A terminus post quem 
                                            
144 Bigwood 1983: 347; Almagor 2009: 3-4. 
145 Cawkwell 1972: 21-22. Tuplin is critical of this view (1991: 47). 
146 Ktesias seems to have left the court around 397 to act for the King in affairs on the 
sea-coast (see Plutarch, Artaxerxes 21.1-30; cf. Diodoros 2.32.4). Judging from 
Photios (see following) he remained connected to events at court for some years after. 
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of 393/2 is supplied by Photios, who in his epitome of the work writes: 'And the 
grave of Klearchos, eight years after the time he was killed, was discovered in 
the midst of palm trees, which Parysatis in secret had had planted by her 
eunuchs' (θαὶ ηὸ ρ῵κα δὲ ηνῦ Κιεάξρνπ, δη' ἐη῵λ ὀθηώ, κεζηὸλ ἐθάλε θνηλίθσλ 
νὓο ἦλ θξύθα Παξύζαηηο, θαζ' ὃλ θαηξὸλ ἐθεῖλνο ἐηειεύηεζε, δη' εὐλνύρσλ 
θαηαρώζαζα, Bibl. 72.44b.16-19, trans. author). In the opening of his epitome 
he writes that Ktesias disagreed with Xenophon on some points, but this was 
probably written by Photios with both works at hand and is his own 
judgement.147 
 
An. 5.3.7-13. Halcyon Days at Skillous: After 372 
 
In this passage Xenophon provides us with a glimpse of how his later life 
unfolded. In addition to the manner of his description of Skillous (see further 
below), the estate where he was settled by the Spartans, his statement that he 
hunted with his sons (5.3.10) provides dateable material. At 7.6.34, in a speech 
to the army defending his involvement with the Thracian chief, Seuthes, he 
indicates that at that time — winter 400/399 — he had no sons; presumably — 
though by no means certainly — he had no time for domestic affairs in the years 
that immediately followed, campaigning hard as he was in Asia Minor with the 
Spartans. His settlement at Skillous in the Peloponnese, probably in the late 
390s, presented a practical opportunity for him to begin a family.148 On the 
question of what age his sons would have had to be in order to hunt, it can be 
remarked that they would not likely have been initiated into this adult world 
                                            
147 Dating of Persika: see Bigwood 1978, Lenfant 2007, Stronk 2010, Llewellyn-Jones 
and Robson 2010. 
148 On the basis of the widely held view that Xenophon was born in the early 420s, he 
would then have been in his mid-30s. Hesiod, an early fount of solid practical advice, 
recommended that a man should marry at about thirty, Erga 695-697. 
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before they were in their teens,149 so the early 370s could be a terminus post 
quem for the date of authorship.150 
 
Xenophon's nostalgic description of Skillous, and the fact that he uses the 
imperfect tense throughout, could be taken as evidence for a still later date.151 
The territory where his estate was situated had belonged to the Eleans and was 
retaken by them following the Battle of Leuktra in 371, an event which is 
believed to have forced Xenophon and his family to leave. On the basis of this 
evidence some have argued that the work must have been written after 371, 
and written somewhere else.152 However, it seems at least as plausible to 
regard Anabasis as being a work in progress at this juncture: its thoughtful 
construction and abundance of accurate travel and geographic detail point to a 
work that would not have been finished quickly.153 
 
Yet as a piece of evidence for date, and indeed place, there may be a problem 
with this passage. As is shown in the next chapter (2.1), exemplars are a key 
literary device in Xenophon's construction of the text; his representation of 
people, events, and even places, is often driven by his wish to illustrate a 
leadership lesson, or reinforce a point about moral behaviour, rather than 
serving the aim of realistic portrayal. It follows from this view that the historicity 
of the above passage cannot be taken for granted.154 As argued in Chapter 2.1, 
what I consider we have in this flash-forward in the narrative is Xenophon 
                                            
149 Xenophon makes references to this matter in other writings, though nothing really 
conclusive can be drawn from these. Cf. Kyn. 2.1: 'The first pursuit, therefore, that a 
young man just out of his boyhood should take up is hunting' (Πξ῵ηνλ κὲλ νὖλ ρξὴ 
ἐιζεῖλ ἐπὶ ηὸ ἐπηηήδεπκα ηὸ η῵λ θπλεγεζίσλ ηὸλ ἤδε ἐθ παηδὸο ἀιιάηηνληα ηὴλ ἡιηθίαλ); 
in the Kyroupaideia (1.2.8) he writes that in the Persian system, boys are enrolled into 
the class of young men at 16 or 17. Cf. Plato who has Persian boys commencing riding 
lessons at seven (Alkibiades 121e). 
150 Breitenbach (1967: 1640) noted that the boys could have been as young as ten; 
coupling this with the possibility that they could have been born in 399, the evidence 
relating to the sons does not, strictly, allow the composition date to be pushed further 
down than the early 380s. 
151 See Cawkwell 2004: 48; Waterfield 2006: 189. MacLaren, however, has made the 
point that the use of the imperfect does not rule out the text having been written at 
Skillous (1934a: 244). 
152 See Cawkwell 2004: 47-8, S.R. Bassett 1999: 475, Anderson 1974: 173. 
153 An ancient wit is said to have remarked of Isokrates, a contemporary of Xenophon's, 
that it took him longer to write his treatise on panhellenism than it did Alexander to 
conquer the whole of Asia. Cf. Isokrates Panegyrikos 14. 
154 Contra Humble (2006: 43), who considers this 'one of the few solid autobiographical 
details we have about Xenophon outside the time frame of the Anabasis'. 
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indicating the result of his good actions on campaign (and in the following years 
of his life). A number of the alternative readings of the passage referred to in 
Chapter 2.1 support the argument that Skillous plays an essential literary role in 
the text. 
 
The above suggestion need not mean that Xenophon did not live at Skillous, 
whether for a short period of time or for the entirety of his life post-Koroneia. 
There is no conclusive evidence either way. That he did live there is probable, 
given that his banishment from Athens and period of service to Sparta made it 
likely that he would have settled in an area within the Spartan sphere of 
influence, and these facts in turn make it reasonable to accept his own 
statement that Sparta settled him there (5.3.7); that they placed him in a 
disputed border area, a fact that Xenophon does not allude to, makes the 
arrangement the more plausible as it achieves several ends simultaneously. In 
sum, while it is likely that Xenophon resided at Skillous, the paradigmatic quality 
of the passage in Anabasis undermines its value as chronological (and 
historical) evidence.155 
 
Hell. 3.1.2. Themistogenes of Syracuse: relative dating 
 
In the opening of Book 3 of his Hellenika Xenophon offers up what appears to 
be a remarkable revelation: 'The story of how Cyrus gathered an army and with 
it marched up-country against his brother, how the battle between them turned 
out, how Cyrus was killed, and how after this the Greeks made their way safely 
back to the sea — all this has been written by Themistogenes of Syracuse' 
(3.1.2). This statement provides evidence for the relative chronology of 
Anabasis, for it indicates that the work — regardless of whether or not 
Themistogenes is a pseudonym — predates (the second part of) Hellenika. 
Unfortunately this does not provide a great help, as the task of dating the latter 
is equally problematic and no solid inferences about the date of authorship of 
                                            
155 Later authors did not doubt that Xenophon had lived at Skillous: see Diogenes 
Laertios 2.52; Plutarch, On Exile 10, 14. Pausanias (5.6.6) relates that Xenophon was 
allowed to return to Skillous by the Eleans after being tried and acquitted by the 
Olympic Council on a charge of receiving the land from the Spartans; he himself was 
shown what was said to be Xenophon's tomb, though this whole story may be Elean 
propaganda. See Humble 1997: 16 citing Breitenbach (1967). 
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our work can be drawn from it; even if we make an assumption (by the 
reference to Tisiphonos at 6.4.37) that the entire work dates to 356, this is 
almost coterminous with the author's death.156 
 
I would like to offer an alternative explanation for Hell. 3.1.2. The passage could 
mark a point in Xenophon's conceptual development of Anabasis, this being a 
work in progress at the time he was composing (this section of) Hellenika. As 
the literary aspect of the former grew, he decided to publish a companion piece 
that would provide the broad context for his writing agenda; as indicated in his 
description of it, this would be a threadbare narrative of events, and would be 
written under a pseudonym with the aim of avoiding confusion between the two 
works. In the event, this lesser project never came to fruition, for it almost 
certainly would have left some trace in the ancient literary record, the later 
Souda excepted. In his final version Xenophon included the detail which at this 
juncture of Hellenika he had thought to commit to a companion work.157 In this 
reading Anabasis postdates Hell. 3.1.2. (The question of the pseudonym is 
looked at further in Chapter 3.) 
 
An. 6.4.8. Response to Isokrates: After 380 
 
Isokrates, a contemporary of Xenophon's,158 published his treatise on 
panhellenism around 380 or later.159 Passages in Anabasis have been linked to 
ones in the Panegyrikos, suggesting that Xenophon may have had some form 
of engagement with this work.160 At Pan. 146, for instance, Isokrates says that 
                                            
156 For the dating of Hellenika see note 142 above. 
157 Anderson (1974: 83) suggests that there were two editions of Anabasis, the one 
attributed to Themistogenes covering the same ground as 'our Anabasis I-IV'; Tsagalis 
(2009: 454) posits something very similar, with the later work expanding and improving 
on the earlier. 
158 Xenophon and Isokrates were probably born within a few years of each other in the 
same district of Attica; the evidence from their work suggests they shared similar views 
on political philosophy, both being advocates of enlightened monarchy as an effective 
form of government. See further Gray 2000 and 2007. 
159 Cf. Pan. 126: θαὶ λῦλ ὆ιπλζίνπο θαὶ Φιεηαζίνπο πνιηνξθνῦζηλ ('and now they are 
laying siege to Olynthos and Phleious'). Hellenika dates these sieges to 382 (5.2.11) 
and 380 (5.2.8) respectively. 
160 See further Dillery 1995: 80. Millender (2009: 22) considers that the authors, owing 
to the 'strong resemblances between their accounts of the Cyreans and their mutual 
interest in the issue of friendship, especially of the Spartan variety…were "in 
conversation"'. Cawkwell (1972: 16-17) sees no literary relationship. 
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Cyrus's Greek mercenaries 'were not picked troops, but men who, owing to the 
stress of circumstances, were unable to live in their own towns'. This suggestion 
of a ragbag, rootless army, could well have irked Xenophon, and he may be 
responding at An. 6.4.8 (it could as well be Isokrates responding to this 
comment, which would make his work postdate Xenophon's): 
 
For most of the soldiers had sailed out to undertake this service 
for pay, not because they lacked a livelihood, but having heard 
of Cyrus's virtue; some brought other men with them, and some 
even spent money of their own on the enterprise. Still others 
had left their fathers and mothers, and some even their 
children, intending to return again after having earned money 
for them, all having heard that others with Cyrus were doing 
very well. Being of this sort, then, they yearned to be safe in 
Hellas (6.4.8).161 
  
It is worth noting that in the same Panegyrikos passage above Isokrates goes 
on to comment favourably that, when the Persians seized the Greek High 
Command, 'hoping by this lawless act to throw their army into confusion…the 
soldiers not only stood together but bore their misfortune nobly (θαι῵ο)' (148); 
and then at 149: 'Let me sum up the whole matter: these men did not set out to 
get plunder or to capture a town, but took the field against the king himself'. 
 
Yet the stain of his earlier disparaging remark is not fully removed, and with 
Xenophon's propensity for apologia, there must be a strong possibility that he 
took Pan. 146 hard and is responding to it at An. 6.4.8. As I show in Part 2 of 
the next chapter, Xenophon furnishes lessons in the handling of mercenaries 
through his narrative, and shows that the paramount driving force behind their 
behaviour is self-interest; furthermore, he takes trouble to distance himself from 
the mercenaries on the march, emphasising at several points, in different ways, 
                                            
161 η῵λ γὰξ ζηξαηηση῵λ νἱ πιεῖζηνη ἦζαλ νὐ ζπάλεη βίνπ ἐθπεπιεπθόηεο ἐπὶ ηαύηελ ηὴλ 
κηζζνθνξάλ, ἀιιὰ ηὴλ Κύξνπ ἀξεηὴλ ἀθνύνληεο, νἱ κὲλ θαὶ ἄλδξαο ἄγνληεο, νἱ δὲ θαὶ 
πξνζαλεισθόηεο ρξήκαηα, θαὶ ηνύησλ ἕηεξνη ἀπνδεδξαθόηεο παηέξαο θαὶ κεηέξαο, νἱ 
δὲ θαὶ ηέθλα θαηαιηπόληεο ὡο ρξήκαη' αὐηνῖο θηεζάκελνη ἥμνληεο πάιηλ, ἀθνύνληεο θαὶ 
ηνὺο ἄιινπο ηνὺο παξὰ Κύξῳ πνιιὰ θαὶ ἀγαζὰ πξάηηεηλ. ηνηνῦηνη ὄληεο ἐπόζνπλ εἰο 
ηὴλ Ἑιιάδα ζῴδεζζαη. 6.4.8. 
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that he is not driven by the desire for profit, this being the guiding light of the 
mercenary body (see Chapter 3.2.4). It is the fact that he does not generally 
portray them in glowing light that makes 6.4.8 stand out:162 according to this 
description Xenophon is amongst a community of virtual kaloi kagathoi, a hard-
working body of men who, if not seeking personal development, are pursuing 
the (important Xenophontic) virtue of self-sufficiency.163 This incongruous 
quality of the passage, coupled with the apologetic character of the work, 
indicate that it could very plausibly be a response to the Panegyrikos, so 
providing a terminus post quem for Anabasis.164 The possibility that Xenophon 
was separately responding to the sentiment of the Panegyrikos is looked at in 
Section 6.2 below. 
 
                                            
162 Mercenaries behaving badly: 1.2.11, demanding money from Cyrus; 1.4.12, the men 
refuse to proceed unless given more money; 4.4.14, burning of houses in Armenian 
villages; 5.4.16-18, unsanctioned raid; 5.7.12-25, murders at Kerasos; 6.2.4-7, 
threatening a Greek city (Herakleia); 7.1.15-19, storming of Byzantium. 
163 McKechnie (1989: 80) prefers what Xenophon says in 6.4.8 to the characterisation 
of Isokrates; Azoulay (2004) too thinks there is something in the honourable depiction, 
arguing that Xenophon is distinguishing between two categories of Greeks, one which 
followed from noble motives, the other only out of desire for profit. While this argument 
has some appeal, Azoulay's conclusion that, in this regard, 'the Ten Thousand cannot 
be considered as a homogenous group' (2004: 297), is misleading in that it may 
suggest that the proportion of men belonging to each category was comparable if not 
equal. There can be little doubt that those joining Cyrus for the promise of fortune 
formed the largest group by far; Roy's (2004: 287-288) argument that the ultimate aim 
of the mercenaries was to secure long term employment in Cyrus's garrisons is 
consistent with this view. Neither is it affected by the status of the men prior to their 
joining Cyrus: that they might have come from modestly prosperous backgrounds is not 
a proof that they did not seek to increase their material means. Cf. van Soesbergen 
1982/3: 134-135; McKechnie 1989: 79-80; Roy 2004: 271, 275-6. 
164 Cf. An. 3.1.10: this earlier statement also represents the men in positive light and 
could also be taken as a response. 'When they came to Kilikia, however, it then 
seemed clear to all (πᾶζηλ) that that the expedition was against the King. Although they 
feared the journey and were unwilling, the majority (νἱ πνιινὶ) nevertheless followed 
along out of shame both before each other and before Cyrus'. However, the actual 
events at Kilikia as narrated by Xenophon in Book 1 - the men refuse to go on and 
agree to do so only after Cyrus has increased their pay - contradict this idea of a noble 
motive on the part of the majority. A further confusing signal regarding Xenophon's 
attitude to the mercenaries is found in a reference he makes in Hellenika. On the 
Maeander Plain, Derkylidas prepares to face the armies of Pharnabazos and 
Tissaphernes; the former wishes to attack the Greeks, who are apparently in some 
disorder, but the latter opposes, recalling 'how the Greek army of Cyrus's supporters 
had fought with and defeated the Persians' (3.2.18). In what may be an echo of 
Thucydides' moving tribute to Brasidas (4.81), Xenophon adds that Tissaphernes 
'believed that all Greek forces were similar to those'. 
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An. passim. Negative assessment of Sparta 
 
As is demonstrated in later sections of the dissertation, Xenophon's portrayals 
of Spartan figures of authority in Anabasis are frequently negatively slanted. 
While emphasising the state's paramount status among Greek poleis in the 
aftermath of the Peloponnesian War, he at the same time questions the moral 
basis of this authority by revealing a set of negative character traits — 
selfishness, deceitfulness, and cruelty included — exhibited by its 
representatives abroad.165 Given his longstanding and close links to several 
senior Spartans, and the likelihood that following his return from Asia Minor in 
394 he resided in an area under Spartan control, this expression would seem to 
need to be located at terminal points of these relationships.166 Arguments 
similar to those used for the dating of the censorious Chapter 14 of Lak. might 
also be used here, except that Xenophon's treatment of Spartan failings in 
Anabasis is measurably more subtle:167 although a close reading of the work 
must leave at least a sense of uneasiness about the integrity of the Spartan 
leaders depicted, in his narrative of the retreat Xenophon is implicitly admiring 
of the state's military prowess, and his formal assessment of the man who has 
succeeded in extricating them from the clutches of the King in Babylonia is 
creditable, if not glowing (cf. 2.6.1-15 for the obituary of Klearchos). It might be 
said, then, that Xenophon's skill as a writer enabled him to sidestep potential 
                                            
165 Sparta as leader of Greece: cf. 3.2.37, 6.6.9, 6.6.12, 7.1.27, 7.1.30; best leaders 
7.6.37. Examples of negative traits. Self-centredness: Klearchos persuades Greek 
generals to go to tent of Tissaphernes believing he will be able to remove those who 
are threatening his personal authority (2.5.27-30). Deceitful: Anaxibios makes false 
promises of pay to the Cyreans at Byzantium (6.1.16, 7.1.3-7). Cruel: Aristarchos sells 
more than 400 Cyrean sick and wounded at Byzantium into slavery (7.2.6). 
166 Of the Spartan leaders whom he was associated with, Xenophon was closest to, 
and seemingly the most enamoured of, Agesilaos (cf. his encomium, written 360/359). 
His admiration for the king might have acted as a restraint on the airing of his views, as 
too could the nature of the relationship. One view of what this was is transmitted by 
Plutarch. In his Agesilaos (20) he says that the king ordered, ἐθέιεπε, Xenophon to 
send for his sons to have them reared at Sparta. If Xenophon's freedom to act was 
limited, then it is reasonable to assume that his latitude to write freely was too — 
whether he wrote in Sparta, at Skillous, or elsewhere within the Spartan-controlled 
world. The death of Agesilaos in 360 could, thus, provide a terminus post quem for 
authorship. It is possible that at that stage Xenophon was resident at Corinth (Diogenes 
Laertios 2.53, 56), or further afield (Athenaios, Deipnosophistai 10.427 ff., has 
Xenophon Socratizing with a Dionysius at a lavish dinner table in Sicily). 
167 For the particularly problematic dating of Lak. see Cartledge 1987: 56-57, and 
especially Humble's excellent treatments 1997: 39-44 and 2004b: 219-220. 
77 
 
restrictions on his ability to express his views freely.168 The question to be 
addressed here is whether his views are rooted in the experience of the march, 
in which case they can conceivably be dated to any time after the event, or 
whether they are a retrospective representation of Sparta inspired by some later 
event(s) or circumstance(s). In the former case the evidence of Anabasis shows 
that Xenophon had reason to be circumspect about Sparta as early as 401;169 
however, his subsequent serving with Sparta, and personal association with 
Agesilaos, would suggest that disillusionment came late. One possible source 
of this, the Peace of Antalkidas, is considered below. 
 
6.2. External Evidence 
 
External evidence for the date of the work is thin. Some consider that the figure 
of 6,000 given by Isokrates in the Panegyrikos (146) as the number of retreating 
Cyreans derives from An. 7.7.23, which would thus furnish a terminus ante 
quem of c. 380.170 Xenophon, though, has already stated (5.3.3) that the 
number who survived the march down to the sea was 8600; moreover, even if 
Anabasis was in circulation Isokrates could have obtained his figure from 
another source, or it may simply be a suitably low (to amplify the weakness of 
Persia) estimate.171 His treatise, nonetheless, may be helpful in shedding light 
on the chronology question. An alternative approach to this problem would be to 
try to link prominent concerns in Anabasis to particular historical circumstances. 
Notwithstanding his exile,172 and (putative) long residence in an idyllic country 
retreat, by the evidence of his writings Xenophon remained connected to events 
and currents of thought in the Greek world.173 Several of the major concerns 
                                            
168 Millender (2009: 25) similarly argues that Xenophon's portrayal was subtle enough 
for him to get away with the criticisms he makes. 
169 Noreen Humble has made this point, and notes as well that what Xenophon says in 
Hellenika 'is often far from laudatory' (2004b: 220). 
170 See Breitenbach 1967: 1641-2. As noted Isokrates' statement at 146 that the 
Greeks were not picked troops (discussed above) could conceivably be a response to 
An. 6.4.8. 
171 This last explanation is preferred by both Parke 1933: 29 and van Soesbergen 
1982/3: 134. 
172 The cause of Xenophon's exile is doubtless a major factor in shaping the content 
and character of some of his writings; his apologetic agenda in Anabasis is examined 
in detail in Chapter 3. See Dillery (2007) for an exploration of the impact of exile on the 
Greek historian. 
173 S.R. Bassett concludes in her study of his use of Ktesias in Anabasis that Xenophon 
'was influenced by earlier authors, contemporary authors, and by stories that were 
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recurring across his writings have strong contemporary resonances. For 
instance, in his portrayal in Anabasis of an empire 'strong in its extent of territory 
and number of people, but weak in the length of its roads and the separation of 
its forces, if someone should make war quickly' (1.5.9), there is an apparent 
engagement with the contemporary 'Panhellenist' agitation for a crusade 
against Persia championed by Isokrates. Elsewhere Xenophon thinks of 
founding a colony, the aim being 'to acquire both land and power for Greece' 
(5.6.15). While such a sentiment might not have been remarkable if expressed 
at the turn of the fourth century, it is notable that it chimes with popular feeling in 
the 380s.174 
 
As has been mentioned, a marked feature of the work is its negative portrayal of 
Spartan leaders. While Xenophon could have had different motivations for this, 
one could be linked to the pronounced anti-Sparta and anti-Persia feelings that 
prevailed in Greece, and particularly Athens, following the King's Peace of 
387/6 (effectively a deal between Sparta and Artaxerxes to limit Athenian 
ambitions). Taking the Panegyrikos and the Olympic oration of Lysias to be 
literary manifestations of this popular sentiment, it is possible that Xenophon is 
reacting to these in his Anabasis in his careful distancing of himself from both 
Sparta and Persia.175 In the two sections which follow, I highlight passages in 
the Panegyrikos which, if they are not an entirely accurate reflection of public 
                                                                                                                                
circulating through Persian and Greek society' (1999: 483). Pomeroy (1994: 15-16) 
thinks that Xenophon had a library at Skillous. Had he indeed lived there, not far from 
Olympia, he could have attended up to half a dozen Olympic Games. Cf. Tuplin 2004b: 
263; Casson 1994: 77-79. L'Allier (2009: 10) remarks that there was a philosophical 
school (of Phedon) at Elis, and a Pythagorean sect at Phlious in the Argolid. Kahn 
(1996: 30) in contrast, seeking to establish Xenophon as a marginal Socratic figure, 
characterises Skillous 'as a remote village'.  
174 For detailed consideration of panhellenism in Anabasis see Rood 2004a; see also 
Dillery 1995: 59-63, and Cawkwell 2004: 64-67. Tuplin (2007a: 27) comments that 
there are 'complex issues surrounding Anabasis and fourth century panhellenism', and 
suggests that Xenophon is responding in a rational way to Isokrates's take on the role 
of mercenaries (27-28). In the failed colony project Howland (2000: 881, 883) sees 
engagement with Plato's Republic. As part of this discussion it is perhaps worth taking 
note of the maxim that the use of the past is intimately connected with the present. 
175 Lysias' oration (33) was delivered in 384. While these pieces, to a certain degree at 
least, must reflect sentiment, like all effective oratory they will also have been influential 
in forming and directing the popular response. Isokrates, who on his own reckoning 
had more students in his school than all other sophists of the day put together (Antid. 
39-40), included among his pupils Ephoros, Theopompos, Hypereides and Timotheos. 
The Panegyrikos extended his popularity abroad; it may have inspired the Second 
Athenian Confederacy of 378. 
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sentiment at Athens in this period, will have been in wide circulation and widely 
influential. In such a climate it should not be surprising if Xenophon, by then an 
exile from his city, was stirred to explain his associations with both Sparta and 
Persia. 
 
Sparta's betrayal of (Pan)Hellenism 
 
Early in his history of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides has Brasidas say to 
the Akanthians that the Spartans had sent him and his army out 'to validate the 
cause which we proclaimed at the beginning of the war: to fight the Athenians 
for the liberation of Greece' (4.85.1).176 In Hellenika (3.4.5, and 3.1.3-4) 
Xenophon ascribes a similar motive to Agesilaos' campaign in Asia. Yet in spite 
of their good intentions, in the Panegyrikos, reflecting on the poor present state 
of Athens' affairs, Isokrates sees fit to rear on Sparta:  
 
We may well blame the Lakedaimonians because, although in 
the beginning they entered upon the war with the avowed 
intention of freeing the Hellenes, in the end they delivered so 
many of them into bondage; and because they induced the 
Ionians to revolt from Athens, the mother city from which the 
Ionians emigrated and by whose influence they were often 
preserved from destruction, and then betrayed them to the 
barbarians (122). 
 
The betrayal referred to here is the King's Peace (or Peace of Antalkidas), 
signed in 387/6.177 According to its terms, the cities of Asia were to belong to 
the King, and those on the Greek mainland, κηθξὰο θαὶ κεγάιαο, were to be 
autonomous, with the King as enforcer of the terms. Thus the alliances which 
                                            
176 Cf. Thucydides 8.46.3 for the same goal iterated by Alkibiades: 'The Athenians 
would cooperate in a policy of enslavement, with the Aegean area subjugated to them 
and all the Greeks living in the King's territory subjugated to the King: whereas the 
Spartans were coming on the contrary as liberators, and it was not likely that when they 
were liberating Greeks from Greeks they would stop short of liberating Greeks from 
barbarians, unless the Persians managed somehow to get them out of the way soon'. 
177 Xenophon reproduces what is probably just a summary of the text at Hell. 5.1.31. 
Cf. Isokrates Pan. 120, 176. Antalkidas, a leading Spartan, and probably a political 
opponent of Agesilaos, negotiated the peace with Persia. Tuplin describes it as 'a 
remarkable achievement' for Persia (2009: 341). 
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had Athens and Thebes respectively at their cores, and the union of Argos and 
Corinth, had to be dismantled. Sparta, however, as leader of the voluntary 
Peloponnese League, did not fall under the clause, leaving her with effective 
hegemony over the mainland states. Her willingness to press home this 
supremacy deepened her unpopularity amongst the Hellenes, a situation in 
which Xenophon, settled by Sparta in the Peloponnese, may have felt decidedly 
uncomfortable, perhaps sufficiently so for him to sit down and write.178 
 
Athenian 'misobarbarism' 
 
The ultimate target of Isokrates' ire is Persia, the historical enemy of Hellas and 
of Athens in particular. The Mede/barbarian is by the early fourth century a 
defining feature of Athenian identity, the polar 'other' whose range of character 
flaws furnish the template for the ideal democratic citizen. Isokrates is at pains 
to establish a primacy for Athens on the basis of its supposed historical hostility 
towards the Asiatics: 
 
Of my own countrymen also I have a similar tale to tell. For 
towards all other peoples with whom they have been at war, 
they forget their past enmities the moment they have concluded 
peace, but toward the Asiatics they feel no gratitude even when 
they receive favours from them, so eternal is the wrath which 
they cherish against the barbarians. Again, our fathers 
condemned many to death for defection to the Medes; in our 
public assemblies even to this day, before any other business is 
transacted, the Athenians call down curses upon any citizen 
who proposes friendly overtures to the Persians (Pan. 157). 
 
Isokrates continues in the same vein for several paragraphs. While his treatise 
needs to be appreciated as a work of emotive public oratory, of propaganda for 
                                            
178 Cf. Hell. 5.3.16 and 5.4.1. Xenophon's judgement on the treaty is that it benefitted 
Sparta (Hell. 5.1.36). Ephoros (Diodoros 15.19) writes that as a result of it her 
reputation declined; Plutarch at his remove is more damming, claiming it had been 
made by Antalkidas in the interest of the King, and was a 'mockery and betrayal of 
Greece' (Artaxerxes 21.5). For other attacks on Sparta hegemony of the day see 
Isokrates Pan. 18, 80-81, 110-114, 123-132. Xenophon suggests that Sparta's zenith 
was reached in about 379, following the surrender of Olynthos (Hell. 5.3.27). 
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panhellenism, it is its public inscribing of sentiment, actual or exaggerated, that 
lends it its power. This could have been a further spur to Xenophon to defend 
himself, and as is shown in Chapter 3, there is considerable evidence in 
Anabasis to support a claim that in the work he is distancing himself from 
Persia. 
 
6.3. Conclusions 
 
The search for a date of composition for Anabasis is hampered by the dearth of 
autobiographical information in the work, and by the fact that its paradigmatic 
character renders it an inherently unreliable historical source. From internal 
evidence all that can really be asserted is that it was written after the publication 
of Ktesias' Persika in the late 390s, although a short passage in Book 6 (4.8) 
indicates, arguably, that it was written after the Panegyrikos of Isokrates, dated 
to 380. 
 
Following his return from Asia with Agesilaos in 394, Xenophon (probably) 
resided in the Peloponnese and embarked on his literary career. Reasonable 
confidence that it was in the Peloponnese and in (semi-)retirement that he 
began to write does, nonetheless, provide a broad context for the oeuvre. It was 
suggested that an approach to the chronology problem would be to match one 
or more of the themes and concerns in Anabasis with particular historical 
circumstances; through strong echoes of panhellenism, and discernible 
defences against his associations with Sparta and Persia respectively, this 
revealed the late 380s/early 370s as a plausible window of authorship. Given 
Xenophon's links with Sparta and Persia, and the fact that he was already 
exiled from Athens for one — or both — of these reasons, there can be little 
doubt but that his standing at home fell further in the period following the King's 
Peace. It is certainly plausible, then, that he chose this time, through this work, 
to distance himself from both Sparta and Persia. 
 
There are, however, a number of caveats to be taken into account with this 
approach. Firstly, there is the risk of circularity, a particular writing motivation 
being invoked to justify a time-frame, but this in turn being dependent on the 
writing motivation. Panhellenism, and apologia vis-à-vis Sparta and Persia, 
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were not the only motivations Xenophon had for writing Anabasis, and they may 
not have been the most important.179 Xenophon's negative treatment of Spartan 
leaders, furthermore, may have explanations additional, or different, to apologia. 
As argued in Chapter 2, a main preoccupation in Anabasis is styles of 
leadership, and Xenophon clearly criticises the Spartan; he could, as well, be 
critically commenting on the state's hegemony of Greece in the aftermath of the 
Peloponnesian War, an exercise that need not be tied to any particular time 
period (in support of this motivation, Books 6 and 7 especially provide an 
intimate insight into the exercise of Spartan power as she comes to terms with 
her newly acquired status in the Hellenic world). 
 
The second caveat is that a part of the problem of pinning Xenophon down, 
whether in time or to place, is his apparent aloofness, or indifference to life-
changing events. His exile from Athens, referred to only twice and apparently 
incidentally (5.3.7, 7.7.57), is one example; another is the death of his son in a 
cavalry action on the Athenian side at Mantinea in 362. 'Good men among them 
were killed', is his sole comment (Hell. 7.5.17). Doubtless Xenophon felt this 
loss keenly, as he must have the loss of his motherland, but it is a feature of his 
character and writings that he will not show us. This same outwardly 
impermeable persona would (possibly pointedly) not be responding to the sort 
of public pressure exerted by Isokrates' rhetoric. 
 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The evidence for Xenophon's life ultimately derives from two main sources: his 
own writings, and the biography of Diogenes Laertios, who had independent 
sources but drew on Xenophon's oeuvre as well. Diogenes did not interrogate 
his material well and errors and inconsistencies in his writing are common. 
While Anabasis is regarded by many as the most important document for the 
                                            
179 Cawkwell (2004: 64-67) concludes that 'panhellenism has at least tinged the 
Anabasis…but it would be wrong to think of the book as essentially panhellenist 
propaganda'. As argued in the following chapters, Xenophon's apologetic agenda is 
extensive, and is not confined to defence of himself, however important this aspect of it 
may be. In the next chapter it is demonstrated that a key concern in the work is 
instruction on military leadership. 
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author's life, as has been demonstrated in this chapter, the work may not be 
reliable in this regard. 
 
From the hard evidence, such as it is, a rough outline of Xenophon's life may be 
figured: 
 
— Born in Attica in the early years of the Peloponnesian War 
— Of landowning class, member of the Athenian cavalry 
— A follower of Socrates (although the nature and extent of his relationship with 
the philosopher is disputed) 
— 401-399. Left Attica in April/May 401 and travelled through Asia Minor, Syria, 
Mesopotamia, Eastern Anatolia, and along the Black Sea coast with the 
mercenary army of Cyrus the Younger. Became leader of the 'Cyreans' in 
Thrace at the end of the journey and returned with them to Asia to fight with 
Sparta in its campaign against Persia 
— Exiled from Athens at some point in the period 399-394 
— Returned to Greece in 394 with the Spartan king Agesilaos 
— Allotted land (by Sparta) in north-west Peloponnese; based there with his 
family (wife and two sons), probably until late 370s 
— Authored 14 (+) books, the last of which dates his death to the late 350s. 
 
This chapter has sought to generate a picture of the times in which Xenophon 
lived, with special focus on the post-war stasis and its aftermath at Athens. 
Through highlighting the circumstances in which he was brought up and lived, a 
context is established for the themes and concerns that recur in his writing. By 
any standard, the closing years of the fifth century were interesting ones, 
defined by cultural, political, and social upheaval: that Xenophon should, when 
he sat down to write in his later years, be influenced by this experience should 
not be surprising. His preoccupation with ordering — personal lives, 
households, armies, societies — may be seen as a reaction to the unstable 
environment in which he was raised. In the next chapter, his deep interest in the 
subject of leadership is examined. 
 
Xenophon was born into a landowning family and was raised in the aristocratic 
tradition of the time. His class was defined not only by its comparative wealth, 
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but by educational background, connections at home and abroad, common 
political outlook, and by a conviction of superiority, of a right to lead and to take 
part in governing the state.180 There is no evidence to suggest that Xenophon 
ever adopted views, or pursued ends, that were seriously at odds with his own 
heritage. As argued in the course of the dissertation, his positive interest in 
democracy can be attributed to his interest in political philosophy and a concern 
to defend his reputation at Athens, rather than reflecting concern for enlightened 
government or civic empowerment. 
 
From his writings it is clear that Socrates was a major influence in his life. Four 
of his works feature the philosopher prominently, and it is an argument of this 
dissertation that on one level Anabasis functions as a Socratic defence. In the 
key passage of this work (3.1.4-10) there is the sense of a paternal relationship 
between Socrates and Xenophon, one which survives in the later story of the 
first meeting between the two told by Diogenes in the opening of his biography. 
Though the association of country aristocrat and city-bound thinker might seem 
somewhat incongruous, underlying the relationship were common anti-
democratic and pro-Spartan sentiments (Xenophon certainly seems to have 
changed his attitude regarding the latter, possibly, as suggested in later 
chapters, as a result of his experiences on the long march). This background 
was ultimately to place Xenophon and Socrates on the wrong side of the 
authorities. The outcome for both was, in a sense, the same, in that they were 
to be deprived of the homeland that they each professed, and demonstrated, 
deep concern for. 
 
An objective of this chapter has been to widen the perspective on Xenophon's 
departure from Athens in 401. From his own evidence and that of other ancient 
sources it is apparent that a hostile political climate in the city towards members 
of his class, and those directly associated with the Thirty Tyrants in particular, 
was an important factor. However to argue, as some have done, that 
Xenophon's involvement with the hippeis was 'the cause' of his leaving his 
homeland is too narrow a view to take.181 While in itself the fact compromised 
his standing, and probably undermined his safety, given the constraints within 
                                            
180 The right to power: Thucydides 6.16; Xenophon, Kyro. 8.1.37, P.H. 2.1. 
181 See Bugh 1988: 123, 129. 
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which the restored democracy was obliged to operate it would not on its own 
have been a sufficient reason to drive him into self-exile. The cases of other 
hippeis who subsequently gained office contradict the contention that remaining 
at home was not a realistic option, as indeed does the presence of at least 300 
horsemen in the city in 399. On the other hand, these cases certainly relate to 
participants who were not involved at a high, or serious, level in the criminality 
of the Thirty. Xenophon's age, and (the admittedly apologetic) character of his 
writings, strongly suggest that he would not have been in this last category, but 
there is no certainty on this. If Xenophon was not at Athens but in Eleusis, as I 
have argued he could have been, his perceived culpability, even by this 
migratory act alone, would have been higher. While this hypothesis is indeed 
speculative, it has the merit of highlighting the fact, notwithstanding the meeting 
with Socrates at An. 3.1, that there is no concrete evidence for his being in the 
city in the period following the restoration of the democracy. 
 
There were, as has been shown, other factors in play too, and it may well have 
been that even in a more favourable atmosphere Xenophon would have gone 
on the road. He was young and ambitious, keen for adventure, and probably 
seeking to find his place in the world. Though it may have facilitated his 
intellectual development, his involvement with the Socratics, in the main a fairly 
sedentary group, would not have met his need to be a part of the military and 
political life.182 Joining the war against the Peloponnesians late, with his 
country's power in decline, he did not have the opportunity to participate in the 
type of military event that had helped to define such prominent figures as 
Thucydides, Alkibiades, and even Socrates himself. A chance to join the circle 
of an important figure in Mediterranean geopolitics must have seemed like a 
unique chance to develop and establish himself. It was, then, most likely an 
interplay of political and personal factors that led to his departure from Athens in 
the late spring of 401. 
 
                                            
182 See Buzzetti 2008. In his deconstruction of Kyroupaideia, Higgins (1977: 56) writes: 
'Xenophon's Socrates and Cyrus [the Great] have too much in common to warrant a 
radical segregation. Both possess a similar self-control, both honour the gods, both are 
rulers of themselves. Both have an analogous task: to dispose men to care about the 
right things in the right way…Yet [they] are not exactly the same, either, for Cyrus is 
certainly not devoted to the life of the mind and Socrates never cares to pursue the life 
of honour and glory to be found in government'. 
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Some of these same reasons will have been significant in the question of his 
return. His intention to go home following his extraordinary adventure in Asia 
was prevented first and foremost by an intensification of the hostility towards his 
class, the decree passed against him being a result and expression of this state 
of affairs.183 It was probably not until the King's Peace (c. 387) that this 
circumstance changed, and while he was then at liberty to go home, there is no 
evidence that he did so — no trace in the records of a homecoming, or of any 
subsequent involvement in civic life. 
 
In the last part of the chapter evidence for the dating of Anabasis was 
examined. While no date for authorship was determined, it was argued that it 
was written during Xenophon's retirement, probably begun, if not finished, on 
the estate at Skillous furnished him by the Spartans. This indicates a significant 
gap between the event and publication, possibly one of up to forty years. It was 
suggested that the political climate in Greece following the King's Peace of 
387/6 provides a persuasive background for the work, linking a number of its 
concerns — Sparta's stewardship of Hellas, panhellenism, the struggle for the 
memory of Socrates — with pressing matters of the day. It was further 
considered from the internal evidence, and the notable degree of thematic unity 
across Xenophon's works, that the work and corpus are the product of a 
mature, reflective phase. 
 
A clear and reliable portrait of Xenophon is elusive. He emerges from the 
complex literary fabric of his own writings as a man difficult to pin down. The 
pattern that emerges from the traces we have of his early life is one of extensive 
movement; his early exposure to the exhilaration of horse riding may well have 
left him with a passion for movement and travel, and from his reports this 
evidently found expression in the march of the Cyreans. In this travelling 
community he found a place in the world, a home on the move where he tested 
his practical training and the solidity of his Socratic morality against the random 
challenges thrown up by fortune. From such flux, tellingly relived for at least 
                                            
183 Xenophon wants to go home: 6.2.15, 7.1.4, 7.1.8, 7.1.38, 7.7.57. Bradley (2001: 80) 
points out that Xenophon's phrasing of his desire as being 'to sail away' is 
contextualised in his later speeches to the army in Thrace (7.6.11-38) where he speaks 
of having turned back to help them after he had already 'set out for home'. On the 
subject of Xenophon's nostos see further Chapter 3.3. 
87 
 
another five years, it would always be hard to return to settled life. In this light, 
perhaps displacement from Skillous was not as traumatic as it might be thought 
to have been; perhaps he left of his own accord before 371, if indeed he had 
ever settled there. Notably Xenophon was not alone in embracing life outside of 
the polis. McKechnie writes of the Cyreans: 'Once those who wished to had 
sailed away, or settled in the cities near Byzantium, it could be said that the 
remainder had chosen the wandering life, that the army itself had become (now 
by choice, though previously by chance), in Isokrates' phrase, a "wandering 
army"'.184 
 
In the next chapter an outstanding feature of the author's literary method is 
explored, and the question of what motivated him to write his Anabasis is 
addressed. 
                                            
184 McKechnie 1989: 80. 
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Xenophon's Agenda in Anabasis: 
Lessons in Leadership 
 
 
 
 
 
How vain it is to sit down and write before you have stood 
up to live. 
  Thoreau, Walden 
 
 
While Xenophon's works span an extraordinary range of genres — biography, 
and arguably autobiography, history, historical fiction, philosophical dialogue, 
technical treatise, travelogue — almost all are closely connected by the 
recurrence of certain themes and concerns.1 These include Sparta and 
panhellenism, Socrates and moral philosophy, leadership, and apologia. One 
inference to be drawn from this is that his works are the product of a single, if 
evolving literary project; a second is that these common elements may offer 
insight into what his motivations for writing were. To investigate this further, in 
this chapter the subject of leadership — which recurs prominently across the 
oeuvre — is explored in Anabasis. The analysis shows a clear concern in the 
work with issues of military leadership and, importantly, it shows that the 
manner of the presentation is decidedly didactic: in addition to showcasing the 
strengths and weaknesses of individual leaders, the author critiques different 
styles of leadership, and implicitly concludes that the optimal form is that which 
is informed by both democratic principles and moral philosophy. Combined with 
the openly didactic character of several of his other works, a strong case 
emerges for instruction being a key element of the author's agenda in Anabasis. 
 
A further factor supporting the claim for the work's didactic character is the 
author's extensive use of exemplars, a prominent feature as well in the literary 
construction of other of Xenophon's works. Part 1 of the chapter illustrates the 
                                            
1 Gish and Ambler (2009: 182) comment that the range of Xenophon's writings have no 
rival in the ancient world. 
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paradigmatic nature of the narrative and provides the relevant background for 
arguments in this and the following chapters. 
 
The subtle, if unambiguous, conclusion of Xenophon's elaborate exposition on 
leadership styles alerts to another key element of his agenda: apologia. In 
representing his character as a successful leader in the Athenian philosopher 
mould, he is defending his own reputation, and also that of his teacher, 
Socrates. These apologies are explored in depth in Chapters 3 and 4 
respectively, with a main conclusion of the dissertation being that Xenophon's 
treatment of leadership in Anabasis is also intended to serve an extensive 
apologetic agenda. 
 
 
PART 1. XENOPHON'S USE OF EXEMPLARS IN ANABASIS 
 
The richness of Xenophon's life experiences furnished him with substantial 
writing material. His output of fourteen complete works reflects the range of 
these experiences and at the same time reveals an extraordinary literary talent.2 
Hallmarks of Xenophon the writer include experimentation with form, genre 
innovation, subtlety of style, and use of a variety of literary devices. In this part 
attention is drawn to one of the more remarkable features of his literary method: 
his extensive use of exemplars. The treatment, while not being exhaustive, 
highlights the prevalence of exempla and how they enable the author to realise 
his writing agenda. Xenophon's agenda is explored more fully in the Part 2, but 
the preponderance of exempla already indicates that instruction is one of its 
defining features.3 
                                            
2 As Gray remarks (2010a: 1), 'he was so highly regarded that all of his writings were 
preserved, and one (Respublica Atheniensium) credited to him as extra'. On the Ps-
Xenophon tract, MacDowell's (2009: 9) explanations for works that may have been 
wrongly attributed to Demosthenes are attractive: 'A papyrus would not necessarily 
bear the writer's name. Demosthenes may have been given a copy of someone else's 
speech which, when found among his possessions after his death, was assumed to be 
his own. Or a bookseller may have thought he could get a higher price for a copy of a 
speech if he attached Demosthenes' name to it.' 
3 The power of example to influence human behaviour was readily understood by 
Xenophon and became for him a prime instructional method. Cf. Kyroupaideia 8.8.5, 
where, having witnessed it in their rulers, Xenophon says the inhabitants of Asia turned 
to wickedness: 'for of whatever sort those who are foremost may be, such also, for the 
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1.1. Context: Overview of the Development of Xenophon's Literary Method 
 
The paradigmatic nature of Xenophon's Anabasis is evident from a close 
reading of the text. Many of the episodes and events described have a distinctly 
exemplary quality, as do the leading characters in the story; Xenophon himself, 
as argued in the final chapter, is represented as a model student of Socrates, 
his aim being to defend his own character and to defend his teacher against the 
charges brought at his trial in 399. This section brings out Xenophon's 
preference for this form of literary expression. The argument made is that he 
uses exemplars in Anabasis as a means of realising aspects of his apologetic 
agenda and for instruction on leadership (in this case in the military context). As 
in other of his works, moral exempla are also a feature, and the main inspiration 
for this attempt at providing guidance on character to his readers is his 
association with Socrates. The link between the men was touched upon in the 
previous chapter and is looked at again in Chapter 4.2. 
 
Xenophon's extensive use of exemplars can be appreciated better by 
considering contemporary developments in historiographical writing in the early 
fourth century. Frances Pownall examines this subject and shows how writers 
such as Xenophon, Ephoros, Theopompos, and even Plato (in the funeral 
oration in his Menexenus) came to manipulate the past for the purpose of moral 
instruction.4 The notion of historical accuracy, if ever it had wide adherence, 
now became a more marginal concern.5 The context for this paradigm shift, as 
Pownall argues, was the social, economic, and political upheaval of the later 
                                                                                                                                
most part, do those beneath them become' (ὁπνῖνί ηηλεο γὰξ ἂλ νἱ πξνζηάηαη ὦζη, 
ηνηνῦηνη θαὶ νἱ ὑπ' αὐηνὺο ὡο ἐπὶ ηὸ πνιὺ γίγλνληαη). 
4 Pownall 2004. On Xenophon and paradigmatic history see also Dillery 1995. The 
suitability of the former's employing of the Menexenus as part of her argument has 
been questioned. In a review of her monograph, among more serious criticisms, 
Noreen Humble (2008) writes: 'It is first and foremost a Socratic dialogue and within 
that it purports to present an epideictic oration. That it treats historical material does not 
make the Menexenus generically equivalent to the other three works under discussion'. 
5 Dillery (1995: 130) writes that Xenophon's use of positive and negative exemplars 
permitted him 'not only to provide moral lessons but also to construct historical 
explanations, as those places and persons are made to represent larger truths about 
the past'. On the problems of Anabasis as a historical text see especially Bradley 2001: 
60-65. 
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fifth century.6 In coming to his text in the 370s or later, Xenophon was thus in an 
intellectual milieu that sought to reinvigorate moral fibre and which embraced 
morally driven paradigmatic writing as a way of promoting aretê. This is not, 
however, to say that earlier historical writing was disregarded: as shown in Part 
2, in Anabasis Xenophon draws on the content of Thucydides, even if he is not 
strongly influenced by this author's method. Nor is it to say that paradigm was 
not a force in forming the narratives of earlier writers: see, for example, 
Herodotus' presentation of three model forms of government in his constitutional 
debate (3.80-82), and Thucydides' use of set piece accounts to illustrate military 
phenomena (e.g. Mantinea for the hoplite battle, 5.64-75; Plataea for sieges, 
2.71-78).7 
 
Although he was an important part of the fourth-century trend in historiography, 
typically Xenophon was also apart from it, developing his own approaches to 
enhancing the effectiveness of his agenda. The unique, genre-defying nature of 
Anabasis may be attributed to the requirements of this agenda, in particular his 
personal apologia. In order to attract and keep the interest of his audience he 
needed to find innovative ways of expressing his own defence; a colourful 
framework and diverse subjects thus serve to keep the audience engaged, 
while making overt, and often lengthy, apologetic passages more digestible. In 
the work, one of his innovations is his rooting of exemplars in a real context: his 
detailed, and impressively accurate, march record provides the foundation for 
the leadership lessons he wishes to provide.8 In this way one form of truth 
complements another, and consequently the impact of the individual episodes is 
greater. In this innovation Xenophon may have sought to forge a unique imprint 
for his own teaching style, though it is at least as likely that his main intention 
was to keep his audience engaged by playing on their knowledge of the 
                                            
6 Pownall 2004: 9. According to the author, it would not be until the modern era that a 
'scientific' history would develop (ibid. 1). 
7 An immediate difference between Xenophon and his two predecessors is evident in 
the openings of his historically-orientated works, Anabasis and Hellenika, which, as 
Gray remarks in the case of Hellenika (1989a: 1), begin in media res. In contrast both 
Herodotus and Thucydides open with succinct programmatic statements. 
8 In more general historical contexts versions of the past in the fourth (and indeed fifth) 
century tend to be highly subjective and/or to draw on mythological tradition, with the 
end of serving the agenda of the writer/orator, e.g. the Athenian version of the Persian 
Wars and of Athenian relations with the Mede: see Isokrates, Pan. 157 ff., and note 
Xenophon's selective use of a Persian history in Kyroupaideia. On the integrity of 
Xenophon's march record in Anabasis see Brennan 2009. 
93 
 
expedition's historicity.9 The enduring popularity of the work is a testament to 
the effectiveness of its style as well as content. 
 
1.2. Exemplary Episodes in Anabasis 
 
To illustrate Xenophon's method and the nature of his exemplars, in this section 
a selection are analysed. The first relates to the army's initial leader and his 
(effective) successor, the second to the overarching expression of the 
leadership theme in Anabasis, and the third to Xenophon himself and his later 
life in the Peloponnese. 
 
1.a. Wagons stuck in Mud. 1.5.7-8. 
 
While travelling through the desert region north of the Middle Euphrates, the 
author reports that wagons in the train become stuck in mud. He says that 
Cyrus ordered them to be dragged out, and eventually they were freed by a 
group of Persian nobles. Although this episode takes place in the closing stages 
of the march to Babylonia and there are challenging circumstances, such as the 
terrain, and a lack of food, the event could not be said to have any substantial 
significance in the story. In a straightforward account of the march we might 
expect it to warrant no more than a mention, yet it receives a half page of OCT. 
Putting this in context, the description of the long stage (90 parasangs) during 
which it occurs receives only the same amount of space. 
 
Analysis of the event reveals the substance of its exemplary character, if not 
quite yet its main purpose, which Xenophon artfully holds up in order to 
underline the point he wishes to make. Upon arriving at the place where 
wagons had become stuck, he tells us that Cyrus, who is accompanied by the 
most privileged of his men, ordered two of them to take some of the native army 
and help to free the wagons. 
 
                                            
9 Contra Higgins (1977: 95) who writes that Xenophon's purpose in providing the march 
record is not to establish authenticity but 'to suggest quietly the ever deepening 
ensnarement of the Greeks within Persian territory'. S.E. Bassett (1917: 567) puts the 
record down to a compulsive tendency in the author, he being 'an industrious gatherer 
of facts of this kind'. I have not yet read Rood on Xenophon and parasangs (2010a). 
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But when it seemed to him that they did so at their leisure, as if 
in anger (ὀξγῇ) he ordered the best of the Persians around him 
to go down. And then one might have beheld a sample of good 
order: they each threw off their purple cloaks where they 
chanced to be standing, and rushed, as a man would run to win 
a victory, down a most exceedingly steep hill, wearing these 
costly tunics and coloured trousers, some of them, indeed, with 
necklaces around their necks and bracelets on their arms; and 
leaping at once, with all this finery, into the mud, they lifted the 
wagons high and dry and brought them out more quickly than 
one would have thought possible (1.5.8). 
 
Xenophon is highlighting features of Cyrus's leadership which he wishes to 
draw attention to; although the scene could reflect accurately a real event 
witnessed by, or reported to, Xenophon, on balance it seems more plausible to 
believe that it has been built up, if not wholly designed by the author, in order to 
enable his points to be learned. (I think of Xenophon as recalling some likely 
incident on the march which he then adapts to suit his didactic ends.) While in 
this instance he is evidently bringing thought to bear on the value of 
commanding discipline and loyalty, the main lesson of the episode only 
becomes clear in the second book when Xenophon chooses to highlight 
another incident — again, not a particularly obvious one to dwell on — involving 
Cyrus's successor as leader of the army, Klearchos the Spartan. 
 
1.b. Klearchos in the Mud. 2.3.11. 
 
As the Greeks begin their long march homewards from Mesopotamia, 
Xenophon reports that the route which they were led along by the Persians was 
criss-crossed by ditches and canals full of water. To cross these they had to 
make bridges from palm trees; Xenophon describes how Klearchos, leading the 
army, handles this situation: 
 
And here it was possible to learn how Klearchos commanded, 
holding his spear in his left hand, his staff in his right. And if any 
of those who had been assigned to one of these tasks seemed 
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to him to be shirking, he would pick out someone appropriate, 
and strike him, and at the same time he himself would get into 
the mud and take up the task, with the result that it shamed all 
who did not join him in earnest (2.3.11).10 
 
While the disciplinarian in Klearchos is to the fore, he complements his use of 
physical punishment with exemplary action: in doing as he himself orders, the 
leader inspires — or in this case shames — those around him. His descent into 
the mud pointedly recalls Cyrus's failure to do so when his wagons had become 
stuck. In his explicit flagging of this episode as a lesson in leadership, 
Xenophon is emphasising the importance of this quality in a leader. The implicit 
linking of this episode with the earlier one gives both a sense of the subtlety of 
Xenophon's narrative and the degree to which it is subject to paradigm. 
 
2. Leaders. 
 
The paradigmatic character of the narrative registers again on the macro level. 
For instance in dealing with the subject of leadership style Xenophon chooses 
to present different paradigms; his choosing of three (arguably there are more 
embedded in the narrative) perhaps betrays the influence of Herodotus' three-
sided constitutional debate (as mentioned above, Histories 3.80-82). Moreover, 
and more interestingly from the viewpoint of intertextuality, both writers here are 
concerned with the problem of how to lead and dwell on similar models. What 
Herodotus presents — first democracy, then oligarchy, and then monarchy, with 
this last being decided on as best by the Persians — is inverted by Xenophon 
who introduces his styles in order of their effectiveness, the first being 
represented by the Persian prince, Cyrus the Younger (Book 1), the second by 
Klearchos of Sparta (Book 2), and the final and optimal by Xenophon the 
Athenian (Books 3-7). A further difference between the two writers is that 
whereas Herodotus' treatment of the rulership problem takes the form of an 
open discussion of the merits and deficiencies of each of the three types he 
                                            
10 θαὶ ἐληαῦζα ἦλ Κιέαξρνλ θαηακαζεῖλ ὡο ἐπεζηάηεη, ἐλ κὲλ ηῇ ἀξηζηεξᾷ ρεηξὶ ηὸ δόξπ 
ἔρσλ, ἐλ δὲ ηῇ δεμηᾷ βαθηεξίαλ· θαὶ εἴ ηηο αὐηῷ δνθνίε ηῶλ πξὸο ηνῦην ηεηαγκέλσλ 
βιαθεύεηλ, ἐθιεγόκελνο ηὸλ ἐπηηήδεηνλ ἔπαηζελ ἄλ, θαὶ ἅκα αὐηὸο πξνζειάκβαλελ εἰο 
ηὸλ πειὸλ ἐκβαίλσλ· ὥζηε πᾶζηλ αἰζρύλελ εἶλαη κὴ νὐ ζπζπνπδάδεηλ. 2.3.11. 
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names, Xenophon fashions his material into the storyline without indication of 
his purpose. His treatment of leadership styles is examined in detail in Part 2. 
 
3. Skillous. Xenophon in Paradeisos. 5.3.7-13. 
 
At some time following his return to Greece with Agesilaos in 394, Xenophon 
was settled in the Peloponnese by the Spartans. He describes his later life on 
his estate in Anabasis, and there is a clear sense of this being idyllic: 
 
8. The river Selinos chanced to flow through the place. And also 
in Ephesus a river Selinos flows beside the temple of Artemis, 
and fish and mussels are present in both. And on the land at 
Skillous it is also possible to hunt all the wild animals of the 
chase…10. For both Xenophon's sons and those of the other 
citizens used to hold a hunt for the festival, and the men who 
wished to would join the hunt with them. Boars, gazelles, and 
deer were captured from the sacred precinct itself, as well as 
from Mount Pholoe. 11…In the sacred precinct are both a 
meadow and hills full of trees, sufficient to nourish pigs, goats, 
cattle, and horses, so that even the baggage animals of those 
who come to the festival have their feast. 5.3.8, 10, 11. 
 
The Skillous vignette has been read in a variety of ways by scholars, many of 
whom comment on the contentment portrayed in it.11 Most recently, Rood has 
                                            
11 Horn (1935: 158) writes that 'we can imagine Xenophon's joy and satisfaction as he 
spent his later years in this delightful place, indulging his love of hunting and writing'; 
Higgins (1977: 97) remarks on the simplicity and quiet of the author's life at Skillous: 
'Family, farming, the hunt, it all seems somehow far removed from the adventures of an 
earlier day. He seems to have come to a new understanding about the nature of 
philotimia, the love of glory and fame, to have reduced the scope of his past ambitions 
to a contentment with place and the stability of the definite which he could not find 
while addicted to travel'. Dillery (2007: 67) likewise sees an ideal quality in Xenophon's 
construction of his life at Skillous: 'Xenophon finds a new identity in exile, as the patron 
and sole official of a new community he has founded, just as he had imagined doing on 
the march of the Ten Thousand, but without result'. Azoulay (2004: 300-301) regards 
the Skillous digression as part of an attempt by Xenophon to impress that he did not 
profit personally from the expedition (in the passage he accounts for the monies he has 
received from booty), but does not deny its idyllic quality. Referring to the annual 
offering of a tithe to the goddess from the fruits of the estate (5.3.9), Tuplin (2004b: 
263) remarks that this evokes a 'paradigmatic, traditional festival' (incidentally, he does 
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written that Xenophon's reason for describing the estate was 'to show that it 
was modelled on the goddess' [Artemis'] own sanctuary at Ephesus and to 
stress its plentiful produce'.12 I take this divine parallel further and suggest that 
Xenophon's aim is to indicate an earthly paradise, a heaven on earth. The 
episode is thus principally intended to be a moral exemplar showing the benefit 
that flows from a noble and pious life. The idyllic estate is divine reward for just 
action and piety; the abundance of meat — fish, mussels, boar, deer, gazelles 
— Xenophon hunting with his sons, celebrating with his neighbours, is a clear 
portrait of an earthly paradise. As Xenophon himself puts it in his speech to the 
generals and captains of the army on the banks of the Greater Zab River, this is 
the life which accrues in the end to brave men:13 
 
For my part, men, I have pondered also this, that regarding all 
those who crave staying alive through wars in whatever way 
they can, these for the most part die both badly and shamefully; 
but all those who know that death is common to and necessary 
for all human beings, and compete over dying nobly, these I 
see somehow arriving more often into old age and, for as long 
as they live, passing their time more happily (3.1.43).14 
 
 
                                                                                                                                
not consider that Xenophon intends to portray the estate at Skillous as a paradeisos, 
ibid. 268). Bradley (2001: 77) makes the point that the digression 'previews and 
emphasises Xenophon's exile', and sets 'the physical context of the exile before 
reader's eyes' (80). This reading supports the argument that Skillous plays an essential 
literary role in the text. 
12 Rood 2009: 2 (and 18-19). See this paper for a study of the Skillous scene's 
reception. 
13 Cf. also Lak. 10, where Xenophon points out that worthy Spartans at the end of their 
lives earn a place in the gerousia. The ends of Tissaphernes (Hell. 3.4.25) and 
Klearchos (An. 2.6.1), and the undistinguished death of Kheirisophos (An. 6.2.14, 
6.2.18, 6.4.11) also fit into this paradigmatic scheme. Notably, in the case of the 
Persian, Xenophon has an envoy of his assassin say to Agesilaos: 'The man 
responsible for your and our troubles has now received his due'. The model of 
benefit/punishment for deeds done is applied not only to individuals in Xenophon: note 
for instance in Hellenika the case of the Thirty at Athens, and the connecting of 
Sparta's eventual downfall at Leuctra to its illegal seizure of the Theban citadel (5.4.1). 
14 ἐληεζύκεκαη δ' ἔγσγε, ὦ ἄλδξεο, θαὶ ηνῦην, ὅηη ὁπόζνη κὲλ καζηεύνπζη δῆλ ἐθ παληὸο 
ηξόπνπ ἐλ ηνῖο πνιεκηθνῖο, νὗηνη κὲλ θαθῶο ηε θαὶ αἰζρξῶο ὡο ἐπὶ ηὸ πνιὺ 
ἀπνζλῄζθνπζηλ, ὁπόζνη δὲ ηὸλ κὲλ ζάλαηνλ ἐγλώθαζη πᾶζη θνηλὸλ εἶλαη θαὶ ἀλαγθαῖνλ 
ἀλζξώπνηο, πεξὶ δὲ ηνῦ θαιῶο ἀπνζλῄζθεηλ ἀγσλίδνληαη, ηνύηνπο ὁξῶ κᾶιιόλ πσο εἰο 
ηὸ γῆξαο ἀθηθλνπκέλνπο θαὶ ἕσο ἂλ δῶζηλ εὐδαηκνλέζηεξνλ δηάγνληαο. 3.1.43. 
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PART 2. XENOPHON DIDASKALOS: LEADERS AND LEADERSHIP IN 
ANABASIS 
 
As remarked several of Xenophon's works have a clear didactic character, 
indicating that instruction was a major part of his writing agenda. The Cavalry 
Commander, and the treatises on Hunting and Horsemanship are explicitly 
concerned with practical instruction;15 the Kyroupaideia, through direct teaching 
and paradigm, has a pronounced didactic flavour, as do the major Socratic 
works.16 One of Xenophon's main subjects is leadership, and in Anabasis, the 
story of an army on the march, there is an evident interest in military leaders 
and the leadership of armies.17 In the account Xenophon himself commands the 
army for a considerable part of its arduous journey back to Greece. The aims of 
this part are to bring out the extent to which the subject pervades the text and to 
demonstrate that the author's aim in his treatment is instruction. The argument 
made is that, in addition to a range of practical situational lessons, he presents 
different styles of leadership, and implies that the optimal is that which he 
himself is representative of on the retreat. One important lesson that emerges is 
that it is essential for a leader to be aware of the nature of his constituency, and 
to understand the interplay between ruled and ruler, soldier and commander. 
                                            
15 The first is addressed directly to hipparcheis and outlines the tasks that a successful 
commander must undertake; the treatise on hunting concludes with the author advising 
young men to follow what he has written (ὥζηε ὑπάξρεηλ ἐλζπκνπκέλνπο ηνύησλ 
ζενθηιεῖο η' εἶλαη θαὶ εὐζεβεῖο ηνὺο λένπο ηνὺο πνηνῦληαο ἃ ἐγὼ παξαηλῶ, 13.17), while 
that on the art of horsemanship opens with the statement that 'we wish to explain to our 
younger friends what we believe to be the correct method of dealing with horses' 
(βνπιόκεζα θαὶ ηνῖο λεσηέξνηο ηῶλ θίισλ δειῶζαη ᾗ ἂλ λνκίδνκελ αὐηνὺο ὀξζόηαηα 
ἵππνηο πξνζθέξεζζαη, 1.1). 
16 In Kyroupaideia Xenophon outlines the education of Cyrus the Great and proceeds 
to demonstrate its worth in a range of situations. Of the major Socratic works, 
Memorabilia provides guidance on a range of moral and practical questions, while 
Oikonomikos focuses on household and agricultural management (Gray 2010a: 21 
remarks that it 'offers a complex of teaching and learning strategies about success in 
farming'). 
17 Leadership is a central concern in the Cavalry Commander, Oikonomikos, 
Kyroupaideia, Agesilaos, and Hiero, and is notably evident in Hellenika commander 
descriptions and anecdotes, e.g. Teleutias in Book 5, and in Memorabilia 3.1-5. This 
range of contexts is indicative of a broader interest on Xenophon's part in political 
philosophy, particularly in the problem of how to rule. Xenophon's expertise on the 
subject is, it is worth noting, highly valued by modern practitioners; Peter Drucker 
(1993: 158) writes: 'The first systematic book on leadership: the Kyroupaideia of 
Xenophon – himself no mean leader of men – is still the best book on the subject'. 
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This argument is made in the first section through a consideration of the army's 
character.18 
 
2.1. The Political Character of the Army 
 
Studies of the Ten Thousand's organisation have shown the extent to which the 
political character of the army resembled, and differed from, that of a polis.19 At 
various junctures the rank and file, whether by contingent or in general 
assembly, listen to speeches by their leaders and deliberate on matters at hand; 
leaders are, moreover, brought to account for their actions and subjected to the 
justice of the army.20 Yet in other cases, often, tellingly, in more trying 
circumstances, the democratic dynamic is absent: decisions are taken by the 
leader(s) without consultation and are carried through without protest from the 
soldiers. This applies most notably during the march from the Greater Zab River 
to Trapezus, a pressurised period when tight control and discipline were self-
evidently in the collective interest and served the common objective of reaching 
safety (cf. 3.5.17, 4.1.12, 4.6.7, 4.8.9). In this section I argue that in Anabasis 
Xenophon seeks to elucidate a behavioural model for mercenaries.21 In his 
construction, ethnic and contingent loyalties are overridden by individual self-
interests, which can readily form into a collective will that is difficult, if not 
impossible, to resist (cf. Mem. 3.9.4, then An. 1.2.11, 1.3.7, 1.4.13-16, 2.4.2-4, 
5.1.2-3, 5.7.34, 6.1.17-25, 6.4.10-11). As the author demonstrates, this will 
manifests itself in various forms and at times which are not always predictable; 
                                            
18 Leadership in Anabasis has been a focus of attention for scholars since 
Breitenbach's 1950 study, which brought out the concern in Xenophon's 
historiographical works for portraying models of good military leadership. Notable 
subsequent studies which cover Anabasis include Wood 1964, Nussbaum 1967, and 
Humble 1997. Humble establishes Xenophon's as an ideal form of command, and 
proceeds to compare the leadership of the Spartans in the story to this ideal, with the 
aim of revealing any pro-Spartan bias in the writer. 
19 See Nussbaum 1967, Anderson 1974, Dalby 1992, Hornblower 2004, Lee 2007. For 
parallel arguments as to the extent to which Alexander's army resembled the 
Macedonian state on the road, see Hammond 1989. 
20 Voting: 3.2.9, 33, 38; 5.1.4, 7, 8, 11, 12; 5.6.11, 33; 6.1.32; 6.2.4-7; 6.4.11; 7.3.5-6, 
14. Justice: 5.8.1. 
21 The origin of this line of enquiry is a paper by Christopher Tuplin on Xenophon in 
Anatolia in which he comments that an aim of Anabasis is 'to highlight the problems 
involved in controlling mercenary armies' (2007a: 27). The importance of Anabasis as a 
source of information on mercenaries has long been recognised by modern scholars. 
See especially Roy 1967, Parke 1933, Griffith 1935. 
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if he is to be successful, it is essential for the leader of such a group to be able 
to manage its dynamics.22 
 
The Exercise of Mercenary Power: Disobedience, Democracy, Disorder 
 
A basic model for the behaviour of mercenaries is that their aim, on the one 
hand, is to follow instructions, and on the other to take home what profit they 
can.23 Once he has set out the terms of their employment, the employer should, 
therefore, be reasonably confident of leading them towards his stated end. In 
his detailed depiction of the Cyreans' relationship with two separate employers, 
Cyrus the Younger and Seuthes of Thrace, Xenophon shows how any alteration 
to this contract can result in great dangers. The focus in the present treatment is 
limited to Cyrus the Younger.24 
 
The most obvious and the most sensitive contractual changes relate to money: 
mercenaries will demand it from anyone, whenever it is due (cf. Thucydides 
8.84). As Xenophon demonstrates, delay has the side-effect of undermining 
authority in the longer term, a process that can end badly for the employer. He 
begins by showing Cyrus setting about his task of managing mercenaries with 
some expertise; he carefully assembles his armies (1.1.6-11), reviews the force 
(1.2.7), and prudently presides over games for the Arkadians — who form a 
                                            
22 The success of Pericles' leadership is, arguably, attributable in large measure to his 
understanding of the mindset of the Athenian demos. Cf. Plutarch, Political precepts 3-
4: 'it is necessary to turn oneself to learning the character of the citizens, the dominant 
character, that is, that appears from the combined characters of them all…The 
Athenian people, for example, is swift to anger...The statesman must not ape the 
popular character but he must understand and use the features which make each 
society amenable. Ignorance of the character of the people produces mistakes and 
failures in political dealings, just as much as in royal friendships'. 
23 With reference to the Ten Thousand Dalby (1992: 16) formulates it as follows: 'the 
men's aim when they were Cyrus's mercenaries (like the aims of other mercenaries) 
had been to follow what instructions had come to them from above and to take home, 
individually, what pay and profit they could.' Lee (2007: 77-78), more abstractly, defines 
their interest in terms of opportunity: amongst a range of possibilities, 'economic 
opportunity was probably the greatest motivator'. See also Roy 2004. 
24 In the period of Xenophon's narrative (401-399) the Cyreans have three different 
employers, each with their own objectives: Cyrus the Younger forms the army, with the 
intention of pacifying the Pisidians (1.2.1); the Thracian dynast Seuthes engages the 
force planning to use it to regain his father's lands (7.2.32-34); and the Spartans under 
Thibron enlist the remnants of the army for a campaign against Tissaphernes (7.6.7). 
Roy (1967: 316) remarks that terms of service were negotiated on a contractual basis, 
and in some detail. 
101 
 
major block within his mercenary force (1.2.10; cf. Hiero 9.1-3). Yet shortly after, 
he is unable to pay the mercenaries monies owed. A disturbing disregard for his 
status is recorded: 'He owed his soldiers more than three months' wages, and 
they often went to his headquarters and demanded it' (θαὶ πνιιάθηο ἰόληεο ἐπὶ 
ηὰο ζύξαο ἀπῄηνπλ, 1.2.11). Although the money is soon paid thanks to the 
timely arrival of a benefactor, Cyrus's standing as a leader has been damaged. 
The first evidence of a degrading of his power occurs only a matter of days 
after. The prince, at the behest of his benefactor, the Queen of Kilikia, holds a 
review of the entire army on the plain at Tyriaion. Having inspected his native 
troops, when he had ordered them to arrange themselves in their battle 
formations, he reviewed the Greeks (1.2.15). Halting his own chariot at the 
middle of the phalanx, he sent his interpreter to their generals and ordered them 
to advance with their weapons facing forward (1.2.17). The generals passed 
this order to the soldiers: 
 
When the trumpet sounded, they advanced with weapons 
forward. After this, advancing faster and faster of their own 
accord (ἀπὸ ηνῦ αὐηνκάηνπ) and with a shout, the soldiers 
began to run toward the camp; and there was great fear among 
the barbarians as both the queen in her carriage, and those in 
the market — leaving their wares behind — fled (1.2.17-18). 
 
While the men obey the order from Cyrus passed on through their generals, 
consciously empowering themselves, they put on display not only their arms, 
but the extent to which the power of their leaders is dependent upon them. 
Cyrus is reported to have been pleased for the fear the display struck in the 
barbarians (1.2.18), but such independent behaviour must also have unsettled 
him to some degree. The incident may have served to remind him that freedom 
was the source of Greek strength (cf. 1.7.3). 
 
A more serious incident of disobedience occurs once the army has crossed the 
Taurus Mountains, a landmark which exposes the pretence that the expedition's 
object is the Pisidians (cf. 1.2.1). Realising now, if not before, that they had 
been misled, and suspecting that Cyrus was marching against his brother, the 
men refused to continue. They said that 'this was not what they had been hired 
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for' (κηζζσζῆλαη δὲ νὐθ ἐπὶ ηνύηῳ ἔθαζαλ, 1.3.1). Xenophon describes at length 
(4 OCT pages) the tense series of events at Tarsus in order to highlight how 
easily control of a mercenary body can be lost, and how dangerous the potential 
consequences of this can be. Notable is the collective decision of more than 
2,000 soldiers to shift their allegiance from their respective leaders to another, 
one whom they adjudged would be a more effective champion of their welfare 
(1.3.7; cf. 6.1.17-18, where the soldiers decide to choose a single leader 
believing this would increase their chances to win booty). A further lesson 
seems to be that mercenaries will readily, if not enthusiastically, accept new 
terms if it suits their self-interest. In this case, it was deemed that the new object 
— the satrap Abrokomas, who was said to be on the Euphrates — was 
acceptable, contingent on an increase in pay; when this aim in turn proved to be 
false, an additional increase in pay was sufficient to persuade the men to march 
against the King (1.4.11-13). 
 
An evident distinction drawn here is with a citizen army, whose loyalty to their 
polis normally outweighs considerations of individual and collective self-interest. 
The Spartans at Thermopylae are a clear case in point, with the same principles 
of self-sacrifice being expressed in the Athenian ephebic oath (cf. too, Plutarch, 
Kimon 17.6).25 Nor do ethnic affiliations carry much weight with mercenaries, as 
Xenophon indicates when informing us of the fact that a large contingent of 
Arcadians, who had been under the command of Xenias of Parrhasia (Arcadia), 
chose to decamp to the command of Klearchos the Spartan (1.3.7).26 Absent as 
well is any sense of a unifying ideological agenda, such as panhellenism, or 
indeed fear of great monarchic power, such as the native contingent are implied 
to exhibit through the author's silence on their behaviour at Tarsus and 
elsewhere.27 
                                            
25 Making a comparison with the Athenian force that sailed to Sicily in 415, Parke 
(1933: 24) writes that the Ten Thousand 'had gone to serve as far from its home…but 
moved by no stimulus of national ambition'. Mixed or coalition armies seem to be a 
separate case. Citing the refusal of the Corinthians to participate in an attack on Athens 
when they realise the real purpose of the expedition (Herodotus 5.92), Hornblower 
(2004: 257-258) writes that such forces 'sometimes behave very like mercenary ones'. 
26 Lee (2007: 66-74) argues persuasively for this position, explaining the later Arcadian-
Achaean secession as 'the product not of long-simmering tensions, but of a short-term 
chain of events' (69-70). 
27 The mercenaries in the later part of their journey frequently confront Spartan power: 
cf. their storming of Byzantium 7.1.14 ff. However Hornblower, in the same passage 
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Democracy is a further means by which the collective will of the mercenary 
body is expressed. Following Cyrus's death and the assumption of responsibility 
for their own fate by the Greeks, this particular form of political expression 
becomes prominent. For instance at Herakleia on the Black Sea, dissatisfied 
with gifts sent to them by the people of the city, the men assemble themselves 
and resolve to send one of Kheirisophos and Xenophon to secure more 
provisions from the citizens. In the event, these two prove strongly reluctant to 
do so (νἱ δὲ ἰζρπξῶο ἀπεκάρνλην) on account of it being a friendly Greek city, 
and the men sent instead their own ambassadors (6.2.4-7). 
 
In an earlier notable instance on the parabasis, the men use democratic power 
to assert symbolically their control over the leadership (5.8.1). Having been 
called to account for their actions since the beginning of their rule, several of the 
generals are fined, with Xenophon himself forced to answer charges of hubris 
(on this episode see further Chapter 3.2.2). His apologia and later elaborate 
addresses to the men show, however, that the mercenaries are amenable to the 
charm and power of speech. Through this episode Xenophon is also 
highlighting the propensity of democracies to hastiness and hasty judgements, 
and doubtless expects his readers to recall both the trial of the generals at 
Athens after Arginousai and the earlier Mytilenean episode. (See note 75 below 
for insights provided by Xenophon on the control and management of 
democracies.) Democratic power is also used by the soldiers to ensure 
equitable distribution of booty among the whole army: 
 
Now whenever the army stayed back resting, it was permitted 
to go out after plunder, and those who went out kept what they 
got. But whenever the entire army went out, if anyone went out 
                                                                                                                                
cited above (2004: 258), seems to regard them as being in a special relationship with 
Sparta: 'it is not quite safe to treat them [the Ten Thousand] as a mercenary force in 
the sense of a body with no state ties whatsoever. When the question of the supreme 
command comes up at a late stage of the expedition, Xenophon hints plainly that the 
Spartans will have an interest in the outcome and will be less than pleased if a non-
Spartan is appointed'. While it could be argued that the Spartans felt some sense of 
proprietorship over the army, the army in Xenophon's account felt no loyalty to Sparta. 
Cf. 6.1.30, and the treatment of the men by the Spartans once they have crossed out of 
Asia (e.g. 7.2.6, 7.2.13). 
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separately and got something, it was decided that this be public 
property (δεκόζηνλ ἔδνμελ εἶλαη). (6.6.2). 
 
Where civil means of expression fail, or are inadequate to the circumstances, 
the preferred form of mercenary expression is violent action. An early hint of this 
is seen at Tarsus when Klearchos' own men initially prevent him from moving 
forward by attacking his entourage. 'Klearchos at this point narrowly escaped 
being stoned to death' (1.3.2).28 Instances of violence recur on the march inland 
(cf. 1.5.11-12), but are more or less absent from Kounaxa to the Black Sea, 
when the restraining imperative of survival recedes. At Kotyora, when the men 
learn of a supposed plan by the generals to sail them back in the direction 
whence they came (to Phasis, 5.7.1), they react negatively: 'On hearing this, the 
soldiers took it hard, and gatherings began to take place and circles to be 
formed, and it was greatly to be feared that they would do the sort of things that 
they had done also to the heralds of the Kolchians and the market managers, 
for as many of these as did not flee into the sea were stoned to death' (5.7.2). 
The highly volatile situation is defused by Xenophon, who hastily convenes an 
assembly in which, through unadorned and systematic argument, he quells the 
bubbling discontent of the mercenaries (5.7.5-11). 
 
The most notorious incident of disorder occurs at Byzantium. Instructed to leave 
the city by the admiral Anaxibios, the men do so reluctantly, not having been 
paid the money they were promised by the Spartan. As their generals confer 
outside the walls, the mercenaries 'snatched up their weapons and ran in a rush 
toward the gates, intending to go back inside the wall…Other soldiers ran 
toward the sea, and at the breakwater they got over the wall and into the city; 
and when other soldiers, who chanced to be within, saw the action at the gates, 
they cut through the bar with their axes, and threw the gates wide open, and the 
rest raced in' (7.1.15-17). Once again, Xenophon is on hand to reign in the 
mercenaries, and again he achieves this through reasoned argument (7.1.18-
32). 
 
                                            
28 Hornblower (2004: 249) writes that 'stoning is the paradigm of the undisciplined 
collective act'. 
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Leaders and Leadership 
 
As noted the subject of leadership is prominent in Xenophon's writings. In 
different works he engages with it in contexts ranging from empires 
(Kyroupaideia) to the household (Oikonomikos); as is demonstrated here, a 
principal concern in Anabasis is military leadership. A critical factor 
distinguishing treatment of the subject in this book from that in others is the 
explicit non-fictional setting, the effect of which is to impart greater force to 
episodes within the narrative, even if these episodes are frequently 
paradigmatic. This extensive use of paradigm is a further notable feature of the 
work. Although on occasion he is prescriptive, either as narrator or character 
(cf. 2.2.5, 2.2.13, 3.3.36-44, 7.7.41), in the main Xenophon's didacticism is 
realised indirectly through example.29 As discussed in Part 1, his preference for 
this style is doubtless due to the development of historiography along these 
lines, but may be based too on a wish to develop a different approach to that 
used by Socrates, and to avoid putting his audience off through overt 
didacticism. 
 
The importance of the leadership theme may be gauged from the fact that a 
considerable amount of the narrative is taken up describing the characters and 
actions of leaders in the story. The more than 30,000 strong Asian contingent is 
almost completely ignored except for Cyrus and a handful from his inner circle, 
while of the 14,000 odd Greek mercenaries, only a very small number are 
mentioned (c. 70), with the majority of these being officers (c. 50).30 Xenophon 
himself, up until the events on the banks of the Greater Zab River, appears only 
three times (1.8.15-16, 2.4.15, 2.5.37-41), whereafter he has cause to mention 
himself over 270 times. The prominence of the leadership theme can further be 
brought out by examination of the travelogue, which is frequently abbreviated to 
                                            
29 In his obituaries, of Cyrus (1.9), and then the captured generals (2.6), Xenophon is 
more explicit in his guidance. Gray (2010a: 12) remarks: 'The obituary is a device he 
appears to have invented for the purpose of revealing the secrets of leadership'. In his 
treatment of leadership in other works Xenophon tends to be more openly didactic: for 
example in the Kyroupaideia, he sets out Cyrus's training in the opening book, and in 
the remaining ones demonstrates the efficacy of his education. 
30 Roy (1967: 303-306) provides a list of individuals whose name and nationality are 
given in Anabasis: 16 of these are strategoi, 29 lochagoi, 7 are other officers (taxiarchs, 
hipparch), and 14 are non-officers. 
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allow for treatment of a leadership event. Two examples taken from the cases 
dealt with in the following sections illustrate this. 
 
1. Mutiny at Tarsus. An. 1.3. (See Section 2.3 below for detail of the episode.) 
Klearchos, the Spartan commander who is closest of all the Greeks to Cyrus, 
deals with a mass insubordination at Tarsus and succeeds in getting the 
mercenaries to continue. The detail which Xenophon provides on Klearchos' 
engagement with the problem makes it apparent that he is going beyond what is 
needed to be told about the episode for the purposes of the story; the space 
occupied, over 4 OCT pages, is just under half of the whole narrative length up 
until this point. Certainly the event is an important one, but evidently so too for 
the author is its handling by the Spartan, and, as argued above, this links into a 
supplementary concern about the management of mercenary soldiers. 
 
2. Wagons stuck in mud. An 1.5.7-8. (On this incident see further Part 1 above 
and Section 2.2 below.) Travelling through the remote desert region north of the 
Middle Euphrates, a number of wagons become stuck in mud and Cyrus orders 
them to be freed; eventually they are lifted out by a group of Persian nobles. 
Although this episode takes place in the closing stages of the march to 
Babylonia, and there are difficult circumstances, the event could not be said to 
have special significance in the story. However it receives a half page of OCT, 
the same amount of space as the description of the long stage (90 parasangs) 
during which it takes place.31 
 
While, as remarked, a number of leaders feature in Anabasis, on a quantitative 
measure the most prominent are those who effectively head the Greek force 
during the course of its long march. These are Cyrus the Younger, Klearchos 
the Spartan, and Xenophon the Athenian and Kheirisophos the Spartan.32 The 
                                            
31 Of Xenophon's method in Hellenika Pownall (2004: 110) writes: 'he often gives 
relatively minor people and events, for their intrinsic moral value, as much space or 
more than important ones'. 
32 Strictly, following the seizure of several of the generals by the Greater Zab, the 
leadership is a collective of seven (Xenophon, Kheirisophos, Sophainetos, Timasion, 
Xanthicles, Philesios, and Kleanor); in practice, Xenophon and Kheirisophos jointly 
command, with Kheirisophos primus inter pares. Kheirisophos leaves at Trapezus but 
returns again at Sinope and is elected sole leader; Diodoros 14.27.1 writes that he was 
elected supreme commander at the Greater Zab. Contra Roy (1967: 289, 296), who 
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arrangement of the narrative reflects this primacy, with Cyrus the focus in Book 
1, Klearchos in Book 2, and Xenophon and Kheirisophos in Books 3-6; following 
the death of Kheirisophos (6.4.11), Xenophon dominates the stage in Book 7.33 
In his exposition of the actions of these individual leaders, one of Xenophon's 
concerns is to highlight their respective strengths and weaknesses and thereby 
for his record to serve as thoughtful and instructive material for aspiring 
commanders. His standard teaching method can be formulated in the following 
terms: 
 
— Leader is confronted with a problem/opportunity 
— Leader implements a course of action, or does not act at all 
— Lesson. The impact of the decision is occasionally commented on, but more 
often the reader, who is a witness to the unfolding events, is left to reflect 
himself on its implications for the leader, his command, and for the army as a 
whole.34 
 
An important additional aim, it is argued, is to critique different styles of 
leadership: Cyrus is royalty and rules on an oriental model; Klearchos and 
Kheirisophos are products of the Spartan militaristic tradition; and Xenophon 
himself is an Athenian citizen and a student of moral philosophy.35 This 
important aspect of the work, then, is as much about the effectiveness of 
leadership styles as it is a practical exercise in learning from the successes and 
                                                                                                                                
considers that the seven strategoi managed the army's affairs by majority decision 'until 
Kheirisophos was elected sole leader' (289). 
33 Xenophon receives most attention, being mentioned in the text approximately 275 
times, all but three of these (1.8.15-16, 2.4.15, 2.5.37-41) in Books 3-7. Cyrus is 
mentioned 236 times, 177 in Book 1; Klearchos, 95 times, the majority of these in Book 
2; Kheirisophos, 87 times. The most frequently mentioned of the other leaders are the 
Persians, Tissaphernes and Ariaios, 70 and 32 respectively; Menon the Thessalian, 29; 
and Proxenos of Boiotia, 25. (All figures are approximate.) The leaders in this second 
group frequently function to bring out qualities or failings of those in the first. See, for 
example, Cyrus and his relationship to Tissaphernes below; Kroeker (2009: 8) argues 
for Klearchos and Proxenos as opposites. 
34 Cf. Mitchell's (2008: 30) conclusion that Thucydides' political theorising 'is implicit 
and allusive rather than explicit, and worked out through action and event. He presents 
the case, but he leaves his readers to draw their own conclusions.' 
35 Coming from a different perspective Kingsbury (1956: 163) identifies the roles of 
Cyrus, Klearchos, and Xenophon as significant within the architecture of the work; in 
her view the characters are framed by the genre of tragic drama, with the rank and file 
being a massed chorus. 'The spectacle of drama or epic is that of a single large action 
carried on by a few major characters with a chorus of individuals more or less affected 
by the actions of the main characters'. 
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failures of outstanding men. In the remaining sections features of the leadership 
of these men accentuated by the author are examined. 
 
2.2. Cyrus the Younger 
 
Cyrus, the son of Darius and Parysatis, is the principal actor in Book 1. He 
assembles the expeditionary force, leads it up-country to Babylonia, and directs 
the attack against his brother. As with the other main characters in the story, the 
picture which Xenophon draws of him is not intended to be an accurate 
historical portrait, but rather is a composite of (probably real) individual traits 
and, in this case, the stereotype of an oriental ruler. In the author's 
representation, Cyrus's potential to be a great king (1.9.1) resides in his 
appreciation of Greek values and customs, epitomised in his lauding of 
'freedom' in his address to the officers in the run-up to battle (1.7.3); his route to 
virtue, however, is problematised by the deeper roots of his upbringing (cf. 
'disorder', 1.7.20). A selection of incidents from the march up-country both 
illustrate his hybrid character and prompt reflection on the prince's leadership.36 
 
An. 1.2.11-12. A Crisis over Pay. 
 
On the Kaÿstros Plain in western Anatolia, Cyrus is approached by the soldiers, 
to whom he owes more than three months wages. Xenophon reports that 'he 
was clearly distressed; for it was not in keeping with the character of Cyrus not 
to give them their pay, if he had it' (1.2.11). While they are still encamped on the 
plain the Queen of Kilikia arrives and soon after the men are paid. Xenophon 
reports that 'it was said that Cyrus had intercourse with the Kilikian' (1.2.12). 
 
In this vignette Xenophon highlights several features of his Cyrus's leadership, 
in particular his concern for his soldiers, and his resourcefulness. The first 
feature distinguishes Cyrus from the stereotype of oriental enslaver and is an 
                                            
36 Some, placing weight on the obituary of Cyrus (1.9), regard Xenophon's portrayal of 
his leadership as ideal: see for example Delebecque (1947: 97), and more recently, 
Azoulay (2004: 299), Almagor (2009: 9), and Millender (2009: 7). There is, however, a 
clear, and not to be unexpected contradiction between the encomium, and the account 
given of Cyrus and his leadership on the march up-country. In the end this portrait is 
not that far away from the picture painted by Plutarch in his Artaxerxes (2-3). 
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early example of Xenophon's individualist representation of the prince.37 The 
quality nonetheless has a potentially negative aspect to it: in his obituary of 
Proxenos, Xenophon remarks on the danger of softness in a leader, saying that 
'he [Proxenos] was manifestly more afraid of being hated by his soldiers than 
his soldiers were of disobeying him…Thus the noble and good among his 
associates were well disposed to him, while the unjust plotted against him, as 
against someone easily manipulated' (2.6.19-20).38 Cyrus's own obituary (1.9), 
which, at odds with his depiction in the preceding narrative, is clearly a portrait 
of an exemplary leader, does not disqualify the latter part of this description 
being applied to him. Notably, the ways in which Cyrus seems to have been 
deceived, or manipulated, by Tissaphernes (1.1.2-3), Megaphernes (1.2.20), 
Menon (1.4.13-17), Orontes (1.6), and Klearchos (1.8.12-13), suggest that 
concern for, and a trusting attitude towards, others was a weakness of his rule. 
 
A second facet of Cyrus's leadership featured in this passage is his 
resourcefulness, apparent in the manner of his securing of substantial funds 
from the Kilikian queen. The importance of this quality is underlined by the 
evident potential of the cash crisis to derail the whole enterprise; Xenophon may 
also be saying that good leaders are always prepared to put their bodies on the 
line for their men. On the other hand, we are clearly invited to wonder how, 
hardly having begun his march up-country, Cyrus has already run out of money. 
In spite of the care he shows for his men, he has now failed in his duty to 
provide for them (cf. Hipp. 6.2: 'feelings of loyalty will naturally be fostered when 
the commander is kind to his men, and obviously takes care that they have 
food'). Given his straitened financial circumstances his earlier decision to offer 
more to Aristippos than he requested seems, in this new light, to be more 
bravado than professional generalship (1.1.10). It could have been that the 
meeting with the Kilikian queen was pre-arranged, but Xenophon would hardly 
then have described Cyrus as being distressed (ἀληώκελνο) when the men 
came to him demanding pay. The sudden, unexpected shadow of disorder 
                                            
37 There may be an implied contrast here to Spartan contemptuousness towards men 
owed money: see 7.1.7, and cf. Thucydides 8.84. 
38 Late in the journey, in Thrace, Xenophon is described by Seuthes to the Spartans as 
a θηινζηξαηηώηεο (7.6.39). However, Xenophon has shown that he is not afraid to be 
disliked by the soldiers (cf. 5.8.13-16), and what Seuthes has construed as over-
familiarity may just as easily be interpreted as proper concern for the welfare of the 
men and the army as a whole. 
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which comes over the expedition is reinforced by the suggested image of the 
barbarian royals copulating on the dusty Asian plain. 
 
An. 1.5.7-8. Wagons stuck in Mud. 
 
In the course of marching through the desert a number of wagons in the train 
become stuck in mud.39 Cyrus, who is accompanied by the best and most 
privileged of his men, orders two of them to take some of the native army and 
help to free the wagons. But the prince is dissatisfied with their efforts and 
orders others from his entourage to go down: 
 
Here, then, it was possible to observe some portion of their 
good order. For throwing down their purple robes wherever 
each chanced to be standing, they hurled themselves, just as 
one might run for victory, down a very steep hill, with their very 
expensive tunics and multicoloured trousers, and some even 
with necklaces around their necks and bracelets around their 
wrists. Leaping at once into the mud with these on, they lifted 
the wagons out into the air more swiftly than one might have 
thought possible (1.5.8). 
 
In terms of the teaching formula outlined above, Cyrus has encountered a 
(minor) logistical problem, and when his solution to this has not had the desired 
result, he responds by committing additional, higher quality resources to 
expedite the matter; his successful resolution, furthermore, reveals the loyalty 
which he commands among those close to him, this in contrast to the 
mercenaries he has hired (cf. 1.3). However, at the same time the episode 
raises questions about Cyrus's style of leadership. For instance, why did he not 
himself take part in the action, lead by example, as later Klearchos (2.3.11) and 
Xenophon (3.4.47, 7.3.45) see fit to do? Then there is the fact that his 
motivation for sending the others seems to have been anger (ὀξγή). Perhaps, 
                                            
39 The paradigmatic character of this episode was brought out in Part 1, where it was 
remarked that, on the balance of probability, incidents such as this are based on actual 
events which the author adapts to his own end. The mud incident probably occurred 
north of the Middle Euphrates, in the west of the modern Anbar province of Iraq. For 
the potential chronological value of the episode see Brennan 2008. 
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rather than being an expression of loyalty, the nobles were afraid of the 
consequences of not showing immediate and unquestioning obedience. The 
impression is that the stereotypical image of the oriental ruler driving his horde 
forward with the lash lurks not far beneath the surface.40 
 
An. 1.5.11-17. Diffusing a Dispute. 
 
At a desert halting-place on the way to Babylonia41 a quarrel arises involving 
Klearchos and the soldiers of Menon the Thessalian.42 A stand-off between their 
two camps ensues, and Proxenos attempts unsuccessfully to placate the 
Spartan commander, being told by him to get himself and his men out of the 
way. 'At this point, Cyrus came up and inquired into the matter. He immediately 
took his javelins into his hands, and riding with those of his trusted troops who 
were present, he arrived in the middle and spoke as follows: 
 
"Klearchos and Proxenos and other Greeks who are present, 
you do not know what you are doing; for if you begin a battle 
with each other, believe on this day that I will have been cut to 
pieces, and you not much later than I. For if our affairs go badly, 
all these barbarians whom you see here will become even more 
hostile to us than are those who are with the King." Hearing 
this, Klearchos came to himself. And both sides having ceased, 
they put their arms in their places' (1.5.16-17). 
                                            
40 We might make a comparison with Iphikrates' handling of trierarchs at Corcyra, and 
the result, but he is acting in measured fashion, not out of anger. 'He warned them that 
anyone who failed to follow him must not find fault with the punishment that would be 
inflicted upon him. When the scouts announced that the ships were arriving and the 
herald made the proclamation, the eagerness displayed by all was a sight worth 
seeing. Everyone who was about to sail went at a run to his ship' (Hell. 6.2.34). 
41 Opposite the city of Charmande, which lies on the south bank of the Middle 
Euphrates, probably in the vicinity of Heit. 
42 Following a dispute between men from the two camps, Klearchos adjudged that one 
of Menon's men was at fault and beat him; the victim reported his mistreatment to his 
comrades, who were angered, and when later that day they saw Klearchos passing 
through their camp, they hurled stones. Hornblower, in an illuminating study of Spartan 
violence (2000), does not refer to this episode, though it may offer additional 
circumstantial evidence for his thesis that free Greeks were enraged by Spartan use of 
the βαθηεξία for beatings on account of its demeaning quality - 'both a weapon in a 
crude sense and not quite a weapon' (70) - and its regular use against helots. I hasten 
to add that Xenophon does not refer to Klearchos' staff here, but when we see him 
striking soldiers later on (2.3.11), it is with his βαθηεξία. See further Section 2.3 below. 
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Cyrus's intervention is both decisive and critical. Seeing the great danger he 
reacts at once and places himself, armed, between the two sides. Proxenos had 
done this too, but his words, instead of defusing the crisis inflamed the situation 
(Klearchos judged that he 'spoke of his experience in mild terms', 1.5.14). Cyrus 
has thus achieved this result through a combination of action and judicious 
words, neither on their own sufficient to bring about the resolution. (Cf. also his 
earlier effective handling of officer desertions at Myriandros, 1.4.6-9, and note 
50 below.) 
 
It is notable that Xenophon here, as he does elsewhere (see Chapter 3.3.2), 
casts Cyrus as a Greek. 'For if our affairs go badly, all these barbarians whom 
you see here will become even more hostile to us (ἡκῖλ) than are those who are 
with the King.' Having attributed valour and wisdom to Cyrus, it seems as if 
Xenophon is denying that these qualities can be present in a typical barbarian 
ruler. Cyrus's potential Greekness is brought out in other ways through the 
book, arguably most strongly by contrast with Tissaphernes, who is the 
embodiment of barbarian perfidy. This opposition is signalled at the very outset 
when, summoned to the court by his father, Cyrus takes Tissaphernes, ὡο 
θίινλ, but is then slandered by him and nearly loses his life (1.1.2-3). His open, 
trusting nature, and sense of ηηκή, is repeatedly emphasised, as is the treachery 
of Tissaphernes.43 
 
An. 1.7. The Approach of Battle. 
 
As the army marches through Babylonia, they pass by a trench dug by the King; 
contrary to Cyrus's expectation, he fails then to appear for battle. Cyrus 
summons the soothsayer who had predicted eleven days previous that the King 
would not give battle within ten days and pays him the money he had promised, 
for he had said then, 'he will not fight at all, if he will not fight within these ten 
                                            
43 Cyrus's noble nature: sends extra funds to guest-friend (1.1.10); holds a trial for a 
traitor (1.6); charges directly against the king while Tissaphernes makes to plunder the 
Greek camp (1.8.24, 10.8). A feature of Xenophon's didactic method is his use of other 
leaders - Tissaphernes, Proxenos, Menon, Ariaios - to highlight the presence or 
absence of qualities/vices in his main protagonists. There is a view that Xenophon 
depicts Cyrus the Great in his Kyroupaideia as a Greek rather than a Persian. See 
Gera 1993: 27 n.6 and reference. 
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days' (1.7.18). As a result of this belief, and no one challenging their passage 
by the trench, Cyrus advanced more carelessly (ἠκειεκέλσο, 1.7.19). 
 
On the third day he was making his advance both sitting in his 
chariot and with only a few troops in order in front of him, while 
the greater part of his army was advancing in disorder, and 
many of their weapons were being carried for the soldiers on 
wagons and pack animals (1.7.20). 
 
Having prepared his army for battle (1.7.1-9), Cyrus has effectively stood the 
men down, the basis of his confidence being his own opinion that his brother 
would not now fight as too much time had elapsed. This fraternal hunch, 
however, sits in opposition to the real presence of a newly dug trench, and 
evidence over many days of enemy scouts in the vicinity (cf. 1.6.1). 
 
The commander's poor judgement in this case is subsequently exposed when, 
late morning, an aide comes into sight riding at top speed, shouting that the 
King is approaching. 'Then indeed much confusion ensued, for it seemed to the 
Greeks, and indeed to all, that he would fall on them at once in their disorder' 
(ἔλζα δὴ πνιὺο ηάξαρνο ἐγέλεην· αὐηίθα γὰξ ἐδόθνπλ νἱ Ἕιιελεο θαὶ πάληεο δὲ 
ἀηάθηνηο ζθίζηλ ἐπηπεζεῖζζαη, 1.8.2). The army, though, manages to get into 
order, Cyrus saved from his error by the gaping flatness of the Mesopotamian 
plain. But the consequences of his poor leadership judgment as a leader are 
only deferred, for the commander in whom he now entrusts the success of the 
expedition, Klearchos of Sparta, disobeys his order to attack the enemy centre 
(1.8.12-13). Keeping the river on his right, Klearchos instead leads the Greeks 
against the force arrayed directly opposite them.44 In his obituary of Klearchos, 
Xenophon writes that he had before disobeyed the ephors, an act which earned 
him the death sentence at Sparta (2.6.3-4): it was at this point he went to Cyrus, 
                                            
44 Cf. Plutarch, Artaxerxes 8.3-7: 'if he [Klearchos] sought safety above everything else, 
and made it his chief object to avoid losses, it had been best for him to stay at 
home…The caution of Klearchos rather than the temerity of Cyrus must be held 
responsible for the ruin of Cyrus and the expedition.' 
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who therefore, Xenophon implies, knew before hiring him of his propensity for 
disobedience (cf. also 1.3.8).45 
 
In a poignant irony, it is in an attempt to prevent the King getting in behind the 
Greek force that, with just his own six hundred cavalry, Cyrus launches his fatal 
attack on the Persian centre. The heroic action fought by Cyrus's own men, 
epitomised by the destruction alongside him of 'the eight best of his staff' 
(Κῦξνο δὲ αὐηόο ηε ἀπέζαλε θαὶ ὀθηὼ νἱ ἄξηζηνη ηῶλ πεξὶ αὐηὸλ ἔθεηλην ἐπ' 
αὐηῷ, 1.8.27), contrasts pointedly to the simultaneous movement away from the 
battle epicentre of the mercenaries (1.8.19). With the barbarians mirroring the 
Spartan ethos of glorious death (cf. Lak. 9.1-2), and the Greeks skirting along 
the fringes of the battle, Xenophon confounds the stereotypes and seems to 
admit the possibility of an ideal oriental leadership. 
 
2.3. The Spartans: Klearchos and Kheirisophos 
 
Following the death of Cyrus, Klearchos the Spartan became de facto leader of 
the Greek mercenaries, remaining so until his capture some 7 weeks later by 
Tissaphernes.46 His unofficial elevation was due to a combination of his Spartan 
background (cf. 3.2.37), long experience of warfare (2.6.2, 15), and his 
privileged position under Cyrus (1.6.5, 3.1.10).47 From his obituary we learn that 
he became an exile from Sparta and thereafter turned to Cyrus, who was 
sufficiently impressed by his character to part with money for a force to be 
maintained in the Chersonese (1.1.9). Xenophon goes on to tell us of his 
fondness for war. 'When it is possible for him to be at peace without shame or 
harm, he chooses to make war; when it is possible for him to turn to an 
easygoing life, he wishes to do hard labour, so long as it be in making war; 
when it is possible for him to possess money without risk, he chooses to 
diminish his funds by making war. He was willing to spend on war just as on a 
favourite or some other pleasure, so fond of war was he' (2.6.6-7). 
                                            
45 Humble (1997: 64) points out that this characteristic was all the more remarkable for 
a Spartan, 'whose whole upbringing demanded the strictest obedience'. 
46 From the report of Cyrus's death to the Greeks (2.1.4), Klearchos takes over 
effective command (cf. 2.2.5). 
47 Age may also have been a factor, longevity conferring authority. Cf. 2.1.10, and 
Thucydides 5.65.2. Klearchos was around fifty at the time of the expedition (2.6.15). 
115 
 
There is a sense in this description, and through the obituary, that Xenophon 
could as well be describing the state, the militarised Spartan mode of life which 
he describes in Lak. Just, then, as with Cyrus, with Klearchos we are viewing a 
stereotype inflected by real individual traits. This is no less true of Kheirisophos, 
who in effect takes over his compatriot's role following the events by the Greater 
Zab River. Kheirisophos, moreover, is an official Spartan representative, having 
been sent out by the city with 700 hoplites (1.4.3; cf. Diodoros 14.19.5); 
Xenophon underlines his status at the outset, himself recommending to the 
Greeks that he should lead the vanguard, 'since he is also a Lakedaimonian' 
(3.2.37). In the selections which follow key characteristics of the Spartan leader 
emerge, so linking the two Cyrean commanders and enabling the effectiveness 
of this leadership style to be assessed. As in the case of Cyrus, the reader is 
implicitly invited to contemplate the reasons behind positive and negative 
outcomes. 
 
An. 1.3. Managing Crises (1): Dealing with a Mutiny.48 
 
At Tarsus, realising they have been deceived and suspecting the true scale of 
Cyrus's ambition, the men refuse to continue (1.3.1). Klearchos attempts to deal 
with the crisis by using force to get his own troops to move, but they react 
violently, throwing stones at him and the pack animals as they try to go 
forward.49 Later he changes tack and calls an assembly of his men: standing 
before them, he begins to cry, and continues doing so for a long time (πνιὺλ 
ρξόλνλ, 1.3.2). The men fall silent and look on in amazement. By virtue of the 
emotive speech which he subsequently makes on the subject of his personal 
loyalty, Klearchos secures the trust of his men, and a large number of others 
(some 2,000 soldiers) leave their own commanders to join him (1.3.7). 
 
                                            
48 Although this event occurs in Book 1, when Cyrus is leader, on this occasion the 
prince has suffered what can only be described as temporary leadership paralysis, thus 
leaving the Spartan in effective charge. 
49 Taking up again Hornblower's study of Spartan violence (see note 42 above), the 
angry reaction may have been triggered by the use of the βαθηεξία, which was 
probably carried by all Spartan officers (2000: 58). But presumably there is a link with 
the circumstances of its usage: in the canal case below, there is no adverse reaction 
from the men when Klearchos uses his staff to strike. 
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Klearchos' instinct when confronted with this mutinous situation is to act as a 
disciplinarian, using force to bring about order (cf. Lak. 2.2, 6.1-2). On first sight, 
his response to the failure of this approach seems almost un-Spartan — this 
impression reflected in the reaction of the men to his tears. But in fact another 
key trait of his training is apparent in this action, the art of deception being 
taught to Spartan youths from an early age (cf. Lak. 2.6-9, 1.5; and see An. 
4.6.14-15). In playing false with his true loyalties (cf. 1.3.8) he is drawing on this 
training. One outcome is that Cyrus is pressed into offering an increase in pay, 
and the crisis is averted, for the time being at least; a second is that Klearchos 
has succeeded in strengthening his own position in the army. 
 
The ability of leaders to adapt to circumstances as they present themselves is 
undoubtedly one of the instructive features of this episode. So too is the 
ineffectiveness, and even the danger, of using violence to control mercenaries 
(the important question of how to control mercenaries at critical moments is 
developed through the narrative by Xenophon, who himself is faced with this 
task on several occasions). In addition, a concern arises about the impact which 
the decision of 2,000 soldiers to transfer their allegiance to Klearchos from the 
commands of Pasion and Xenias might have on the unity of the army as a 
whole. Not long after the departure from Tarsus, one consequence of the 
decision — or rather the failure of either Klearchos or Cyrus to address the 
transfer — manifests itself in the desertion at Myriandros of the two disaffected 
commanders (1.4.6-9).50 
 
An. 2.3.11. Crossing Canals: Leadership in the Field.51 
 
Following the battle at Kounaxa, the Greeks conclude a truce with the King, 
whose heralds lead them off to a location where they can secure provisions 
(2.3.1-9). Even though a truce is in effect, Klearchos keeps the army in order 
and he himself commands the rearguard (2.3.10); his control invites contrast 
with Cyrus's laxity on the approach into Babylonia. Xenophon reports that the 
                                            
50 The episode at Myriandros is a further instance of paradigm in the narrative: it clearly 
serves the purpose of revealing the consequence of Klearchos' self-interested 
leadership on the one hand, and on the other of Cyrus's leadership skill in restoring the 
morale of the men and his own standing among them. 
51 Another paradigmatic episode; see above Part 1. 
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route which they were led along by the Persians was criss-crossed by ditches 
and canals full of water and that to cross they had to make bridges from palm 
trees: 
 
And here it was possible to learn how Klearchos commanded, 
holding his spear in his left hand, his staff (βαθηεξία) in his right. 
And if any of those who had been assigned to one of these 
tasks seemed to him to be shirking, he would pick out someone 
appropriate, and strike him, and at the same time he himself 
would get into the mud and take up the task, with the result that 
it shamed all who did not join him in earnest (2.3.11). 
 
The disciplinarian in Klearchos is again to the fore, though in this episode he 
complements his use of physical punishment with exemplary action: in doing as 
he himself orders, the leader motivates those around him. This is another key 
quality of Spartan leadership (cf. Lak. 8.2). Notably, Klearchos' descent into the 
mud recalls Cyrus's failure to do so when his wagons had become stuck. In his 
explicit flagging of this episode as a lesson in leadership (θαὶ ἐληαῦζα ἦλ 
Κιέαξρνλ θαηακαζεῖλ ὡο ἐπεζηάηεη), Xenophon is emphasising the importance 
of this quality in a leader. (Xenophon himself displays it on several occasions 
through the retreat: see 3.4.47-48, 4.4.12, 7.3.45, and note also Kyro. 1.6.8, 
Oik. 12.18, and Hipp. 6.4: 'In short, a commander is least likely to incur the 
contempt of his men if he shows himself more capable than they of doing 
whatever he requires of them'.) 
 
An. 2.5. Greater Zab River: Leadership around the Table. 
 
Some days after terms for a return to Ionia had been agreed and sworn upon 
with the Persians (2.3.26-28), the Greek army, together with a Persian one led 
by Tissaphernes, set off north along the Tigris River. However, mutual suspicion 
between the two sides grows steadily and threatens to develop into serious 
conflict (2.4.9-11). At the Greater Zab River, on the initiative of Klearchos, the 
two leaders meet to discuss the volatile situation (2.5.3-27); as a result, the 
Spartan agrees to return to the tent of Tissaphernes on the next day with the 
other generals in order that those suspected of being responsible for fomenting 
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hostility can be identified. Not all in the Greek camp are convinced of the 
wisdom of this, but five of the generals, and twenty captains, are prevailed upon 
by Klearchos to go (2.5.29-30). He and the generals are seized, and the 
captains cut down, by the Persians (2.5.31-32).52 
 
From Xenophon's construction of the dialogue between the men at their 
meeting, it is clear that the Persian outwits his adversary: at the start Klearchos 
assumes that Tissaphernes shares his implacable faith in the sanctity of their 
oaths (πξῶηνλ κὲλ γὰξ θαὶ κέγηζηνλ νἱ ζεῶλ ἡκᾶο ὅξθνη θσιύνπζη πνιεκίνπο 
εἶλαη ἀιιήινηο, 2.5.7), thereby leaving himself open to be exploited on trust. He 
goes on to reveal personal ambition by suggesting that he would be willing to 
lead the mercenaries in any number of campaigns that would benefit 
Tissaphernes (2.5.13-14); in his reply, Tissaphernes says: 'and as for those 
things in which you are useful to me, you too have said most of them, but it is I 
who know the greatest of them: for it is possible only for the King to have his 
tiara upright on his head, but perhaps another, if you are on hand, could easily 
have upright the one that is upon his heart' (2.5.23). Klearchos thus departs 
with heady prospects in mind. Xenophon then reveals that he was already 
anxious to purge the army of elements in it hostile to himself (2.5.29); given his 
arrangement with Tissaphernes that each of them would identify the 
troublemakers (2.5.24-26), it is apparent that he saw the occasion as well as an 
opportunity to strengthen his own grip over the army.53 
 
While the initiative of Klearchos was commendable, it is clear that he had not 
the requisite level of political skill to carry it through successfully. Far superior in 
this field, Tissaphernes turned the situation to his own advantage by exploiting 
the naivety, rashness, and ambition of the Spartan. Reviewing events from his 
perspective, the decision of the Greeks to remain in Babylonia for over twenty 
days while he gathered his own force (2.4.1) must have been taken as a sign of 
                                            
52 Danzig (2007: 35) remarks: 'the fact that some Greeks guessed Tissaphernes' 
intentions shows that his actions were not as shocking as Klearchos' were foolish'. 
Rood (2006: 51) sees one of the roles of the advisers ('some Greeks') here as pointing 
up the rashness of the person (Klearchos) who neglects it. 
53 Klearchos' suspicion of his fellow officers, and his need to cajole them to go to 
Tissaphernes, summons a contrast with Cyrus and the apparent loyalty which he 
inspired in those under his command (cf. 1.5.8, 1.8.24-28). Even when dealing with a 
noble who had been treacherous towards him previously, Cyrus acts justly (1.6). 
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uncertainty, and he may well have attributed this leadership failure to credulity 
(cf. 2.4.7). 
 
Once again, as at Tarsus, and on the battlefield at Kounaxa, Klearchos failed to 
act in the interest of the whole army body. His actions now proved not only fatal 
to himself, but, by depriving it of its high command, put in serious peril the very 
survival of the Greek army. This theme of Spartans pursuing individual self-
interest is continued through the narrative and is especially marked in 
Xenophon's depiction of their behaviour in European Thrace (Book 7 passim). 
 
An. 3.1-3. Managing Crises (2): Difficult Straits. 
 
On the initiative of Xenophon Kheirisophos the Spartan becomes commander of 
the army vanguard, with himself and Timasion taking charge of the rear and the 
army's two eldest generals the flanks (3.2.37; on the command see further note 
60 below). Kheirisophos' primacy arises from his status as a Spartan ('let 
Kheirisophos lead, since he is also a Lakedaimonian', 3.2.37), and, we may 
assume, from his experience in the field.54 
 
In contrast to the elaborate speeches made by Xenophon (Book 3 passim), 
Kheirisophos' words to the men are sparse, and may seem to be inadequate in 
light of the desperate circumstances in which the army finds itself. Yet with their 
reputation for military prowess, and tradition of military success, the men look to 
the Spartans for decisive action rather than inspirational words and gestures 
(recall, for instance, their amazement when Klearchos wept at Tarsus before 
                                            
54 Kheirisophos does not feature in the surviving histories of the Peloponnesian War, 
but it may be inferred from the fact that he has been sent out by Sparta with 700 
hoplites that he was a respected commander at home (incidentally, and unintentionally 
downgrading his prominence, Roy (1967: 300) speculates that these men were 
Peloponnesian mercenaries hired by Sparta for the purpose). Xenophon, deliberately 
one suspects, is vague on the subject of Spartan support for Cyrus (1.4.2-3), but 
Diodoros on the other hand (14.19.2-5, 21.1-2) is clear that Kheirisophos and his 
contingent are an official, if clandestine, Spartan contribution to the expedition. He 
writes as well that the army chose the Spartan as supreme commander at the Greater 
Zab (14.27.1). That Kheirisophos was not among the generals who were taken to 
Tissaphernes by Klearchos shows not that he was of secondary standing, but that 
Klearchos trusted him more than the other commanders: it is he whom Klearchos sent 
to Ariaios following the battle at Kounaxa to offer him the throne (2.1.4-5. Menon the 
Thessalian goes as well because he 'wished it, since he was a friend and a guest-
friend of Ariaios'). 
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going on to speak at length). Kheirisophos, in his pragmatic response to the 
crisis, meets this expectation. When Xenophon has concluded his speech (1.5 
OCT pages long) to an assembly of surviving generals and captains, 
Kheirisophos instructs the men to go and choose new rulers where this is 
necessary, in order that a full assembly of the army can be held: 'and as he said 
this, he got up, so that what was needed might be carried out, not delayed' 
(3.1.46-47); following Xenophon's subsequent and lengthy speech to the full 
assembly (5 OCT pages), for which he dresses himself in his finest armour, 
Kheirisophos urges the measures spoken of to be voted on 'as soon as 
possible' (3.2.33).55 
 
Kheirisophos impresses his stamp in the crucial period which sees the army 
cross the Greater Zab River and establish its viability. It is he who answers 
Mithradates — an old ally of Cyrus who comes claiming to be well-disposed 
towards them — on the morning they set out (3.3.3); the subsequent decision 
not to admit heralds so long as they are in enemy territory (Mithradates was 
suspected by the Greeks of spying for Tissaphernes) bears the trademark of his 
militaristic training, as does the preceding decision to burn the wagons and 
dispose of anything superfluous (3.3.1). Once on their way, he leads from the 
front and is quick to point out and admonish even high-level errors (cf. 3.3.11, 
Xenophon at fault). 
 
The quiet pragmatism of Kheirisophos is, understandably, easily overlooked 
amidst the drama of Xenophon's introduction to the story, and particularly when 
set against the memorable series of speeches which he delivers on the banks 
of the Greater Zab River. However, in the wider picture, these same 
inspirational speeches are an equally, and arguably, an even more important 
ingredient for survival. In the terrible solitude and danger of the predicament, 
there is the unmistakeable impression that the laconic contribution would not be 
sufficient of itself to bring about the rebuilding of morale that, Xenophon at least, 
                                            
55 It may be that in his response to Xenophon's speech to the officers (3.1.45) — 
'previously, Xenophon, I knew you only so far as to have heard you were an Athenian, 
but now I praise you for what you are saying and doing, and I would wish that as many 
as possible be of this same sort' — Kheirisophos is acknowledging what Xenophon's 
narrative will go on to demonstrate, namely that, at least for a non-homogenous army, 
an Athenian style of leadership is more effective. 
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sees as a prerequisite for escape from Tissaphernes' grasp (cf. 3.1.39-42, and 
Kyro. 1.6.13). In this regard, Xenophon's leadership brings into relief the limits 
of that of Kheirisophos when dealing with a non-Spartan army. 
 
An. 1-4 passim. Military expertise. 
 
Both of the Spartans show a high level of competence in military matters. 
Numerous instances highlight tactical proficiency (1.8.13, 4.3.17), proficiency in 
the art of deception (2.3.9, 2.4.26), strategic foresight (2.3.13, 3.5.6), 
maintaining order and obedience (2.2.20, 2.3.11), and logistical nous (2.3.5, 
4.7.3). The quality of the Spartans' training and its more or less successful 
application invites comparison with Cyrus and Xenophon respectively. While 
demonstrably capable, both of these men are shown lacking in one or more 
important facets of military leadership: Cyrus, for example, in leaving his forces 
vulnerable on the approach to battle by not maintaining their order (1.7.19-20), 
Xenophon through failing to grasp the limitation of pursuing enemy cavalry on 
foot (3.3.8-10). However, in the latter case, the deficit is evidently attributable to 
inexperience and Xenophon duly shows that he has the critical capacity to learn 
from his mistakes (see further Section 2.4 below). What comes through from the 
author's narrative is that military expertise, while an essential ingredient in good 
military leadership, is not sufficient by itself to make a good leader. 
 
An. 4.6.2-3. Incident with the Guide: the Angry Spartan.56 
 
After a week sheltering from ferocious winter weather in the Armenian 
Highlands, the Greeks continue on their journey, taking with them as a guide 
the chief of the village where they had stayed (4.6.1).57 On the third day's 
march, still not in sight of any settlements, Kheirisophos confronted the guide, 
who insisted that there were none in the area. Becoming angry with him (αὐηῷ 
ἐραιεπάλζε) the Spartan struck him (αὐηὸλ ἔπαηζελ), and that night, not having 
                                            
56 For this section I am indebted to feedback received from Chris Farrell, Phil Davies, 
and Rosie Harman at an ICS Graduate Work in Progress Seminar, March 19, London, 
2010. 
57 The Armenian villages Xenophon writes of are probably situated to the north of the 
Euphrates in the region of Bulanık. See Brennan 2009 for comment on stretches of the 
journey through eastern Anatolia. 
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been bound, he fled.58 Xenophon states that this incident — the harsh treatment 
of the guide and the neglect that led to his escape — 'was the sole 
disagreement between Kheirisophos and Xenophon on the march' (4.6.3). By 
this explicit disapproval he is first and foremost underlining the importance of 
the need for commanders to manage properly key assets; later in the march he 
himself exemplifies the correct approach, placing informants under strict guard 
(ἐθύιαηηελ ἰζρπξῶο) 'in order that they might be his guides wherever needed' 
(6.3.11). 
 
While Xenophon may be being ironic when he says that this was the only thing 
the two men disagreed on (see 4.1.19, and further Chapter 3.3.3), in relating 
this incident he is pointing up two serious failings in Kheirisophos' leadership, 
both of which may be attributable to his Spartan background. The first is his 
arrogant attitude towards the guide: his failure to ensure that he was bound 
resulted in the man fleeing during the night, this leaving the Greeks lost in a 
harsh environment. They may subsequently have gone on to follow a river, the 
Phasis, in the mistaken belief that it emptied into the Euxine, an error that at the 
least lengthened their journey and occasioned additional hardship. Given the 
prudence of Kheirisophos' leadership up to this point, it is hard not to read his 
inaction here as a form of arrogance, deeming the guide to be so insignificant 
as not to warrant detention. 
 
The second, and arguably more severe, fault in Xenophon's eyes is the event 
that led to the guide fleeing — Kheirisophos, by his quickness to anger, striking 
the man. This lack of self-discipline in a critical situation left the entire army 
open to potentially devastating consequences, a fact signalled by Xenophon 
when he singles out the incident as one where he has crossed words with the 
Spartan. Nor is this the first time that Spartan rage has endangered the 
expedition: as described above, Klearchos, having been stoned by Menon's 
men, orders his own to arms to exact retribution for the humiliation (1.5.11), with 
only the prompt intervention of Cyrus preventing disaster (and cf. 2.6.9). It is 
notable that in Hellenika, too, Spartan propensity to anger is highlighted; for 
                                            
58 As it would with Klearchos at 1.3.1 and 1.5.11, it would be nice to know if 
Kheirisophos used his stick; if so, it would seem that free Greeks were not the only 
ones to be outraged by abusive deployment of the βαθηεξία. 
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example at 1.6.6-7, 2.4.32-34, 5.3.3-7, and 6.2.19. At Hell. 5.3.7, Xenophon 
interjects an explicitly didactic paragraph warning of the danger of acting out of 
anger: 'Now I claim that men can learn from such experiences [the fate of 
Teleutias], and they can learn especially that it is not right to punish anyone in 
anger — even a slave, since masters who are angry often themselves suffer 
greater evils than they inflict on their servants. And it is a complete and utter 
mistake to attack an enemy with anger rather than judgement. For anger acts 
without foresight, whereas judgement has in view a way to harm one's enemy 
without suffering any hurt from him in return.' 
 
Xenophon, from extensive firsthand experience, is evidently of the view that 
Spartan commanders are prone to angry outbursts and can exhibit arrogance in 
their attitude towards non-Spartiates. This temperament is shown as 
undermining the effectiveness of their leadership on the retreat, and by 
extension, a view is implied about their suitability for governing Greece. 
Xenophon does not put forward an explanation for these character faults, but he 
may be hinting in the episode with the guide that they are a consequence of 
their social system and its dependence on an underclass of helots: the guide, 
chief of a village which supplies the stables of the Great King (4.5.34), is in a 
similar type of relationship to the Persians as the helots are to the Spartans. 
Referring to the Teleutias episode mentioned above, Thomas writes, 'the 
reason Spartans are addicted to outbursts of temper may be the high proportion 
of unfree people within Spartan society, whom upper-class Spartans can attack 
without restraint'.59 
 
2.4. Xenophon the Athenian 
 
Although it is he who has proposed Kheirisophos to lead (Χεηξίζνθνο κὲλ 
ἡγνῖην, ἐπεηδὴ θαὶ Λαθεδαηκόληόο ἐζηη, 3.2.37), Xenophon's own dominant role 
on the retreat implies that he is at least as influential in the directing of the 
                                            
59 Thomas 2009: xl; cf. Hornblower 2000: 60-61, 69-71, and on 71 citing Redfield's 
(1995: 173) interesting explanation for the phenomenon of Spartan violence: 
'Spartiates, he [Redfield] notes, "were raised predominantly by women, then evicted 
into the male world of asceticism and competition, and we may attribute to the 
abruptness of this change the rigid and yet uncertain self-control of the Spartans; for all 
their discipline, they were certainly (as we meet them in the histories) more than other 
Greeks subject to fits of rage and violence'". 
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march.60 By his own account it is he who stirs the army from its torpor (ἀζύκσο) 
on the banks of the Greater Zab River following the devastating decapitation 
strike by Tissaphernes. His speeches, first to the captains of the contingent to 
which he is attached, then to the surviving generals and captains of the army, 
and finally to a full assembly of staff and soldiers, succeed in rallying morale 
and producing a plan for an ordered retreat out from under the shadow of 
Tissaphernes.61 The achievement brings to mind Themistocles' persuading of 
the Athenians to leave their city and their subsequent improbable triumph over 
Persia (cf. Plutarch, Themistocles 10.1-2; Herodotus 7.143). Arguments in his 
speeches furthermore invite comparison with ones made by other leaders of the 
early fifth-century Persian resistance. For example, his argument that the king 
would gladly build roads to assist the Greeks in leaving his territory (3.2.24) 
mirrors Aristides' plea to Themistocles that, rather than destroying the bridges 
over the Hellespont and cutting off Xerxes's army, they should seek ways to 
speed his departure from Hellas 'lest, being shut in and unable to make his 
escape, from sheer necessity he throw this vast force of his upon the defensive' 
(Plutarch, Aristides 9.3-4). With more contemporary resonance, the eloquence 
of Xenophon's speech to the full assembly recalls key addresses given to the 
Athenians by important statesmen during the Peloponnesian War, in particular 
the funeral oration which Thucydides ascribes to Pericles at the outset of the 
                                            
60 New generals are elected by the surviving officers to replace those seized by 
Tissaphernes (3.1.46-47), leaving seven in overall command for the retreat: Xenophon, 
Kheirisophos, Sophainetos, Timasion, Xanthicles, Philesios, and Kleanor. This 
structure appears to have operated until Sinope on the Black Sea, when Kheirisophos 
is elected sole commander (6.1.18). Nonetheless, on the crucial march down to the sea 
Sophainetos only appears once (4.4.19), and Kleanor twice (4.6.9, 8.18), with none of 
the others bar Xenophon and Kheirisophos being mentioned at all; moreover, the latter, 
like Klearchos before him, seems to be regarded as de facto leader (cf. 3.4.38, where 
he orders Xenophon to the front). This need not necessarily indicate that the others 
had only a nominal involvement in leading the march, but Xenophon would hardly have 
underplayed their roles to such a significant degree knowing that one or more might 
challenge a seriously biased account. Diodoros reports that Kheirisophos was made 
supreme commander following the seizure of Klearchos (14.27.1). On the matter see 
further Roy 1967: 293-294, and Erbse 2010: 495-499, who seeks to show that 
Diodoros' report is not reliable. 
61 We might see Xenophon's purpose in his speeches as being to mould a force like 
that of Cyrus the Great: 'Cyrus's army was full of zeal, ambition, strength, confidence, 
mutual exhortation, moderation, obedience; this, I think, is most terrible for the 
opposition' (Kyro. 3.3.59). His speeches contain motifs of exhortation from a range of 
categories, including custom, justice, and expediency. On the arguments, forms, and 
functions of exhortative speech, see further Keitel 1987. 
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conflict (2.35-46).62 Notably, for his address, Xenophon accoutres himself in his 
finest armour: in the absence of a recognisable physical forum this act 
symbolises the formality and importance of the occasion.63 The democratic 
setting — full assembly, speech, the inclusion of the whole group in the decision 
making process, and the earlier Council of captains and commanders — in turn 
symbolises the new style of leadership which Xenophon the Athenian will come 
to impose on the army, and which will deliver it from the clutches of the King, 
eventually, to the shores of Asia Minor. 
 
As with his depiction of the other principal leaders, Xenophon's representation 
of himself is not to be regarded as wholly historically accurate;64 rather than 
Xenophon qua Xenophon, the character we have in Anabasis is at one and the 
same time an exemplar of a young Athenian citizen and, as is argued in detail in 
Chapter 4, a model student of Socrates. It is this democratic and philosophical 
background — whether or not either was actually embraced by the author — 
which informs his leadership throughout. In this section distinctive features of 
Xenophon's character's style are highlighted, and where relevant, contrasted to 
their absence in the barbarian and Spartan approaches to leadership. 
 
Xenophon the Democrat 
 
The number, length, and rhetorical accomplishment of the speeches which 
Xenophon makes are the hallmark of his leadership. From his formal 
introduction to the story in Book 3, he makes over twenty substantial speeches, 
invariably at times of difficulty either for the army or for himself. While the power 
of action is by no means overlooked by Xenophon's character, his narrative 
emphasises the primacy of the spoken word and its power to influence and 
even to change the course of unfolding events.65 
                                            
62 See Mitchell 2008 for an illuminating study of 'political champions' in the Athenian 
democracy. 
63 Xenophon is doubtless also keen to impress, if not to cast a spell on his audience: 
see Kyro. 8.1.40, and Erbse 2010: 491. Cf. Waterfield (2006: 183) who suggests that 
the dressing up reveals a pretentious side to Xenophon's character. 
64 Contra Due (1989: 203) who considers Xenophon's depiction of himself as a 'self-
portrait'. 
65 The power and charm of speech: 3.2.8-32, Xenophon rallies men to pull together and 
save themselves; 5.7.5-33, defuses tense situation arising from rumours that the army 
is to be led back towards the Phasis; 5.8.2-26, successfully defends himself against 
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From his first address to the assembled army it is apparent that Xenophon is 
embracing the tradition of Athenian public oratory, where political success 
depends on the ability to persuade and carry the majority. More particularly, as 
Ferrario has observed, this pivotal address, replete with references to sacrifice 
and freedom, is indebted to the funerary oration, the delivery of which was 
reserved for eminent political and military leaders of the democracy (cf. 
Thucydides 2.34.6).66 Xenophon is thus positioning himself in a line of 
successful Athenian leaders and signalling that his leadership on the march 
ahead will be according to the same principles as his democratic forebears. 
Towards this end, I suggest that he intends his leadership performance to be 
viewed by his readership against the background of Pericles' famous funeral 
speech. Throughout the retreat, Xenophon is the embodiment of the ideals 
expressed by Pericles in his address, and his success builds the case for 
democratic leadership being more effective than the two styles he has already 
showcased.67 The examples below demonstrate how echoes of Pericles' 
speech reverberate through the retreat, and how Xenophon links himself to it 
via his character.68 Following this exposition another key dimension of 
Xenophon's leadership, his interest in ethical philosophy, is considered. 
                                                                                                                                
charge of hubris; 7.1.22-32, prevents sack of Byzantium; 7.6.11-38, defends himself 
against charge of corruption. Cf. Mem. 3.3.11, Hipp. 8.22. Dio Chrysostom (On 
Training for Public Speaking, 15-16) writes of Xenophon's speeches: 'If it is needful for 
the statesman to encourage those who are in the depths of despondency, time and 
again our writer shows how to do this; or if the need is to incite and exhort, no one who 
understands the Greek language could fail to be aroused by Xenophon's hortatory 
speeches'. On his speech to the general assembly Erbse (2010: 491) writes: 'These 
familiar tropes of Athenian rhetoric provide scarcely any grasp on how to deal with the 
present situation. But they do give the exhausted troops the will to live again: 
Xenophon manages to get something to happen, and demonstrates that only he, the 
educated and rhetorically trained Athenian in the midst of the rough mercenaries, has 
access to the means for this success'. 
66 On Xenophon's speech Ferrario (2009: 23) writes: 'The recollections of the victories 
over the Persians, of the eleutheria that the Greek states enjoy, and of the 
achievements of the soldiers' progonoi are all also traditional themes of the Athenian 
epitaphios logos.' Similar patriotic tropes appear in many of Xenophon's later 
speeches: cf. 3.4.46, 4.8.14, 6.5.23-24. 
67 Beyond the retreat Xenophon continues to represent himself as an important 
Athenian figure; cf. his dedication at the Athenian treasury at Delphi (5.3.5), probably 
made while Agesilaos was there in August 394. As Ferrario (2009: 25) remarks, 'such 
commemorative effort was certainly a known behaviour on the part of high-achieving 
military commanders'. 
68 Examining the role of advice and advisers in Anabasis, Rood (2006) asserts that 
Thucydides' portrayal of Pericles is 'relevant to interpreting Xenophon's self-
presentation' (50); he goes on to point up similarities in how each leader deals with 'the 
heightened feelings of the crowd' (55), and how Xenophon's complaint about being 
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Thucydides 2.40.2. 'We are unique in the way we regard anyone who takes no 
part in public affairs: we do not call that a quiet life, we call it a useless life. We 
are all involved in either the proper formulation or at least the proper review of 
policy, thinking that what cripples action is not talk, but rather the failure to talk 
through the policy before proceeding to the required action.' 
 
Xenophon's initiative by the Greater Zab exemplifies this principle. To call 
attention to the Periclean speech at the very outset, he uses symbolic and literal 
references: as suggested above, his dressing-up is meant to mark the formality 
of his address — the sartorial equivalent of Pericles' mounting a specially 
constructed platform (cf. Thucydides 2.34.8); and then his statement 
immediately prior to the speech that, if he is to die now, he wishes himself to be 
adorned nobly, prompts the reader to call funerary speeches to mind.69 
Arguably, to his readership none would have been as familiar as that of 
Pericles. A further notable parallel to add to these are the political 
circumstances: both actual audiences, Xenophon's more pressingly, are facing 
daunting futures with a formidable enemy at the gate. 
 
Thucydides 2.37.1. 'Our constitution is called a democracy because we govern 
in the interests of the majority, not just the few.' 
 
On each occasion on which a participatory assembly is held, the Athenian form 
of government is emulated. The majority is empowered through voting and 
given voice through the freedom afforded to ordinary soldiers to air their 
views.70 Although assemblies have been held prior to the establishment of the 
new leadership, they have either been limited in their participation (1.3.2; 
1.4.13), or intended only to report information (1.4.12).71 From the crossing of 
                                                                                                                                
blamed for offending someone but not being remembered for doing a favour (5.8.25-
26) mirrors Pericles' that 'the Athenians take credit for success themselves, but blame 
failure on their advisers' (55). 
69 I owe the point about the link between Xenophon's reference to his death and 
funerary oration to Ferrario 2009: 22-23. 
70 Voting: 3.2.9, 33, 38; 5.1.4, 7, 8, 11, 12; 5.6.11, 33; 5.8.1; 6.1.32; 6.2.4-7; 6.4.11; 
7.3.5-6, 14. Voices: 5.1.2; 5.8.2; 6.2.4, 5; 6.4.18; 7.3.13; 7.6.8. See Nussbaum (1967: 
48) for a definition of the general assembly of the army. 
71 It is notable that Klearchos calls an assembly of his own men only after his use of 
physical force to achieve his end has failed (1.3.1-2). He does not call any assemblies 
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the Euphrates up until the Greater Zab there are no assemblies at all recorded, 
whereafter through to Thrace more than twenty are. Indeed Xenophon, from a 
tense episode at Kotyora (5.6.37), leads us to believe that there would have 
been more had his view always prevailed. 
 
The question of Xenophon's attitude to democracy is one which, arguably, does 
not receive as much attention as it might. The commonplace view that he is not 
enamoured of the system tends to be based on his aristocratic profile rather 
than a close reading of his writings.72 From these it is evident that political 
philosophy is a preoccupation, with different forms of government appraised in 
several works: the evidence from Anabasis is that Xenophon readily grasped 
how potentially effective a means of exercising and maintaining power 
democracy was, and from this perspective he can properly be characterised as 
an enthusiast. By contrast, we can counterpoint the sceptical attitude to 
democracy of Thucydides' Kleon, who, on account of the influence of 
demagogues, sees the system as undermining the power of the polis. 
 
Some examples highlight Xenophon's exposition of democracy in action. 
Notably, as Nussbaum points out, no proposal put to the army is ever 
rejected:73 the clear implication is that, in situations where a leader judges that a 
proposal may not pass, he simply does not put it forward and may instead seek 
another way to achieve the desired end (conversely, if he fears a proposal 
brought forward by the men may pass, and he does not want it to do so, he can 
intervene to have it bypassed: cf. 6.1.25-31). For example when the army is at 
Trapezus and faced with the possibility of there being insufficient ships to ferry 
them onwards, Xenophon's suggestion that they order the cities along the coast 
to have the roads rebuilt is received negatively. 'Here they cried out that there 
                                                                                                                                
during the critical period in which he has command post-Kounaxa up until his capture 
at the Greater Zab River. 
72 Anderson, for example, writes that 'his political ideas reflect the inherited traditions 
and prejudices of his class' (1974: 40). For Xenophon as an anti-democrat see Luccioni 
1947, Vlastos 1983, Goldhill 1998, Brock 2004, Pownall 2004. Writing on Anabasis, 
Dalby (1992: 17) comments: 'He [Xenophon] was not an enthusiast for democracy, so 
one might look for unsympathetic reporting of mass meetings'. When carried out, 
however, the search scarcely shows positive on this count. Indeed Gray (2010a: 13) 
remarks that 'it is hard to find any image of democracy in his works other than a 
positive one'. 
73 Nussbaum 1967: 58. 
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was no need to go by land. And Xenophon, because he knew their foolishness, 
did not put anything to a vote, but persuaded the cities to rebuild the roads 
voluntarily, saying that they would be rid of them more quickly if the roads were 
easily passable' (἖ληαῦζα δὲ ἀλέθξαγνλ ὡο νὐ δένη ὁδνηπνξεῖλ. ὁ δὲ ὡο ἔγλσ 
ηὴλ ἀθξνζύλελ αὐηῶλ, ἐπεςήθηζε κὲλ νὐδέλ, ηὰο δὲ πόιεηο ἑθνύζαο ἔπεηζελ 
ὁδνπνηεῖλ, ιέγσλ ὅηη ζᾶηηνλ ἀπαιιάμνληαη, ἢλ εὔπνξνη γέλσληαη αἱ ὁδνί, 
5.1.14). 
 
Howland points out the need for suppression of dissenting voices, citing the 
example of Apollonides, a captain in the contingent of Proxenos who airs 
concern about the wisdom of trying to escape from the King following the 
seizure of the generals by the Greater Zab (3.1.26). Xenophon cuts Apollonides 
off in mid-speech and after a detailed response proposes that he be demoted 
from captaincy to slave (3.1.27-30).74 In his own account Xenophon brings out 
several other central operating principles in the control and management of 
democracies.75 
 
Thucydides 2.37.2. 'We are open and free in the conduct of our public affairs.' 
 
Xenophon makes accessibility a virtue of his leadership. Early on in the retreat, 
he makes it explicit that he is approachable at any time: 
 
                                            
74 Howland 2000: 886. 'The political understanding displayed here is profound: the 
freedom of speech that characterises the community of soldiers after Xenophon's 
ascent is made possible only by the prudent use of force to suppress dangerous 
speech at the moment of founding'. 
75 For instance, in an episode at Herakleia (6.2.4-7) Xenophon shows that democratic 
will is comparatively easier to subvert: in this case both he and Kheirisophos get out of 
a task they have been charged with by the soldiers, an implication being that, had they 
been instructed on this by another form of authority, they may not have been able to 
avoid compliance. A further insight is provided in Thrace where, directly expounding on 
political philosophy, he says to Seuthes: 'You surely know that those who have now 
become your subjects have been persuaded to be ruled by you not out of friendship for 
you but by necessity, and that they would undertake to become free again unless some 
fear should hold them down' (7.7.29; cf. Thucydides 3.37.2). There is a clear notion 
here of a human propensity for freedom, of a state of not being held in subjection by 
(an)other(s); in seeming to address this need, democracy, Xenophon is hinting, 
provides an efficient means of controlling a population. In his words to Seuthes 
Xenophon may have in mind Athens' dependence on intimidation rather than loyalty to 
control the Delian League. 
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While Xenophon was having his breakfast, two youths ran up to 
him; for they all knew it was possible to go up to him as he was 
having breakfast or dinner or, even if he were sleeping, to wake 
him and tell him anything one had to say that related to the war 
(4.3.10). 
 
The merit of this reputation is manifested in this instance by the army, through 
the agency of the youths, finding a way out of a difficult predicament. 
 
A similar situation arises later on in the march down country when, faced on the 
opposite bank of a river by an array of determined local warriors, Xenophon is 
approached by one of the peltasts, a man who had been a slave at Athens and 
believed he knew the language of this tribe. 'I think,' [he said], 'this is my 
fatherland. And unless something prevents it, I am willing to converse with them' 
(4.8.4). As a result, a misunderstanding about the motive of the Greeks on the 
part of the tribe was cleared up and the Greeks were able to continue on their 
way. 
 
Xenophon's accessibility is implicitly attributable to the greater accountability to 
which Athenian leaders were bound; he gives a strong indication of this at 
Kotyora, where it is decided to 'subject the generals to a trial covering all the 
time that had passed' (5.8.1). This mirrors the Athenian practice of euthuna — 
the public audit of archons at the end of their service — and while he does not 
say that the suggestion was his, he has made the one immediately preceding 
this to purify the army (cf. 5.7.35). Xenophon's conscious effort to make himself 
accessible to the soldiers contrasts with what he says about Klearchos in his 
obituary: 'he [Klearchos] even used to say that the soldier had to fear his ruler 
more than the enemy if he were to stand guard well, keep his hands off his 
friends, or go against the enemy without making excuses' (2.6.10).76 
 
                                            
76 As Xenophon shows elsewhere, accessibility as a leadership quality is not exclusive 
to democracies: cf. the Spartan Teleutias at Hell. 5.1.14; Ages. 9.1-2. 
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Xenophon the Philosopher 
 
Xenophon's leadership as represented in Anabasis has a further dimension to 
it, one which, it is argued in this section, owes itself to his training with the 
philosopher Socrates. His marked capacities for self-discipline, selflessness, 
rational thinking, and foresight on the one hand, and his piety on the other, can 
be more persuasively attributed to Socrates, the ethical philosopher par 
excellence, than to his education in the 'School of Hellas'. Xenophon's 
representation of himself as a model pupil of Socrates is examined in Chapter 
4; in the current section examples from the narrative are provided to illustrate 
the aforementioned qualities. 
 
1. Self-discipline 
 
A virtue on display from the point of his introduction is Xenophon's ability to be 
master of himself. Overcoming the fear and despair that has gripped the army 
— visited upon his character through a dream in which he sees his father house 
burning (3.1.11) — he rises, and though extremely afraid (πεξίθνβνο), takes 
command of the crisis. Throughout his performance on the retreat this quality is 
in evidence, sometimes implied by way of contrast to others (for example 
Kheirisophos striking the guide, 4.6.2-3). We also witness it, from a different 
angle, in an episode which sees him recognise his own error and initiate 
corrective action. 
 
3.3.8-11: A Flawed Manoeuvre: Learning to Learn. 
 
Almost immediately after they had crossed the Greater Zab River, the army is 
harried by the pursuing Persians; the Greek rear came under severe pressure 
and Xenophon in response decided to lead out a contingent. However, they 
were unable to catch up with the enemy, and were rendered more vulnerable 
for having detached from the main body. The action furthermore retarded the 
progress of the army as a whole, and did this at a critical phase of the retreat. 
Upon halting the march for camp, Kheirisophos and the oldest of the generals 
blamed Xenophon 'because he went off in pursuit, away from the phalanx, and 
because he ran risks himself and yet was no more able to do harm to the 
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enemy' (3.3.11). Xenophon openly acknowledges his error (ἀθνύζαο δὲ 
Ξελνθῶλ ἔιεγελ ὅηη ὀξζῶο αἰηηῷλην, 3.3.12), but goes on to point out that the 
episode has exposed their critical need for cavalry and slingers. The measures 
he proposes to remedy this are adopted and, as a result, the army is able to 
fend off a sustained attack the following day. 
 
On first reading, Xenophon's act in going off to pursue the enemy on foot could 
be taken as an ill-disciplined one; in fact, it is tactical naivety, evidence of his 
inexperience in military matters.77 His capacity to acknowledge the error, and to 
learn from the episode, evidences a mind operating on a principle of self-control 
(ἐγθξάηεηα): this capacity to learn from mistakes is, he is saying, more valuable 
than a fixed set of techniques, and is a key hallmark of successful leadership. 
That Xenophon has learned well on the arduous march down country — and 
has been learning from Cyrus and Klearchos through the march up-country — 
is demonstrated by his masterful conduct of the expedition to procure supplies 
from the Drilai when the army is no longer able to source them on forays from 
Trapezus (5.2; cf. also 7.3.37-38). 
 
This episode touches on both of the major apologetic elements in the work, 
each examined in turn in the following chapters. By his highlighting of his 
capacity to learn from his mistakes, and to do so quickly, Xenophon is pointing 
to the benefit of his Socratic training (Chapter 4), while in showing himself in a 
flawed light, as he does on a number of other occasions, he serves his personal 
apologia by increasing sympathy for his character (Chapter 3).78 
 
                                            
77 Xenophon has not joined the army in a military capacity, and though he has likely 
seen active service during the Peloponnesian War, his young age precludes significant 
campaign experience (cf. 3.1.25). Against this both Anderson (1974: 117) and Lee 
(2007: 54) consider that Xenophon, by virtue of the fact that Proxenos' men had 
elected him in their leader's place, had executed commander duties during the course 
of the seven months of the march up until this point; Anderson, indeed, considers that 
'from the first Xenophon showed superior professional skill in tactics and handling men 
in formation' (129). 
78 Xenophon's forgettable moments: idea to establish a colony (5.6.15 ff.); gets drunk 
with Seuthes and gives grounds for suspicions against himself on the part of the men 
(7.3.29-32, see further Chapter 3.2.3); over friendly with those under his command 
(θηινζηξαηηώηεο, 7.6.4). 
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2. Selflessness 
 
Xenophon shows constant concern for the welfare of the soldiers, even to the 
extent of putting their interests ahead of his own. Thus we see him in the harsh 
weather conditions of Armenia returning to give aid to stragglers (4.5.8, 18; cf. 
4.5.11, Kheirisophos camping at a village for the night while men are still out on 
the trail), and in Thrace, foregoing his own share of pay and booty (7.6.19, 
7.7.39-40, 56). Xenophon's selfless actions could be read in the light of the 
Periclean framework, where doing good for others is regarded as a means to 
gaining advantage for oneself (Thucydides 2.40.4-5); however, his selflessness 
seems to draw on a less calculating basis than this, as is implied on the several 
occasions in which those whom he has benefitted, far from even acknowledging 
their debt, charge him with doing them harm.79 Selflessness on the part of 
Athenian generals seems, furthermore, to be uncommon. In his account of 
Nikias' surrender on Sicily, Thucydides makes a point of underlining his 
exceptional character: '[he] asked him [Gylippos] to do whatever he and the 
Spartans wanted with his own person, but to stop the slaughter of his men…Of 
all the Greeks in my time, he was the least deserving of this depth of 
misfortune, since he conducted his whole life as a man of principle' (7.85-86). It 
seems proper therefore to situate Xenophon's enlightened behaviour in the 
overlapping space between the political and moral spheres, and to see it as well 
as a measure of his progress on the path to becoming kalos kagathos. 
 
3. Analytical thinking 
 
Time and again when the retreating army is confronted with a challenge, it is 
Xenophon who devises an effective solution. But rather than simply supplying 
this in the narrative, Xenophon builds it up so that the stages of resolution are 
transparent: this process draws attention to the disciplined cognitive action as 
much as to the solution, showing the importance and value of this quality to the 
                                            
79 At 5.8 Xenophon has to defend himself against a charge of hubris brought by several 
of the soldiers in connection with his actions to save them in the snow; at 7.6.9-10 he is 
charged with enriching himself at the expense of the soldiers. A function of these 
episodes may well be to elucidate the related views that mercenaries tend to be 
grateful only at the moment of gratification, and that their loyalty cannot be relied upon. 
134 
 
leader. Two examples from the pressurised march across eastern Anatolia are 
given below. 
 
4.6.5-13. The army finds that its way across heights down to a plain is blocked 
by an array of tribes lined up on the ridge.80 Kheirisophos, leading the army, is 
indecisive, and waits until the rear has come up so that a discussion can take 
place. One of the generals, Kleanor, recommends they attack as soon as they 
have eaten, for delay, he argues, will embolden the enemy. Xenophon then 
interjects, beginning by defining what their objective is: 'If it is necessary to fight, 
we must prepare to fight with as much strength as possible. But if we wish to 
cross over as easily as possible, it seems to me we must consider how we 
might receive fewest wounds and lose as few bodies of our men as possible' 
(4.6.10). He then proceeds to outline his proposed solution (4.6.11-13). 
 
4.7.1-7. Subsequently the army crosses through the territory of one of the same 
tribes which had been blocking the ridge. The Taochi had taken refuge in a high 
stronghold, where they had gathered in all of their provisions. Attempts by 
Kheirisophos to take it have failed and he invites Xenophon on his arrival to 
help address the problem of taking the fort. Again, Xenophon defines the nature 
of the problem and proceeds to outline a solution (4.7.7). 
 
4. Foresight 
 
An additional outcome of Xenophon's philosophical training might be said to be 
foresight, defined here as action based on a considered and informed reading 
of a situation or set of circumstances. Themistocles displayed it in preparing his 
city for a further, greater struggle against the Persians, when others thought that 
Marathon meant an end to the war (Plutarch, Themis. 3.5), and Socrates shows 
it when he advises Xenophon to consult the oracle about his plan to join Cyrus 
the Younger (3.1.5). Xenophon at several points on the retreat himself displays 
this uncommon quality, sometimes drawing attention to it by an implied contrast 
to lack of foresight in others. Thus when in a difficult phase late in the march he 
has local informants placed under strict guard 'in order that they might be his 
                                            
80 The pass may be over the Çakırbaba Dağları, a watershed between the Aras and 
Çoruh rivers. See map (Appendix I), west of Kars. 
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guides wherever needed' (6.3.11), the reader recalls how Kheirisophos had 
earlier endangered the army in the Armenian mountains by failing to guard their 
guide (4.6.2-3). For further instances of Xenophon's foresight see 5.1.13-14, 
5.7.3, and 7.3.12. 
 
5. Piety 
 
After his speech-making, arguably no feature marks Xenophon's character on 
the retreat more than the respect which he shows for divine laws and his 
reverence towards the gods. Hardly any course of action is undertaken without 
there first being an attempt to discern divine will, and due gratitude is always 
offered for successful outcomes (cf. 3.2.9, 4.3.13, 5.2.9, 6.1.22, 7.8.10). I argue 
in Chapter 4 that this aspect of Xenophon's leadership is a pillar of his defence 
of Socrates, but undoubtedly too, in the same way as democracy, he regarded it 
as an effective way of influencing and maintaining control over a constituency. 
By this I do not mean to say that Xenophon was ambivalent about religion, 
rather that he saw that its practice could be beneficial in the exercise of 
leadership. The examples below illustrate this argument.81 It is notable how 
neither of the other principal leaders pays anything like the same amount of 
attention to the conduct of religious matters as Xenophon does.82 
 
3.2.9. An omen from the gods. A sneeze from the ranks at the outset of 
Xenophon's key speech to the army by the Greater Zab River occasions a mass 
prostration. Xenophon seizes on this moment, declaring that the sneeze is an 
omen from Zeus the Saviour, delivered at the point when the talk was of 
salvation. Before launching into his speech proper he has thus been able to 
frame his rhetoric against the backdrop of divine approval.83 
                                            
81 On the relation of Xenophon's piety to his leadership in Anabasis see further Buzzetti 
2008: 18-20. 
82 There are numerous occasions from Tarsus to the Greater Zab on which Klearchos 
might have sought divine guidance, but in the narrative he only does so on a single 
occasion (2.1.9). In contrast to Xenophon at Sinope (see below), Kheirisophos does 
not sacrifice to find out if it is in the soldiers' and his own interests to accept the sole 
command (6.1.32; cf. 6.1.31). Cyrus does sacrifice before the crucial battle (1.8.15), 
but is not conspicuously pious through the march up-country. 
83 A sneeze, as an involuntary action, was considered to be a divine signal. Dreams - 
such as Xenophon experienced at critical moments on the retreat - were also regarded 
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6.1.17-31. Evasion of a dangerous role. At Sinope the men decide to choose a 
single ruler to lead them, and their choice is Xenophon. Xenophon, however, 
although he is flattered by the offer, realises that accepting it could be a serious 
source of trouble for him with the Spartans. 'And for me, in turn, I do not believe 
this to be very safe at all' (6.1.26). He may further see that, given the motivation 
of the men — maximising their booty — the role of sole commander would be 
based on an unstable platform. When the soldiers apparently still insist that he 
take the position, he has recourse to sacrifices which he says he undertook. '"I 
swear to you by all the gods and all the goddesses that when I became aware 
of your judgement, I offered sacrifice as to whether it was better both for you to 
turn this command over to me and for me to undertake it. And the gods 
signalled to me in the sacrifices, so that even a novice would know it, that I must 
abstain from this monarchy". Thus they elected Kheirisophos' (6.1.31-32). 
 
6.4.12-22. Following the entrails. At Kalpe Harbour on the Black Sea coast, 
fearing that there is a plan to found a colony at this site, the soldiers wish to 
press on; Xenophon is happy to go along with this desire (though he is 
suspected of wanting to colonise the place), subject to favourable sacrifices. 
Over days, however, these persistently fail to be propitious, with the result that 
even with their provisions dangerously low, the men will not venture out for 
supplies. Xenophon performs the sacrifices himself, and by so doing indicates 
that control over the ritual can in turn be used to resist even basic impulses 
such as hunger and fear. (For a fuller account of this episode see Chapter 4.3.) 
 
Conclusions 
 
Leadership is a major interest throughout the Xenophontic corpus. In Anabasis 
Xenophon brings to bear his substantial experience of war to present a detailed 
picture of different military leaders and leadership styles in a non-fictional 
setting. It is apparent from the nature of his paradigms, and from the structure of 
the narrative, that he intends his presentation to be instructive. I have argued 
that his didacticism here works on two levels. Firstly, there are 'situational 
lessons', wherein the behaviour of a commander in a challenging situation is 
                                                                                                                                
as a way in which gods communicated with men. On divine intervention see Dover 
1994: 133-144. 
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observed. These are signalled by a standard method which has one of the 
leaders facing a challenge, and are given force by their being situated in a real 
context. The flowing narrative produces vivid images of recognisable historical 
figures in action and by this colouring the author ensures that the experiences 
of good and bad practice which he wishes to share are the more effectively 
digested and retained. His second lesson is an exposition of major styles of 
leadership. Three different ones are treated — Oriental, Spartan, and Athenian. 
Through successive focus on exponents of each, their distinctive features are 
brought out, as are their respective strengths and weaknesses. In each case 
the individuals under spotlight are composites of the stereotype and unique 
character traits which the author chooses to highlight. 
 
Oriental 
 
Cyrus displays several of what, from the Greek perspective, are typical 
weaknesses of barbarian rule. There is lack of forethought in his planning of the 
expedition (he runs out of money early) and disorder in his advance towards his 
brother's army in Babylonia.84 He cannot exert full control over his mercenary 
contingent — in the end a failure which cost him his life. His own troops are 
faceless and nameless, except for a handful in his inner circle, whose 
obedience may be owed as much to fear as loyalty. Often in situations where he 
displays leadership qualities, as when he intervenes between Klearchos and 
Menon and their armies by the Euphrates, Xenophon shows him representing 
himself as a Greek, thereby pointing to the impossibility of truly successful 
barbarian rule. While Xenophon's encomium of the prince is, appropriately for 
the genre, flattering, the reality of his rule as depicted in Book 1 shows that this 
style of leadership is inefficient and, ultimately, ineffective. The success of the 
retreat provides a proof of the comparative superiority of Greek leadership. By 
the same token, Xenophon also shows that the capacity for ideal leadership is 
not restricted by ethnicity: the barbarian, by acquiring virtue, has every potential 
to become a successful ruler.85 
                                            
84 See Herodotus on Cambyses (3.25) for a similar instance of barbarian impetuosity. 
85 Xenophon almost seems to make a point of this in his choice of Cyrus the Great as 
model for the ideal king; see Kyro. 8.1.21-32 for a summary of the essential virtues 
which Cyrus the Great bears. In Anabasis the inverse situation is also demonstrated: 
Menon, through his lack of virtue (2.6.21-28), is a de facto barbarian. 
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Spartan 
 
Klearchos, Book 2, and Kheirisophos, Books 3-6, are the principal 
representatives of the Spartan style of leadership. Not surprisingly, they are 
both marked as highly capable in military matters, and they display competence 
in diplomacy and speech; Klearchos especially shows impressive flexibility in 
turning to oratory to achieve a notable success for his leadership. When they 
need to, then, Spartans can deploy the power of speech too (cf. Brasidas in 
Thucydides 4.84-87). Yet in the performance of Kheirisophos, we see that they 
do not do so nearly enough to be effective in an army of non-Spartans. 
Xenophon demonstrates convincingly that there are other factors, too, which 
make them unsuitable for all but parochial leadership: notably, they are quick to 
anger, corruptible, and selfish. Although Xenophon does not seek to explain 
these character failings, when set alongside the context of his own self-
representation, the intended inference is that they are attributable to their own 
society and system of government. 
 
Athenian 
 
Xenophon himself is the embodiment of the third style of leadership presented. 
This is Athenian in character, with a distinctively Socratic flavour. By making 
repeated, if subtle, allusions to the working of government at Athens, and 
wearing his own identity openly, he makes his self-representation as a leader 
conform to that of a leader of the democracy.86 His exemplifying of Socratic 
precepts is intended to enhance this model and at the same time to differentiate 
it from the conventional Athenian one. From the evidence of the narrative this is 
the most effective style of leadership, its outstanding features being its rooting 
in an ethical philosophy and the use of speech to motivate, influence, and direct 
action; pointedly, inexperience, if not ineptitude, in military affairs, is not a bar to 
successful leadership. The failure of both Cyrus and the Spartans to exert 
                                            
86 Several models from the Athenian past for Xenophon's character on the retreat were 
suggested; a further one may be Kimon, of whom Plutarch says: 'he received with 
mildness those who brought their wrongs to him, treated them humanely, and so, 
before men were aware of it, secured the leadership of Hellas, not by force of arms, but 
by virtue of his address and character' (Kimon 6.2). As suggested Xenophon could, 
additionally, be drawing a contrast between himself and these approaches to 
leadership, and other political figures, such as Kleon. 
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decisive control over the mercenary body on the one hand, and Xenophon's 
success in leading the expedition back to Asia Minor on the other, is the 
ultimate measure of the respective management approaches. Xenophon's 
achievement is made all the more impressive by the fact that the task of 
leadership became measurably more difficult after the army had reached the 
sea and the attendant pressures of survival that had bound the Greeks together 
receded. In narrating the performance of his character Xenophon offers a 
number of valuable insights into the operation of democracy, indicating how this 
system can be managed to the advantage of its leaders. He may well be being 
ironic when he reports Seuthes's claim to the Spartans that he is a 
θηινζηξαηηώηεο (7.6.4); however, the contradiction between his apparent 
concern for the welfare of the men and his pursuit of leadership aims that are 
sometimes against their wishes (as for example at Trapezus, where he has 
roads built) is resolved by his acting in (what he considers to be) the best 
interests of the army as a whole. There is no doubt that Xenophon's view is that, 
as with any other form of government, the success of democracy is dependent 
on politically and morally responsible leadership. 
 
Mercenaries 
 
I argued in the opening section that an important additional concern in the work 
is the subject of how to manage mercenary soldiers. The increasing use of hired 
men by states in the fourth century made this subject a pertinent one, and 
Xenophon, with his extensive experience, was ideally placed to provide 
guidance (see further Chapter 3.2.4). A series of lessons emerges from his 
work: for example, mercenaries cannot be controlled by violence; they react 
badly to being deceived and tend to be untrusting; they are susceptible to 
demagoguery and will subject themselves to a leader who convinces them he 
can realise their immediate aims; their gratitude is short-lived, if forthcoming at 
all, and needs to be constantly curried with actual or prospective material 
wealth. Xenophon furthermore shows how a large mercenary body can 
constitute a formidable political force, being capable of directing its own activity 
and not being fettered by loyalties to states or individuals — even those which 
have shown themselves ready to look out for the interests of the members. In 
this light Sparta's awkward attempts to dismember the Ten Thousand as they 
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marched towards, and into, her sphere of control looks less cynical and 
treacherous. It is following a failed attempt by the Spartans to disperse the men 
into Thrace that Xenophon again demonstrates that mercenaries can be (just 
about) managed through the power and charm of speech. His comparatively 
greater leverage on the journey may in the end be due to his Athenian 
background and recognition by the men themselves that democracy could be a 
more efficient means of expressing collective will than gross acts of 
disobedience and disorder. 
 
 
PART 3. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Noreen Humble has remarked that, as with every writer before and after, 
Xenophon had an agenda.87 In his case, the range of his subject matter, his 
innovative use of literary forms, and his personal evasiveness make the attempt 
to infer this conclusively less than straightforward; the likelihood of a wide 
chronological writing span introduces additionally the possibility of evolving 
concerns and motivations. Nonetheless, close reading of his corpus reveals a 
number of prominently recurring elements, among them preoccupations with 
Socrates and Sparta, political philosophy, a penchant for moral and practical 
instruction, and apologia. This suggests, if not a single literary project, a real 
degree of unity, with different works expressing views and thoughts pressing at 
the time of authorship. 
 
The focus of this chapter has been on Anabasis, considered by many to be 
Xenophon's most autobiographical piece of writing. In Part I I turned to look 
behind the text at the processes of its construction, and specifically at the 
author's use of exemplars. As shown, these are a dominant, even a defining 
feature of the narrative, the author to a large extent realising his apologetic and 
didactic agendas through this means. In a sense, too, the medium is the 
message: in the Xenophontic world learning takes place in-field, through the 
practice and experience of power, politics, and warfare. A result of the wide use 
of exempla is that Xenophon's accounts of the past tend to be less than 
                                            
87 Humble 2007. 
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systematic and can appear to be historically biased, factors that have caused 
him to be labelled as shoddy, or worse, by a number of modern scholars. 
However, by appreciating his method and reading his work on its own terms, 
apparent omissions and anomalies are seen in a more sympathetic light. 
 
Given that an argument made here was that Xenophon rooted his exemplars in 
a real context, it is appropriate to address briefly the question of omissions in 
the march record in Anabasis. To take a pair of well-known examples, during 
the course of the retreat the author does not describe the crossing of the 
Greater Zab River, and he makes no mention at all of the Lesser Zab River 
before that. While both of these are notable river crossings — and are events 
that would almost certainly have surfaced in a more methodical account — their 
omission does not undermine either the accuracy or the completeness of the 
overall record: points before and after are duly registered and there is no 
question left open about their relative locations. As far as research to date has 
shown, most of the events and incidents on the march which Xenophon 
describes can be assigned to actual locations. 
 
Part 2 looked at the theme of leadership, and it was demonstrated that the 
author's purpose in his extensive treatment of the subject was primarily didactic. 
A concern with leaders and leadership is evident in much of Xenophon's oeuvre 
and Anabasis, the story of an army on the march, presents an ideal canvas for 
the presentation of lessons on military leadership; a study of Xenophon's 
treatment indicates that while set in a real context, these are paradigmatic and 
are not necessarily intended to portray real events or character traits. However, 
it seems reasonable to conjecture that the raw material for the lessons derives, 
in the main, from actual observations made (or episodes learned about) by the 
author on the road. 
 
Xenophon's lessons on military leadership are of two types. Firstly, he provides 
case studies, or what might be termed situational instruction: that is, he 
describes how a leader encounters and then deals with a challenge on the 
march. Typically these episodes are artfully integrated into the narrative and it is 
left to the reader to discern the lesson, though these tend to be unambiguous. It 
is pertinent to emphasise that readers of Xenophon, known for the range of his 
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military experiences and his connections with high-level figures around the 
eastern Mediterranean, will probably have expected to learn something on the 
subject and will therefore have been alert to the subtlety and nuances of his 
narrative. The instruction so provided, while not to be characterised as 
systematic, nonetheless covers many of the key areas — discipline, motivation, 
self-control, strategy, diplomacy, financial management, provisioning — that a 
military commander must aspire to be master of on campaign. 
 
The second type of lesson, more deeply embedded still into the narrative, 
concerns different styles of leadership. Xenophon presents three in succession, 
each one a progression toward an ideal of command. The narrative is 
structured around these consecutive treatments, beginning in Book 1 with the 
Persian prince, Cyrus the Younger, then moving on to focus on the Spartan 
approach through Klearchos and, later, Kheirisophos (Books 2 and 3-6 
respectively), and finally, in tandem with the latter, on Xenophon himself, who is 
introduced as a young Athenian in a close relationship with the philosopher 
Socrates (Books 3-7). His style, indebted to Periclean democracy and to 
Socrates, clearly comes across as the optimal one, an impression underwritten 
by the fact that it is Xenophon more than any other who is instrumental in 
bringing the army to safety.88 The death of all the previous leaders suggests 
finite life for their respective approaches; notably, through his exposure of the 
weakness of Spartan rule beyond their own polis, Xenophon is at the same time 
commenting on Spartan hegemony of Greece, and foreshadowing its end. 
 
As with the other leaders under focus, Xenophon himself is to be understood as 
an exemplar, in his case a model young Athenian citizen and pupil of Socrates. 
A further remarkable feature of the author's didactic method is his skilful 
interrelating of events and leaders. For example when Klearchos descends into 
muddy canals early on the retreat, we recall Cyrus's failure to do so when his 
wagons had become stuck along the Euphrates; prior to that Klearchos' tight 
marshalling of the first stage of the retreat, even with a truce in force, draws a 
sharp contrast with Cyrus's laxity on the approach into Babylonia. Similarly, 
                                            
88 Xenophon's character in Anabasis, hardly surprisingly, bears resemblance to 
Agesilaos, and to Cyrus the Great in Kyroupaideia, but there is too in his conception of 
himself a notable similarity to Plato's 'Philosopher King' (see Republic 473c-e). On the 
interrelationship between Anabasis and the Republic see Howland 2000. 
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other leaders in the story, notably Tissaphernes, Proxenos, and Menon, 
function to bring out qualities, and the lack thereof, in the main subjects.89 While 
both of the types of lesson presented — situational and stylistic — are intended 
to be valuable (cf. Hunting 13.7), in the end, Xenophon is more concerned with 
discovering the factors that make good leaders than he is with simply providing 
a record of their actions. His conclusion, moreover, is not exclusive: a barbarian 
leader who is willing to set aside his own training and have his actions guided 
by ethical philosophy and democratic ideology can be as successful as any 
Greek. 
 
A particular concern which emerges in Anabasis is the problem of how to 
manage a large body of mercenaries. Through Xenophon's adult lifetime the 
subject was topical, and there were few in a better position than he to contribute 
ideas to the issue. A reading of the text as a guide to mercenary management 
reveals a thought-provoking treatment; it furthermore brings to the fore 
Xenophon's interest in political philosophy and thereby links the work to others 
in the corpus in which the problem of how to rule is considered. Gray has 
claimed that all of Xenophon's works show 'an interest in paradigms of 
government', an assertion which finds support here in the argument that a major 
focus in Anabasis is on the management of mercenaries, a unique constituency 
of growing importance on the political landscape.90 Xenophon lays special 
emphasis on the power of speech, and the democratic system more broadly, in 
controlling a large, independent-minded population. Through his record of the 
march down country he also highlights the fact that the existence of pressing 
external circumstances lessens resistance to command. Xenophon's various 
and prescient observations on the operation of democracy show how highly he 
regarded the utility of the Athenian system; while his ultimate interest in the 
problem of government was in finding ways to secure the success, or well 
being, of the whole community, and not just of its rulers, it could be argued that 
                                            
89 The role of Tissaphernes in Anabasis deserves special attention. Although 
Xenophon in this and other of his works (Ages., Hell.) portrays him as a treacherous 
and untrustworthy figure, he nonetheless emerges as a formidable military commander 
and statesman. An alternative presentation of leadership styles to the one argued for 
here could have Tissaphernes's as the template for the superior model. See further 
Chapter 3 (3.2.4). 
90 Gray 2007: 2. 
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this concern does not come across pointedly in his consideration of the problem 
of how to manage mercenaries. 
 
Stepping back from the subject detail, Xenophon's elaborate treatment of 
military leadership in Anabasis can be seen to link with a broader, and, I argue, 
a still more pronounced concern in this work — apologia. In representing his 
character as an ideal leader, he is addressing questions about his role on the 
retreat raised by other participants and writers,91 and also defending the 
memory of Socrates, whose teachings inform to a large degree his actions on 
the retreat. These respective apologias are the subject of the remaining 
chapters. 
                                            
91 Rood (2006: 56), plausibly, appears to take the opposite view on this, regarding 
Xenophon's major self-defence speeches as being designed to highlight qualities of his 
leadership. 'Xenophon's defence of his earlier conduct [his striking of the soldier in the 
snow] ensures that the positive qualities of his leadership (his maintenance of discipline 
and morale, for instance) are not left to be inferred from the narrative, but presented as 
such in a speech, and acknowledged by his internal audience. (The same is true when 
Xenophon defends his later conduct before the Spartans and the Thracian ruler 
Seuthes.)' 
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Apologia Xenophontos 
 
 
 
 
 
Consequently death, which because of the changes and 
chances of life is daily close at hand, and because of the 
shortness of life can never be far away, does not frighten the 
wise man from considering the interests of the state and of his 
family for all time; and it follows that he regards posterity, of 
which he is bound to have no consciousness, as being really 
his concern. 
Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 1.38 
 
 
The impression given by Anabasis is that Xenophon was at pains to represent 
his role on the retreat of the Ten Thousand as highly significant. From obscurity 
in the march up-country, he emerges as a formidable leader of men on the 
banks of the Greater Zab River; until the army leaves Thrace some 15 months 
later, he is involved in almost every major action, and is constantly on hand with 
sound advice. The fact that he appears to have used a pseudonym has been 
taken as a reinforcement of this view, there being an argument at least from the 
time of Plutarch that the attribution was intended 'to win greater credence for his 
narrative' (de gloria Atheniensium).1 Yet from the evidence of his other writings, 
from which he is mostly absent, Xenophon was not a man we might expect to 
be given to self-aggrandisement; indeed, the promoter of ethical philosophy, 
and author of practical works intended for public benefit, might be expected not 
to embrace such a self-interested motive.2 A resolution to this contradiction — a 
                                            
1 'Xenophon, to be sure, became his own history by writing of his generalship and his 
successes and recording that it was Themistogenes the Syracusan who had compiled 
an account of them, his purpose being to win greater credence for his narrative by 
referring to himself in the third person, thus favouring another with the glory of the 
authorship' (Ξελνθῶλ κὲλ γὰξ αὐηὸο ἑαπηνῦ γέγνλελ ἱζηνξία, γξάςαο, ἃ ἐζηξαηήγεζε 
θαὶ θαηώξζσζε, [θαὶ] Θεκηζηνγέλεη πεξὶ ηνύησλ ζπληεηάρζαη ηῷ Σπξαθνζίῳ, ἵλα 
πηζηόηεξνο ᾖ δηεγνύκελνο ἑαπηὸλ ὡο ἄιινλ, ἑηέξῳ ηὴλ ηῶλ ιόγσλ δόμαλ ραξηδόκελνο·), 
Moralia 345e. 
2 Xenophon is a retiring presence in most of his books, and in these, where he does 
touch on events that involve him, he does not seek recognition or sympathy. For 
example in his Hellenika, rather than name himself as the leader of the Cyreans in 
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reconciliation between Xenophon the author and his character in the account — 
can be brought about if his aim is understood as being more subtle and 
politically-directed than vain personal glory. In the previous chapter it was said 
that Xenophon in Anabasis is an exemplar, a hybrid model of a young Athenian 
and a pupil of Socrates, and that this form of representation effects an original 
and powerful defence of Socrates. Yet to the greater number of his readers, 
whatever the degree of their awareness of his Socratic defence, Xenophon's 
actions will have been read at least in some sense as his own, a fact that he 
himself must have been fully conscious of. In this chapter, Xenophon's defence 
of himself through his character in the narrative is examined. The analysis of 
this and the following chapter — where the argument for a Socratic defence is 
developed — is intended to bring out the nature and pervasiveness of the 
apologetic element in Anabasis and the extent to which it shapes the text. 
 
In Part 1 a persistent view about the reason why Xenophon wrote his account of 
the expedition — as a response to another published version — is examined 
and it is concluded that the evidence for another account is not compelling. In 
subsequent Parts, examining closely the content of his speeches and his self-
representation, alternative motivations for personal apologia are argued for. 
Part 2 focuses on direct attacks made on Xenophon's integrity in the course of 
the retreat, and, additionally, on the matter of his involvement in a mercenary 
enterprise, a circumstance which he will have been keen to explain. Part 3 is 
concerned with Xenophon's exile from Athens: the argument is that his 
                                                                                                                                
service to Sparta, he refers to 'the leader of the men who had fought with Cyrus' (ὁ ηῶλ 
Κπξείσλ πξνεζηεθὼο, 3.2.7); later in the same account, coming to the battle (of 
Mantinea) in which one of his son's died, by all accounts bravely, Xenophon confines 
himself to the comment that 'many brave men were killed' (7.5.17). Diogenes opens his 
biography by describing his subject as 'a man of rare modesty' (2.48), a distinction not 
afforded by him to any other of the Socratics. It is more common now for modern 
writers to share this view: see especially Gray 1998, chapter 6, and 1989b: 137: 
'Xenophon saw megalegoria (lit. 'big talk') as a fault of character associated with self 
praise, the antithesis of the good grace he so admired in Agesilaos of Sparta'. Contra 
Waterfield (2006: 190), who discerns a decided hint of self-promotion in Anabasis and 
thinks that Xenophon exaggerated his role for his own benefit; ibid: 183, 'there was a 
somewhat pretentious side to Xenophon's character; he was, after all, the one who 
chose to make his first major speech to the ruffian mercenary army, after the capture of 
the generals, in his finest armour, the metalwork chased in gold, the helmet mightily 
plumed, the shield beautifully engraved'. Likewise LaForse (2005: 12) thinks that 
Anabasis is predominantly about Xenophon's own success, and he adds in a note that 
'it is a rare modern critic who does not think Xenophon exaggerates his own 
importance in the Anabasis'. 
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elaborate distancing of himself from both Cyrus and Sparta in the text are 
explained in large part by his banishment and constitute a comprehensive 
defence against the decree of exile. Xenophon's defence of the hippeis is also 
examined in this part. 
 
By reading the text as apologia a view opens up on the important question of 
the author's intended audience(s). While he was evidently writing for Greeks — 
the account is written in Attic, and from a Hellenic viewpoint, with a marked 
tendency to report what was not familiar to the Greek experience3 — taking 
cognisance of the substance of his apologia, it becomes possible to 
circumscribe this broad grouping and identify within it a defined body of citizens, 
or social class, at which particular types of defence were aimed. For instance in 
the case of his careful distancing of himself from Sparta and Persia it is argued 
that his audience is primarily the citizens of his native city, Athens, while in 
defending himself against the taint of mercenary service he has his own social 
class in mind. A conclusion of the chapter is that the aristocratic class at Athens 
was the core audience for the work. 
 
 
PART 1. ANABASIS AS A RESPONSE TO OTHER ACCOUNTS OF THE 
EXPEDITION WHICH DID NOT DO JUSTICE TO XENOPHON'S ROLE 
 
A setting straight of the record has, in modern times, been one of the most 
widespread explanations offered for Anabasis. Xenophon's dramatic 
introduction into the narrative at the Greater Zab River (3.1), and his near 
flawless achievement in helping lead the Greeks homeward, is believed by 
many to be a response to (what he at least saw as) unfair portrayal of his role in 
other accounts of the march.4 This apologia argument is dependent on there 
                                            
3 On the reporting of the unfamiliar see Brule 1995, Tuplin 1999, Roy 2007, Brennan 
2009. 
4 The theory appears to have emerged in the late nineteenth century in German and 
French scholarship (Schwartz 1889: 161-193, Dürrbach 1893: 346 ff.). W. Tarn, in the 
first edition of the CAH (1927: 5), states it thus: 'Sophainetos wrote the first story of the 
expedition, and Xenophon probably wrote his own account, the Anabasis, largely 
because he thought Sophainetos had overlooked his merits'. Later adherents to this 
view include Breitenbach 1967: 1646-7, Cawkwell 1972: 17-19 (restated 2004), 
Anderson 1974: 81-84 (though a qualified endorsement), Stronk 1995: 9, Dillery 1998: 
7-9. See Lee (2005: 46) for a recent overview. 
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having been another account published prior to Xenophon's, and on that not 
portraying him in a favourable light. There are differing views on this matter. 
Though Xenophon's is the only one that survives, his may not have been the 
only account of the expedition to have been published. Four fragments of a 
Kyrou Anabasis by Sophainetos — who is likely to be the Stymphalian general 
in Xenophon's account — are mentioned in Stephanos, the sixth-century AD 
Byzantine lexicographer (FGrH 109 FF 1-4); Xenophon himself refers to the 
record of Themistogenes (Hell. 3.1.2), and the history of Ktesias contains an 
account of the Battle of Kounaxa and other information related to the march.5 
There could have been other, probably rudimentary, accounts, no traces of 
which now survive.6 
 
1.1. Sophainetos of Stymphalos 
 
In Book 14 of his Universal History Diodoros relates the story of Cyrus's march 
up-country and the retreat home of his Greek mercenaries (14.19-31, 37). His 
account is almost certainly based on that of the fourth-century historian 
Ephoros, whose history covered the period immediately following the Trojan 
War down to the siege of Perinthus in 341.7 The question of Ephoros' source(s) 
for the march has divided opinion. His apparently poor opinion of Xenophon, 
suggested by his neglect of the latter's Hellenika as a source for his own history, 
has been thought to rule out Xenophon's Anabasis;8 he may have used a text or 
texts of which we now have no knowledge, though there is a modern tradition 
which thinks he drew on Sophainetos.9 In Xenophon's account he is the oldest 
                                            
5 Ktesias' Persika, a history in 23 books, survives partially in an epitome by Photios, 
and through Plutarch's Artaxerxes. 
6 For unknown authors of the period see Breitenbach 1970: 406-407. Cartledge (1987: 
59) writes that 'it is generally agreed that [Xenophon's] was not the first participant 
account to be published'. 
7 Diodoros has been shown to have a tendency to follow one source wherever he can; 
since Jacoby (FGrH), it has been widely accepted that his source for material on 
Greece and the East in books 11-14 is Ephoros. See also Brunt 1980: 478, Gray 1980: 
308, and Markle 1994: 44. 
8 For discussion see Barber 1935: 64-65 and 111, Westlake 1987: 248, Stylianou 2004: 
68. Erbse (2010: 498) detects a pronounced 'anti-Xenophon' bias in Ephoros, but 
thinks he did draw on the work, changing or reordering passages as he saw fit. Higgins 
(1977: 94) suggests that, as a pupil of Isokrates, Ephoros may have avoided using the 
work of a known Socratic. 
9 Barber 1935: 127, Cawkwell 1972: 17-19, Lendle 1995: 12, 249, Stronk 1995: 7. 
Erbse (2010: 498) thinks that Sophainetos was probably one of his sources. Westlake 
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of the Greek generals (6.5.13) and one of those who survived the expedition. It 
is plausible that he may have published his story. 
 
Two preliminary issues concerning a Sophainetos Anabasis present 
themselves, namely, the slightness of the reference to his work in Stephanos 
(four fragments) and its lateness (sixth century AD). The scanty surviving 
material, appearing in the context of geographical names — Sophainetos is 
quoted as an authority for two tribal names, a city, and a river (see note 17 
below) — is hardly sufficient to assert that it is the basis of any substantial 
account of the expedition; while to do so may not be 'a desperate hypothesis',10 
it is in my opinion not a strong one.11 More problematic still is the fact that what 
would have been a significant work — not least because it would have survived 
through a generation before being used by Ephoros (writing in the later 330s 
and 320s) — was unknown to later writers: notably, neither Polybius, Dionysius 
of Halikarnassos, Arrian, nor Plutarch, who dealt directly with the event in his 
Artaxerxes, have heard of it. It may be relevant too that Arcadia, for all the size 
of its reputation for producing soldiers, was not famed for literary exponents 
(although the military writer, Aeneas Tacticus, is said to have come from the 
same Stymphalos). Explanations for the work by doubters range from outright 
scepticism about its existence, to a belief that it is a forgery, to a theory that 
Sophainetos' story was incorporated into a military handbook and Stephanos at 
his long remove inferred that he had written an actual account.12 
 
The lynchpin of the 'response' apologia theory under consideration is that 
Diodoros makes only one mention of Xenophon, and this comes when the 
                                                                                                                                
(1987) has argued that the Oxyrhynchos Historian was Ephoros' main source, though 
this is speculative (for this criticism see especially Stylianou 2004: 70); no less so is 
Anderson's suggestion that a Greek confidant of the Persian king, Phalinos (An. 2.1.7), 
could have authored some form of account, and that Ephoros in turn could have drawn 
on this (1974: 83). 
10 Bigwood (1983: 349), on the basis that virtually nothing is known of Sophainetos' 
work, characterises it as such. 
11 Cf. Higgins (1977: 93): 'In the absence of significant portions of Sophainetos' work 
this [assertion of a substantial account] must remain a gratuitous assumption'. However 
Roy (1967: 290), Cawkwell (1972: 17-18), and Dillery (2009: 406), among others, 
assume that there was a meaningful work. 
12 Scepticism: Bigwood 1983: 343; Forgery: Westlake 1987: 252; Mistaken 
transmission: Stylianou 2004: 73-74. To be added to these is a recent suggestion by 
Almagor (2009: 2) that the name Sophainetos is 'the result of some later corruption and 
a hyper-correction of "Xenophon"'. 
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remnants of the army are in Thrace (14.37). His ultimate source, then, can 
hardly have been Xenophon, and the most obvious candidate is the putative 
work of Sophainetos. Tentative evidence of animosity shown towards 
Sophainetos by Xenophon comes from two passages in Anabasis: at 5.8.1 he 
notes that the Stymphalian had been fined for neglect (θαηεκέιεη) by the men 
(although charges against three of the other generals, including himself, are 
noted too); more interestingly, at 6.5.13, in the closest he comes to castigating a 
fellow commander, he interrupts him as he dismisses the option of crossing a 
ravine to declare that, in the interests of safety, they must cross. They do, and 
are successful, and Sophainetos is not heard of again. 
 
The first reservation with the Sophainetos hypothesis arises from the quality of 
Diodoros' compilations. While it is very likely that Ephoros is his source for the 
march, it is less certain that he reproduced a faithful summary of his version. 
From modern studies it is clear that Diodoros was slipshod in many ways. As 
evidence of his carelessness, Brunt points to his having the Athenians starve 
the Spartans trapped on Sphacteria (Diodoros 12.61-63), whereas it must be 
unlikely that Ephoros would have rejected Thucydides' detailed testimony on 
this matter (4.31-39);13 a more concerning incidence is apparent in his 
seventeenth book, which he based on Klitarchos: while the latter's work is 
believed to have run to 12 books, Diodoros compressed it into just one. Brunt 
writes: 'If he paraphrased Klitarchos in a few places, he had to abbreviate 
inordinately elsewhere, and simply leave out masses of material'.14 Xenophon's 
dropping out of the Ephoran narrative could, then, be as well due to the method 
of Diodoros as the indifference of Sophainetos. A second, related concern is the 
disposition of Ephoros himself: if, as some consider, he bore an 'anti-Xenophon' 
bias (note 8 above), he could have chosen selectively from his source(s). He 
has, moreover, a marked tendency to rewrite his sources, a factor which can 
lead to significant distortion; Gray writes: 'No matter what the quality of the 
original, by the time it had passed through the hands of Ephoros, it was likely to 
                                            
13 Brunt 1980: 493. 
14 Ibid. 493. 
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have altogether lost that quality'.15 In both of these outlined situations the 
original(s) need not have been hostile or indifferent to Xenophon.16 
 
A third reservation with the hypothesis is that nothing in the fragments of 
Sophainetos' Anabasis corresponds with Diodoros/Ephoros, whereas the 
names are all found in Xenophon; that being said, the references are so slight, 
nothing conclusive from this can really be drawn.17 More revealing is a study by 
Stylianou which has sought to demonstrate that most of Diodoros' account can 
be shown to derive from Xenophon.18 While endorsing the belief that Ephoros 
was dismissive of Xenophon's Hellenika, Stylianou makes the point that 
Anabasis was an altogether different work, and one a capable historian such as 
Ephoros would not have disregarded so quickly;19 in any event, as he shows, 
the chronological detail and the narrative style in Diodoros are very similar to 
Xenophon's, so whatever the ultimate source, it is at least not materially at odds 
with the Athenian's record.20 
 
A further point in support of Diodoros being ultimately based on Xenophon, and 
notwithstanding earlier comments on the quality of his compilations, is that the 
                                            
15 Gray 1987: 73. 
16 Another relevant, if speculative point, is that Diodoros could be focussing on leaders 
as a framework for his compilation: thus he says that Kheirisophos was elected 
supreme leader by the men after the seizure of the generals by Tissaphernes 
(14.27.1), and he says Xenophon was chosen as their leader in Thrace (14.37.1). The 
understanding in the accounts which follow respectively is that leadership resided in 
the named leader and no additional command information was necessary; however 
stellar, or anonymous, Xenophon's role might have been, by this approach it would not 
anyway have been noted by Diodoros. 
17 F.109.1 Καξδνῦρνη = An. 4 passim; F.109.2 Τάνη (Τάνρνη in Xenophon) = An. 4 
passim; F.109.3 Φύζθνο = An. 2.4.25; F109.4 Χαξκάλδε = An. 1.5.10. 
18 Stylianou 2004; contra Westlake 1987 who allows for only limited use of Anabasis by 
Ephoros, arguing instead that his main source was the Hell. Oxy. 
19 Stylianou 2004: 68, noting, however, that 'Ephoros was no mere compiler. He could 
recast his sources, and even interfere with their historical causation and interpretation' 
(74). Erbse (2010) makes more of this habit, arguing that Ephoros, 'who is more 
concerned with an effective than a reliable presentation of the material' (499), 'typically 
changed or reordered Xenophontic passages as he saw fit' (498). 
20 The assertion of course supposes that Diodoros accurately reproduced his source, 
and see caveat on Ephoros in note above. Dalby (1992: 17), following Roy (1967: 294-
295), regards Diodoros' account as an over-simplification of Xenophon's: 'It has nothing 
independent to offer.' On the other hand, Marincola (2010) argues that the first author 
of an account shapes the story, and subsequent writers, if they contradict facts, rarely 
go against the traditional narrative: so on the basis of this argument we should not 
perhaps expect notable divergence between any of the accounts, whichever appeared 
first. 
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passage in which Xenophon is mentioned (14.37.1) in fact betrays a concise 
and accurate reading of Anabasis. 
 
About the same time, of those men who had campaigned with 
Cyrus and managed to get back safely to Greece, some now 
returned to their own countries, but the majority of them, having 
grown accustomed to a soldier's life, chose Xenophon as their 
general (Diodoros 14.37.1). 
 
The statement that some of the soldiers who had got back safely to Greece 
returned to their own countries (θαὶ δηαζσζέλησλ εἰο ηὴλ Ἑιιάδα ηηλὲο κὲλ εἰο 
ηὰο ἰδίαο παηξίδαο) reflects Xenophon's statements that Byzantium was the first 
Greek city which the army came to (An. 7.1.29; cf. 6.1.17, 6.5.23), and that 
some of the soldiers sold their weapons 'and sailed away' (7.2.3). That the army 
was indeed then in Thrace is confirmed in Diodoros' next line: 'And Xenophon 
with this army set out to make war on the Thracians who dwell around 
Salmydessos' (ὃο ἀλαιαβὼλ ηὴλ δύλακηλ ὥξκεζε πνιεκήζσλ Θξᾷθαο ηνὺο 
πεξὶ ηὸλ Σαικπδεζζὸλ νἰθνῦληαο, 14.37.2). For Xenophon being chosen as 
their general, Diodoros/Ephoros is evidently drawing on his return to Thrace 
(An. 7.2.8); Xenophon does not say he was then chosen as leader, but he 
implies as much: νἱ δὲ ζηξαηηῶηαη ἐδέμαλην ἡδέσο θαὶ εὐζὺο εἵπνλην (7.2.9). He 
subsequently presses this more: Μεηὰ ηαῦηα Ξελνθῶλ κὲλ ἡγεῖην, νἱ δ' εἵπνλην 
(7.3.7). What is revealing is that while on two occasions before this Xenophon 
has been offered the leadership (6.1.19, 7.1.21), he has declined these 
opportunities, so it is only in Thrace that he is in sole command. Diodoros in this 
passage, then, is consistent with Anabasis, a fact which mitigates against the 
charge that he is guilty of undue oversight of Xenophon in his report of the 
expedition — this is further strengthened if the point about his having a 
leadership framework is credible (note 16 above). 
 
In light of the foregoing arguments, and the obstacles outlined to accepting a 
work by Sophainetos, the most reasonable conclusion is that Xenophon was not 
writing in response to a work by Sophainetos. 
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1.2. Themistogenes of Syracuse 
 
Xenophon's account contains no detail about the narrator: Xenophon is a 
character in the story, and is formally introduced into it in the third person 
(3.1.4). In his Hellenika (3.1.2) Xenophon does, however, write that one 
Themistogenes of Syracuse authored an account of Cyrus's march up-country 
and the retreat of his Greeks to the sea; as MacLaren in his study of the 
problem noted, this statement has caused considerable trouble for students of 
Hellenika and Anabasis.21 The solution to the problem might be framed in the 
following terms:22 
 
1.) Themistogenes wrote an Anabasis, Xenophon did not 
2.) Themistogenes and Xenophon wrote accounts, but the former's is lost 
3.) Themistogenes is a pseudonym used by Xenophon. 
 
The principal advocate for the first scenario (1) is the author of the Souda, who 
considered that Anabasis, though attributed to Xenophon, was actually the work 
of Themistogenes.23 It may be presumed that he based his view on Hell. 3.1.2, 
though it cannot be discounted that he derived it from a source now lost. On the 
weight of the antique literary evidence for Xenophon's Anabasis alone it is safe 
to say that his belief that Xenophon did not write an Anabasis is incorrect;24 the 
fact that several themes and concerns in the work recur across Xenophon's 
corpus may furthermore be pointed to as a proof that he was indeed the author. 
The second scenario (2) above is more plausible, but is undermined by the fact 
that the only ancient reference to Themistogenes external to Hellenika is the 
                                            
21 MacLaren 1934a: 240. Rood (2005: xix) calls this 'the oddest passage in the whole of 
Xenophon'. 
22 There are other explanations for the passage, notably that it is an interpolation 
(Richter, cited in Prentice 1947: 74), and that the name is the result of a copyist's error 
and that the sentence should read: 'Has been written, rightfully and dutifully, by one of 
Cyrus's men' (Prentice 1947). 
23 The Souda entry: Θεκηζηνγέλεο, Σπξαθνύζηνο, ἱζηνξηθόο. Κύξνπ ἀλάβαζηλ, ἥηηο ἐλ 
ηνῖο Ξελνθῶληνο θέξεηαη· θαὶ ἄιια ηηλὰ πεξὶ ηῆο ἑαπηνῦ παηξίδνο (123.1). 
24 References to Xenophon's Anabasis: Dionysius of Halikarnassos, Art of Rhetoric 
8.11, 9.12; Strabo, Geography 8.7.5; Arrian, Periplus 2.3, Anabasis 1.12.2; Lucian, 
Dream 17; Aelian, On Animals 6.25; Athenaeus 6.252a; Diogenes, Lives 2.50, 57; 
Pollux 10.80. 
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entry in the Souda; in this regard the same reservations about Sophainetos in 
Stephanos raised above are applicable.25 
 
The notion that Themistogenes was a pseudonym used by Xenophon (3), 
current at least from Plutarch's day, is the most widely accepted explanation for 
Hell. 3.1.2. Plutarch considered that his aim was 'to win greater credence for his 
narrative' (de gloria Atheniensium, 345e), but other equally (mostly) credible 
views have been aired since: recent ones include that the pseudonym was 
intended to signal the objectivity of the account ('Themis' for natural order; 
'Syracuse' for its remove from the Aegean hub);26 that the attribution was 'in 
part Xenophon's unconscious recognition that he had been uprooted by the 
expedition, that he no longer was who he had been';27 and that he was simply 
being modest.28 While in Chapter 1 (Section 1.6) I put forward a further possible 
explanation, in the next chapter I argue that Xenophon's purpose in using a 
pseudonym was to emphasise that the work is not autobiographical. 
 
Whatever the thinking behind it, the pseudonym does seem to be the most 
convincing explanation for Hell. 3.1.2; the fact that Anabasis pointedly lacks a 
prologue or proem might be adduced as (qualified) evidence that the work was 
published in this way. If Xenophon is using a pseudonym he is not responding 
to an account by Themistogenes. 
 
                                            
25 Strauss (1972: 178) appears to try to make some connection between 
Themistogenes and the Syracusan who features in the Symposion, though he provides 
no indication of what this might be: 'As for Xenophon's choice of a Syracusan as the 
antagonist of Socrates, I fear that its explanation may depend on the explanation of 
"Themistogenes of Syracuse," the author of a book which is indistinguishable from 
Xenophon's Anabasis.' 
26 Krentz 1995: 157, and see further Tsagalis 2009. Erbse (2010: 494) dwells on 
Themistogenes, 'descendant of justice', opining, with additional reference to his use of 
Theopompos at 2.1.12-13, that Xenophon has a strong liking for wordplay. 
27 Waterfield 2006: 194. 
28 Bowen 1998: 1. In his novel of the march, Manfredi (2008: 397) has his heroine 
suggest that Xenophon, in a diary he was keeping, was embarrassed to speak of 
himself in the first person. 'He spoke of himself as if he were speaking of another 
person. He didn't say "I"; he said "Xenophon". Perhaps he found it embarrassing to 
speak well or badly of himself'. 
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1.3. Ktesias of Knidos  
 
Ktesias, having been captured in a campaign, is said to have spent seventeen 
years at the Persian court as the personal physician of the Great King.29 In 
addition to an Indika (1 book), Geography (3 books), and some medical 
treatises, he wrote a multi-volume history of the Persian Empire down to 397.30 
In his Persika, according to Photios' epitome, 'he differs almost entirely from 
Herodotus' (Bibl. 72.35); Photios adds that in some respects he also disagrees 
(ἐπ' ἐλίσλ δηαθσλεῖ) with Xenophon, but it is to be presumed that Photios is 
writing from his own perspective, comparing Xenophon's account with that of 
Ktesias, rather than implying — as he does explicitly with Herodotus — that the 
work of the Knidian postdates some or all of Xenophon's corpus. A case for the 
latter is, at least in the case of Anabasis, ruled out by Xenophon's mention of 
Ktesias and his account.31 
 
Without the complete work, only a limited catalogue of comparable subject 
material between the two authors can be drawn up. From Xenophon we know 
that Ktesias gives an eyewitness account of events on the battlefield at 
Kounaxa in 401, Xenophon referring to this in his own battle report (1.8.26-
27).32 Ktesias further provides detail of the fate of the generals captured by 
Tissaphernes on the Greater Zab (An. 2.5), claiming to have had contact with 
Klearchos at Babylon, even being given his ring as a sign of friendship.33 It is 
probable that Ktesias learned from him a variety of detail about the march, and 
he could have included this in his Persika, though there is no evidence in what 
                                            
29 Diodoros 2.32.4. A tradition of Greek healers at the Persian court seems to have 
begun with Democedes of Kroton, who tended to King Darius (Herodotus 3.129-130). 
30 Epitomes of the Persika and Indika survive in Photios (Bibliotheca 72); fragments of 
Ktesias are collected in Jacoby (FGrH 688). Besides Photios, the major transmitters 
are Nicolaus of Damascus, Diodoros, and Plutarch. For an up to date treatment of the 
writer and his works see Stronk 2010, and Llewellyn-Jones and Robson 2010. Kuhrt 
2010 asserts that we do not really have Ktesias at all, and she draws attention to the 
view of some scholars that his work may be a fiction, or at least was written without him 
ever having left the surroundings of Knidos. But historians write today about places 
they have never visited, and the bustling port of Knidos would have provided a wealth 
of research possibilities. 
31 Xenophon refers to him twice in Anabasis (1.8.26, 27 = FGrH 688 F21). See Chapter 
1.6. 
32 For a treatment of the relationship between the battle reports of Xenophon and 
Ktesias see S.R. Bassett 1999. Note the caveat of Thucydides on eyewitness battle 
reports, 7.44 
33 Plutarch, Life of Artaxerxes 18 = FGrH 688 F27; cf. Photios 72.44a.30. 
156 
 
survives to support such a hypothesis; furthermore, Xenophon did not emerge 
as a figure in the march until after the seizure of the generals, so Klearchos will 
not have had anything to say about his role on the retreat. 
 
It could be argued that Ktesias took details of the retreat from another source — 
there being ample time for him to do so (the Persika was published no earlier 
than the late 390s: see Chapter 1.6 above) — and on the basis of this provided 
a report of the retreat, one which was not to Xenophon's liking. Whether such a 
report would fit in a history of Persia must be questioned, and it might be added 
that it is unlikely that Xenophon would have referred to Ktesias' account at all if 
he had felt dissatisfied with his own portrayal in it.34 Ktesias' work, furthermore, 
does not seem to have been well received critically in antiquity, so even if 
Xenophon had been disparaged in it he might not have felt a pressing need to 
respond.35 
 
Conclusions 
 
The case has been made here that Xenophon's account of the expedition was 
the only written one in circulation. Evidence for an Anabasis by Sophainetos is 
slight, and because so little of it is extant, there is no conclusive way to judge 
that it was unfavourable to Xenophon. 
 
It is probable that Themistogenes was a pseudonym used by Xenophon, though 
there is no agreement on what his purpose in using this was. Plutarch, 
reasonably, considered he intended it as a way to enhance his reputation at 
home — that he wished to create an image of himself as an outstanding 
Athenian; perhaps, as suggested in Chapter 2, in the mould of Themistocles or 
                                            
34 While not going as far as to suggest that Xenophon was writing in response to 
Ktesias, Almagor, in a recent attempt to show a substantial relationship between the 
works of the two authors, argues that 'the Athenian's report is linked in a special way to 
the Persika and that Xenophon had to take into consideration the stories he found 
there' (2009: 2). Kelly (1996: 159) believes that Xenophon was set on correcting the 
detail given by Ktesias in his history. 
35 Almagor (2009: 2 n.14) provides an extensive list of references for the predominantly 
negative ancient reception of the Persika. Nor has Ktesias' writing been highly valued 
in the modern era (cf. Momigliano 1990: 10), although this may now be changing: see 
for instance S.R. Bassett 1999, Stronk 2007 and 2010, Llewellyn-Jones and Robson 
2010. 
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Pericles. I have argued that his undeniably glowing account of himself is 
principally intended to be a defence of Socrates (on this see further Chapter 4), 
but that inevitably, too, the performance of his character reflects on the 
historical figure behind it. My addition to the pseudonym debate is that 
Xenophon's purpose in attributing the work to another was to signal that it is not 
autobiographical. 
 
The work of Ktesias, although it intersects with the expedition, and might have 
contained interviews with its leading Greek, would not have had anything to 
report on the retreat. To argue for, as has recently been done, a dependence by 
Xenophon on the work of Ktesias is not the same as arguing that he wrote in 
response to him, or that he composed Anabasis as a corrective to the Knidian's 
account. The view that Xenophon took up his pen in response to other accounts 
is, accordingly, not accepted here. 
 
 
PART 2. CHARGES AND CHARACTER ATTACKS 
 
As remarked in Chapter 2, the later books of Anabasis are dominated by 
speeches given by Xenophon. Examination of these shows that a number bear 
a decided apologetic character, engaging in an elaborate way with charges 
made against the author. These may have been contained in whole or part in 
another published account, though it is more likely that they featured in the 
prevalent oral accounts told at home; as a natural process, common strands 
amongst the myriad of stories told by the participants would have formed the 
basis of durable oral versions.36 In the Peloponnese especially, where literary 
culture was slower to take hold than in other parts of Greece, Athens notably, 
the oral record retained its primacy through the fourth century.37 In this 
environment it would have been harder for Xenophon, resident in this region in 
                                            
36 The following reference is owed to Stylianou (2004: 73): cf. 2.1.17 where Klearchos 
envisages advice given by a Greek in the King's service being spoken of back in 
Greece: 'And you know that whatever advice you give us will of necessity be spoken of 
in Greece (ιέγεζζαη ἐλ ηῇ Ἑιιάδη)'. Waterfield (2006: 190) compares the Ten Thousand 
to the survivors of the Chinese Long March, noting that many stories would have 
circulated afterwards about the expedition. 
37 See Harris 1989: 89-90, 112-114. It is perhaps not overstating his influence to say 
that Xenophon's account of the expedition, together with his other written works, would 
have been a catalyst for inroads of literacy in Sparta and the wider Peloponnese. 
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his later life, to avoid what was being said. There may well have been positive 
sentiment echoed, given his role in the success of the retreat, but by his own 
account, too, many in the army had axes to grind with him. The argument of this 
second part of the chapter is that in Anabasis Xenophon is responding to 
particular charges made against him and to slights on his character. An 
important point of difference with the apologia theory that has been examined is 
that, according to the latter, Xenophon was prompted to write from a sense of 
injured pride, whereas in what is considered here, he is defending himself 
against personal attacks. His warning to the soldiers at 5.7.12 (and plea at 
5.7.32-33; cf. also 6.1.21) to take care of their reputation in the eyes of others 
reveals at the same time his own deep concern on this score.38 
 
2.1. Deceiving the soldiers. An. 5.6.17, 27; 5.7.5-12 
 
While the army is encamped outside the Black Sea city of Kotyora (see map, 
Appendix I) awaiting the arrival of ships from Sinope, Xenophon is accused of 
planning to found a colony with the aim of furthering his own name and power. 
Initially, when word of the venture circulated, the prospect of settling in the 
Pontus divided the men, but when they learned that Xenophon had been 
sacrificing in secret the mood turned against him: 'Then Philesius and Lycon got 
up, both Achaeans, and said that it was terrible for Xenophon in private, not in 
common with the army, both to be persuading people to stay behind and to be 
sacrificing on behalf of remaining, while not speaking publicly to the common 
about these things' (5.6.27). 
 
Xenophon has already explained to the reader his reason for considering 
establishing a colony (having ample, and skilled, manpower on hand), and has 
stated that the aim was 'to acquire both land and power for Greece' (θαιὸλ 
αὐηῷ ἐδόθεη εἶλαη ρώξαλ θαὶ δύλακηλ ηῇ Ἑιιάδη πξνζθηήζαζζαη, 5.6.15). He 
now defends himself to the army, claiming that the sacrifices were made to 
                                            
38 Erbse, in his important deliberation on the purpose of the work (1966, re-published 
2010), writes that the text is a defence of Xenophon's actions in the years 401-399; 
however, he focuses on only one motivation for this, namely Xenophon's association 
with Cyrus the Younger, which Erbse considers to be the cause of his exile (2010: 
486). This and the next part of the chapter seek to reveal a more complex picture and 
to unpack the various elements of Xenophon's personal apologetic agenda. 
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learn 'whether it was better to begin to speak to you and to act about these 
things or not to touch the matter in any way at all' (5.6.28). He blames the 
soothsayer, source of the rumour — allegedly because he himself is anxious to 
return to Greece, for slandering him. As there are ships on route to take them 
homewards, and two of the other generals, Timasion the Dardanian and Thorax 
the Boiotian, have secured pay for the men from Black Sea Greek cities, he 
recommends without reservation that they pursue this course. 'It seems to me a 
beautiful thing to arrive safe where we wish to go and also to get a salary for our 
very difficulties' (5.6.31). 
 
However, the matter is not laid to rest. Those who had promised the men 
money discovered that, because the army had decided to sail away anyway 
following Xenophon's recommendation, the colonists (the Herakleians) went 
back on their promise to send money as well as ships. Now they only sent the 
ships and Timasion and Thorax, 'terrified of the army' (5.6.36), went to 
Xenophon and proposed that they should arrange for all to sail east to Phasis. 
Xenophon answered that he would say nothing of the sort to the army. But 
another general, Neon the Asinaean, spread a rumour that it was he who was 
planning to lead them back to Phasis, and a menacing atmosphere developed 
in the camp. Sensing the danger Xenophon summoned an assembly, and in an 
emotive but methodical speech (1.5 OCT), defended himself against this 
subsequent charge of deception (5.7.5-12). 
 
The byzantine machinations surrounding their plans in going onwards at 
Kotyora suggest an even more complex picture than Xenophon paints of events 
here. Existing tensions between commanders have been intensified by several 
factors — arguably chief among them the creation of a vacuum by the earlier 
departure of Kheirisophos at Trapezus — and there may well have been a 
determined attempt by one, or a group of them in concert, to gain control of the 
army. Xenophon's comprehensive defence against the charge of deceiving the 
army is best set in this context of a power struggle in which he, Timasion, 
Thorax ('who was always doing battle with Xenophon over the generalship', 
5.6.25), and Neon, acting in the place of Kheirisophos, were the principal 
protagonists. It is only at Sinope that the army decides on a sole commander 
(cf. 6.1.18). 
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2.2. Hubris. An. 5.8.1 
 
Many of the Ten Thousand were Peloponnesians, and those who eventually did 
return to Greece will all have had their own stories to tell about the adventure.39 
As remarked above, Xenophon, who was probably living in the region in the 
later part of his life, may have been moved by what was circulating to defend 
himself. (It could also have been the case that there was something negative in 
an account by any other author of an 'anabasis', although the case for other 
versions has not been found persuasive here.) Further evidence for this form of 
apologia is found at Kotyora where, as Xenophon relates, the generals were 
brought to account for their conduct on the retreat (5.8).40 He himself is accused 
by several of the men of hubris, violent assault intended to humiliate the victim: 
Ξελνθῶληνο δὲ θαηεγόξεζάλ ηηλεο θάζθνληεο παίεζζαη ὑπ' αὐηνῦ θαὶ ὡο 
ὑβξίδνληνο ηὴλ θαηεγνξίαλ ἐπνηνῦλην (5.8.1).41 We must believe that such a 
charge would have been unsettling for Xenophon, positioning himself as he was 
through his writing as an important follower of Socrates; it would also have been 
damaging for his image as a military leader, another area where he was 
constructing authority by his writings. 
 
Xenophon deals comprehensively with the charge made against him at Kotyora. 
In an address to the men (5.8.3-12), he methodically questions one of his 
accusers and demonstrates that his actions against him were entirely justified;42 
he then proceeds to justify other cases where he beat men on the grounds that 
discipline was necessary for the good of the army as a whole (5.8.13-22). 
                                            
39 On the question of the mercenaries' origins see Roy 1967 and 2004, Lee 2007, 
Brennan 2008. Roy (2004: 280-288) argues that most never returned home, their main 
objective being to 'stay in employment in Asia Minor ' (288). The experience of 
economic emigrants in more recent times, for example in the case of citizens from 
Ireland for much of the 20th century, supports this view. 
40 Xenophon names three other commanders, among them Sophainetos, whom he 
says was fined for neglect. 
41 Dover defines hubris as 'behaviour in which a citizen treats a fellow-citizen as if he 
were dealing with a slave or a foreigner'. A charge of hubris was indictable under Attic 
law: see Dover (1994: 54) with references to Demosthenes (21.71 ff.), Isokrates (20.2-
11), and Aristotle (Rhetoric 1378b10-35). 
42 His accuser, who turned out to be a mule-driver, had tried to bury a man alive in the 
snow rather than carry him as ordered by Xenophon: 4.5.7-22. 
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Greatly adding to the sense of authentic self-defence is the undisguised 
frustration with which he concludes the episode.43 
 
'But I am amazed,' he said, 'that if I am hateful to anyone 
among you, you recall it and do not stay silent, but if for anyone 
I lightened the burden of winter, or kept an enemy away, or 
joined in providing something for one who was weak or at a 
loss, no one recalls it; nor if I praised someone who acted nobly 
or if I honoured as well as I was able anyone who was good, 
you recall nothing of it' (5.8.25).44 
 
As a part of the same extraordinary developments at Kotyora related by 
Xenophon, he tells us, in the passage immediately following the colony episode 
above (5.7.13-25), of a series of disgraceful events at Kerasos, a Greek city 
through which the army had passed after leaving Trapezus (for these locations 
see Appendix I). He describes at length (2 OCT pages) how some of their men 
had attempted to plunder a friendly village with the intention of making off with 
their booty on a ship; the survivors of the failed raid subsequently stoned to 
death representatives of the village who came to see the Greek commanders. 
We would have expected the recounting of this villainous affair to have come at 
Kerasos (5.3), but Xenophon delays it in his narrative in order to establish a 
context in which his own actions on the retreat seem not only appropriate, but of 
the sort that are absolutely necessary if the army is 'to avoid appearing to be the 
worst and most contemptible men in the eyes of both gods and men' (5.7.12).45 
The recounting of the Kerasos passage concludes with the purification of the 
whole army ('with Xenophon advising it and with the soothsayers joining in this 
counsel', 5.7.35).46 
                                            
43 For Xenophon expressing exasperation at his treatment by the soldiers see also 
7.6.11, 23. 
44 ἀιιὰ γάξ, ἔθε, ζαπκάδσ ὅηη εἰ κέλ ηηλη ὑκῶλ ἀπερζόκελ, κέκλεζζε θαὶ νὐ ζησπᾶηε, 
εἰ δέ ηῳ ἢ ρεηκῶλα ἐπεθνύξεζα ἢ πνιέκηνλ ἀπήξπμα ἢ ἀζζελνῦληη ἢ ἀπνξνῦληη 
ζπλεμεπόξηζά ηη, ηνύησλ δὲ νὐδεὶο κέκλεηαη, νὐδ' εἴ ηηλα θαιῶο ηη πνηνῦληα ἐπῄλεζα 
νὐδ' εἴ ηηλα ἄλδξα ὄληα ἀγαζὸλ ἐηίκεζα ὡο ἐδπλάκελ, νὐδὲλ ηνύησλ κέκλεζζε. 5.8.25. 
45 The specific usage of the passage for Xenophon's own purpose is underlined by the 
fact that his internal audience must already have been aware of the recent events 
involving their comrades. 
46 Gwynn 1929, describing this passage as a 'long and ill-proportioned digression', 
believes that the author originally had it in the natural sequence of events i.e. at 5.4.1, 
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The effectiveness of Xenophon's defence against the charge at Kotyora is 
already apparent in the course of his speech: the men shout out that he had 
struck the man who is accusing him 'too few blows', and when he invites others 
to say why they were struck, no one comes forward (5.8.12-13). His 
competence and justice are subsequently affirmed at Sinope (6.1.18-19) when 
the men approach him to be their sole leader, and again at Byzantium (7.1.21-
22) when he is offered the same distinction. 
 
2.3. Corruption. An. 7.6.9-10 
 
Equally as damaging a charge as hubris for Xenophon would have been that of 
dōrodokia: Xenophon the commander enriching himself at his soldiers' 
expense, Xenophon the moral philosopher acting as an unprincipled brigand. 
Such an accusation was levelled at him in Thrace in spring 399 after the army, 
which had spent the winter in the service of a local chief, Seuthes, agreed to 
enlist with the Spartans in their campaign against Tissaphernes.47 Perhaps 
significantly, the first accuser was a Peloponnesian:48 
 
But we, Spartans, would have come to you long ago if 
Xenophon had not prevailed on us and brought us here, where 
we have been soldiering day and night through the terrible 
winter without stopping; and he has the benefits of our toil. For 
Seuthes has enriched him, while depriving us of our pay. So, as 
the one speaking first, if I could see this man stoned to death as 
justice for having dragged us about, I would consider myself to 
have my pay and would not be aggrieved at all the hard work I 
have done (7.6.9-10, trans. Ambler, modified).49 
                                                                                                                                
when the army was leaving Kerasos, but that he later altered the arrangement as part 
of a response to Sophainetos, who is another of the generals brought to account by the 
men at Kotyora. 
47 Seuthes II, a paradynast of the Odrysian king, Medocus. See further Stronk 1995: 
140 ff. See Hell. 3.1.3-6 for the beginnings of the Spartan campaign against Persia. 
48 An Arkadian. Following his attack, others stood up and made similar charges. 
49 Ἀιι' ἡκεῖο κέλ, ὦ Λαθεδαηκόληνη, θαὶ πάιαη ἂλ ἦκελ παξ' ὑκῖλ, εἰ κὴ Ξελνθῶλ ἡκᾶο 
δεῦξν πείζαο ἀπήγαγελ, ἔλζα δὴ ἡκεῖο κὲλ ηὸλ δεηλὸλ ρεηκῶλα ζηξαηεπόκελνη θαὶ 
λύθηα θαὶ ἡκέξαλ νὐδὲλ πεπαύκεζα· ὁ δὲ ηνὺο ἡκεηέξνπο πόλνπο ἔρεη· θαὶ Σεύζεο 
ἐθεῖλνλ κὲλ ἰδίᾳ πεπινύηηθελ, ἡκᾶο δὲ ἀπνζηεξεῖ ηὸλ κηζζόλ· ὥζηε [ὅ γε πξῶηνο ιέγσλ] 
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Xenophon's defence against the charge is, again, methodical and thorough. His 
speech, covering 4.5 pages of OCT, is divided into two parts (7.6.11-32, 33-38). 
In the first he addresses the army's historic situation, arguing persuasively that, 
even without pay, they benefitted from their association with Seuthes: without 
his cavalry they would have been ineffective and vulnerable, but with him they 
have been able to secure sufficient supplies to survive the winter. Swearing by 
all the gods and goddesses (ζενὺο ἅπαληαο θαὶ πάζαο), he repudiates the 
charge of profiteering at the soldiers' expense (7.6.18-19, cf. 7.3.10, 5.2-4). 
 
In the second part of his defence (7.6.33-38) he turns the focus on himself. 
Having already stated that he had turned back to help the army when he heard 
they were in difficulty (7.6.11),50 he recalls how he had left the men to go home 
at Byzantium, with their gratitude 'ringing in [his] ears' (7.6.33). The present 
result of his decision to return and help them is that he has earned the enmity of 
the Spartans, whom he has disobeyed, and of Seuthes, who has been angered 
by his persistent advocacy of the soldiers' interests. By acting as a 
θηινζηξαηηώηεο he has jeopardised his future in Greece and alienated a 
potential benefactor. And now he faces the death penalty at the hands of the 
soldiers.51 
 
This is Xenophon's immediate defence of himself, its elaborateness both a 
reflection of the gravity of the charge and a measure of his concern for his 
reputation. Its apparent success is signalled by the response to it given by a 
Spartan: here the medium is as important as the (laconic) message: an outsider 
— not one of the army — and not well disposed to Xenophon, is moved to stand 
up for him.52 'By the Twin Gods, men, I have to say that personally I do not think 
                                                                                                                                
ἐγὼ κὲλ εἰ ηνῦηνλ ἴδνηκη θαηαιεπζζέληα θαὶ δόληα δίθελ ὧλ ἡκᾶο πεξηεῖιθε, θαὶ ηὸλ 
κηζζὸλ ἄλ κνη δνθῶ ἔρεηλ θαὶ νὐδὲλ ἐπὶ ηνῖο πεπνλεκέλνηο ἄρζεζζαη. 
50 In contradiction to 7.2.8-9, where Xenophon says that he returned to the army having 
been pressed to do so by Anaxibios. See Stronk's comment 1995: 260. 
51 Millender (2009: 16) notes that in his lengthy speech Xenophon 'equally calls 
attention to the harm inflicted on the Cyreans by their fellow Greeks'. She locates his 
apologia in a context of Spartan pursuit of alliances with barbarians to the detriment of 
other Hellenes (12). 
52 Xenophon's relations with Spartan officials, rarely represented as cordial on the 
journey, became notably strained following the arrival of the Ten Thousand at 
Byzantium. For detail see Part 3 of this chapter. 
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it is right for you to be angry with this man' (Οὐ ηὼ ζηώ, ἀιι' ἐκνὶ κέληνη νὐ 
δηθαίσο δνθεῖηε ηῷ ἀλδξὶ ηνύηῳ ραιεπαίλεηλ· 7.6.39). 
 
Yet in a certain sense, for the audience this second defence is almost 
redundant, for it is set within a framework of personal transparency that the 
author has assiduously built up in the preceding narrative: by the time the 
charge of corruption is made against him, Xenophon's innocence is already 
virtually beyond doubt. A selection of examples highlights these foundational 
blocks of his defence. 
 
7.1.5-6. At the outset of the book Xenophon recounts the detail of his brief 
encounter at Khrysopolis with Medosades, Seuthes's ambassador, who asks 
him to help persuade the army to cross to Thrace. 'But the army will cross over,' 
Xenophon responds, 'so let Seuthes pay neither me nor anyone else on this 
account' (7.1.6). Later, in the presence of Seuthes and two Greek officers, 
Xenophon asks the ambassador to confirm the details of the encounter. 'On 
saying this, he asked Medosades if what he said was true. He said it was' 
(7.2.25). 
 
7.2.10. Second approach by Seuthes. 'Now Seuthes heard that he [Xenophon] 
had come back again, and sending Medosades to him by sea, he asked him to 
bring the army to him, promising him in speech whatever he thought would 
persuade him. But he [Xenophon] answered that it was not possible for any of 
this to come to be. So on hearing this, Medosades departed.' Again, at the 
same meeting with Seuthes, and with Phryniscos the Achaean and Polykrates 
the Athenian present, Xenophon seeks corroboration. 'At this he again asked 
Medosades whether he had said this. He assented also to these points' (7.2.26-
28). 
 
7.2.17. Considered preparation for going to see Seuthes after the army is 
prevented by Aristarchos the Spartan from crossing to Asia. 'So when the 
sacrifices seemed to be propitious both for him and for the army to go safely to 
Seuthes, Xenophon took Polykrates the Athenian captain, and from each of the 
generals (except Neon) he took a man whom each trusted.' 
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7.2.19-30. First meeting with Seuthes. On the Thracian's order Xenophon is 
only allowed to bring two men into his tower. But before they come to business, 
Xenophon requests that the others with him are called in: 'Outside is the person 
most trusted by each of the generals, except Neon the Lakonian. So if, then, 
you want this transaction to be still more marked by trust, call in also those who 
are outside' (ἔμσ εἰζὶλ ἀπὸ ηῶλ ζηξαηεγῶλ ὁ πηζηόηαηνο ἑθάζηῳ πιὴλ Νέσλνο 
ηνῦ Λαθσληθνῦ. εἰ νὖλ βνύιεη πηζηνηέξαλ εἶλαη ηὴλ πξᾶμηλ, θαὶ ἐθείλνπο θάιεζαη, 
7.2.30). 
 
7.3.7. Xenophon brings the army to Seuthes. 'On seeing [Seuthes], Xenophon 
bade him ride up, so he could say to him what seemed advantageous with as 
many as possible listening.' 
 
The narrative prior to the corruption charge is, furthermore, marked by its 
careful, detached recording of the army's relationship with Seuthes. The 
impression is that the convergence between the Greeks and Seuthes has come 
about more by fate than design, an end achieved by the author's setting out of a 
chain of events which lead to the army joining Seuthes: he makes clear that it is 
only when the Spartans refused to let the men cross into Asia (7.2.12-13), and 
only after sacrifices had proven favourable (7.2.17), that he went to see 
Seuthes, this with a view to securing the army's survival through the winter. 
When Seuthes has made his offer, Xenophon reports that anyone who wished 
to do so was allowed to speak. 'And many spoke in the same vein, that what 
Seuthes had said was of the greatest value. His proposals were exactly what 
they needed: now that it was winter, those who wanted to sail back home could 
not do so; there was no way they could survive in friendly territory if they had to 
buy the necessities of life; and it would be safer for them to spend time and get 
their food in hostile territory with Seuthes than on their own. The fact that they 
were going to get paid, on top of all these advantages, was generally held to be 
a lucky bonus' (7.3.13). 
 
The same systematic approach is evident in the author's construction of his 
friendship with Seuthes. At their first meeting Seuthes refers to the kinship 
between Athenians and Thracians (7.2.31), so establishing a filial basis for the 
friendship between the two men (cf. Thucydides 2.29). This link is subsequently 
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emphasised when he suggests they adopt 'Athena' as the watchword for the 
two forces (7.3.39). Xenophon highlights the appropriateness of the bond from 
his own perspective by representing Seuthes as a noble figure: a man who is in 
search of justice, and who has taken measures to be self-sufficient (7.2.32-4). 
Other civilised qualities attributed to him by Xenophon include the ability to hold 
drink (7.3.35) and a sound knowledge of Greek (7.6.8).53 Xenophon and 
Seuthes formally establish their guest-friendship by 'giving and receiving the 
hand-clasp of friendship' (7.3.1).54 
 
Nonetheless, and for all its considered construction, the matter of Xenophon's 
dealings with Seuthes during his time in Thrace transpires not to have been as 
straightforward as portrayed. After the Cyreans have enlisted with Sparta, 
Xenophon is sent to Seuthes by the new employers to try to recover the pay 
due to the mercenaries (7.7.20). In a lengthy speech (4.5 pages OCT) he dwells 
on the fact of their friendship, and details how he has acted in Seuthes's 
interests throughout. In so doing, Xenophon underlines the honourable nature 
of his relationship with the Thracian, making the possibility of corruption seem 
implausible. Seuthes's response — anger at the person who was responsible 
for the payment not being made — re-establishes his credentials as a just man, 
one whom it would be suitable for Xenophon to be on terms of friendship with.55 
However, during the speech, Xenophon does seem to own up to receiving gifts 
from Seuthes: 'You, however, even before I served you in any way, received me 
with pleasure evident in your eyes, your voice, and your gifts of hospitality' (ζὺ 
δὲ πξὶλ κὲλ ὑπεξεηῆζαί ηί ζνη ἐκὲ ἐδέμσ ἡδέσο θαὶ ὄκκαζη θαὶ θσλῇ θαὶ μελίνηο, 
7.7.46). As Azoulay points out, xeniois here must be translated as 'hospitality 
                                            
53 Xenophon's tendency to blur constructed boundaries between Greek and barbarian 
has been remarked upon in the last chapter; see further Part 3. 
54 Cf. Herman 1987: 18, Stronk 1995: 198, Azoulay 2004: 291. 
55 The reason for the absence of due monies is laid at the door of Herakleides, a Greek 
from Maroneia who has the confidence, and holds the purse strings, of Seuthes. 
Xenophon clashed angrily with him over the amount of money he claims to have 
received from the sale of booty earned by the army (7.5.4-5): it as a result of the 
underpayment that Xenophon falls out both with the army and with Seuthes. Money 
trail: 7.4.2, Herakleides sent by Seuthes to Perinthos to sell booty taken from ravaged 
territories; 7.5.4-6, the money is sufficient only to make a part payment to the men; 
Xenophon, with an oath, derides the paymaster, so earning his enmity; 7.6.41, 
Herakleides is accused of stealing the money in front of an assembly of the Greeks and 
promptly slips away with Seuthes. 
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gifts' and not 'hospitality'.56 Xenophon in the end is thus owning up to receiving 
material benefit from Seuthes, but within the sphere of guest-friendship, in 
which it has a traditional legitimacy. He is adamant throughout that he did not 
receive dōra, gifts that would count as attempts at corruption.57 
 
The fineness of this distinction may have been lost on the men — who were 
convinced that he had received dōra from Seuthes (ἔθαζαλ δέ κε θαὶ δῶξα 
ἔρεηλ παξὰ ζνῦ, 7.7.44) — and formed the earlier grounds for their accusation 
against him. Xenophon himself, in what is perhaps a vindictive swipe, has 
earlier named other commanders who did receive gifts, so there is real reason 
for the men to be suspicious about the goings-on with Seuthes.58 Xenophon's 
plea to Seuthes to pay the men's wages through him (7.7.49) (an act that would 
improve his standing among the soldiers), and indeed this long speech in 
general, seems to show that his earlier elaborate efforts at defusing the bribes 
issue have not ultimately had the desired effect. The affair invites 
reconsideration of a prior episode in which Xenophon is suspected of 
'persuading' a soothsayer to pronounce an unfavourable reading of victims (θαί 
ηηλεο ἐηόικσλ ιέγεηλ ὡο ὁ Ξελνθῶλ βνπιόκελνο ηὸ ρσξίνλ νἰθίζαη πέπεηθε ηὸλ 
κάληηλ ιέγεηλ ὡο ηὰ ἱεξὰ νὐ γίγλεηαη ἐπὶ ἀθόδῳ, 6.4.14). Does this reveal a prior 
suspicion of bribery on his part? In the end one is left with the feeling that 
Xenophon is not disclosing everything about his dealings with Seuthes, and that 
this defence, notwithstanding its length and detail, is not his most effective.59 
                                            
56 Azoulay 2004: 294. 
57 The gradual replacement of the clan by the polis as the paramount social unit is the 
context against which these tensions should be seen. We might see the beginnings of 
this transformation in Pericles' efforts to undermine and counter the aristocratic power 
base of Kimon (see Plutarch, Pericles 7.3, 9.2-4); judging from a speech Xenophon has 
Agesilaos make to Pharnabazos in 395 (Hell. 4.1.34), the marginalising of xenia culture 
must have been almost completed by the early fourth century. Cf. Herman (1987: 7) 
who remarks: 'when seen from the perspective of the community, gift-exchange with an 
outsider - the essential characteristic of guest-friendship - could appear as bribery. The 
antithetical notion of abstinence from accepting gifts became the mark of the ideal 
citizen.' 
58 'The generals were in disagreement: Kleanor and Phryniskos wished to lead the 
army to Seuthes, for he persuaded them, and gave a horse to one and a woman to the 
other' (νἱ ζηξαηεγνὶ ἐζηαζίαδνλ, Κιεάλσξ κὲλ θαὶ Φξπλίζθνο πξὸο Σεύζελ βνπιόκελνη 
ἄγεηλ· ἔπεηζε γὰξ αὐηνύο, θαὶ ἔδσθε ηῷ κὲλ ἵππνλ, ηῷ δὲ γπλαῖθα, 7.2.2, trans. Ambler, 
modified). 
59 Another basis for suspicion (and anger) on the part of the soldiers against Xenophon, 
and one which could have been the touch paper for the corruption charge, was his 
behaviour at the dinner hosted by Seuthes (7.3.15-33). Here Herakleides tells 
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2.4. The Spectre of the Mercenary 
 
As is the case today, mercenaries in the ancient world were not highly thought 
of.60 Traditionally, cities defended themselves with their citizenry and did not 
rely on paid troops, outsiders or otherwise. However in the course of the fourth 
century, with economies monetised and ever greater numbers of hoplites taking 
up military service abroad, the practice came to be widely accepted as a feature 
of Greek society;61 this did not extend to the elite classes, for whom any wage-
earning (which implied dependence and susceptibility to corruption) was 
considered dishonourable. For an aristocrat, hiring himself and his arms out for 
pay was a dire measure, and Xenophon the hippeus will have wanted to 
distance himself from misthos relationships with both Cyrus and Seuthes. This, 
it is argued here, is a further strand of his personal apologia, one that was 
probably directed at readers from his own social class.62 
 
Xenophon deals directly with the nature of his relationship with Cyrus. At the 
point of his character's introduction to the story he makes it explicit that he did 
not join the prince for military service:  'Among the Greeks there was one 
Xenophon, an Athenian, who followed the army neither as a general nor a 
captain nor a common soldier' (Ἦλ δέ ηηο ἐλ ηῇ ζηξαηηᾷ Ξελνθῶλ Ἀζελαῖνο, ὃο 
                                                                                                                                
Xenophon and the other guests that they should give what gifts they can in order to 
gain the dynast's favour (7.3.16-18; for this Thracian custom see also Thucydides 
2.97.4); Xenophon is dismayed, 'for he had come across from Parium with nothing, 
save a boy and enough for the road' (7.3.20). When his turn comes at the banquet, he 
stands up, slightly drunk (ὑπνπεπσθὼο), and declares at length that he is 
enthusiastically placing (δίδσκη) himself and his companions at Seuthes's service 
(7.3.29-31). This declaration might not have been well received by the other Greeks at 
the dinner. The men were not subjects and their leaders were such by their gift: 
Xenophon may be acknowledging such a mistake by recording the embarrassing 
episode, excusing it on the grounds of inebriation. (For interest, Xenophon and 
Seuthes probably crossed paths one more time after the Cyreans had left for Asia: in 
the spring of 398 the Greeks travelled back to Thrace with Derkylidas who was hosted 
there by Seuthes. See Hell. 3.2.9.) 
60 Cf. Plato, Laws 630b, 697e; Isokrates, On the Peace 46, Ep. 9.8-9; Demosthenes, 
First Phillipic 46; Aeneas Tacticus, On Siegecraft 11.14, 12.3; Aristotle Nic. Eth. 3.89. 
61 See Trundle 2005 on the increase in mercenary numbers in the fourth century. 
62 The literature on mercenaries in the ancient world is extensive; as a chronicle of 
mercenary service, Anabasis is a uniquely important source for ancient historians 
working on the subject. In this section my focus is on Xenophon and his self-
representation: I do not seek to evaluate the information he provides about service for 
pay, or the related network of reciprocal friendships. For studies on the political and 
social history of mercenaries see notably Trundle 2004, Roy 1967, Griffith 1935, Parke 
1933. 
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νὔηε ζηξαηεγὸο νὔηε ινραγὸο νὔηε ζηξαηηώηεο ὢλ ζπλεθνινύζεη, 3.1.4, trans. 
Ambler, modified.).63 In the same passage he implies that his reason for joining 
was out of admiration for the personal qualities of the prince, a motive which 
later finds an echo at 6.4.8 (on this passage see above Chapter 1.6).64 
Regarding money, there is no indication through the course of the marches that 
he is seeking any, or that he is in need of maintenance;65 in fact we learn he 
has come from Athens well-resourced, this being implied in his report of how he 
formed a cavalry for the retreating army: 'I see too there are horses in the army, 
some mine…' (ὁξῶ δὲ ἵππνπο ὄληαο ἐλ ηῷ ζηξαηεύκαηη, ηνὺο κέλ ηηλαο παξ' 
ἐκνί…3.3.19, trans. Ambler, modified).66 
 
In the same passage Xenophon explains why, although deceived about the 
purpose of the expedition, he nonetheless continued: 'when they came to 
Kilikia, however, it then seemed clear to all that the expedition was against the 
King. Although they feared the journey and were unwilling, the majority 
nevertheless followed along out of shame both before each other and before 
Cyrus. Xenophon too was one of these' (3.1.10). After Cyrus has been killed in 
Babylonia, the Greeks are forced to embark on a journey of survival, and 
Xenophon plays a key part in its success. Notably, when eventually they reach 
                                            
63 1.8.15 may contradict this statement: Xenophon approaches Cyrus on the battlefield 
to learn if he has any announcements to make prior to the engagement (on the 
intention of this vignette see 3.3.1.2 below). Also, the election of new officers following 
the seizure of the generals by the Greater Zab River warrants some consideration. 
Upon awakening from his dream, Xenophon summons together the captains of 
Proxenos (3.1.15) in order to decide on a plan of action; he makes himself available to 
lead, and is readily accepted as leader (3.1.25-26, 3.1.47). Xenophon was clearly a 
part of Proxenos' contingent, and clearly the captains regarded him as an integral part 
of their unit and someone in whom they were prepared to entrust command (cf. 
Anderson 1974: 117, and Lee 2007: 54). The implication is that he may have been 
more than, as Stronk has put it, 'a gentlemanly kind of hanger-on of Proxenos' (2009: 
5). As against this, however, Kheirisophos, commending Xenophon for his rallying 
speech to the officers, says that all he had previously known about him was that he 
was an Athenian (3.1.45): I owe this last point to LaForse 2005: 22. 
64 Azoulay (2004: 299) contends that it was his ties of friendship with Proxenos that led 
Xenophon to join Cyrus. 
65 Except for 1.8.15, Xenophon is completely absent from the march up-country with 
Cyrus. This representation of himself as a mere implied presence ensures that he 
cannot be explicitly associated with the several episodes involving demands for pay: cf. 
1.2.11, soldiers demanding money from Cyrus; 1.3, strike at Tarsus; 1.4.12, the men 
refuse to proceed unless given more money. His absence also serves to reinforce his 
claim that he did not follow the army in a military capacity. 
66 At 4.2.20 Xenophon refers to his shield bearer (ὑπαζπηζηὴο), a further indicator that 
he had not come without resources. Cf. Chapter 1.3 above. 
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the straits of the Bosphoros, in sight of what Xenophon terms the first Greek city 
(Byzantium), he announces that he wishes to leave (7.1.4).67 The objective of 
safety which he had set down on the banks of the Greater Zab River has now 
been achieved and he has no further responsibility to the men: 'And then it was 
over the kingship of Cyrus that you were brave men, but now [after the seizure 
of the generals], when the contest is over your salvation (ηῆο ὑκεηέξαο 
ζσηεξίαο), it is surely very fitting that you be both better and more eager' 
(3.2.15). This declaration is a delineation of the nature of his association with 
the Ten Thousand, and is the background against which his later service with 
Seuthes is to be read. Having gone and left the army at Byzantium, he returns 
to assist the force when he hears it is in trouble, finally leading it to Seuthes, 
whom he judges to afford the best chance of survival through the winter. On the 
matter of payment from the army's new employer he is pointedly indifferent; 
typically, after Seuthes has made his offer to the men and they are digesting the 
terms, Xenophon is thinking of their future safety. 'How far from the sea will you 
expect the army to follow you?' (7.3.12). 
 
Throughout the text Xenophon distinguishes between himself and the 
mercenary body by showing that he is not motivated by personal enrichment. At 
Tarsus the men continue with Cyrus when they are granted an increase in pay 
(1.3.21), whereas Xenophon continues because he believes it is the honourable 
thing to do (3.1.10);68 when he thinks of founding a city on the Black Sea coast, 
it is not with a view to increasing his own wealth and power, but that of Hellas 
(θαιὸλ αὐηῷ ἐδόθεη εἶλαη ρώξαλ θαὶ δύλακηλ ηῇ Ἑιιάδη πξνζθηήζαζζαη πόιηλ 
θαηνηθίζαληαο, 5.6.15); he turns down the opportunity to become sole leader of 
the army (6.1.25-31), and to become tyrant of Byzantium (7.1.21-31), in both 
cases there being a clear indication that he would have personally benefited 
                                            
67 First Greek city: 7.1.29. Xenophon has referred to cities along the Black sea coast as 
being Greek, but he regards these as being outside the Hellenic world (Trapezus 
4.8.22, Kerasos 5.3.2, Kotyora 5.5.3, Herakleia 6.2.1): cf. 6.1.17 at Harmene, the port 
of Sinope, where they are 'near to Greece', and 6.5.23 in Bithynia, where they are at 
the very 'gates of Greece'. 
68 At 3.1.10 Xenophon writes that 'the majority (νἱ πνιινὶ)…followed along out of 
shame both before each other and before Cyrus', but this contradicts the account he 
has earlier given at Tarsus, where it is implied that the men assented to go on only 
when an increase in their wage was granted (1.3.18-21). 
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from the position;69 when Seuthes invites him to take something from the 
proceeds of the sale of plunder in Thrace, he declines and tells him to give the 
pick to the officers who are with him, who duly take up this offer (7.5.3-4); again, 
when the Thracian finally furnished the army with pay, Xenophon, who is central 
to the transaction, pointedly did not take anything for himself or become 
involved in the distribution of the booty (7.7.48-57). 
 
A further degree of separation from the mercenaries is achieved through the 
way in which Xenophon controls them as one of their leaders: by deflecting the 
body from its course at critical junctures, he disrupts its natural tendency, 
thereby showing himself to be an alien — if benign — force attached to it, rather 
than being a part of it.70 For example, at Kotyora when the men become 
severely agitated by rumours that they are going to be led east on ships to the 
Phasis, foreseeing dire consequences, Xenophon 'decided to convene an 
assembly of them as quickly as possible and not to allow them to gather 
spontaneously' (5.7.2-3). Again at Byzantium, after the soldiers, deceived by the 
Spartans, force their way angrily back in to the city, Xenophon, 'fearing that the 
army might turn to plundering and that there might arise incurable evils for the 
city, for himself, and for the soldiers, [he] ran over and raced inside the gates 
with the crowd' (7.1.18)… 
 
When the soldiers saw Xenophon, many raced up to him and 
said, 'Now it is possible for you to become a man, Xenophon. 
You have a city, you have triremes, you have money, and you 
have men in such numbers. Now then, if you should wish, you 
would benefit us, and we would make you great.' And he 
answered, 'You speak well, and I will do so too. But if you 
desire this, fall into order and ground your weapons as quickly 
as possible,' he said, wishing to calm them. And he himself 
                                            
69 Ironically, the reason that the men tried to persuade Xenophon to be their supreme 
commander is that they considered it would be easier to score booty with him in charge 
(6.1.17-18); on the Byzantium episode see below. 
70 Xenophon's concern with the matter of how to manage mercenary soldiers was 
explored in the previous chapter. Cf. Tuplin (2007a: 28): 'The message is that, unless 
they are exceptionally well led and controlled, mercenaries are dangerous in general 
and therefore, in particular, a dangerous tool for the liberation of Greek subjects of 
Persia'. Xenophon's concern with the management of mercenaries, and the apologetic 
purpose suggested here, are not mutually exclusive. 
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passed the word and bade the others pass it and ground their 
weapons (7.1.21-22).  
 
The tone of the speech which follows (7.1.25-31) underscores the essentially 
paternalist nature of his relationship with the men,71 while its content — a 
spelling out of the consequences of rebellion, and an attempt to kindle the 
patriotism of the soldiers — affirms that Xenophon's concerns extend beyond 
his personal sphere of interest.72 
 
At the conclusion of the book Xenophon closes his defence on the question of 
mercenary status by referring to his then impoverished circumstances: 
 
From there they sailed to Lampsakos…and Eukleides asked 
him how much gold he had. Swearing an oath, he told him it 
would not even be sufficient for his trip home, if he should not 
sell his horse and what he had with him, but Eukleides did not 
believe him (7.8.1-2). 
 
The promise of neat closure is, however, seemingly denied by the odd 
pronouncement that he was not believed by the soothsayer, Eukleides (ὁ δ' 
αὐηῷ νὐθ ἐπίζηεπε). A number of explanations are possible. It could be a clever 
way by Xenophon of showing that he did have gold — and probably quite a lot 
of it (cf. 5.3.4-7) — but that this was sacred money, of no significance for his 
own welfare. He has earlier emphasised that he had earned nothing from his 
time with the Cyreans in Asia: 'for he had come across from Parium [to Thrace, 
having been on his way from Byzantium to Greece with Anaxibios] with nothing 
but a boy and money enough for his travelling expenses' (7.3.20). The reaction 
                                            
71 In his apologia speech for the corruption charge made against him in Thrace, 
Xenophon recalls that the men even called him 'father', and promised to remember him 
always as benefactor: ἀιιὰ θαὶ παηέξα ἐκὲ ἐθαιεῖηε θαὶ αἰεὶ ὡο εὐεξγέηνπ κεκλήζεζζαη 
ὑπηζρλεῖζζε (7.6.38). 
72 It may be remarked that Xenophon's controlling of the mercenary body in some ways 
mirrors Pericles' effective handling of the Athenians in the 430s: both men, riding 
accusations of corruption, succeed in steering their respective constituencies, not being 
led by their wishes and demands. Xenophon's actions also call to mind literary models, 
notably Odysseus and the compassion he shows for his hapless crew on their ill-fated 
attempts to return home; Xenophon alludes to this Homeric text twice in the course of 
the retreat (3.2.25, 5.1.2). 
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of the soothsayer could also be taken as representative (or prophetic) of a view 
in the Hellenic world that the Ten Thousand had taken a substantial amount of 
booty on their long march home. Xenophon may be indicating wearily that, even 
as he sets out for home, he is facing a prejudice that he may never overcome; if 
this is the case, then it is ironic that he immediately furnishes grounds for this by 
reporting on how he led a raiding party against a Persian aristocrat and secured 
a large amount of booty for himself and his friends (7.8.8-23). Moreover, he has 
now transgressed his own carefully cultivated aversion to personal profit built up 
through the course of the book.73 
 
However, this final Xenophontic twist may be accommodated within the wider 
context of his own moral outlook, in this instance via the virtue of self-
sufficiency, one of the qualities on which he places a premium in his writings (cf. 
Kyn. 2.1, Mem. 1.1.9), and through the implementation of justice, this last 
suggested by the circumstances of the raid, the target being a barbarian of 
great (excess) wealth — some or all of which is doubtless owed to exploitation 
of the indigenous Greek population — and the booty taken then shared 
amongst loyal mercenaries. As is argued in Part 3, the episode could also be a 
part of the continuity between Xenophon's separate services in Asia, functioning 
to rule out poverty as the reason he joined the Spartan campaign against 
Tissaphernes.74 
 
Conclusions 
 
It is evident from his account that Xenophon was defending himself against 
serious attacks on his character. The space, thought, and craftsmanship which 
he deployed in his defence is sufficient to show that Anabasis was not a 
whimsical exercise in self-promotion. 
 
                                            
73 Greeks considered it admirable for a person who was in great need to remain poor 
rather than seek to alleviate his situation through dishonourable or dishonest means 
(Dover 1994: 171 with references). 
74 Bradley (2001: 81-83) suggests that the ending is intended to be anti-climactic so 
that the reader is prompted to construct his own closure to the story, namely that 
Xenophon's nostos has been thwarted by the exile decree against him. See Section 
3.3.3 below. 
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The charges against him considered in this part — deceiving the soldiers, 
hubris, corruption, and service for profit — were particularly damaging to a man 
whose writings promote virtuous conduct; that he should go to lengths to refute 
the charges and justify his actions is a reflection of the depth of his concern 
about what was being said, in whatever form. (It can be remarked that if the 
charges had never received wide circulation, he would hardly have brought 
them up at all.) The elaborate structure of his defence in Book 7 is especially 
remarkable and raises the question whether this section would have been 
written at all were it not for the corruption charge. It is, nonetheless, connected 
to the preceding body of the work through its continuation of several prominent 
themes and concerns; notably, Xenophon uses the emergence of the Cyreans 
into the Greek world to expand his commentary on the reality of Spartan 
hegemony. 
 
Two points should be highlighted with regard to Xenophon's defence in Book 7. 
Firstly, his speeches in the form given were probably never delivered on the 
march (this applies to the other books as well). While he very likely did give 
answers to the men on the subject of the charges, these were surely not on the 
scale or detail of the speeches which he includes in his narrative. There are a 
number of factors which support this, the most obvious being that, had they 
been delivered in the form presented, stories of misconduct by him would hardly 
have subsequently gained the currency they seem to have done. Nor would it 
have been feasible for his speeches to have been delivered to the greater body 
of the army; typically, speeches in theatre must have been brief, and 
communicated down the line by word of mouth (cf. Lak. 13.9).75 Secondly, for all 
                                            
75 However, Thucydides does make a point of telling us how Pericles at the 
Kerameikos mounted a specially constructed high platform (ἐπὶ βῆκα ὑςειὸλ) 'so that 
he could be heard as far among the crowd as possible' (2.34.8). For discussion of the 
physical and environmental factors in warfare see Keegan 1976; Aldrete (2008) 
outlines impediments in the hypothetical case of a force not greatly dissimilar in size to 
that of the Cyreans plus camp-followers: 'Consider an ancient army of 20,000 or more 
soldiers gathered together to hear their general's speech. Assuming that the men were 
not muttering among themselves, could even the most quietly attentive hoplite or 
legionary situated somewhere in the middle of these massed ranks have really heard 
anything but intermittent snatches of his general's words over the incessant 
background noise of the clinking and jangling of the men's armor and weapons as they 
shifted uncomfortably in their full battle equipment…? Finally, how many of his men 
could the general reach with his unamplified voice? The usual limit on projecting 
coherent complex speech with the human voice is around 100 yards in the direction in 
175 
 
its considered construction and polish, the defence is not without blemish; for 
example, at several points Xenophon furnishes contradictory information: at 
7.2.8 he says that Anaxibios ordered him back to the army, but in his defence 
speech he states that he returned because he had heard the men were in 
difficulties (7.6.11). In the same speech (7.6.12) he says that Seuthes sent for 
him many times (πνιινὺο ἀγγέινπο πξὸο ἐκὲ πέκπνληνο), but in the narrative 
he records only two such occasions (7.1.5 and 7.2.10). 
 
 
PART 3. DEFENDING HIMSELF AGAINST PHILOBARBARISM AND 
LACONISM 
 
Like much else in his life, Xenophon's relationship with his native city was not 
straightforward. He grew up in a time of turmoil, and was aligned with the pro-
Spartan side which was defeated in the brief but bitter civil war that followed the 
Peloponnesian War.76 His political orientation may have been a factor in his 
departure from the city in 401; and as was argued in Chapter 1 (5.2), it may well 
have been the underlying reason for the decree of exile passed against him at 
some time in the 390s. He himself refers incidentally to the exile decree in 
Anabasis (5.3.7, 7.7.57), and some consider that in this work he is answering 
the charge(s) against him, whatever this may have been.77 This is without doubt 
the case, though I believe that his pathway is a systematic defence of his 
character and actions rather than emphasis on any specific charge. Xenophon 
would have regarded the banishment as a stain on his character, but it would be 
                                                                                                                                
which a speaker is facing.' See also MacDowell 2009: 5, and most recently Anson 
2010, with focus on the delivery of pre-battle speeches. 
76 Xenophon can probably be placed in the Kimonian philo-laconian tradition at Athens, 
whose adherents will not have welcomed Pericles' prosecution of the war with Sparta. 
77 See Erbse 2010: 486, Breitenbach 1967: 1646, Humble 2002: 80. Xenophon's 
statement at 7.7.57 that the decree at that point had not yet been passed (νὐ γάξ πσ 
ςῆθνο αὐηῷ ἐπῆθην Ἀζήλεζη πεξὶ θπγῆο) rules out the late 400s as a possible date. 
The decree could have been rescinded by the time he was writing the work; Dillery 
thinks it was still in effect in 371 (1995: 94; see also 2007: 61), with a number of writers 
believing it was revoked not long afterwards (cf. New Pauly, 'Xenophon'). This view 
finds support in the facts of Xenophon's sons fighting for Athens in the 360s, and the 
(probable) publication of Hipparkhikos (a work which seeks to aid Athenian military 
efficiency) in that decade. See further Chapter 1.5. 
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typical of him to engage with the decree indirectly, undermining its content with 
substantial contrary evidence.78 
 
It is apt to remark that disdain is a feature of Xenophon's mindset, being one of 
his favoured ways of putting down an individual, or diminishing the importance 
of an event. His disdain can be expressed directly, through a personal attitude 
or the action of a character, or more frequently, indirectly through simple 
omission. For the former case, see for instance Hell. 4.5.6, where Agesilaos 
deliberately ignores the Boiotian embassy;79 an example of omission is the 
author's apparent failure to comment on claims that Derkylidas was of a savage 
temperament (cf. Ephoros, FGrH 70.71). Xenophon's silence here is not only a 
historical judgement but an expression of his own attitude to such charges 
against the Spartan general's character. Notable also is his omission in 
Anabasis of any detail regarding the composition of the barbarian contingent of 
Cyrus's force. This is in contrast with the care he has taken to describe the 
Greeks and their respective contingents. The information which he does provide 
— that they numbered 'one hundred thousand', together with 'about twenty 
scythe-bearing chariots' (1.7.10) — clearly communicates the idea of a 
numberless horde. 
 
While on first consideration the apologetic content of Anabasis promises to 
reveal its audience, the oblique nature of much of the apologia and the rich 
thematic variety of the text complicate this linkage. Moreover, Xenophon can 
target a particular group whilst seeming to address a broader one (see, for 
instance, my reading of An. 1.8.15 in Section 3.1.2 below). This being said, 
while nowhere in the text is it made explicit, there are a number of specific 
instances and representations which collectively enable the assertion to be 
                                            
78 Thomas (2009: xviii) offers an alternative take on Xenophon's attitude to his exile: 'it 
is interesting to note that Xenophon never expresses bitterness about his exile, so 
presumably he accepted that he had done something to deserve it'. Lipka (2002: 4) 
says: 'The banishment left no trace in Xenophon's writings; he remained the Athenian 
who admired Sparta but did not reject Athens.' In general, as noted at Chapter 1.6 
(conclusions), Xenophon is not forthcoming on matters concerned with his personal 
life. 
79 Cf. Thucydides 7.3, where the Athenians ignore the proposal brought by an enemy 
herald on Syracuse and send him back without an answer. 
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made that he is writing to the Athenians, or at least that it is his fellow 
countrymen whom he sees as being, as it were, in the front row.80 
 
3.1. XENOPHON'S AUDIENCE: TO THE ATHENIANS 
 
In substantiating the argument that the core audience for Xenophon's personal 
defence is Athens, my departure point has been to consider, with regard to his 
actions after his departure from the city in May 401, what might have been 
considered prodosia by the citizen body?81 There seems to be two outstanding 
bases for such a charge: 
 
1.) His (brief) association with Cyrus the Younger, and 
2.) His links with Sparta 
 
In Sections 3.2 and 3.3 I show that the text contains substantial evidence for 
apologia on both of these counts respectively. Through his studied 
representation of characters, and of his own relations with them, Xenophon 
convincingly removes grounds for suspicion against himself on these sensitive 
political matters. In the present section evidence which points to his countrymen 
as being his intended audience is highlighted. This section also reveals a further 
element of Xenophon's apologetic agenda — his defence of an institution, the 
                                            
80
 From an analysis of Lak. and Agesilaos, Cuniberti (2009: 2) has argued that 
Xenophon's works were written on two levels for two audiences that are simultaneously 
meant but distinctly managed: Spartans and Greeks. Seeing the condition of exile as a 
major determiner in his writings, he writes: 'In a word, it seems to me that Xenophon 
provides an early symbolic example of the decline of the polis as a close and self-
referential literary background. Obviously I do not mean to say that, until Xenophon's 
time, literary works did not move beyond the polis in which they had been written, but it 
is surely true that the author, especially the Athenian one, when thinking about his own 
reader (listener), had in front of him above all his fellow citizens and that these 
represented the primary reference audience. This is certainly not how it was for 
Xenophon.' Contra Erbse (2010: 486) who writes that the work is 'directed by 
Xenophon to the Athenian reading public'. See further Kelly 1996 who makes a 
distinction between public and private literature, and argues that Xenophon's historical 
writing was intended for the latter, 'small circles that listened to readings and joined in 
discussions' (157). These would be what might be termed upper class gatherings. 
81 Xenophon himself in Hellenika (1.7.20-22) furnishes an indication of the legal 
environment for such charges; the law that may be applicable - 'for sacrilegious people 
and traitors' - states that 'if someone betrays the city and or steals sacred property, he 
is to be judged in court, and if he is found guilty, his property is to be confiscated and 
he is not to be buried in Attica'. It may be that those found guilty in absentia were 
exiled. On Xenophon's exile see Chapter 1.5.2. 
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hippeis, belonging to his social class. Given the probable lateness of publication 
it seems that his aim in this was most likely of a promotional nature, though he 
may have retained a bitterness about the treatment of the horsemen following 
the restoration of the democracy at Athens (cf. for instance, Hell. 3.1.4). In 
defending the horsemen, Xenophon is, of course, also defending himself. 
 
3.1.1. Emphasis on Polis Identity 
 
An. 3.1.4. Formal Introduction. Xenophon begins his formal introduction of his 
character to the story, Ἦλ δέ ηηο ἐλ ηῇ ζηξαηηᾷ Ξελνθῶλ Ἀζελαῖνο (3.1.4). At the 
outset he is emphasising who he is, thereby inviting the interest of his fellow 
countrymen. The call to an Athenian audience is repeated by the author's 
situating of the genesis of his story in Athens, and by his involving in it of one of 
the city's most outstanding figures: ὁ κέληνη Ξελνθῶλ ἀλαγλνὺο ηὴλ ἐπηζηνιὴλ 
ἀλαθνηλνῦηαη Σσθξάηεη ηῷ Ἀζελαίῳ πεξὶ ηῆο πνξείαο (3.1.5).82 A related 
possibility is that Xenophon is calling to mind the trial of Socrates, in that the 
episode deftly defends against the charges that were made against him: 
Xenophon, a young man, shows prudence and forethought in seeking out 
advice, and the advice he receives is conventionally pious (Socrates 
recommends he go to Delphi and take counsel with the god about the 
journey).83 See Chapter 4 for the development of this argument. 
 
5.3.5. Athenian treasury at Delphi. Out of his share of booty won on the march, 
Xenophon informs his readers that he set up a votive offering to Apollo in the 
Athenian sanctuary at Delphi (5.3.5); if he was already an exile at this time (he 
probably visited in 394, in the company of Agesilaos, cf. Hell. 4.3.21), the act 
would have an enhanced significance. 
 
                                            
82 Dillery (1995: 72) comments on the passage: 'The story-teller introduction functions, 
as it does elsewhere in Xenophon, to suggest the fortuitous nature of a moment of 
great historical importance, since the modest, inconspicuous manner of introducing the 
subject has the effect of drawing notice to it' (1995: 72). 
83 Cf. Kyro. 3.1.38-40: it has been suggested that in this story of an Armenian sophist 
who is killed by the king for corrupting his son, Xenophon is making an allusion to the 
death of Socrates and hence addressing the work to an Athenian audience (Gera 
1993: 24). 
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3.1.45, 4.6.16, 6.2.10, 7.2.19, 7.2.31. 'Xenophon of Athens'. In each of the cited 
instances Xenophon is addressed, or referred to, as an Athenian: 3.1.45, by 
Kheirisophos the Spartan; 4.6.16, by Kheirisophos; 6.2.10, by Kallimachos the 
Parrhasian and Lykon the Akhaian; 7.2.19, by Thracian guards; 7.2.31, by 
Seuthes. The inference from this fairly regular pattern is that Xenophon does 
not seek to hide or play down his background, while at the same time, showing 
confidence in his status, he is not over-anxious to press his identity. 
 
6.1.20. Xenophon sees his name esteemed at home. When offered sole 
leadership of the army at Sinope Xenophon writes that he was stirred to take 
the role when he thought how it would 'obtain greater honour for himself in the 
eyes of his friends' and how 'his own name would be greater when it should 
arrive in the city' (kαὶ εἰο ηὴλ πόιηλ ηνὔλνκα κεῖδνλ ἀθίμεζζαη αὑηνῦ, 6.1.20). In 
not actually naming Athens Xenophon indicates how fixed he is in his polis 
identity. 
 
7.7.57. Desire to go home. Once he feels he has no further responsibility to the 
army, Xenophon says that he wants to sail away, ἀπνπιεῖλ (6.2.15; cf. also 
7.1.4, 7.1.8, 7.1.38). His destination, as he makes explicit towards the end, is 
his city: Ξελνθῶλ δὲ νὐ πξνζῄεη, ἀιιὰ θαλεξὸο ἦλ νἴθαδε παξαζθεπαδόκελνο· 
νὐ γάξ πσ ςῆθνο αὐηῷ ἐπῆθην Ἀζήλεζη πεξὶ θπγῆο (7.7.57). Notable also is 
his speech by the Greater Zab River (3.2.8-32), in which he expresses concern 
about the danger to the Greeks of remaining in Asia: 'But I fear that once we 
learned to live lazily and to pass our lives amid abundance, and to consort with 
the tall, beautiful women and maidens of the Medes and Persians, like the lotus 
eaters, we would forget our way home' (3.2.25). Bradley argues that in fact the 
story of Xenophon's nostos is the core plot-line of the story, discernible already 
in Socrates' concern about the implications at Athens of his becoming involved 
with Cyrus.84 
 
                                            
84 Bradley 2001: 78 and 77. 
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3.1.2. Emphasis on Social Identity: A Class Defence 
 
1.8.15. Xenophon rides out to see Cyrus. Prior to his formal introduction to the 
story, Xenophon has made several brief appearances in the narrative. The first 
is in Babylonia, and he is on horseback, riding out from the ranks to consult 
Cyrus before the battle at Kounaxa. At the very first he impresses his identity as 
a hippeus, a member of the Athenian aristocratic class of 'knights'. 
 
In the light of 3.1.4 (Xenophon's formal introduction), it is tempting to read this 
first appearance as a quiet assertion of loyalty to class above city. The form of 
the interjection is subtle enough to avoid alienating the wider citizen body, and 
in any case his implied association is with an Athenian institution. In the episode 
Xenophon is, literally, positioning himself in a commanding role, thus reflecting 
kudos on his native city as well as his social class. He may, further, intend his 
readership to make a connection with Alkibiades. In Thucydides 6.16.1, 
justifying his assertion that he has a better claim to command than others 
(πξνζήθεη κνη κᾶιινλ ἑηέξσλ, ὦ Ἀζελαῖνη, ἄξρεηλ), Alkibiades cites his recent 
success in the chariot race at Olympia: in his speech to the Athenians he 
explicitly associates horsemanship with power and with his own credentials for 
leadership. In making this allusion Xenophon is foreshadowing his own claim to 
lead the army at the Greater Zab River. 
 
3.3.16-20. Formation of cavalry. Following his appointment as one of the army's 
leaders, one of Xenophon's first tactical initiatives is to form a cavalry. An 
Athenian, Lykios, is appointed commander (3.3.20). Through the course of the 
arduous retreat, the cavalry plays a conspicuous part in securing the survival of 
the army. Its capacity to scout and skirmish proves especially beneficial to the 
force.85 The presence and effectiveness of the cavalry grant Athens and her 
hippeis an important role on the retreat, though she has not nearly as many 
men as other poleis represented on the march. 
 
                                            
85 Cf. Xenophon at 7.6.29: 'And after the cavalry unit was attached to us, we never 
even saw an enemy. Until then, our enemies followed confidently after us, and with 
their horsemen and peltasts they prevented us from scattering anywhere in small 
groups to provide provisions in greater abundance'. 
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4.7.22-24. 'The Sea, the Sea!' Just as he has entered the story on horseback at 
a critical juncture, at a later pivotal moment in the march Xenophon features on 
his mount. Responding to the noise from the front of the army, he and Lykios 
and the cavalry gallop forward to assist in what they assume to be a major 
confrontation, only to realise that the shouts herald the end of the arduous 
march down to the sea (ἐδόθεη δὴ κεῖδόλ ηη εἶλαη ηῷ Ξελνθῶληη, θαὶ ἀλαβὰο ἐθ' 
ἵππνλ θαὶ Λύθηνλ θαὶ ηνὺο ἱππέαο ἀλαιαβὼλ παξεβνήζεη· θαὶ ηάρα δὴ ἀθνύνπζη 
βνώλησλ ηῶλ ζηξαηησηῶλ Θάιαηηα ζάιαηηα θαὶ παξεγγπώλησλ, 4.7.24). The 
momentous character of the episode serves to amplify the prominence of the 
hippeis in the narrative, so adding weight to the argument that Xenophon is 
defending the institution in this work. The many militaristic qualities which he, 
rarely off his horse, displays on the retreat — riding skill, valour, initiative, 
daring, cunning — are those that he wishes also to associate with the hippeis.86 
Xenophon's effectiveness and utility on horseback also readily complement his 
treatise on cavalry command (Hipparkhikos), providing practical examples of 
the value of cavalry in military operations. 
 
3.1.3. Promoting Athenian Values: Xenophon the Democrat 
 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, in Anabasis Xenophon's leadership is 
to a significant degree informed by democratic precepts. It was argued that his 
interest in this form of government — a part of a wider interest in the problem of 
how to rule — is in its efficacy as a means of achieving leadership goals; he is 
not evidently concerned with democracy in its literal sense. Nonetheless, 
pursuing his apologetic agenda, he is alive to the importance of not making 
himself appear hostile to the demos. For instance on several occasions he calls 
for proposals to be put to a show of hands, even though these are invariably 
                                            
86 Providing a comparative context, in the earlier narrative Xenophon emphasises the 
prestige of the Persian cavalry, even if their numbers are comparatively small. 1.7.11: 
'The enemy was said to be 1.2 million, with 200 scythe-bearing chariots. There were 
also 6000 horsemen under the command of Artagerses and these were deployed in 
defence of the king himself'; 2.4.6 Klearchos: 'You see, in the event of being driven to 
an engagement, we have no cavalry to help us, but with the enemy it is the reverse — 
not only the most, but the best of his troops are cavalry'. 
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situations where the course he is proposing will certainly be approved.87 On 
other occasions he makes a point of highlighting democratic leanings in himself 
and their simultaneous absence in others; for example, he recommends at 
Kotyora that an assembly be called to discuss a plan to sail back towards 
Trapezus, but Timasion the Dardanian 'expressed the judgment that they 
should not hold an assembly but that each should first try to persuade his 
captains' (5.6.37). In a notable episode in Thrace, Xenophon draws a sharp 
contrast between himself and a pair of Spartan officials (sent to bring the Ten 
Thousand back to Asia).88 The Spartans are seeking to recover the monies 
owed to the mercenaries by the Thracians and, at Xenophon's behest, confront 
a warlord who is aggrieved at the ravaging of villages in his newly acquired 
territory: 
 
'Well,' the Spartans continued, 'we will leave when the men who 
have brought about this state of affairs [won the land] for you 
have been paid. Otherwise, we are going to lend them our 
immediate support and will take vengeance on the oath-
breakers who have wronged them. If you and Seuthes are in 
that group, our quest for justice will start with you.' Xenophon 
said, 'Would you be willing, Medosades, to allow the people in 
whose country we now are to vote, since you say that they are 
your friends, on this question: whether it is fitting that you go 
away from their country or that we do?' He said he would 
not…(7.7.17-18). 
  
3.1.4. Flattery: Wars against the Persians 
 
At the momentous troop assembly the morning after the Greek generals had 
been seized on the banks of the Greater Zab River, accoutred in his finest 
armour, Xenophon delivers a morale-lifting speech in which he singles out 
Athens for its role in previously standing up to the Persians. 'For when the 
Persians and others with them came in a vast expedition in order to annihilate 
                                            
87 3.2.9; 3.2.32; 5.1.7, 8; 5.2.38; 5.7.33, 35; 7.3.3-6. Cf. 5.1.14 'Here they cried out that 
there was no need to go by land. And Xenophon, because he knew their foolishness, 
did not put anything to a vote'. 
88 For Spartan antipathy to democracy see Hell. 2.3.45. 
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Athens, the Athenians dared to stand up to them and were victorious' (ἐιζόλησλ 
κὲλ γὰξ Πεξζῶλ θαὶ ηῶλ ζὺλ αὐηνῖο πακπιεζεῖ ζηόιῳ ὡο ἀθαληνύλησλ ηὰο 
Ἀζήλαο, ὑπνζηῆλαη αὐηνὶ Ἀζελαῖνη ηνικήζαληεο ἐλίθεζαλ αὐηνύο, 3.2.11, trans. 
Ambler, modified). Significantly, he implies that Athens was seen by the 
Persians as the most important of the Greek cities, and he makes no reference 
to Sparta, referring only to the collective Greek effort against Xerxes (see 
3.2.12-14).89 Here again Xenophon plainly has in mind as readers his own 
countrymen. 
 
3.2. ASSOCIATION WITH CYRUS THE YOUNGER 
 
During his time away from Greece, Xenophon established at least two 
relationships with important non-Greeks: the Persian prince, Cyrus the Younger, 
and, as was discussed in Part 2, the Thracian dynast, Seuthes. His involvement 
with the younger Cyrus must always have been a peculiar affair in the eyes of 
his fellow countrymen; he must have sought for an opportunity to justify his 
actions, and there is considerable evidence that he did so in Anabasis. In this 
section I show that Xenophon's defence strategy with regards to Cyrus has 
several interlinking parts. On the most direct level he represents the prince as a 
noble, if not exemplary, figure, one whom it would be fitting for an aspiring kalos 
kagathos to be associated with; at the same time, he limits to an extreme 
degree the contact which he actually has with him. A second defence, executed 
quietly in the course of his introduction to the story, is a declaration that he was 
deceived about the true purpose of Cyrus's expedition: on the one hand this 
reinforces the implied assertion that Xenophon followed Cyrus out of admiration 
for his character, and on the other it seeks to absolve him from charges of 
adventurism and of being involved in an action against the King. A third defence 
is his careful setting up of Tissaphernes as a Greek nemesis — the arch-
barbarian whom the Ten Thousand engage and ultimately outwit. These 
distinctive but complementary points are dealt with in turn below, being 
preceded by brief background descriptions of the relationship between Athens 
and Persia, and the construction of identity at Classical Athens. 
 
                                            
89 That Xenophon here was in morale building mode is apparent from a later 
assessment which he makes of Athenian power at its height: cf. 7.1.27. 
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3.2.1. The Context of Xenophon's Persian Defence 
 
Athens and Persia 
 
In her public persona Athens nurtured a reputation for hostility towards Persia. 
She had supported the Ionians in a revolt against the King in 498 and was 
involved in resistance to Persian expeditions into Greece in the early fifth 
century. The Athenians prided themselves on Marathon (491) and Salamis 
(480), though during the second invasion they had abandoned their city to the 
enemy. This fact, and the stain of violation on the Athenian psyche that resulted 
from the seizure of the Akropolis, doubtless underlies the vehement anti-
Persian rhetoric of subsequent generations. Isokrates' fourth-century speeches 
provide a good illustration of this; in the Panegyrikos, for example, he writes: 
 
Of my own countrymen also I have a similar tale to tell. For 
towards all other peoples with whom they have been at war, 
they forget their past enmities the moment they have concluded 
peace, but toward the Asiatics they feel no gratitude even when 
they receive favours from them; so eternal is the wrath which 
they cherish against the barbarians. Again, our fathers 
condemned many to death for defection to the Medes; in our 
public assemblies even to this day, before any other business is 
transacted, the Athenians call down curses upon any citizen 
who proposes friendly overtures to the Persians; and at the 
celebration of the Mysteries, the Eumolpidae and the Kerykes, 
because of our hatred of the Persians, give solemn warning to 
the other barbarians also, even as to men guilty of murder, that 
they are forever banned from the sacred rites. So ingrained in 
our nature is our hostility to them that even in the matter of our 
stories we linger most fondly over those which tell of the Trojan 
and the Persian Wars, because through them we learn of our 
enemies' misfortunes; and you will find that our warfare against 
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the barbarians has inspired our hymns, while that against the 
Hellenes has brought forth our dirges (157-158).90 
 
Isokrates, a close contemporary of Xenophon's, was influential as both a 
teacher and an orator at Athens. His articulation in this speech — dated to the 
late 380s — of his countrymen's attitude towards Persia doubtless chimed with 
popular sentiment, albeit, courtesy of the King's Peace a few years earlier, it 
probably marks a peak in the enduring climate of hostility. However at the same 
time, existing alongside this popular feeling, amongst the wealthier classes 
there would not have been anything unusual about an association with a 
(aristocratic) foreign figure; as Herman has put it, the ancient world was 'united 
at its highest social level by a web of complex alliances'.91 Proxenos' 
relationship with Cyrus, and Xenophon's with Proxenos, are cases in point.92 
Cyrus, nonetheless, may have been considered an inappropriate 'friend' for an 
Athenian. It was his role in the defeat of Athens by Sparta in the Peloponnesian 
War that concerned Socrates when Xenophon came to consult with him on 
whether or not he should join the prince's expedition. 
 
Identity 
 
The profound impact of the Persian penetration of Athens is manifest in the way 
Athenian culture represents Persians after the event. Before, foreigners tend 
not to be very prominent in the literary and visual records, and the images and 
characterisations depicting them are based on types which, if they are not 
accurate, are not at the same time inherently pejorative. The focus of the 
Athenians' attention at this time is on their own polity and their own past. 
Athenian identity at this time may be characterised as 'aggregative': 'built up on 
the basis of similarities with peers'.93 After the invasions it moves decisively 
towards a 'contrastive', or 'oppositional', paradigm. The Athenian is now 
imagined as the opposite of the barbarian: he is democratic, athletic, war-like, 
frugal, and free. That is, he is not subject to a tyrant, physically flabby, 
                                            
90 Cf. Panegyrikos 150-152 for extremely negative characterisation of Persians. 
91 Herman 1987: 162. 
92 Cf. also Alkibiades' personal connections with both Tissaphernes (Thucydides, 8.47) 
and Pharnabazos (Hell. 1.3.12); see also Hell. 2.1.14, Cyrus and Lysander. 
93 J. Hall 1997: 47. 
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effeminate, decadent, and slavish.94 This polarised conception of ethnicity is 
encapsulated in a scene Xenophon himself paints at Ephesus in Hellenika 
(3.4.16-19). To prepare his army for war with the Persians, Agesilaos has 
forged a 'workshop of war', with the gymnasia full of Greeks exercising and 
competing against one another; in order to instil contempt for the enemy, he has 
some captured barbarians stripped and brought in to be sold at the market. 
'When the soldiers saw the skin of these captives, which was white because 
they never took their clothes off, and when they saw, too, that these men were 
soft and unused to toil because they were accustomed to ride in carriages, they 
concluded that fighting such men would be no more difficult than fighting 
women' (3.4.19). 
 
While Xenophon's portrayal of the 'barbarian' is generally consistent with the 
contrastive model, he is on occasion at pains to nuance his representations, so 
enabling varying degrees of 'barbarism' to be expressed. Thus, for instance, 
barbarians not subject to the king (e.g. the Kardouchoi and the Makrones), and 
therefore free, are less cowardly and can exhibit a certain measure of virtue.95 
Then, on the Greek side of the polarity, there are Persians who behave more 
like Greeks. The satrap Pharnabazos, for instance, adapts himself to Greek 
custom by forsaking his luxurious trappings and sitting on the grass with 
Agesilaos (Hell. 4.1.30); in Anabasis (7.7.48) Seuthes shows himself to be 
honourable by making good on his promise to pay the Cyreans, this in notable 
contrast to Spartan duplicity in this last phase of the retreat: cf. 7.1.7-13; 7.6.13, 
24. And just as a Greek could in truth be falsely assigned a barbarian identity, 
                                            
94 Other reasons have been put forward to explain why the 'barbarian' was recast in 
this starkly negative light: demonising the Persians provided Athens with a justification 
for the creation and continuation of her own empire (J. Hall 2002: 187); Athens had a 
large population of foreign slaves, and their presence both reinforced and was a 
stimulus for arguments supporting the belief that barbarians were inferior (E. Hall 1989: 
2); Persia, whose preferred form of government was tyranny, would not likely be 
tolerant of a democracy - if Athens was to be spared another invasion, it needed to 
convince other poleis that the barbarians were a menace to all (E. Hall 1989: 58). For 
how the Greeks saw themselves and constructed their identity see further E. Hall 1989, 
J. Hall 1997 and 2002, Cartledge 2002, Harrison 2002; for a wider lens on the question 
of identity see Barth 1969. 
95 For this point see Kroeker 2009: 15. We might envisage a linear scale with the 
perfect barbarian at the tip of one end, and the perfect Greek at the other. For elements 
of the 'pure barbarian' type, see for example, Aiskhylos, Persians; Isokrates, Pan. 150, 
181; and Airs, Waters, Places 16. Cf. also the Eurymedon Vase, which depicts an 
Athenian with an erect phallus striding towards a stooped Persian archer. 
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as in the case of Cyrus, so barbarians could bear the outward form of Greeks. 
In Anabasis the figure of Menon the Thessalian is a barbarian in all but name 
(cf. 2.6.21-28), and Apollonides, though he spoke in the Boiotian dialect, is 
discovered through his cowardly nature to be in fact a Lydian (beholding him in 
disgust for his unwillingness to confront the King, Agasias of Stymphalos sees 
that both of his ears are pierced, 'like a Lydian', 3.1.26-31). Possibly 
Xenophon's generally more discerning analysis derives from his social 
background and a resulting heightened affinity with those sharing similar values, 
but it may be too a case of travel broadening the mind.96 
 
3.2.2. Xenophon's relationship with Cyrus the Younger 
 
In his account Xenophon represents Cyrus as a generally virtuous man and a 
charismatic, if limited, leader.97 The obituary which immediately follows Cyrus's 
                                            
96 Instances in Anabasis in which typical barbarian traits are assigned to the Persians 
and their army: 
Slavishness. Cyrus's native troops rarely feature in Xenophon's reports; their 
anonymity communicates their servility, this to be contrasted with the Greek propensity 
for challenging authority where it is perceived to be unjust. Cf. 1.3.1-2, 1.4.12, 5.8.1, 
7.1.12-17. 
Cowardice. Flight of native troops during review at Tyriaion, 1.2.18; the portion of 
Artaxerxes' army facing the Greeks at Kounaxa does not stand their attack, 1.8.19; the 
armies regroup and face off but the barbarians flee again and from yet further away, 
1.10.10-11; Persians harry Greeks but turn and flee when attacked, 3.3.7-10. 
Effeminacy. Cyrus's companions dressed in robes and jewellery, 1.5.8; camp-followers, 
including women, prevent the Persians from sacking all of the Greek camp following 
Kounaxa, 1.10.3, cf. 6.1.13; a barbarian captive bears an axe 'just like those the 
Amazons have', 4.4.16. 
Treachery. Breaking oaths. Ariaios 2.2.8, 2.5.39; Tissaphernes 2.3.26, 2.5.32; 
Tiribazos 4.4.6, 4.4.18. 
97 Cyrus is one of several leaders whom Xenophon focuses on as part of his didaxis on 
military leadership, a major element of the work. In this sphere, as was demonstrated in 
the previous chapter, he is not flawless; as was remarked, Xenophon's Cyrus may not 
be all that different from the picture painted by Plutarch in his Artaxerxes (2-3). Contra 
Almagor 2009: 9, Millender 2009: 7, who both consider that Xenophon portrays Cyrus 
as the ideal leader; Tamiolaki 2009: 4 is closer to the mark when she categorizes him 
as 'an ideal leader [who is] closer to perfect virtue'. 
Cyrus's character: 1.1.6, 1.1.8, 1.2.1, deploys deception; 1.3.20, less than honest (see 
also 3.1.9-10); 1.4.7-8, fairness: two officers desert, but rather than pursuing and 
punishing them, Cyrus lets them go, announcing he will not keep anyone against their 
wishes; 1.4.10, violent: destroys, without apparent reason, the extensive gardens (and 
palace) of the Syrian satrap; 1.5.15-16, diplomatic: diffuses a tense standoff between 
Klearchos and Menon by placing himself between their troops and impressing on them 
the danger of the situation for the army as a whole; 1.6 justice: tries a traitor. Cyrus 
also features in other of Xenophon's works, and in these appearances the variable 
quality of both his leadership and moral worth are emphasised. For instance at Hell. 
1.5.3, he promises Lysander that if he has to, he will break up and sell his own throne 
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death at the end of Book 1, appropriately to its genre, focuses on his personal 
qualities: notable of these are his bravery (1.9.6), loyalty (1.9.9-12), and 
generosity (1.9.22-23), all highly valued attributes for a Greek. With the aim of 
defusing the prejudice of his audience — and without challenging the Athenian 
binary model of identity — Xenophon lays emphasis on Cyrus's likeness to an 
aristocratic Greek. His recasting in this form has already been made almost 
complete by characterisation in the earlier narrative, in particular by several of 
his speeches. For example, prior to the battle in Babylonia, Xenophon has him 
address the Greek generals and captains and extol the superiority of Greeks 
over barbarians: although 'their numbers are great, and they will come on with a 
great shout' [my italics], their threat will be no greater than this (1.7.3-4).98 This 
transformation is evident again in the words Cyrus has used shortly before 
when attempting to impose calm over a potentially disastrous dispute between 
Greeks: 
 
Klearchos and Proxenos and other Greeks who are present, 
you do not know what you are doing; for if you begin a battle 
with each other, believe on this day that I will have been cut to 
pieces, and you not much later than I. For if our affairs go badly, 
all these barbarians whom you see here will become even more 
hostile to us [ἡκῖλ] than are those who are with the King 
(1.5.16). 
 
It is only after he has gone to lengths to establish the prince as a worthy subject 
that Xenophon outlines the circumstances in which he came to join him (3.1.4-
10).99 He tells us that he was invited to do so by Proxenos the Boiotian, a guest-
                                                                                                                                
to finance the Spartan war effort; Oik. 4.20-24, he meets Lysander in his garden, and, 
to the stupefaction of his guest, explains that he has planted all of the trees himself, 
and that when in good health never sits down to dinner 'before working up a sweat 
either by practising some military skill or doing some agricultural work'. Then Hell. 
2.1.8-9 in a chilling contrast has Cyrus execute two cousins for not honouring him in 
the same fashion as they would the king - but the passage may be an interpolation. 
98 Note also in this speech Cyrus's dwelling on the value of freedom. Leaving the 
question of chronology aside, Xenophon may be alluding here to the dictum of 
Isokrates: ηὸ ηῶλ Ἑιιήλσλ ὄλνκα πεπνίεθελ κεθέηη ηνῦ γέλνπο, ἀιιὰ ηῆο δηαλνίαο 
δνθεῖλ εἶλαη, θαὶ κᾶιινλ Ἕιιελαο θαιεῖζζαη ηνὺο ηῆο παηδεύζεσο ηῆο ἡκεηέξαο ἢ ηνὺο 
ηῆο θνηλῆο θύζεσο κεηέρνληαο (Pan. 50). 
99 This apologetic interpretation was suggested by Delebecque (1957: 200); Hirsch 
categorically rejects the notion that Xenophon 'was forced to praise Cyrus in the 
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friend, and a pupil of Gorgias, who believed Cyrus 'to be better for himself than 
his fatherland was' (ὃλ αὐηὸο ἔθε θξείηησ ἑαπηῷ λνκίδεηλ ηῆο παηξίδνο, 
3.1.4).100 Even though Proxenos' credentials must make this an appealing 
proposition (and the preceding narrative has borne out to some degree his high 
assessment of the prince), Xenophon prudently consults Socrates and takes his 
advice by consulting the oracle on the matter (his failure to ask the question he 
has been told to marks him as not yet wise at that point — see further Chapter 
4). With some subtlety and literary skill, Xenophon has thus not only justified his 
decision to join Cyrus, but he has made it seem a commendable course for an 
ambitious young man keen for learning and new experience to take.101 
 
Finally, a related aspect of Xenophon's defence of the relationship is, 
paradoxically, his lack of contact with Cyrus. In the story he has hardly any 
dealings with him, so quite simply there is little basis for intimating a personal 
relationship between the men.102 Xenophon's act of keeping himself off the 
stage almost completely during the period when Cyrus is the chief actor (Book 
1) may be at least in part explained in this apologetic light.103 
 
3.2.3. Defending against the attack on Artaxerxes 
 
In the passage in which he enters the narrative, almost obscured by the 
dramatic circumstances of his introduction, Xenophon writes that he was 
                                                                                                                                
Anabasis in order to defend his own choice to follow Cyrus on his march to Cunaxa' 
(1985: 172), being convinced that the praise is genuine: 'it is clear that he was 
impressed by this brave and rebellious prince' (72). 
100 Danzig (2004: 19) gives off that Proxenos advised Xenophon that Cyrus was 'better 
for him than his fatherland', and concludes that the phrase 'points forward to his 
banishment'. But there is no such ambiguity in the Greek and Xenophon does not set 
up the decision to go as a choice between one future and another. 
101 Cf. Azoulay 2004, who argues that Xenophon's participation in the expedition is 
down to his honouring of his guest-friendship with Proxenos, though even in this case 
his motive has moral content. 
102 Xenophon is introduced to Cyrus by Proxenos upon his arrival in Sardis (3.1.8-9) 
and thereafter their paths cross only once, this as the armies line up on the battlefield 
in Babylonia (1.8.15). But Diogenes Laertios 2.50, whatever his source - it may be 
conjecture, considered that the men were close: θαὶ ὃο γίλεηαη παξὰ Κύξῳ, θαὶ ηνῦ 
Πξνμέλνπ θίινο νὐρ ἧηηνλ ἦλ αὐηῷ. 
103 Erbse (2010: 489) adds that he continues to be a 'scarcely involved spectator' under 
the command of Klearchos (Book 2), this underlining the claim that he had been 
ignorant of the expedition's purpose. So too Tsagalis 2009: 451-452. 
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deceived (ἐμαπαηεζείο) about the object of the expedition (3.1.9-10).104 This 
explicitly apologetic claim seems to be curious in that, as Socrates has 
indicated, the potential problem for Xenophon at Athens lies in the fact of his 
merely associating with Cyrus. The most plausible explanation would be that it 
is a response to a charge that he joined in an expedition against the Great King. 
This presupposes a favourable relationship between Athens and Artaxerxes, 
and there is nothing implausible in this from at least the outbreak of the 
Corinthian War in 394.105 I suggest here that Xenophon has two further aims in 
making this seemingly innocuous but in fact highly significant statement. 
 
He is in the first place drawing attention to his own — and his similarly youthful 
guest-friend's — naivety, both in their believing in the unassailable virtue of 
Cyrus and in their lack of geopolitical nous. The scale of the force, and Cyrus's 
ambition as was manifested in his support for Sparta in the Peloponnesian War, 
were not unknown to them, but unlike the experienced satrap Tissaphernes 
they did not see that the expedition's declared purpose was suspect.106 The 
same general point is made by Xenophon's overlooking Socrates' advice and 
his posing a leading question to the oracle at Delphi (3.1.5-6). As I argue in the 
next chapter, the rapid maturing of his character through the expedition is part 
of the text's Socratic defence. 
 
Xenophon's second and more pressing aim with this statement is to exonerate 
himself from involvement in an unjust conspiracy, one, moreover, whose target 
his city at subsequent junctures was on working terms with. For the fact is that 
Cyrus seems to have had no just cause to make an attempt on the Persian 
                                            
104 ἐιέγεην δὲ ὁ ζηόινο εἶλαη εἰο Πηζίδαο. ἐζηξαηεύεην κὲλ δὴ νὕησο ἐμαπαηεζείο – νὐρ 
ὑπὸ Πξνμέλνπ· νὐ γὰξ ᾔδεη ηὴλ ἐπὶ βαζηιέα ὁξκὴλ νὐδὲ ἄιινο νὐδεὶο ηῶλ Ἑιιήλσλ 
πιὴλ Κιεάξρνπ (3.1.9-10). Plutarch writes that Klearchos was ordered by Sparta 'to 
give Cyrus every assistance' (Artaxerxes 6.3). Spartan involvement in the expedition is 
later confirmed by Xenophon: cf. 1.2.21, 1.4.3. 
105 In 395 the King's man, Tithraustes, channelled money to influential groups in the 
mainland cities for the purpose of warring on Sparta; Xenophon writes that, 'the 
Athenians would not accept the money, but they were nevertheless eager to wage war 
against Sparta, thinking that they would again acquire an empire' (Hell. 3.5.2). 
Pausanias later (5.6.5) writes that one of the reasons the Athenians were upset with 
Xenophon for joining Cyrus was that their relations with Artaxerxes were positive 
(εὔλνπο). On this passage see Rahn 1981: 117 and Tuplin 1987: 66. 
106 Τηζζαθέξλεο δὲ θαηαλνήζαο ηαῦηα, θαὶ κείδνλα ἡγεζάκελνο εἶλαη ἢ ὡο ἐπὶ Πηζίδαο 
ηὴλ παξαζθεπήλ, πνξεύεηαη ὡο βαζηιέα ᾗ ἐδύλαην ηάρηζηα ἱππέαο ἔρσλ ὡο 
πεληαθνζίνπο, 1.2.4. 
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throne, being driven only by his own ambition. This is the judgement of Plutarch 
(cf. Artaxerxes 3.5, 6.3), and notably Xenophon does not seek to provide a 
political or moral justification for the rebellion. Having offered a brief summary of 
the court turmoil that attended the death of the father — Cyrus is implicated in a 
plot, but at the behest of his mother is allowed back to his satrapy — he writes 
that the young prince, 'having been in danger and dishonoured, [Cyrus] began 
planning how he would avoid being subject to his brother ever again but rather, 
if he were able, would rule as King instead of him' (ὁ δ' ὡο ἀπῆιζε θηλδπλεύζαο 
θαὶ ἀηηκαζζείο, βνπιεύεηαη ὅπσο κήπνηε ἔηη ἔζηαη ἐπὶ ηῷ ἀδειθῷ, ἀιιά, ἢλ 
δύλεηαη, βαζηιεύζεη ἀλη' ἐθείλνπ, 1.1.4). Xenophon adds that in this aim he was 
supported by his mother, whose grounds were that, 'she loved him more than 
the ruling king, Artaxerxes' (Παξύζαηηο κὲλ δὴ ἡ κήηεξ ὑπῆξρε ηῷ Κύξῳ, 
θηινῦζα αὐηὸλ κᾶιινλ ἢ ηὸλ βαζηιεύνληα Ἀξηαμέξμελ, 1.1.4). From these 
opening paragraphs we are given to know that Artaxerxes, an older son of the 
King, was appointed as the successor (cf. Plutarch, Artaxerxes 2.3). In light of 
these circumstances, laid out at the very start of the book, it is vital for 
Xenophon as a follower of Socrates to make it explicit that he never intended to 
be part of an adventure whose motive was typically 'barbarian'. 
 
3.2.4. Tissaphernes: 'Xenophon's Wicked Persian' 
 
Another element of Xenophon's defence of his association with Cyrus revolves 
around the satrap, Tissaphernes. Well-known in the Greek world for his having 
played both sides against one another in the Peloponnesian War, with his 
subsequent role in Ionia his reputation as an enemy of Greece became 
cemented. As demonstrated in this section, in Anabasis Xenophon plays on this 
reception and sets him up as a common enemy of both Cyrus and the 
Greeks.107 
 
Tissaphernes is introduced at the very beginning of the story accompanying 
Cyrus to the Persian court (c. 405); but although he has gone up-country with 
                                            
107 Xenophon's antipathy towards Tissaphernes is carried across his oeuvre, 
suggesting a general usage for him as a Greek nemesis. Cf. Ages. 1.11 = Hell. 3.4.6 
('Tissaphernes broke all his promises immediately'); Ages. 1.15, 29, Tissaphernes as a 
poor tactician. 
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the prince, ὡο θίινλ (1.1.2), he proceeds to slander him to the new king: 
Τηζζαθέξλεο δηαβάιιεη ηὸλ Κῦξνλ πξὸο ηὸλ ἀδειθὸλ ὡο ἐπηβνπιεύνη αὐηῷ 
(1.1.3). On the subsequent return of the two men to Asia Minor, in the face of a 
revolt of his cities to Cyrus, Tissaphernes secured himself at Miletos and from 
this base began to plot to take back the Ionian cities (1.1.6-7). He is thereafter 
named by Xenophon as the informer of Cyrus's plot to the King (1.2.4), so 
consolidating the audience's empathy for Cyrus as another victim of his 
treachery. After the prince has been killed, Tissaphernes successfully pretends 
to be a friend of the Greeks, but reveals his intentions when he lures several of 
their generals into a deadly trap and then harries the army into the hostile 
Kardouchian hills. Upon his return to Asia Minor, he again proceeds to menace 
the Greek cities on the coast (Hell. 3.1.3).108 
 
In the devious picture he paints of Tissaphernes, Xenophon invokes the 
stereotype of the barbarian and by the same token accentuates the anomalous 
nature of his Cyrus's character.109 By assigning this bête noire a central role in 
his account, he furthermore imparts a nobility to the struggle of the Ten 
Thousand, an aspect which is reinforced in the very last line of the work when 
we are told that they are co-opted into a Spartan-led campaign against the 
barbarian. Ἐλ ηνύηῳ Θίβξσλ παξαγελόκελνο παξέιαβε ηὸ ζηξάηεπκα θαὶ 
ζπκκείμαο ηῷ ἄιιῳ Ἑιιεληθῷ ἐπνιέκεη πξὸο Τηζζαθέξλελ θαὶ Φαξλάβαδνλ 
(7.8.24).110 
 
In his narrative Xenophon links Tissaphernes closely to the King: Tissaphernes 
is the one who warns him of Cyrus's plot (1.2.4); he is selected to face the 
Greek contingent at Kounaxa (1.8.9; cf. 1.10.7, 2.3.19); in the aftermath of the 
battle, reporting the arrival of heralds to demand the Greek surrender, 
Xenophon says that they 'arrived from the King and Tissaphernes' (2.1.7); when 
                                            
108 Commenting on Hell. 3.1.3-4, Dillery (1995: 102) writes: 'This passage makes 
Tissaphernes, not Artaxerxes, the instigator of the attempt to subject the Ionian cities. 
This makes Tissaphernes, the villain of the Anabasis, the chief antagonist in the Ionian 
War.' 
109 On Xenophon's portrayal of Tissaphernes see Cawkwell 1972, Hirsch 1985, and 
Danzig 2007 ('Xenophon's wicked Persian'). Hirsch (1985: 26) writes that Xenophon 
has created 'a portrait of the Persian satrap that verges on the diabolic'. 
110 The epilogue, which follows this, 7.8.25-26, is considered by many editors to be an 
interpolation. 
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he comes to negotiate with the Greeks, Tissaphernes is acting for the King 
(2.3.20); Tissaphernes receives the King's daughter as his wife (2.4.8); 
Xenophon opens his midnight address by the Greater Zab River to the Greek 
generals and captains saying, 'Now we all know, of course, that the King and 
Tissaphernes have seized those of us they had the power to seize; and as for 
the rest of us, it is clear that they are plotting how they may destroy us, if their 
power permits' (3.1.35); addressing an assembly of the soldiers the next 
morning, Kleanor the Orchomenian says, 'But you see men, the King's perjury 
and his impiety. And you see Tissaphernes' infidelity' (3.2.4). By his meticulous 
binding together of these two figures, Xenophon manages to represent 
Artaxerxes himself as a paragon of perfidy. Cyrus's attempt may not, therefore, 
be as unjust and self-serving as it first appeared to be.111 
 
Xenophon's depiction of Tissaphernes offers, incidentally, a good instance of 
paradigmatic history exposed by historical reality. While the satrap may go up-
country with Cyrus 'as a friend', his first responsibility is to the King, to whom he 
shows loyalty in revealing the information he has on Cyrus's plot against him. 
He furthermore, and notwithstanding the contradictory statement in Agesilaos, 
shows strategic competence at Kounaxa, and bravery (1.10.7), and he displays 
exemplary leadership skill in his disposal of the Greek high command and 
subsequent shunting of the army into the hills of the Kardouchoi (cf. Hipp. 5.9: 
'there is nothing more profitable in war than deception'). This is to be set in the 
wider picture of his considerable influence in the eastern Mediterranean over 
many years. Indeed perhaps no other figure in the late fifth century exerted as 
much influence on the politics of the region as Tissaphernes. Notably, his policy 
of setting Greeks against one another prolonged the war between Athens and 
Sparta and consequently enabled Persia more easily to retain its control over 
Ionia.112 
 
                                            
111 Hirsch (1985: 23) thinks that Xenophon is hostile towards Tissaphernes and the 
King 'probably because they were the paramount enemies of Cyrus, for whom he has 
so much esteem'; in describing Tissaphernes as a 'personal enemy' of Xenophon's, 
neither does Stronk (2009: 9) seem to see through to his apologetic purpose. 
112 Thucydides attributes Tissaphernes' policy of allowing the Hellenes to wear each 
other out to Alkibiades (8.45-46). But this depriving of Tissaphernes of strategic nous 
may be Hellenocentrism. 
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3.3. SPARTA 
 
Xenophon served with Spartan officers in the retreat of the Ten Thousand, and 
he subsequently led the remnants of the Cyreans in the Spartan campaign 
against Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos.113 He remained in their service until his 
return to Greece with Agesilaos in 394, after which he settled on an estate in 
the Peloponnese (see above Chapter 1.5.3). A tradition has it that his sons 
were educated in Sparta (Plutarch, Agesilaos 20; Diogenes Laertios 2.54). 
 
Xenophon's close association with Sparta may have been the cause of his exile 
from Athens. Rivalry between the states was unremitting, with their contrasting 
political systems being a constant point of tension. For the re-established 
Athenian democracy, Xenophon's Socratic links, and links to the hippeis, 
already rendered him something of an enemy within; his high-level ties with the 
Spartans in Asia would seem to have made a return to the city problematic. So 
as an Athenian the matter of his relationship with the Peloponnesian polis is one 
which he must have sought to address, whether or not it was in fact the cause 
of the exile decree.114 Being the beginning of his relationship with the Spartans, 
the retreat of the Ten Thousand was an apt place to focus his defence. 
 
In the previous chapter it was shown how, in his account, Xenophon is subtly 
critical of Spartan commanders on the retreat; his depiction could well, indeed, 
be read as commentary on Sparta's hegemony in the Greek world. This critique 
must have been intended for a broad Hellenic audience, including the Spartans 
themselves, and certainly his fellow Athenians. However, because of its 
deliberately understated presentation it may not of itself have been sufficient to 
convince the latter that Xenophon was not an adopted Spartan, just as a 
patriotic Spartan reader would not necessarily be readily put out by the portrayal 
of his fellow countrymen.115 In this section I argue that Xenophon additionally 
deploys two particular techniques in order to distance himself firmly from Sparta 
                                            
113 When, at Hell. 3.2.7, Xenophon writes of 'the leader of the men who had fought with 
Cyrus', it is considered that he is referring to himself. 
114 Among those who consider that it was are Lesky (1963: 664), Breitenbach (1967: 
1575), and Badian (2004: 42). Tuplin (1987: 68) and Dillery (1998: 4-5) think it was one 
of the reasons. 
115 Thomas (2009: li) writes of his stance in Hellenika: 'His criticisms of Spartans are 
those of an insider, the kind that the Spartans themselves would make of their fellows'. 
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on the retreat. Both of these devices — the establishment of agon and apistia 
respectively between the sides — depend for their effectiveness on his own 
identity as an Athenian. 
 
3.3.1. Nature of relationship (1): Agon 
 
Throughout his narrative Xenophon represents his relations with Spartan 
officials as rarely more than functional. The exception which underlines this is 
his establishment of guest-friendship with Kleander, the harmost of Byzantium, 
who is portrayed as showing wise judgment in the case of charges made 
against two of the Cyreans, and in seeing through accusations that had been 
made against Xenophon (6.6.25-35). Nonetheless, there are times at which 
Xenophon does seem to be bolstering Spartan power, and it is evident that he 
seeks to counter this impression. For example, after the army has crossed to 
Byzantium, and, having been deceived by Anaxibios, storms the city, he 
succeeds in calming the men and returning control to the Spartans (7.1.11-32): 
Xenophon confronts the risk of being accused of pro-Spartanism in this case by 
arguing in his speech that he is acting in the interests of the men. But he has 
furthermore, since his own rise to the high command, created a division 
between himself and Sparta by sustaining a real measure of tension in the 
relationship. One of the ways in which he achieves this is through his bringing 
out a competitive spirit between himself and Kheirisophos, the leading Spartan. 
 
Xenophon's first encounter with Kheirisophos and Spartan power comes late, 
after he has delivered his speech to the remaining Greek commanders by the 
Greater Zab River. The response of Kheirisophos, who joined Cyrus at Issos 
with seven hundred hoplites (1.4.3), pointedly reveals no prior interaction, and 
in this way addresses any suspicion that Xenophon may have left Athens to join 
up with Sparta: 
 
After [Xenophon's speech] Kheirisophos said, 'Previously, 
Xenophon, I knew you only so far as to have heard you were an 
Athenian, but now I praise you for what you are saying and 
doing, and I would wish that as many as possible be of this 
same sort, for the good would be shared in common' (3.1.45). 
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An equally important function of this response is to bring into relief a view that 
Spartans regard their northern neighbours as neither distinguished in words nor 
action; Xenophon goes on to develop a palpable undertone of tension in his 
dealings with the Spartans, playing on the traditional rivalry between the two 
states. On a formal level this is symbolised by the respective roles of the two 
men on the retreat: Xenophon is a commander at the rear, while Kheirisophos 
leads, as Sparta does in the Greek world.116 Right from the beginning this 
leadership is subjected to scrutiny by Xenophon, who invariably sees through to 
a more effective way of achieving an objective: see for instance 3.4.41, 3.5.3-6, 
4.1.15-25, 4.3.27-28, 4.7.2-7.117 According to Xenophon, only on one occasion 
do the men fall out — over the mistreatment of a guide by Kheirisophos (4.6.2-
3) — but given the number of times they have locked horns up until that point, 
this declaration must be regarded either as ironic, or as an outward show of 
contrived magnanimity. (The former reading is possibly supported by an 
evidently ironic set-piece involving the two men which takes place shortly after 
the incident with the guide: see 4.6.14-16, and cf. Lak. 2.7.) 
 
3.3.2. Nature of relationship (2): Apistia 
 
A second important element in Xenophon's representation of his relationship 
with Sparta is the presence of apistia, mistrust. In bringing this out he 
undermines any charges of prodosia or laconism, and simultaneously enhances 
the dramatic tension of his narrative. The tension between himself and the 
Spartans, moreover, is aggregative, so that we come to expect an eventual 
breakdown in the relationship. A selection of passages, beginning from the 
positive appraisal of Kheirisophos at 3.1.45 above, charts the progress of the 
decline. 
 
3.4.37-39. As they march north following the events by the Greater Zab River, 
Kheirisophos summons Xenophon and orders him to bring the peltasts to the 
front. Xenophon rides forward from the rear but does not bring the peltasts, for 
he has seen Tissaphernes come into view with his army. 
                                            
116 Sparta as first among the Greek states: 6.6.9, 12; Hell. 3.1.3, 5. 
117 Calvino (1999: 20) writes: 'there are often two protagonists in each episode: the two 
rival officers, Xenophon and Kheirisophos, the Athenian and the Spartan, and 
Xenophon's solution is always the more astute, generous and decisive one.' 
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The Spartan does not inform Xenophon why he wants the light-armed troops at 
the front, though the reader knows that his order does have a tactical rationale 
as a ridge by which the army must cross has been taken by the Persians 
(3.4.37-38). Xenophon, too, has cause to justify his decision given that he has 
seen Tissaphernes and his whole army approaching (ἐπηθαηλόκελνλ γὰξ ἑώξα 
Τηζζαθέξλελ θαὶ ηὸ ζηξάηεπκα πᾶλ, 3.4.39). In the ensuing exchange between 
the two men, each questions the action of the other, revealing an underlying 
mistrust between them. The use of direct speech dramatises the hupopsia. 
'Why do you call?' (Τί θαιεῖο;) Xenophon asks. Kheirisophos gives his reason in 
brief, and then asks in his turn: 'But why did you not bring the peltasts?' (ἀιιὰ ηί 
νὐθ ἦγεο ηνὺο πειηαζηάο; 3.4.39). 
 
4.1.15-21. The army comes under severe attack in the Kardouchian hills. On 
one occasion, instead of slowing the march to keep touch with the rear, 
Kheirisophos presses ahead and as a result Xenophon's men were forced into 
flight; we are additionally informed that two brave men were killed (δύν θαιώ ηε 
θαὶ ἀγαζὼ ἄλδξε ηέζλαηνλ, 4.1.19). 
 
When confronted by Xenophon, Kheirisophos provides an explanation for his 
decision to keep marching: their road led up to a narrow pass and he sought to 
seize this before the enemy. 'It is for this I was hurrying, and I did not wait for 
you on account of this, that I might somehow be able to take the pass before 
they did. The guides we have deny there is any other road' (4.1.21). The 
explanation is reasonable (even though it turns out that there is another pass), 
but Xenophon had, evidently, assumed that they were abandoned without just 
cause and his description of his own reaction reveals a marked distrust of the 
Spartan: 'When they arrived at a stopping place, Xenophon went directly to 
Kheirisophos just as he was and began to blame him for not waiting, and for 
compelling them to fight at the same time they were trying to flee' (ἐπεὶ δὲ 
ἀθίθνλην ἐπὶ ζηαζκόλ, εὐζὺο ὥζπεξ εἶρελ ὁ Ξελνθῶλ ἐιζὼλ πξὸο ηὸλ 
Χεηξίζνθνλ ᾐηηᾶην αὐηὸλ ὅηη νὐρ ὑπέκελελ, ἀιι' ἠλαγθάδνλην θεύγνληεο ἅκα 
κάρεζζαη, 4.1.19).118 
                                            
118 We might take Xenophon's subsequent comment that the front and rear 'took 
vigorous care of one another' to be ironic (θαὶ ἰζρπξῶο ἀιιήισλ ἐπεκέινλην, 4.2.27). 
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4.2.13-17. In the course of heavy combat with the Kardouchoi, fearing that a 
height just taken would be lost as they progressed up to another, Xenophon 
orders men to hold it while he and the rest press forward. He assigns its 
defence to three captains, and the first two of whom he names are Athenian. In 
light of the critical importance of the task, these appointments can be read as 
significant. The trust he has placed in his fellow countrymen is subsequently 
implied to have been fully warranted when the third captain, an Argive exile, fled 
(πεθεπγὼο) back to the main party reporting the hill retaken and the two 
Athenians killed (4.2.17). 
 
4.6.17-19. Xenophon offers to lead the rearguard in a night operation to take an 
occupied height. He is confident that the enemy will give way once his men 
have climbed onto any part of the ridge. 
 
Kheirisophos, who had encouraged Xenophon to take on the task (4.6.16), now 
changes his mind. 'And why do you need to go and leave your defence of the 
rear? But send others, unless some volunteers show themselves now' (4.6.19). 
Xenophon offers no indication as to what was behind Kheirisophos' change of 
mind, but it is readily understandable in the context of the prevailing atmosphere 
of mistrust, Kheirisophos being concerned that success by Xenophon would 
strengthen his standing among the men. 
 
6.1.16-32. Kheirisophos left the army at Trapezus in order to secure ships to 
take the men home (5.1.3-4). His failure to return prompted them to continue 
their journey by land. They are about half-way to Byzantium when he rejoins 
them, having with him a single vessel, and nothing for the soldiers except a 
promise that Anaxibios, the Spartan admiral, would have pay for them once 
they had left the Euxine. 
 
It becomes apparent from the events which follow that Kheirisophos' return has 
less to do with assisting the army than ensuring that they evacuate the Black 
Sea area; it is apparent also that he has been tasked with keeping a check on 
Xenophon, who is evidently now viewed by Sparta as a threat to her interests in 
the region. In a brief speech which he gives to the army following his election as 
its leader, complementing the men on withdrawing their offer of the same to 
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Xenophon (below), Kheirisophos informs them that 'Dexippos [a Spartan officer] 
said he believed Xenophon would be more willing to share rule over the army of 
Klearchos with Timasion, a Dardanian, than with himself, a Lakonian' (6.1.32; 
cf. 6.6.34). Spartan suspicions seem to be not without grounds, for shortly after 
Kheirisophos had arrived from Byzantium, the men, 'now that they seemed to 
be near to Greece' (6.1.17), decided to choose a single ruler (so as to make 
their plans for the securing of booty more effective), but in spite of the presence 
of Kheirisophos, they chose Xenophon: 'The captains approached him and said 
the army was of this judgement, and each showed his goodwill and tried to 
persuade him to undertake the rule' (6.1.19). 
 
Pre-empting his election by the assembly, Xenophon told the men that it would 
not be in their interests to choose him over a Spartan, and that the role, if he 
should seem 'to be undermining the authority of their [the Spartan] position', 
could lead to a bad end for himself (εἰ νὖλ ηαῦηα ὁξῶλ ἐγὼ δνθνίελ ὅπνπ 
δπλαίκελ ἐληαῦζ' ἄθπξνλ πνηεῖλ ηὸ ἐθείλσλ ἀμίσκα, ἐθεῖλν ἐλλνῶ κὴ ιίαλ ἂλ 
ηαρὺ ζσθξνληζζείελ, 6.1.28). To undercut any presumption that personal 
factors lie behind the animosity (his earlier statement that he only fell out once 
with Kheirisophos may also have had this aim), he specifically links Spartan 
distrust of him to the fact of his being an Athenian. 'For I see that the Spartans 
did not cease making war on my fatherland until they made the entire city agree 
that they were their leaders' (ὁξῶ γὰξ ὅηη θαὶ ηῇ παηξίδη κνπ νὐ πξόζζελ 
ἐπαύζαλην πνιεκνῦληεο πξὶλ ἐπνίεζαλ πᾶζαλ ηὴλ πόιηλ ὁκνινγεῖλ 
Λαθεδαηκνλίνπο θαὶ αὐηῶλ ἡγεκόλαο εἶλαη, 6.1.27). 
 
7.1. Byzantium. Once the Cyreans have left Asia the Spartans become hostile 
towards them, regarding the mercenary body as a threat to stability in its sphere 
of control. Xenophon is now under open suspicion for the influence he wields, 
though by his own account his only desire is to sail away (7.1.8). Ironically, it is 
he who saves Byzantium from being sacked, convincing the Cyreans — who 
have burst back into the city having been locked out by Anaxibios — that it is in 
their own best interests to leave (7.1.24-31). In spite of this, when he 
subsequently requests permission to re-enter the city so that he can sail away, 
he is informed that Anaxibios has serious reservations about letting him in, for 'it 
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was not suitable for the soldiers to be near the wall, with Xenophon on the 
inside' (ιέγεηλ γὰξ Ἀλαμίβηνλ ὅηη νὐθ ἐπηηήδεηνλ εἴε ηνὺο κὲλ ζηξαηηώηαο πιεζίνλ 
εἶλαη ηνῦ ηείρνπο, Ξελνθῶληα δὲ ἔλδνλ, 7.1.39). 
 
7.2. Treachery in Thrace. A change of officials at Byzantium, and the influence 
of Pharnabazos, leads to individual Spartans competing against one another. 
Xenophon, sailing away with Anaxibios, is ordered by the latter to return to 
Thrace and bring the Cyreans over to Asia; but Aristarchos, the new harmost, 
'having been persuaded by Pharnabazos' (7.2.12), sails to Perinthos to prevent 
the crossing. In a terse exchange with Xenophon, he tells him: 'Anaxibios is no 
longer admiral; I am the harmost here. If I catch any of you on the sea, I will sink 
you' (7.2.13). The next day he sends for the generals and captains of the army, 
but Xenophon is advised that if he goes with them, 'he would be seized, and he 
would either suffer something on the spot or be turned over to Pharnabazos' 
(ἤδε δὲ ὄλησλ πξὸο ηῷ ηείρεη ἐμαγγέιιεη ηηο ηῷ Ξελνθῶληη ὅηη εἰ εἴζεηζη, 
ζπιιεθζήζεηαη θαὶ ἢ αὐηνῦ ηη πείζεηαη ἢ θαὶ Φαξλαβάδῳ παξαδνζήζεηαη, 
7.2.14). So Xenophon seeks out Seuthes, the Thracian dynast, secures an 
agreement for employing the men, and takes them into his service. 
 
Spartan manoeuvrings around the Propontis as Xenophon portrays them, 
notably of individuals pursuing their own interest above that of the state, justify 
his decision to lead the Cyreans into barbarian service and provide a final, 
garlanded proof that he has been justified in his ongoing mistrust of Spartan 
rule. His decision to go to Seuthes marks the inevitable break in the 
relationship, although (owing to uncertainty of direction and disunity amongst 
the Spartans) it does not prove fatal for either him or the men. 
 
3.3.3. Xenophon in Spartan Service: the Exile Question, Again 
 
Given the level of mutual distrust between Xenophon and Sparta, Spartan 
mistreatment of the Cyreans, and Xenophon's leading of the mercenaries into 
service with Seuthes, a reconciliation between the sides in the winter of 399 
must have seemed implausible. However, at the behest of the cities on the 
coast, Sparta had decided to launch a campaign against Tissaphernes in Asia 
Minor (Hell. 3.1.3-4, Diodoros 14.35) and Xenophon and the mercenaries had a 
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new use. Thibron sent for them, promising the soldiers a daric per month and 
more for the captains and generals (7.6.1). 
 
Xenophon, consistent with his declared aim at Khrysopolis (7.1.4), does not 
take up this offer but rather prepares to leave for home. 'Xenophon did not go 
near [a sale of booty] but was openly preparing to head homeward, for the vote 
for his exile had not yet been passed against him at Athens' (7.7.57). Some of 
those influential around him (νἱ ἐπηηήδεηνη) plead with him at least to lead the 
army to Thibron; pointedly, he does not say whether or not he agrees to this, 
but he does cross into Asia with the army (7.8.1).119 Depending on the time of 
year, it is probable that he could have sailed from the Hellespont to Athens via 
the north Aegean islands, although this option seems to be ruled out by his 
desperate financial situation at that point (cf. 7.3.20, 7.8.2).120 Perhaps it is not 
unreasonable to conjecture that, in order to perform a last service to the men 
and at the same time take any opportunity that might arise for plunder, he 
decided his best way home was to take the army down the coast and to depart 
from Ephesus, where he had arrived two years previously. 
 
Yet in spite of his statement that he was preparing to go home, and his 
problematic relationship with Sparta, we know that Xenophon does not then 
return home but serves under a succession of Spartan commanders in Asia 
Minor (Thibron, Derkylidas, Herripidas) until his return to Greece in 394 with 
Agesilaos.121 Adding to the aporia surrounding his presence we know further 
that he held Thibron in low regard, and also that by enriching himself at 
Pergamum on the journey through Aeolia (7.8.23), he had no pressing 
pecuniary motive for service.122 
 
Two possible explanations for this outcome suggest themselves. The first is that 
Xenophon believed that the war had the potential to liberate the Greek cities of 
                                            
119 Xenophon has assumed leadership of the army in Thrace, see 7.2.9, 7.3.7; cf. 
Diodoros 14.37.1. 
120 For sailing conditions in the Mediterranean see Tammuz 2005, Brennan 2008. 
121 Grote (1865: 565) thinks that Xenophon travelled to Athens after the death of 
Socrates, and then back to Asia Minor to continue service with Sparta, but this scenario 
has no modern support. 
122 Thibron was condemned for 'allowing his troops to plunder their friends' and exiled, 
Hell. 3.1.8; cf. Hell. 3.1.10, 3.2.1, 3.2.7. 
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the coast, and at the same time deal a fatal blow to Tissaphernes, whom he has 
cast in his writings as an archenemy of Greece; persuaded as to the campaign's 
importance for Greece, he abandons his own plan in order to serve the greater 
community.123 This act of selflessness would round off nicely the image he has 
projected of himself as a model pupil of Socrates. 
 
The second explanation, which, on balance, I find more concrete and 
persuasive, is that during the period between his departure from European 
Thrace and arrival in Ionia, the decree of exile against him at Athens was 
passed.124 The matter of his exile has been discussed earlier in the dissertation 
(Chapter 1.5.2), and I now suggest that, taken in the apologetic context 
described in this chapter, the case for the 399 date argued for is 
strengthened.125 By definition the decree was public knowledge, so Xenophon 
had no need to inform his (Athenian) audience that it was at this time it was 
passed (though the νὐ πσ serves this purpose), and as argued, he will not at all 
have been inclined to provide publicity for the event. Outcast from his own 
country, he now has little alternative other than to put himself to use in the 
campaign against Persia.126 
 
                                            
123 Cuniberti (2009: 10) points to the Asian campaign as having the potential to realise 
'a positive hegemonic function for Sparta'; perhaps as well Xenophon saw this potential 
and sought to encourage it. 
124
 Erbse (2010: 492-493) considers that 'such an interpretation is certainly suggested 
by the words used and presumably the author counted on it that the Athenian reader 
would understand him'. 
125 Xenophon's statement, as he is readying to leave Thrace, that the decree against 
him had 'not yet' been passed (νὐ γάξ πσ ςῆθνο αὐηῷ ἐπῆθην Ἀζήλεζη πεξὶ θπγῆο, 
7.7.57) does seem to carry a temporal quality, and a number of scholars have 
interpreted it as an indication that the decree was then imminent (Erbse 2010: 483, 
Bradley 2001: 80, Higgins 1977: 23, Anderson 1974: 148; see Woodhead 1981: 39 for 
the process of how decrees were voted on and passed). Tuplin (1987: 60), however, 
does not think the term carries this meaning: 'Xenophon is merely giving an incidental 
explanation (for the benefit of readers who know him as ''the Athenian exile'') of how he 
could even think of going home'. So Rood 2006: 58, and see also Rahn 1981: 118. 
126 Bradley (2001: 82-83) argues that the narrative is so designed as to bring the reader 
to the point that he is led to construct for himself the existence of the exile decree as an 
obstacle to Xenophon's nostos. I do not think, however, that Xenophon wished to afford 
the decree such prominence in the minds of his readers, but rather his overriding aim 
was to emphasise his qualities as a citizen and in this way undermine all and any 
charges against him. Moreover, there is the awkward fact for this thesis that surely 
some, if not all given the time lapse between event and publication, of Xenophon's 
readers would have known that he had been exiled at this time and so was prevented 
from returning home. 
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Conclusions 
 
This section has shown that a paramount aim of Xenophon's apologetic agenda 
was to address the questions of his relationships with Cyrus the Younger and 
Sparta respectively. His association with Cyrus — who was instrumental in 
bringing about Athens' defeat in the long and costly struggle against Sparta — 
further compromised him in the eyes of the demos (already suspicious of his 
connection with Socrates and the Thirty), as did his subsequent and 
longstanding links with the Lakedaimonians. Either one or a combination of 
these two factors was very likely the cause of his banishment from the city in 
the 390s, and in any case they are conspicuously hanging threads which, 
unless we disregard the evidence in his corpus for his concern for Athens (for 
instance in Poroi, and Hipparkhikos), he will have wanted to tie up. 
 
In terms of the decree itself, I consider that the formal charge against him was 
the outcome Socrates had feared at 3.1.5: association with Cyrus (ὁ Σσθξάηεο 
ὑπνπηεύζαο κή ηη πξὸο ηῆο πόιεσο ὑπαίηηνλ εἴε Κύξῳ θίινλ γελέζζαη). 
Socrates is a paragon of virtue and wisdom in Xenophon's writings and he, if 
anyone, could be credited with near-prophetic powers. This, therefore, is as 
close as Xenophon can go to a statement of the truth without actually spelling it 
out.127 With regard to the date of the decree, I have argued that it was passed 
'early', in 399, probably during the time Xenophon was leading the Cyreans 
down the Asia Minor coast to join Thibron — possibly at the same time as the 
300 hippeis were sent out from Athens. This dating supports the case made in 
Chapter 1.5.2, where it was also shown that the date of exile would be revealing 
of its (formal) cause, an earlier date suggesting links with Cyrus, a later one, 
with Sparta. Needless to say, the Athenians may well have found good cause in 
his actions with Agesilaos in 394 to exile him, but they could not do so again. 
Among the ironies here is the fact that many of the mercenaries who joined 
                                            
127 He may give another hint in this direction later in the narrative, at 7.6.35, where he 
writes of having incurred the wrath of 'those much stronger than myself' (ηαῦηα πνιὺ 
θξείηηνζηλ ἐκαπηνῦ) because of his concern for the army. The remark is too vague to 
be used as evidence for the cause of his exile, but it must refer either to the Athenian 
demos, the Spartan government, or the governors of the Great King, all of whom had 
reason to see him as having acted against their interests. 
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Cyrus were likely to have been exiles from their own cities (cf. 4.8.26), 
Xenophon, in the end, becoming one of them.  
 
A challenge in arguing the case that Xenophon was defending himself against 
his exile is that he only incidentally refers to the decree and does not name 
Athens as his intended audience for the work. However, it has been 
demonstrated that the author, by explicitly signalling his Athenian background 
and identity, makes it apparent that his countrymen are envisaged as being in 
the front row; more substantially, the content and texture of the text itself — 
Xenophon's systematic distancing of himself from both Cyrus and Sparta 
through careful representation of his relations with them, and the integration of 
thematic strands such as apate, agon, hupopsia, and apistia — demonstrate 
that he was at pains to address questions on the subject of his loyalty to his 
polis. The deliberate ambiguity surrounding the identity of his main audience for 
his main defence is, I suggest, a mark of his contempt for the exile decree. 
 
 
PART 4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Readers of Xenophon's Anabasis have long remarked on an apologetic 
Tendenz in the work. An explanation offered by Dürrbach in the nineteenth 
century was that Xenophon wrote his account in response to another which did 
not depict him in flattering light. While this view retains some currency today, it 
has not been found persuasive in this chapter. Evidence for another published 
account of the march is slight, and moreover there is a well-founded view now 
that Diodoros' summary of the expedition — considered by some to have 
derived (via Ephoros) from an Anabasis written by Sophainetos — is ultimately 
based on Xenophon's account. 
 
Xenophon's work is, however, unquestionably dominated by his own presence, 
and in this chapter a case has been made for reading Anabasis as an apologia 
pro vita. In Parts 2 and 3 it was shown that Xenophon devotes a substantial 
amount of energy and space to confronting matters that had an impact on his 
respective standing as a Socratic, military leader, and as an Athenian citizen; it 
was suggested that the whole of Book 7 is a defence against the charge of 
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corruption laid against him in Thrace. It is apparent that Xenophon wishes to 
leave an indelible impression of himself as a responsible citizen who 
represented his polis with distinction. In the course of his narrative, explicitly in 
the case of character attacks, implicitly on the matter of his polis loyalty, he 
thoroughly debunks charges/suspicions of corruption and improper behaviour, 
association with barbarian enemies, and pro-Spartanism. The extent to which 
self-defence pervades Anabasis permits inferences to be made about why he 
wrote the work, and for whom it was intended. While the defence of his 
character was doubtless directed at the widest possible readership, the careful 
construction of his relationship with Sparta and 'others' in the text seems to be 
directed at an Athenian audience, perhaps in particular his own social class; 
Xenophon may well be signalling this by being on horseback at the point of his 
very first appearance in the story. It is a mark of his skill and subtlety as a writer 
that he can seem to reach out simultaneously in his work to distinct audiences. 
 
Although in a real sense the march of the Ten Thousand was a source of 
troubles for Xenophon the Athenian, yet the telling of the story provided him 
with a means to address effectively issues not all of which stemmed solely from 
his participation in the march. Most notably, there is his longstanding connection 
with Sparta, a relationship whose form he undoubtedly sought to influence if not 
reconfigure in Anabasis. Through his subtly negative portraiture of Spartan rule 
in the work, Xenophon is moreover marking the state's unsuitability for 
hegemony of Greece. As Humble writes of officials in the Propontis, 'their 
collective failure to deal effectively with the mercenaries is indicative both of the 
failure of Sparta to train its citizens for leadership roles outside the insular world 
of Sparta and of the lack of direction provided by the Spartan authorities to 
leaders abroad'.128 For all its preoccupation with apologia — and 
notwithstanding claims that several other of his writings show pro-Spartan bias 
— Anabasis is not a defence of Sparta. 
 
While the story of the expedition and its aftermath presented itself as an ideal 
vehicle for the expression of other concerns and interests, through a close 
reading of the author's speeches, and a highlighting of the sizeable space which 
                                            
128 Humble 1997: 93. 
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they and connected episodes consume, this chapter has brought out the very 
significant extent to which personal apologia has shaped the work. Objections 
to Anabasis as personal apologia tend to be based on a view that a sole and 
self-evident explanation for the work is available. In his seminal book on 
Xenophon, still a stimulating portrait of the author, William Higgins engages with 
the apologetic explanation and finds it unconvincing. If he is defending himself, 
Higgins asks, why does he spend so much time on so many things unrelated to 
apologia? 'What has apologia got to do with men chasing ostriches and wild 
donkeys or getting sick on honey? A work of defence, moreover, implies a 
certain method of operation by which evidence is sifted and selected for biased 
ends. Yet Xenophon seems free of such prejudice'.129 The argument presented 
here suggests that Higgins did not notice sufficiently the elaborate defence of 
himself which Xenophon conducts through the later books, and he is generous 
in seeing him as an impartial reporter of events. His conclusion, that the work is 
'one man's obviously idiosyncratic vision of [the historical] event', does not do 
justice to the complex yet coherent agenda which Xenophon has succeeded in 
weaving into his story of the journey. Wencis, in an article published in the same 
year, comes closer to describing its character in speaking of 'the hybrid form of 
the Anabasis'.130 
 
That personal apologia is a prominent item on Xenophon's writing agenda is 
supported by its recurrence in other of his works, notably the opening of the 
second part of Hellenika (see Chapter 1.3.1). Concern with other forms of 
apologia furthermore is evident across his oeuvre: most obviously in his 
Socratic works, less so in those which highlight the merits of his friends 
(Agesilaos, Hellenika) and class (Kynegetikos, Hipparkhikos, Anabasis). In 
defending his teacher, friends and social group, Xenophon is also defending 
himself. In the final chapter I turn to look at how in Anabasis he builds a 
comprehensive defence of Socrates, and how this serves as well to defend him 
against criticism of his own character. 
                                            
129 Higgins 1977: 94. 
130 Wencis 1977: 49. Cf. Dillery (1995: 64) who remarks that 'there is nothing to prevent 
us from seeing the Anabasis as both apologia and panhellenic call to action'. 
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4 
 
 
Apologia Socratous 
 
 
 
 
 
I have often wondered by what arguments those who drew up 
the indictment against Socrates could persuade the Athenians 
that his life was forfeit to the state. The indictment against him 
was to this affect: Socrates is guilty of rejecting the gods 
acknowledged by the state and of bringing in strange deities; he 
is also guilty of corrupting the youth. 
Xenophon, Mem. 1.1.1 
 
 
In his Apologia and the first third of Memorabilia 1 (1.1-2), Xenophon defends 
the memory of Socrates against the charges of impiety and corrupting the youth 
brought against him in 399; in the remainder of the latter (1.3-4.8), and in two of 
his other works, Symposion and Oikonomikos, Socrates is a central character, 
and there is the clear sense that Xenophon is defending, and indeed promoting 
the value of, the philosopher's character.1 In this final chapter I argue that in 
Anabasis, by representing himself as a model pupil of Socrates, Xenophon 
attempts to refute the charges levelled at the philosopher, and, through his 
outstanding performance on the retreat, to highlight the value of the Socratic 
training. In contrast to the aforementioned works, Socrates only makes a single 
appearance, yet it occurs at the pivotal point in the narrative and his presence 
thereafter is felt throughout Xenophon's arduous trials on the retreat. 
 
The chapter begins with an analysis of Xenophon's introduction of his character 
into the story, and shows that its purpose is to establish him as an aspiring 
kalos kagathos who finds himself unwittingly caught in a desperate situation. In 
the second part a context for the relationship between Socrates and Xenophon 
                                            
1 Scholars traditionally group these four works into a Xenophontic Socratic cycle. See 
for instance Kahn 1996: 29, Macleod 2008: 5; Morrison (1988: vii) expands the 
category to take in Hiero and Agesilaos. Socrates appears twice in Xenophon's 
'historiographical' works: at An. 3.1.5, and Hell. 1.7.15. Besides the Anabasis passage, 
only on one other occasion do Socrates and Xenophon appear together, this at Mem. 
1.3.9-12. 
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is established, and in the third it is demonstrated how, through his actions and 
words on the retreat, Xenophon builds a comprehensive defence of his teacher 
against the charges made. While I argue that his formal aim in representing his 
character as an ideal leader is to defend Socrates, this representation also 
serves the didactic aims of the work, and further, it strengthens his personal 
apologia. The distinction between exemplar and author is finely blurred, and 
both are roundly enveloped in an aura of kudos; Xenophon's readers, 
regardless of the degree to which they are aware of his intended purposes, will 
have certainly linked the two figures in some way. 
 
 
PART 1. THE FRAMING OF XENOPHON: THE PHILOSOPHER ARMED 
 
Xenophon in Anabasis comes across as being more than an average leader. 
His energy and daring at times verge on the superhuman, and it is tempting to 
conclude that in his narrative he has bigger aims than defending himself against 
personal attacks and redeeming his reputation at home.2 The explanation 
offered here for his extraordinary self-portrayal is that Xenophon's character is 
an exemplar, that he projects himself as a model pupil of Socrates behaving as 
such a pupil would do in this type of situation.3 That Anabasis is not intended to 
be autobiographical is signalled, I suggest, by the author's attribution of the 
work to another (cf. Hell. 3.1.2). At the point of his character's introduction into 
the story at the start of Book 3, we thus have a pseudonymous narrator and two 
Xenophons: the author and historical figure who was a participant in the march 
and the character in the text called Xenophon. Rather, then, than claiming a 
glorious role for himself, Xenophon is defending an individual whom he holds in 
                                            
2 Calvino (1999: 20) in an essay on Anabasis writes: 'on occasions Xenophon appears 
to be one of those heroes from children's comics, who in every episode appear to 
survive against impossible odds.' Cawkwell (2004: 60): 'Indeed he never seems to 
make a mistake. Both in counsel and in action, Xenophon was always right.' 
3 In describing Xenophon as a model pupil the intention is not to imply that he is a 
faultless one (his failure to follow Socrates' advice about the journey is proof that he is 
not); rather this quality refers to his capacity to apply his learning to any given situation, 
and to continue to learn from his experiences. Cf. Mem. 4.1.2. 'Thus [Socrates] would 
often say he was "in love", but clearly his heart was set not on those who were fair to 
outward view, but on those whose souls excelled in goodness. These he recognised by 
their quickness to learn whatever subject they studied, ability to remember what they 
learned, and desire for every kind of knowledge on which depend good management of 
a household and estate and tactful dealing with men and the affairs of men.' 
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the highest regard. Regardless of whether or not he was, in fact, an outstanding 
pupil of Socrates, in Anabasis his character behaves as such, and as such the 
work stands as an apologia for his teacher. This part demonstrates how, by way 
of his introduction into the story, Xenophon constructs the framework for his 
elaborate and innovative defence of Socrates. 
 
Prelude. An. 2.1.12-13. 
 
On the day after the battle in which Cyrus has been killed, the King sent heralds 
to the Greeks to demand they surrender their weapons. Among them was one 
Phalinos, a Greek in the service of Tissaphernes. In reply to the demand, a 
young Athenian tells him: 'We have no other good except our weapons and our 
virtue. In having our weapons, we think that we could make use of our virtue as 
well; but if we surrender these, we think we would also be deprived of our lives. 
Do not think, then, that we will surrender to you the only goods we have, but 
with these we will do battle over your goods as well.' Phalinos laughed out loud 
at this and replied: 'But you are like a philosopher, young man, and what you 
say is not without charm. Know that you are a mindless fool, however, if you 
think that your virtue could prevail over the King's power' (2.1.12-13).4 
 
One family of manuscripts names the young Athenian of this episode as 
Theopompos, and another names him as Xenophon;5 in the former case there 
are grounds for thinking that Xenophon may be deliberately disguising himself, 
the name Theopompos, 'sent by god', indicative of the sort of wordplay he 
shows elsewhere in his writing.6 Thus Phalinos' words seem intended by the 
                                            
4 κεηὰ ηνῦηνλ [Θεόπνκπνο] Ἀζελαῖνο εἶπελ· Ὦ Φαιῖλε, λῦλ, ὡο ζὺ ὁξᾷο, ἡκῖλ νὐδὲλ 
ἔζηηλ ἀγαζὸλ ἄιιν εἰ κὴ ὅπια θαὶ ἀξεηή. ὅπια κὲλ νὖλ ἔρνληεο νἰόκεζα ἂλ θαὶ ηῇ ἀξεηῇ 
ρξῆζζαη, παξαδόληεο δ' ἂλ ηαῦηα θαὶ ηῶλ ζσκάησλ ζηεξεζῆλαη. κὴ νὖλ νἴνπ ηὰ κόλα 
ἀγαζὰ ἡκῖλ ὄληα ὑκῖλ παξαδώζεηλ, ἀιιὰ ζὺλ ηνύηνηο θαὶ πεξὶ ηῶλ ὑκεηέξσλ ἀγαζῶλ 
καρνύκεζα. ἀθνύζαο δὲ ηαῦηα ὁ Φαιῖλνο ἐγέιαζε θαὶ εἶπελ· Ἀιιὰ θηινζόθῳ κὲλ 
ἔνηθαο, ὦ λεαλίζθε, θαὶ ιέγεηο νὐθ ἀράξηζηα· ἴζζη κέληνη ἀλόεηνο ὤλ, εἰ νἴεη ηὴλ 
ὑκεηέξαλ ἀξεηὴλ πεξηγελέζζαη ἂλ ηῆο βαζηιέσο δπλάκεσο. 2.1.12-13. 
5 Anabasis is preserved in two main families of manuscripts, 'c' and 'f'. The 'c' family 
here has Theopompos (OCT), while the 'f' has Xenophon. See Ambler's note (2008: 
264 n.4) on the two readings. Theopompos appears nowhere else in Xenophon's 
writings. In addition to this passage, prior to 3.1.4 Xenophon appears three times: at 
1.8.15-16, 2.4.15, and 2.5.37-41. 
6 E.g. Themistogenes, 'descendant of justice' (Hell. 3.1.2). See further Erbse 2010: 
494, and Strauss 1975: 118. 
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author to foreshadow the struggle which he, the young philosopher, is destined 
to engage in. On one level his triumph, and arguably that of Socrates in his own 
life, is the victory of ἀξεηή over δύλάκηο. 
 
Xenophon the Athenian. An. 3.1.4-5. 
 
Xenophon formally introduces his character into the story at the start of Book 3, 
following the treacherous seizure of the Greek commanders by Tissaphernes 
on the banks of the Greater Zab River. Night has come on, and the men are 
lying about in despair, convinced they will never see their homeland, family, or 
friends, again: 
 
4. Among the Greeks there was one Xenophon, an Athenian, 
who followed the army neither as a general nor a captain nor a 
common soldier. But rather Proxenos, an old guest-friend of his, 
had sent for him from his home, promising if he would come to 
make him friends with Cyrus, whom he said he considered to 
be better for himself than his fatherland was. 5. After reading 
the letter Xenophon conferred with Socrates the Athenian about 
the proposed journey (3.1.4-5, trans. Ambler, modified).7 
 
The passage contains three critical assertions about Xenophon and the 
expedition of Cyrus: he did not go in a military role, let alone as a mercenary; he 
was invited by a longstanding friend who regarded Cyrus extremely highly; 
Socrates was consulted about whether or not he should go. As I demonstrate 
below, the passage is intended to establish that Xenophon embarked on his 
journey with the aim of exposing himself to new experiences and developing his 
character. 
 
                                            
7 Ἦλ δέ ηηο ἐλ ηῇ ζηξαηηᾷ Ξελνθῶλ Ἀζελαῖνο, ὃο νὔηε ζηξαηεγὸο νὔηε ινραγὸο 
νὔηε ζηξαηηώηεο ὢλ ζπλεθνινύζεη, ἀιιὰ Πξόμελνο αὐηὸλ κεηεπέκςαην 
νἴθνζελ μέλνο ὢλ ἀξραῖνο· ὑπηζρλεῖην δὲ αὐηῷ, εἰ ἔιζνη, θίινλ αὐηὸλ Κύξῳ 
πνηήζεηλ, ὃλ αὐηὸο ἔθε θξείηησ ἑαπηῷ λνκίδεηλ ηῆο παηξίδνο. ὁ κέληνη 
Ξελνθῶλ ἀλαγλνὺο ηὴλ ἐπηζηνιὴλ ἀλαθνηλνῦηαη Σσθξάηεη ηῷ Ἀζελαίῳ πεξὶ ηῆο 
πνξείαο. 3.1.4-5. 
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1. It was argued in Chapter 3.2.4 that Xenophon's statement that he followed 
the army 'neither as a general nor a captain nor a common soldier' was 
intended to dissociate himself from mercenary service, and from a military 
association with Cyrus, whose bankrolling had enabled Sparta to triumph in the 
Peloponnesian War. I suggest now that the statement also serves to create a 
space in which another, non-military purpose can emerge clearly. Although 
Xenophon has already appeared in what seems to be a military capacity (riding 
out to Cyrus prior to the battle engagement at Kounaxa to learn if he has any 
announcements to make, 1.8.15), this may be justified in the same manner as 
his taking up of arms now: namely, as an act required in the particular 
circumstance of those with whom he is allied facing a severe challenge. It is 
notable that shortly after he is introduced, the narrator explains that he was 
deceived as to the purpose of the expedition, and writes: 'the majority 
nevertheless followed along out of shame both before each other and before 
Cyrus. Xenophon too was one of these' (3.1.10). 
 
2. Proxenos is 'an old guest-friend' of Xenophon's. We know from his preceding 
obituary (2.6.16-20) that he was also a student of Gorgias the Sophist, and that 
he 'desired from his very adolescence to become a man competent to do great 
things' (εὐζὺο κὲλ κεηξάθηνλ ὢλ ἐπεζύκεη γελέζζαη ἀλὴξ ηὰ κεγάια πξάηηεηλ 
ἱθαλόο, 2.6.16). While Xenophon is critical, even contemptuous, of his ambition, 
he remarks that Proxenos would not be willing to obtain any of his ends unjustly 
(2.6.18). He goes on to write: 
 
19. He was competent to rule over those who were noble and 
good; he was not, however, competent to impress upon his 
soldiers either respect for himself or fear, but he was more 
ashamed before them than the ruled were before him. And he 
was manifestly more afraid of being hated by his soldiers than 
his soldiers were of disobeying him. 20. He thought it was 
sufficient for being fit to rule, and for seeming to be, to praise 
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the one who did well and not to praise the one who did 
something unjust (2.6.19-20).8 
 
While Xenophon is doubtless using the obituary of his friend to comment on 
Gorgias and his brand of philosophy, his main intention is to lead into the core 
character-development theme of the journey. Proxenos, who is probably about 
the same age as Xenophon (cf. 2.6.20, and Chapter 1.1.3), is drawn away from 
his homeland by admiration for Cyrus, whom he considers 'to be better for 
himself than his fatherland' (3.1.4).9 His ambition — to acquire a great name, 
great power, and much money — is explicitly moderated by a moral compass: 
'Although he desired these things exceedingly, it was also clear that he would 
not be willing to acquire any of them with injustice (κεηὰ ἀδηθίαο) but thought he 
ought to obtain them with what is just and noble and, if not with these, then not 
at all' (2.6.18). An outward journey facilitating inner development is thus framed 
for the young aristocrats.10 The untimely demise of Proxenos and the success 
of Xenophon on the retreat serve to emphasise the greater desirability of the 
Socratic education over that of Gorgias and the other sophists.11 (See 
Kynegetikos for Xenophon's negative attitude towards sophists.) 
                                            
8 ἄξρεηλ δὲ θαιῶλ κὲλ θαὶ ἀγαζῶλ δπλαηὸο ἦλ· νὐ κέληνη νὔη' αἰδῶ ηνῖο ζηξαηηώηαηο 
ἑαπηνῦ νὔηε θόβνλ ἱθαλὸο ἐκπνηῆζαη, ἀιιὰ θαὶ ᾐζρύλεην κᾶιινλ ηνὺο ζηξαηηώηαο ἢ νἱ 
ἀξρόκελνη ἐθεῖλνλ […] ᾤεην δὲ ἀξθεῖλ πξὸο ηὸ ἀξρηθὸλ εἶλαη αὶ δνθεῖλ ηὸλ κὲλ θαιῶο 
πνηνῦληα ἐπαηλεῖλ, ηὸλ δὲ ἀδηθνῦληα κὴ ἐπαηλεῖλ. ηνηγαξνῦλ αὐηῷ νἱ κὲλ θαινί ηε θαὶ 
ἀγαζνὶ ηῶλ ζπλόλησλ εὖλνη ἦζαλ, νἱ δὲ ἄδηθνη ἐπεβνύιεπνλ ὡο εὐκεηαρεηξίζηῳ ὄληη. 
2.6.19-20. 
9 The broad context for this pursuit of individual development is the Classical, 
particularly Athenian, view that rationality continued to develop up until late middle age. 
The capacity to reason was considered to grow in tandem with increasing experience. 
See further Dover 1994: 102-106. Xenophon describes Cyrus the Younger's education 
and his virtues as a prince in his obituary, 1.9. 
10 There is some other evidence, though not very compelling, for the youthful pair being 
involved in philosophical activity prior to this adventure. Philostratos, writing in the third 
century A.D., says that Xenophon, having been captured before the Battle of Arginousai 
(in 406) and held prisoner in Boiotia, secured his release on bail in order to attend 
lectures by Prodikos, the eminent Khian sophist (Vitae Sophistarum 1.12). Anderson 
(1974: 18) makes a connection with Proxenos, and suggests that he could have 
arranged the release. An essay of Prodikos, 'On Herakles', is referred to in the 
Memorabilia (2.1.21-34). 
11 Widening the field for comparative philosophical commentary by Xenophon, Howland 
(2000) argues that Anabasis is a 'companion piece' to Plato's Republic, and that 
Xenophon sought to engage Plato in a dialogue about the nature of Socratic 
philosophising: 'both works can be viewed as variations on a common set of themes 
and issues, as meditations that are best appreciated in tandem, just insofar as one of 
them takes the measure of the other' (877). Howland contends that both works, in 
highlighting the unattainability of ideal communities, show us the limits of politics (883). 
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3. Xenophon's consultation with Socrates on whether or not to join Cyrus has 
long attracted the attention of readers.12 It has been used to support the view 
that he was a prominent pupil of Socrates, and has been summoned as 
evidence for supporting the claim that association with Cyrus or with Socrates 
constituted the cause of his banishment from Athens. The meeting furthermore 
furnishes evidence for reading Anabasis as a personal apologia (see Chapter 
3.3.2.2), and perhaps for an attempt to bolster the image of the expedition 
through a Socratic connection. My view is that the meeting may not actually 
have taken place, and that it fits rather into the paradigmatic scheme of 
Anabasis.13 However even if it did not take place, its literary value is not 
reduced — the prime function of the episode in the narrative is, I argue, to 
situate Socrates at the heart of Xenophon's decision to join Cyrus. At once, the 
philosophical aspect of the enterprise is underscored, and Socrates, by his 
concern, becomes a presence that will be linked to the trials his pupil is fated to 
undergo in the months ahead.14 Xenophon's subsequent failure to follow the 
advice given by Socrates emphasises his youthful character and is symbolic of 
the need he stands in of the sort of training he cannot obtain within the Socratic 
circle.15 There is little doubt that (Xenophon's) Socrates would have approved of 
                                                                                                                                
He envisages Xenophon's journey in similar terms as described here but with a 
different emphasis on the Socratic relationship: 'The Anabasis is also…the story of 
Xenophon's intellectual and moral growth. It traces the path of his personal 
appropriation of the wisdom of Socrates, whom Xenophon leaves behind in Athens' 
(876). 
12 See for example: Wood 1964: 35; Strauss 1975: 123-124; Wencis 1977: 47; Higgins 
1977: 83, 98; Dillery 1995: 72; Humble 1997: 11-12; Gray 1998: 98-99, and 2007: 17; 
Bradley 2001: 77; Rood 2006: 56-59; Ferrario 2009: 20-21; Tsagalis 2009: 451-452; 
Erbse 2010: 487-488. Humble's observation (2002: 66-67) that the views of modern 
scholars on Xenophon's relation to Socrates are frequently dictated by their own pre-
determined attitudes towards him and his work is notably applicable to interpretations 
of this famous scene. 
13 See Chapter 1.3.2 and Chapter 2.1. Danzig (2004: 18) remarks on the suspect 
historicity of other Xenophontic encounters with Socrates. Cf. Kahn (1996: 33) who 
thinks the episode did occur. 
14 On occasion the presence is made distinct through parallels, as for instance when at 
Kotyora Xenophon (along with the other leaders) stands trial before the army (5.8.1): 
see Part 3, 'Socrates in Anabasis'. Howland (2000: 880) argues that Socrates' 
presence has already been signalled in the opening lines of Book 3 (1.2) through the 
use of aporia, this word 'the hallmark of a philosophical encounter with Socrates'. The 
word is also used at 3.1.11, preceding the description of Xenophon's fateful dream. I 
am not myself convinced of this point, not least as the word seems singularly 
appropriate given the army's predicament. 
15 This action itself allows for multiple readings. Wencis (1977: 47) thinks that it 
provides a glimpse of 'Xenophon's ability to make his own decisions, a foreshadowing 
of his potential for leadership'; other readers see a show of impetuous disobedience, 
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the initiative, his reservation in the reported case being the potential dangers to 
his pupil that could arise from association with Cyrus the Younger.16 
 
These three elements, then, of what is the key passage to the work together 
construct the framework within which the account of the retreat is to be read.17 
The young Athenian, a student of Socrates ambitious to learn from a prince of 
the Persian court, sets off across the Aegean on his personal anabasis. 'So 
after sacrificing to the ones the god had indicated, Xenophon sailed off. He 
overtook Proxenos and Cyrus at Sardis, when they were already about to set 
out on their upward journey, and he was introduced to Cyrus' (ὁ κὲλ δὴ 
Ξελνθῶλ νὕησ ζπζάκελνο νἷο ἀλεῖιελ ὁ ζεὸο ἐμέπιεη, θαὶ θαηαιακβάλεη ἐλ 
Σάξδεζη Πξόμελνλ θαὶ Κῦξνλ κέιινληαο ἤδε ὁξκᾶλ ηὴλ ἄλσ ὁδόλ, θαὶ 
ζπλεζηάζε Κύξῳ. 3.1.8). 
 
Later evidence that this was indeed how Xenophon intended his participation to 
be portrayed comes from his biographer, Diogenes Laertios, who saw fit to write 
this epigram on his subject (2.58, trans. Hicks, modified):18 
 
Not only did Xenophon march up to Persia on account of Cyrus, 
But to search for some way that would lead up to Zeus. 
Having shown Greek achievements to be owed to his education, 
He called to mind how beautiful was the wisdom of Socrates. 
                                                                                                                                
and the pupil's assertion of independence from his teacher: cf. Wood 1964: 35, Rood 
2006: 61. Rood assumes that had Xenophon taken his teacher's advice he would not 
have gone on the expedition; he may be referring to Socrates' sceptical stance, but 
otherwise it surely cannot be excluded that the oracle would have responded positively 
to the question Socrates wished him to ask. 
16 Cf. Mem. 4.1.2 (cited in note 3 above). At Oik. 4.18 Socrates declares that, 'if Cyrus 
had lived, he would, I think, have proved himself an excellent ruler'. Thus the prince's 
potential as a model of good leadership is affirmed. (There may be a contradiction 
lurking here in that, by the dramatic date of this work, the over ambitious and indeed 
morally suspect nature of Cyrus's expedition must have been known to Socrates. This 
seems to be another case of paradigm clashing with reality.) 
17 Bradley's analysis of Xenophon's literary construction of the text leads him to argue 
for two narrative strands, history in Books 1-2, and 'novelesque autobiography' in 
Books 3-7; he attributes the narrative transformation to the new situation of the army 
(2001: 74). 
18 νὐ κόλνλ ἐο Πέξζαο ἀλέβε Ξελνθῶλ δηὰ Κῦξνλ,  
    ἀιι' ἄλνδνλ δεηῶλ ἐο Δηὸο ἥηηο ἄγνη,  
   παηδείεο παξ' ἑῆο Ἑιιεληθὰ πξάγκαηα δείμαο,  
    ὡο θαιὸλ ἡ ζνθίε κλήζαην Σσθξάηενο. 2.58. 
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The Philosopher Armed. An. 3.1.13-14. 
 
Back in real narrative time Xenophon's world has changed dramatically. With 
the Greek high command decapitated, he finds himself in mortal peril in a land 
far from Greece. Awakening from a dream, he articulates his new reality, his 
linear analysis and persistent questioning of himself emphasising already his 
Socratic training: 
 
Why I am lying here? The night is passing and at dawn the 
enemy will probably arrive. If we fall into the king's hands, we 
will surely die inglorious deaths, after witnessing all the most 
terrible scenes one could possibly imagine and suffering the full 
range of the most gruesome tortures. Yet no one is showing the 
slightest interest in defence or doing anything practical about it; 
we are just lying here as if we were in a position to be at ease. 
From what other city do I expect a general to come and 
organise things? Why am I waiting? How old do I have to be? I 
will not get any older at all if I just surrender to the enemy today 
(3.1.13-14).19 
 
So the student is impelled into action. Rising, he calls together the captains of 
his slain companion and urges them to take their fate in hand. 'Let us not wait 
for others to come and call us to these most noble deeds: let us be the ones 
who begin to incite the others to virtue' (3.1.24). Xenophon is appointed as the 
leader of Proxenos' contingent, and following a conclave of generals, an 
assembly of the entire army is called. The young Athenian accoutres himself in 
his finest armour and prepares to address the soldiers. His character and 
learning are now to be tested in the crucible of war. Socrates is on trial again: 
success will be a testimony to the worth of his teaching, failure, another proof of 
his pernicious influence on the youth of Athens. 
                                            
19 ηί θαηάθεηκαη; ἡ δὲ λὺμ πξνβαίλεη· ἅκα δὲ ηῇ ἡκέξᾳ εἰθὸο ηνὺο πνιεκίνπο ἥμεηλ. εἰ δὲ 
γελεζόκεζα ἐπὶ βαζηιεῖ, ηί ἐκπνδὼλ κὴ νὐρὶ πάληα κὲλ ηὰ ραιεπώηαηα ἐπηδόληαο, 
πάληα δὲ ηὰ δεηλόηαηα παζόληαο ὑβξηδνκέλνπο ἀπνζαλεῖλ; ὅπσο δ' ἀκπλνύκεζα νὐδεὶο 
παξαζθεπάδεηαη νὐδὲ ἐπηκειεῖηαη, ἀιιὰ θαηαθείκεζα ὥζπεξ ἐμὸλ ἡζπρίαλ ἄγεηλ. ἐγὼ 
νὖλ ηὸλ ἐθ πνίαο πόιεσο ζηξαηεγὸλ πξνζδνθῶ ηαῦηα πξάμεηλ; πνίαλ δ' ἡιηθίαλ ἐκαπηῷ 
ἐιζεῖλ ἀλακείλσ; νὐ γὰξ ἔγσγ' ἔηη πξεζβύηεξνο ἔζνκαη, ἐὰλ ηήκεξνλ πξνδῶ ἐκαπηὸλ 
ηνῖο πνιεκίνηο. 3.1.13-14. 
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PART 2. SOCRATES AND HIS CIRCLE. ACCUSERS AND DEFENDERS 
 
In Chapter 1.2.1 Xenophon's interest in philosophy and his relationship with 
Socrates was touched upon. This is complemented and expanded upon in the 
first section of this part by means of a more detailed look at Socrates' life and 
teaching. In the second section the charges made against him are outlined, and 
in the third the impact of his trial and the enduring literary legacy produced by 
his followers is looked at. 
 
Life of Socrates 
 
Socrates is not believed to have written anything in his lifetime, and most of 
what we know of him derives from the surviving accounts of his life and 
teachings provided by his pupils, contemporaries, and the later biographical 
tradition.20 The principal surviving first-hand sources are Aristophanes, Plato, 
and Xenophon.21 Each presents a portrait of the philosopher that is in important 
ways different from the other: from the 'pretentious parasite' of Aristophanes, to 
Plato's inquisitive intellectual, to Xenophon's practically orientated ethical 
philosopher. Extracting the historical figure from these records has proven to be 
as contentious an exercise as it is problematic; doubtless, each account 
contains elements of truth, but how much can probably never be known.22 An 
                                            
20 Plato (Phaedo 59c-61c) says that he wrote poetry in prison, though nothing of this 
survives. The later biographical tradition is extensive, diverse, and frequently 
contradictory. To take an example, Diogenes Laertios (2.20) refers to an Aristoxenos 
who has Socrates as a banker: 'he would at all events invest sums, collect the interest 
accruing, and then, when this was expended, put out the principal again'. It has been 
well put that Socrates is both the best known and the least known of ancient 
philosophers. 
21 Aristotle, who was born after the death of Socrates, makes frequent reference to him 
in his works, but his remarks are considered to be based mostly if not completely on 
Plato's picture. See Waterfield (2004: 86), and generally New Pauly entry on Socrates, 
and Nails' entry in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. 
22 Dorion (2006: 95-96) presents 17 differences between the Socrateses of Plato and 
Xenophon and asserts that 'there is no hope of harmonising their doctrines'; contra 
Pomeroy (1994: 23): 'Socrates' method of enquiry, his personality, and some of his 
ideas, as reported by Xenophon on the one hand and by Plato on the other are, in my 
view, essentially reconcilable'. In recognition of an acceptance of meaningful 
alternative pictures some scholars now speak of Socratesp and Socratesx. 
Aristophanes' is the earliest portrait of the philosopher, and he is the only one of the 
surviving sources who could claim to have known him as a younger man; however, the 
fact that his picture was produced in a comedic context may make it less historically 
valuable than the other two. But some think that his Socrates is a Pythagorean, and 
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historical picture of Socrates can, nonetheless, be tentatively sketched from 
what appears to be common in the reports from antiquity, and from what is 
known of the times through which he lived and died. In this latter regard, the 
context for Xenophon at Athens in the closing years of the fifth century provided 
in Chapter 1 is relevant here too, notably the circumstance that both men found 
themselves part of a minority towards whom the restored democracy was not 
well disposed. 
 
Diogenes Laertios (2.44), citing the authority of Apollodoros (Chronology 34), 
says that Socrates was born in the archonship of Apsephion, in the fourth year 
of the 77th Olympiad. This places his birth in 469-68, some forty years before 
Xenophon and Plato. A sculptor by trade, he is said to have had works 
displayed before the entrance to the Akropolis during the time of Pericles.23 
While he does not seem to have been prosperous, he was sufficiently well off to 
serve as a hoplite at Potidaea in 432 and in early campaigns of the war with 
Sparta. From the reports of Plato and the later biographer Diogenes he was not 
lacking in valour or stamina, and was regarded highly by those who served with 
him and against him.24 
 
A common theme of the biographical tradition is the philosopher's physical 
oddness. A thick-set frame marked by a pot-belly, bulging eyes, and flaring 
nostrils, is said to have made him more akin to a satyr than a man.25 He went 
about barefoot and was impervious to cold and alcohol; on his drinking 
prowess, no less a figure than Alkibiades enthused that he could drink anyone 
under the table, and that nobody had ever seen him drunk.26 It is likely, though, 
that there is a degree of exaggeration in the depiction of his person and 
                                                                                                                                
that this characterisation could well be a true reflection of the philosopher as a young 
man: see Birds 1553-64 and the interpretation of this passage by Ogden 2009: 27. On 
the 'Socratic Question' see notably Dorion 2006, Waterfield 2004 (with references on 
p.86), Danzig 2003, Vlastos 1991 (chaps. 2-3) and 1983. 
23 Statutes of the Charities and an image of Hermes Propylaios. Pausanias 1.22.8, 
9.35.7; Diogenes Laertios 2.18-19; Suidas s.v. Sokrates. 
24 Socrates in battle: Plato, Symposion 220d-e, 221a, Laches 181b; Diogenes Laertios 
2.22-3. 
25 On Socrates' appearance see: Plato, Theaetetus 143e, Symposion 215a-216e; 
Xenophon, Symposion 2.19, 4.19, 5.5-7; Aristophanes, Clouds 362. 
26 Barefoot: Xenophon, Mem. 1.6.2; Plato, Symposion 220b; Aristophanes, Clouds 103, 
363. Drinking: Plato, Symposion 220a. Gill (1973: 27) points out that Plato's description 
of Socrates' controlled reaction to his poisoning in the Phaedo could be intended to 
underline his physical toughness. 
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constitution, a natural tendency where a larger-than-life character is concerned. 
For their part, the intentions of both Plato and Xenophon in highlighting 
Socrates' outward rawness are doubtless to draw attention to the inner beauty 
of his soul, emphasising that it is this state which the philosopher desires.27 
 
From Plato and Xenophon we learn that his main approach to teaching was 
based on the elimination of what is not true as a path to what is. His engine for 
this process was a series of questions which probed the axioms underlying his 
interlocutors' assumptions about the world and their own place in it.28 This 
method drew many into his circle, though it irked some and intimidated others.29 
His fame, or infamy, soon earned him a place in the popular culture of the day: 
in the City Dionysia of 423 he was a main character in Aristophanes' comic play, 
Clouds. In it he is cast as a deranged head of a school which teaches young 
men, among other things, how to avoid repaying their debts (1214-1302), and 
that it is just to beat their parents into submission (1408-46). Commenting on a 
passage (358-363) in which Prodikos is referred to admiringly, and Socrates 
dismissively — ζύ ηε, ιεπηνηάησλ ιήξσλ ἱεξεῦ ('and you, priest of the most 
subtle trifles', 358, trans. Dover) — Dover writes that the lines are 'intelligible as 
comedy only if we believe that Aristophanes shared the popular esteem of 
Prodikos as an artist, and regarded Socrates, by contrast, as a pretentious 
parasite who inexplicably fascinated some wealthy young men but had nothing 
coherent to say and produced nothing of any artistic merit'.30 Whatever the truth 
of Aristophanes' characterisation, as Plato has Socrates himself argue at the 
                                            
27 Cf. Socrates' prayer to Pan. 'O beloved Pan and all ye other gods of this place, grant 
to me that I be made beautiful in my soul within, and that all external possessions be in 
harmony with my inner man. May I consider the wise man rich; and may I have such 
wealth as only the self restrained man can bear or endure' (Plato, Phaedrus 279b-c). 
28 Although Xenophon seems to downplay the prominence of the elenchus (cf. Mem. 
1.4.1), he uses the technique himself: e.g. Socrates with Euthydemos, Mem. 4.2.8-39. 
Socrates denied that he was a didaskalos (cf. Plato, Apologia 19e), but probably to 
distance himself from sophists who took money for their teaching services; Socrates 
did not (cf. Mem. 1.2.5-7; Plato, Apologia 19e), although Aristophanes has his Socrates 
appear to accept a payment in Clouds 1146 ff. 
29 Diogenes Laertios (2.21) writes: 'frequently, owing to his vehemence in argument, 
men set upon him with their fists or tore his hair out'. Even in the logoi, there are hints 
that having Socrates and his companions pay a visit could be a daunting experience: 
cf. Mem. 4.2.1-2. 
30 Dover 1968: lv-lvi. 
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opening of his trial (Apologia 18a-b, 19c), the poisonous image of him painted in 
the play endured in the minds of many.31 
 
Plato and Xenophon emphasise that to the very end of his life Socrates was an 
ardent believer in the sanctity of the law. In his Memorabilia Xenophon writes: 
'All his private conduct was lawful and helpful: to public authority he rendered 
such scrupulous obedience in all that the laws required, both in civil life and in 
military service, that he was a pattern of good discipline to all' (4.4.1).32 Specific 
examples of this behaviour that are recorded include his refusal, while serving 
on the Council's presiding committee in 406, to support the decision of the 
Assembly to put forward an illegal motion concerning the fate of the generals 
from the Arginousai campaign (this being to judge them collectively, not 
severally: Hell. 1.7.9-15, and see also Mem. 1.1.18, Plato, Apology 32b, 
Gorgias 473e); then during the reign of the Thirty, when the regime sought to 
implicate other Athenians in their crimes, he refused to take part in the arrest of 
a man who had not committed any offence (Plato, Apology 32c-d). 
 
Socrates' concern for upholding the law was a part of his mission to produce 
virtuous citizens for the state. The process of acquiring virtue (aretê) was the 
path to becoming kalos kagathos, a condition which enabled men to benefit 
themselves and others, or in Xenophon's words, 'to do their duty by house and 
household, and relatives and friends, and city and citizens' (Mem. 1.2.48).33 A 
specific group of interest to Socrates were young men of outstanding potential; 
these individuals he would attempt to pick out and then prepare for leadership 
                                            
31 That version 1 of Clouds was placed last in the 423 competition may (or may not) 
say something about the representation of Socrates in it. Socrates appeared in other of 
Aristophanes' plays, as well as ones by Kallias, Eupolis, and Telekleides, in nearly all 
cases his portrayal being along the same negative lines as in Clouds. (Fragment 372 
from Eupolis reads: 'I hate Socrates who has thought everything out but ignored the 
problem how to provide himself with food'.) 
32 ἰδίᾳ ηε πᾶζη λνκίκσο ηε θαὶ ὠθειίκσο ρξώκελνο θαὶ θνηλῇ ἄξρνπζί ηε ἃ νἱ λόκνη 
πξνζηάηηνηελ πεηζόκελνο θαὶ θαηὰ πόιηλ θαὶ ἐλ ηαῖο ζηξαηείαηο νὕησο ὥζηε δηάδεινο 
εἶλαη παξὰ ηνὺο ἄιινπο εὐηαθηῶλ. Mem. 4.4.1. 
33 It is worth emphasising that the term aretê - excellence, good quality, good 
disposition - covers a range of meanings. In common usage it tended to indicate either 
valour or brave deeds, or a moral quality. The term is discussed at length by Aristotle in 
Nicomachean Ethics Books 2-6. Tamiolaki (2009: 2) suggests that Xenophon uses the 
word in two ways: in a political/military sense, this mostly in his historical writings, and, 
mainly in his Socratic works, with a moral sense. 
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roles in the state (cf. Mem. 1.6.15, 3.1-7).34 Among those with links to his circle 
were several of the leading political figures at Athens at the close of the fifth 
century. However in spite of his influence, not all turned out as he would have 
liked: Kritias became a leader of the Thirty Tyrants, and Alkibiades, whom 
Socrates is said to have saved at Potidaia in 432 (Plutarch, Alkibiades 7), and 
struggled to save from a life of hedonism, did not in the end realise his full 
potential.35 
 
Although he opposed neither side in the civil war at Athens in 404-03, Socrates 
antagonised both, and was held in deep suspicion by many in the demos. 
Natural scepticism concerning the practice of philosophical inquiry on the part of 
the conservative majority was intensified by the turbulence that had brought 
Athenian society to its knees in the preceding quarter century; that the 
aforementioned Kritias and Alkibiades had central roles in the more catastrophic 
episodes provided a basis for their disapproval (cf. Mem. 1.2.12). Socrates' 
presence following the restoration was especially unwelcome to the leaders of 
the demos. As a potent symbol of non-conformity, he rose inevitably to the top 
of the list of personalities whom the new democracy, loosing itself from the 
shackles of Sparta, regarded as a threat to its viability. As concluded in Chapter 
1, his trial was ultimately a part of a determined effort to uproot opposition and 
clear the way for a fresh period of democratic rule. 
 
The Charges against Socrates and his trial36 
 
In 399 an indictment was brought against Socrates by three of his fellow 
citizens, Meletos, Anytos, and Lykon. Diogenes Laertios preserves the wording 
in his biography of the philosopher: 
                                            
34 His initial encounter with Xenophon as reported by Diogenes Laertios (2.48) may be 
seen in this context. 
35 Alkibiades, a byword for flamboyance in Classical literature, was famously implicated 
in a scandal involving the mutilation of the city's Hermes statutes. Thucydides 
remarked that the people, 'feared him for the extent of the lawlessness of his lifestyle, 
and his attitude towards everything in which he was involved' (6.15.4, trans. Hammond, 
modified). 
36 The literature on Socrates' trial is extensive. My objective in this section is only to 
summarise the historical event. For the trial and its political and social context, see for 
example Sato 2008, Nails 2006, Brickhouse and Smith 2002, Munn 2000, B. Strauss 
1986. 
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This indictment and affidavit are sworn by Meletos, the son of 
Meletos of the deme Pitthos, against Socrates, the son of 
Sophroniscos of the deme Alopece: Socrates is guilty of 
refusing to recognise the gods recognized by the state, and of 
introducing new divinities. He is also guilty of corrupting the 
youth. The penalty demanded is death (2.40).37 
 
Meletos and Lykon were not well-known characters, a minor poet and orator 
respectively, but Anytos was a distinguished statesman and an important figure 
in the restored democracy; this suggests that the prosecution, if not 
orchestrated by leading democrats, had the support of some of them.38 That the 
case did have its origins in politics rather than justice is apparent from the later 
robust refutation of the charges by several of the Socratics; one of these, 
Xenophon, comments sarcastically to emphasise the point: 'I wonder 
(ζαπκάδσ), then, how the Athenians can have been persuaded that Socrates 
was a freethinker, when he never did or said anything contrary to sound 
religion…no less wonderful is it to me that some believed the charge brought 
against Socrates of corrupting the youth' (Mem. 1.1.20-1.2.1). 
 
Socrates made his own defence speech at the trial, though Lysias is said to 
have prepared one for him.39 Having heard defendant and prosecutors, the jury 
found Socrates guilty by a clear but not sizeable majority (approximately 280 to 
220, on the assumption of 500 jury members: cf. Plato, Apology 36a). 
Exercising his right to propose an alternative punishment to the death penalty, 
                                            
37 ηάδε ἐγξάςαην θαὶ ἀλησκόζαην Μέιεηνο Μειήηνπ Πηηζεὺο Σσθξάηεη Σσθξνλίζθνπ 
Ἀισπεθῆζελ· ἀδηθεῖ Σσθξάηεο, νὓο κὲλ ἡ πόιηο λνκίδεη ζενὺο νὐ λνκίδσλ, ἕηεξα δὲ 
θαηλὰ δαηκόληα εἰζεγνύκελνο· ἀδηθεῖ δὲ θαὶ ηνὺο λένπο δηαθζείξσλ. ηίκεκα ζάλαηνο. 
Diogenes Laertios 2.40. See also Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.1.1, Apologia 10; Plato, 
Apologia 24b. 
38 In Plato's Meno (90b-95a) Anytos is offended by Socrates, an outcome which points 
to a personal animosity between the two men. However the historicity of the encounter 
is not assured, and in any event does not rule out a politically motivated trial. For an 
excellent recent study of Anytos and his role in the prosecution of Socrates see Sato 
2008. 
39 In his biography of Socrates, Diogenes Laertios (2.40-41) says that he read the 
speech of Lysias and, though impressed, thought it not suitable for him. 'If it is a fine 
speech, how can it fail to suit you? Well, [Socrates replied to him] 'would not fine 
raiment and fine shoes be just as unsuitable to me?' Cf. Gray (1989b: 140) for an 
interpretation of this to the effect that Socrates rejected the speech because it failed to 
portray his own high-mindedness (megalegoria) well enough. 
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Socrates suggested that he be maintained at the public expense, and though he 
subsequently offered to pay a fine, his uncompromising attitude through the trial 
probably led to his death (cf. Plato, Apologia 36d and 38b). 
 
The Socratic Writings 
 
There is some evidence that the Athenians were remorseful after convicting 
Socrates. Diogenes Laertios (2.43) says that they shut up the training grounds 
and gymnasia, banished Anytos and Lykon, and put Meletos to death.40 On the 
other hand there is evidence of lingering unpopularity. A work dated to the late 
390s by the Athenian rhetorician Polykrates, Accusation of Socrates, speaks of 
Socrates' malignant effect on Kritias and Alkibiades. (The banishment of 
Xenophon from Athens, dated between 399 and 394, is not a particularly useful 
indicator of public feeling here as the later date would more likely be due to his 
links with Sparta than Socrates.) 
 
For those in Socrates' circle, his trial and death were an understandable cause 
of pain and dismay. In the years following, many set about defending his 
memory, giving rise to a genre of Sokratikoi logoi. In these Socrates is typically 
the central character and his virtues, and his value to friends and city, are 
emphasised through dialogue and deed.41 Known authors of such works include 
Antisthenes, Aeschines, Euclides, Phaedo, Simmias, Plato, and Xenophon. The 
latter two were prominent in this movement, developing inventive literary forms 
in order to defend the memory of Socrates and promote the value of his 
philosophy.42 There is a longstanding debate about the extent to which Socrates 
                                            
40 The veracity of this report has been questioned, though attempts to undermine it are 
not helped by the obscurity of the protagonists, in particular the later life of Anytos. 
41 For the term Sokratikoi logoi see Aristotle, Poetics 1447b11. In speaking of a 
'Socratic work', I draw a distinction between a logos and an apologia, the former being 
a prose work which has Socrates as its main protagonist, e.g. Oikonomikos, the latter a 
piece whose primary aim is to address the charges made against Socrates, e.g. Plato, 
Xenophon Apologia. A Socratic work can, then, be defined as one which aims 
particularly to defend Socrates against the charges made against him at his trial, and/or 
generally portrays his character and teaching in favourable light. This definition allows 
Anabasis, where the presence of Socrates through the retreat is implied, and in which 
the charges against him are challenged, to be categorised as a Socratic work. 
42 The men's relationship is unclear, though they were undoubtedly acquainted with 
one another's work. Plato does not mention Xenophon in his writings, but is probably 
criticising his Kyroupaideia in Laws 694c6-7, where the Athenian Stranger says that 
Cyrus 'was entirely without a right education, and had paid no attention to household 
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in these writings serves as a vehicle for the thoughts and individual outlooks of 
the authors. 
 
Xenophon, who was not in the city for Socrates' trial, and so may have felt a 
greater sense of frustration than others connected to the philosopher, is 
regarded as having authored four 'Socratic works': Apologia, Memorabilia, 
Symposion, and Oikonomikos. Socrates is the central figure in each, and in 
different ways they each present his personal qualities and teachings, with the 
aim of underlining that he was ὠθέιηκνο to friends and city alike. Although they 
aim at the same end, the works set about their task in subtly different ways, 
evidence of the author's artistic impulse in seeking originality of expression. 
Alert to his subtlety, some have argued that other of Xenophon's works are 
Socratic too, notably the Kyroupaideia, the chief character in which may be an 
embodiment of the philosopher's teachings.43 
 
The historical and philosophical worth of these books has, however, long been 
a matter of contention, with precedence on both counts being afforded to Plato 
in the modern era. The latter's early dialogues in particular have been thought 
by many scholars to contain the most accurate picture of Socrates and his 
teaching. The suspicion that Xenophon used Socrates as a mouthpiece for his 
own ideas is founded principally on the view that opinions, and even situations, 
assigned to Socrates by Xenophon are often somehow incongruous: Socrates 
discoursing on farming practice, generalship, and dancing at a Symposion.44 
Yet given the fact that so little concrete is known about Socrates' life, claims of 
                                                                                                                                
management'; Xenophon names Plato only once, at Mem. 3.6.1. In his biography of 
Plato, Diogenes Laertios (3.34) writes that 'Xenophon was not on good terms with him', 
and goes on to say that they wrote in competition with one another. Athenaeus 
(11.112) similarly remarks on rivalry. Modern scholars are divided on the matter of their 
relationship. Pomeroy (1994: 26) argues strongly against the assumption that, where 
the two cross literary and philosophical paths, Xenophon was copying from Plato; 
Waterfield (2004: 107-109) lists 18 instances in Xenophon's Memorabilia and 
Symposion where he argues the author is drawing on Plato. 
43 Whidden (2008: 31 n.3) argues persuasively that the plural pronouns ('we', 'us', 'our') 
used by Xenophon in the Kyroupaideia prologue are meant to refer to Socratics, and 
concludes that it was Xenophon's conversations with Socrates that motivated him to 
write the work. See also Gera 1993: chapter 2.  
44 Oik. 19, Mem. 3.1-5, and Sym. 2.15-21 respectively. Socratesx famously dismisses 
speculations on the nature of the universe as useless (Mem. 1.1.11-16), but Socratesp 
is also principally concerned with ethics (cf. Phaedo 96a-100a). This picture of the 
philosopher is starkly different to that of Aristophanes in Clouds. 
224 
 
this sort are not watertight; the oddness, even faint absurdity of Xenophon's 
image of Socrates (and indeed that of Aristophanes') to a modern reader, arises 
from the iconic status which Plato's Socrates has assumed in our time.45 What 
Xenophon may actually be doing is providing a supplement, if not a corrective, 
to what he viewed as the subjective portrait of his counterpart. This would 
explain why his picture is starkly different at points, and why he, for example, 
seems to downplay the importance of Platonic features such as the elenchus 
(cf. Mem. 1.4.1). But it is perhaps more likely to be the case that he is 
presenting a moral exemplar, the kalos kagathos, inspired by the life and 
teaching of Socrates as he himself interpreted them. 
 
For the purpose of the present argument the question of Xenophon's 
faithfulness to the 'real' Socrates and to his philosophy, whatever these may 
have been, is not critical: the overriding point is that his intention is to defend 
the memory of Socrates, and this project is not unduly affected by nuances in 
his historical representation. For argument's sake, even if Xenophon were using 
Socrates as a mouthpiece to promote his own philosophy, the roundly positive 
representation of Socrates in any case constitutes a de facto defence of the 
historical figure. Indeed it would surprising if Xenophon's Socrates, like other 
historical figures depicted in his writings, did not have a marked paradigmatic 
character (cf. Cyrus the Great, Agesilaos).46 
 
 
                                            
45 Nails (2006: 5) remarks that through his dialogues Plato's account of the indictment, 
trial, and execution of Socrates, has become 'philosophy's founding myth', and has 
immortalised Socrates in the popular imagination. Socrates' most widely known 
statement, 'The unexamined life is not worth living', comes from Plato's Apologia (38a). 
This primacy, however, is a modern phenomenon, the pair having been by and large 
ranked at the same level and held in equal esteem up until the 20th century. Waterfield 
(2004: 79) suggests that it is 'really only with the rise of analytic philosophy, to which 
Plato's concerns are more akin, that Plato's stature in this respect has overtaken that of 
Xenophon'. 
46 Gray, arguing that Xenophon constructed Socrates' character in the Apologia in light 
of a rhetorical theory, cautions against the historicity of the figure: 'The Socrates of 
literature might need to be different from the Socrates of real life if he were to convince 
the audience' (1989b: 139). Cf. in a similar vein Gill (1973: 28), who detects in Plato's 
description of Socrates' death in the Phaedo an instance of an historical event being 
transformed into a representation of a philosophical idea: '[this] should alert us to the 
possibility that many of what seem to be authentic glimpses into the life, and death, of 
the historical Socrates may in fact be illustrative pictures, attached or inset, like the 
myths of the dialogues, into Plato's arguments'. 
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PART 3. DEFENCE OF SOCRATES 
 
In Part 1 it was shown how in Anabasis Xenophon carefully introduced himself 
as a model pupil of Socrates seeking to further his learning. Part 2 highlighted 
key aims of Xenophon's Socrates' teaching, namely the production of virtuous 
citizens and the preparation of promising young men for leadership of the state. 
In this final part of the chapter the argument is developed that Xenophon, 
himself one of the promising talents nurtured by the philosopher, from his 
introduction in Book 3 to the conclusion of his Anabasis, is defending Socrates 
against the charges brought against him in 399. The linkage between his 
exemplary conduct and the charges is established firstly through the character 
of his leadership style and secondly by the philosopher being a prominent 
presence in the book. The Socratic character of Xenophon's leadership was 
argued for in Chapter 2, and in the first section of this part, the case for 
Socrates' pronounced presence on the retreat is made. In the second and third 
sections it is demonstrated how Xenophon combats each of the charges against 
his teacher.47 
 
Socrates in Anabasis 
 
Socrates appears only once in the story, this at the opening of the third book, 
when the author recounts how he was invited to join Cyrus the Younger by 
Proxenos, and how he thereafter sought the advice of Socrates: (3.1.4 is quoted 
in Part 1 above) 
 
5. After reading the letter [from Proxenos] Xenophon conferred 
with Socrates the Athenian about the proposed journey. And 
Socrates, suspecting that becoming a friend of Cyrus might 
bring an accusation from the city, because Cyrus had seemed 
                                            
47 The charge of refusing to recognise the gods recognized by the state, and of 
introducing new divinities, has been analysed in detail by scholars, with various 
interpretations arising on its meanings and the culpability of the defendant (cf. Munn 
2000, and more recently Sato 2008 and Waterfield 2009). In the present treatment the 
compound charge is conflated into impiety, and Xenophon's actions set against this 
measure. The gods whom he sacrifices to on the retreat are traditional ones, and, in so 
far as I am aware, no new deities are introduced (Zeus Meilichios, whom Xenophon 
sacrifices to at the end, had been honoured by his family in Athens for at least a 
generation: cf. 7.8.4). 
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eager in joining the Lakedaimonians in making war against the 
Athenians, advised Xenophon to go to Delphi and take common 
counsel with the god about the journey. 6. But having gone 
Xenophon asked Apollo to which one of the gods he should 
sacrifice and pray in order to make the journey he had in mind 
in the noblest and best way and, having done well, to return 
safely. And Apollo indicated to him the gods to whom he 
needed to sacrifice. 7. When he came back again, he told the 
oracle to Socrates; upon hearing it, Socrates blamed him 
because he did not first ask whether it was more advisable for 
him to make the journey or to remain, but he himself had judged 
that he was to go and then inquired how he might go most 
nobly. 'However, since you did ask it in this way,' he said, 'you 
must do all that the god ordered' (3.1.5-7, trans. Ambler, 
modified).48 
 
There are several elements of this episode which render the appearance of 
Socrates in it of paramount significance to the story. Firstly, as shown in Part 1, 
the passage is a part of Xenophon's extraordinary introduction of himself into 
the story: Socrates' involvement in this is accordingly marked as significant per 
se. Secondly, Socrates is central to the decision to join Cyrus the Younger, a 
decision which it is evident to the informed reader is one of the most important 
of Xenophon's life; embedded as it is in the desperate situation which the army 
finds itself in, Socrates' role assumes significance as well for the fate of the Ten 
Thousand. The fact that Xenophon ignores the advice he is given is intended to 
underline his lack of wisdom at this point and at the same time this action 
serves to exonerate Socrates from any suspicion that it was under his influence 
                                            
48 ὁ κέληνη Ξελνθῶλ ἀλαγλνὺο ηὴλ ἐπηζηνιὴλ ἀλαθνηλνῦηαη Σσθξάηεη ηῷ Ἀζελαίῳ πεξὶ 
ηῆο πνξείαο. θαὶ ὁ Σσθξάηεο ὑπνπηεύζαο κή ηη πξὸο ηῆο πόιεσο ὑπαίηηνλ εἴε Κύξῳ 
θίινλ γελέζζαη, ὅηη ἐδόθεη ὁ Κῦξνο πξνζύκσο ηνῖο Λαθεδαηκνλίνηο ἐπὶ ηὰο Ἀζήλαο 
ζπκπνιεκῆζαη, ζπκβνπιεύεη ηῷ Ξελνθῶληη ἐιζόληα εἰο Δειθνὺο ἀλαθνηλῶζαη ηῷ ζεῷ 
πεξὶ ηῆο πνξείαο. ἐιζὼλ δ' ὁ Ξελνθῶλ ἐπήξεην ηὸλ Ἀπόιισ ηίλη ἂλ ζεῶλ ζύσλ θαὶ 
εὐρόκελνο θάιιηζηα θαὶ ἄξηζηα ἔιζνη ηὴλ ὁδὸλ ἣλ ἐπηλνεῖ θαὶ θαιῶο πξάμαο ζσζείε. θαὶ 
ἀλεῖιελ αὐηῷ ὁ Ἀπόιισλ ζενῖο νἷο ἔδεη ζύεηλ. ἐπεὶ δὲ πάιηλ ἦιζε, ιέγεη ηὴλ καληείαλ ηῷ 
Σσθξάηεη. ὁ δ' ἀθνύζαο ᾐηηᾶην αὐηὸλ ὅηη νὐ ηνῦην πξῶηνλ ἠξώηα πόηεξνλ ιῷνλ εἴε 
αὐηῷ πνξεύεζζαη ἢ κέλεηλ, ἀιι' αὐηὸο θξίλαο ἰηένλ εἶλαη ηνῦη' ἐππλζάλεην ὅπσο ἂλ 
θάιιηζηα πνξεπζείε. ἐπεὶ κέληνη νὕησο ἤξνπ, ηαῦη', ἔθε, ρξὴ πνηεῖλ ὅζα ὁ ζεὸο 
ἐθέιεπζελ. 3.1.5-7. 
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that Xenophon left to join Cyrus. The establishment of Xenophon's state of 
immaturity further adds to the dramatic tension in the story by casting in doubt 
his ability to undertake the daunting challenge of leadership; an early tactical 
mistake which draws the ire of Kheirisophos confirms the scale of the challenge 
facing the young Athenian (3.3.8-11). Xenophon's ultimate success, which 
builds steadily through his trials on the retreat, is thus made the more 
impressive and duly reflects on the training of Socrates, whose presence, 
established in this key episode, is now felt through the course of the retreat. A 
final point is that the appearance of Socrates, if not actually unsurprising (in 
Mem. 1.1.6, from the circumstances of the episode in question, we can infer 
that Xenophon was an intimate associate of the philosopher), is not essential: if 
he wished to show himself semi-wise by seeking advice, Xenophon need not 
have named Socrates as his advisor. 
 
Although he does not mention him by name again, in several episodes through 
the narrative, Xenophon conjures the presence of Socrates. This is so for 
instance at Kotyora, when Xenophon (along with the other generals) stands trial 
before the army (5.8.1): that these are the very people he has struggled to 
benefit in the preceding months recalls the fate of Socrates and the Athenian 
democratic habit of eliminating its best citizens. In this sense the episode also 
foreshadows the author's exile. Another notable instance in which Socrates is 
recalled is in the fact of Xenophon's loyalty to the army: his repeated and 
selfless commitment to its safety (7.1.4, 7.6.11, 7.7.57) brings to mind Socrates' 
refusal to leave Athens when afforded the opportunity to avoid death (cf. Plato, 
Krito). 
 
Additional support for a pronounced Socratic presence comes from other of 
Xenophon's (conventionally) non-philosophical works. In Hellenika Socrates 
similarly makes just a single appearance, and here too it is especially significant 
and can be related to an apologetic purpose on Xenophon's part. Henry's 
reading of the section reveals its essence, the purpose of the author's dramatic 
account of the Arginousai trial being to accentuate the extraordinary courage of 
Socrates in refusing to admit an illegal motion (Hell. 1.7.1-16).49 The 
                                            
49 Henry 1966: 197. 'Now the development of this entire scene was obviously contrived 
with no other object in view than to set off the adamant refusal of the great philosopher 
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Kyroupaideia represents a still more pointed case, for Socrates is not 
mentioned in it by name at all, yet his presence is felt through the narrative. 
Gera discerns three types of Socratic influence in the work: personal traits 
shared by Socrates and Cyrus the Great; reference to events related to 
Socrates' trial and death; and the Socratic tenor of much of the dialogue.50 
Almost the same interpretative model could be applied to Anabasis with 
Xenophon's character in the place of Cyrus the Great, but here the author has 
gone further by naming Socrates at the critical juncture of the story. As now 
argued below, his presence is made more vital by the implicit linkage of his 
pupil's actions to the charges made against him. 
 
CHARGE 1. THE DEFENCE AGAINST IMPIETY: refusing to recognise the 
gods recognized by the state, and introducing new divinities. 
 
When Xenophon asks him for advice on whether or not he should join Cyrus the 
Younger, Socrates, aware of the political sensitivity of the matter and the 
potential dangers for his pupil, refers him to the god at Delphi. Socrates' later 
reaction to Xenophon's failure to ask the right question underlines his piety: 
'However, since you did ask it in this way,' [he said] 'you must do all that the god 
ordered' (3.1.7; cf. Mem. 1.1.2).51 Reflecting this piety Xenophon proceeds 
through the retreat to display the utmost reverence towards the gods. Hardly 
any course of action is undertaken without first there being an attempt to 
discern divine will, and due gratitude is always offered for successful outcomes. 
Through the march he sacrifices to traditional deities and does not introduce 
new ones (note 47 above). 
 
Xenophon could, of course, by nature have been of a pious disposition, 
although it is implicit that this tendency, if it was already there, was cultivated 
and brought to a higher state by his contact with Socrates: what substantiates 
the argument for a Socratic defence is the pains to which he goes to emphasise 
                                                                                                                                
in the face of overwhelming constraint. All objections that Xenophon in according 
Socrates only this one line is slighting him or that he does not recognise the meaning of 
his life are intolerable and can only arise from a profound misconception of the artistry 
of the description'. 
50 Gera 1993: 26-27. 
51 Gray (1998: 99) puts it: '[Xenophon] characterises Socrates as supremely wise and 
supremely pious, obeying the oracle in spite of his forebodings'. 
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this piety. The examples given below, taken from regular points along the 
retreat, illustrate both his extraordinary piety and the degree to which it is a part 
of his everyday life. To bring these two factors into more relief, the emphasis 
here is on the performance of ritual rather than the (numerous) occasions in 
which he either simply invokes or swears by a deity, or speaks of the 
consequences of impiety for others (for example of oath breaking, 3.2.10, and 
arrogance, 6.3.18); also towards this end, where relevant, contrast is drawn with 
other leaders of the army. 
 
3.2.9. Pledges by the Greater Zab River. 
 
As Xenophon begins his momentous address to the army on the dawn following 
the seizure of their generals, somebody in the assembly sneezes, and at once 
all the soldiers prostrate themselves to the god. Xenophon acts to complement 
this devoutness by recommending that they 'vow to sacrifice thank offerings for 
our salvation to this same god [Zeus the Saviour] wherever we first arrive in a 
friendly land, and that we should vow as well to sacrifice also to the other gods 
to the extent of our power' (3.2.9). This was pledged by a show of hands and 
the solemn vows were made and the paean sung. Only 'when all was fine with 
what pertained to the gods' did Xenophon continue his address. (For fulfilment 
of these vows see 4.8.25; for usage of piety in leadership see Chapter 2.2.4.) 
 
4.3.8-13. Crossing of the Centrites. 
 
Just as he has done at the Greater Zab River, on the banks of the Centrites, in 
the midst of a second dire crisis for the army — enemies stand in front and 
behind, and there is a seemingly impassable river to cross — Xenophon has a 
disturbing dream, which he takes as a divine sign that the situation will be 
favourably resolved (4.3.8). Having related this to Kheirisophos at dawn, the 
generals offer sacrifice. Shortly after this, while he is having breakfast, 
Xenophon is approached by two youths who have discovered a ford. On 
completion of their report Xenophon's attention at once (εὐζύο) turns to the 
gods. 'Immediately, then, Xenophon himself poured a libation and bade the 
youths pour one and pray to the gods who had shown both the dreams and the 
crossing, to accomplish as well the good things that were still left' (4.3.13). 
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5.7.35. Purification of the army at Kotyora. 
 
At a tense assembly called by Xenophon himself at Kotyora (see Appendix I for 
location of this and the other cities referred to), he announces that he sees a 
serious problem of disorder developing in the army (5.7.12). He proceeds to 
elaborate on his concern, describing a murderous incident that had taken place 
not long before in Kerasos. 'What city will be our friend and receive us,' he 
concludes, 'if it sees such lawlessness in us?' (5.7.33). As a result a series of 
measures are proposed, following which, Xenophon advises that the army 
should be purified (θαζῆξαη ηὸ ζηξάηεπκα), and this takes place on the spot 
(5.7.35). 
 
6.1.17-31. The leadership at Sinope. 
 
At Sinope the men decide to choose a single ruler to lead them, and their 
choice is Xenophon. Although he is flattered by the offer, considering that the 
role would enhance his reputation and that it might enable him to be the cause 
of some good (ἀγαζνῦ ηηλνο) to the army, he nonetheless has pause for 
thought. 'Now such considerations stirred him to desire to become a ruler with 
sole command. But when, on the other hand, he reflected that it was unclear to 
every human being how the future would go, and because of this there was the 
danger of throwing away even the reputation he had already earned, he was at 
a loss. Since he was at a loss how to decide, it seemed best to take common 
counsel with the gods' (6.1.21-22). As he had done following his visit to Delphi, 
having been sent there by Socrates, Xenophon sacrificed to Zeus the King. The 
result being unfavourable, he duly declined the leadership. Notable here is that 
the alternative candidate, Kheirisophos the Spartan, chosen in the face of 
Xenophon's refusal, does not consult any deity about his own decision. 
 
This case is notable again in that it may, on another level, furnish evidence for a 
less than pious Xenophon, or at least one who is using his reputation for piety to 
realise a desired outcome. In this regard the episode serves rather the 
leadership didaxis theme on his agenda as shown in Chapter 2.4. Thus, 
believing that the role will be a poisoned chalice owing to the high expectations 
of the soldiers, Xenophon attempts to avoid it by having recourse to divine 
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counsel. When the men insist that he take up the position, he responds: '"I 
swear to you by all the gods and all the goddesses that when I became aware 
of your judgement, I offered sacrifice as to whether it was better both for you to 
turn this command over to me and for me to undertake it. And the gods 
signalled to me in the sacrifices, so that even a novice would know it, that I must 
abstain from this monarchy". Thus they elected Kheirisophos' (6.1.31-32). 
 
6.4.12-22, 25. Waiting for a positive sign at Kalpe Harbour. 
 
At Kalpe Harbour on the Black Sea, the army having reunited after an 
unsuccessful division into three units, Xenophon recommends that they 
complete their onward journey on foot. The matter of proceeding has assumed 
an urgency for they have exhausted the supplies in their current location. 
Xenophon and the other generals offer sacrifice, but these are not propitious for 
the journey (6.4.13); the next day Xenophon offers sacrifice again, three times, 
but the signs are not favourable. The soldiers are now agitated as their 
provisions have at this point run out (6.4.16). Xenophon therefore decides to 
sacrifice on the question of going out for provisions instead of the journey, and 
he does so three times, but again without a positive outcome (6.4.17-19). 
Following this the men, going hungry, keep coming to his tent, 'but he said he 
would not lead them out unless the sacrifices should become [propitious]' (ὁ δ' 
νὐθ ἂλ ἔθε ἐμαγαγεῖλ κὴ γηγλνκέλσλ ηῶλ ἱεξῶλ, 6.4.19). The next day, once 
again, he offers sacrifice — and nearly the entire army circles around, but again 
they are disappointed. The victims having been exhausted, an ox is bought and 
sacrificed, but not to the desired end (6.4.22). At this stage, seeking to enhance 
his standing, one of the generals, Neon the Asinaean, arranges for a foray away 
from the harbour; but the men who go out are decimated by the enemy, with as 
many as five hundred killed (6.4.23-24). Receiving news of the desperate 
situation, Xenophon takes an ox and after sacrificing leads out to give aid 
(6.4.25). In this case he does not report the outcome of the sacrifice, which 
must almost certainly mean that it was not favourable. But he has already 
shown remarkable piety, insisting on waiting for the sign on five separate 
occasions, in spite of the increasingly difficult circumstances. 
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The same argument as made about the episode above, showing how piety can 
be used to realise leadership objectives, applies here as well. In this case 
Xenophon painstakingly illustrates the power which religion can exercise over a 
community, and more particularly how, by assuming control over the ritual 
process, the leader can resist even basic impulses such as hunger and fear. 
 
7.8. Through the Troad and Aeolis. 
 
In the final phase of the Cyreans' journey, after they have crossed back over 
from Thrace to Asia Minor, Xenophon's concern shifts from the army's welfare 
to his own. After two years campaigning he is penniless and is forced to sell his 
horse to fund his passage home (7.8.2, 6). This unhappy outcome would seem 
to indicate some divine disapproval, for all the attention he has been at pains to 
pay to the gods, but the situation does fulfil the prediction made by a soothsayer 
at the outset of his journey at Ephesus. As he left the city, Xenophon saw an 
eagle perched on his right, screeching. The soothsayer who was escorting him 
interpreted this to mean that the journey he was setting out on would bring him 
into great danger, for the eagle when sitting is vulnerable: small birds can 
swarm it, or a snake can strike. Neither would there be much reward, as the 
eagle gets its food on the wing, not hunting by foot. But the journey would bring 
him glory and fame, the eagle being the bird of Zeus the King (6.1.23). 
Xenophon's forced sale of his horse in Lampsakos — moreover his means of 
transport — can thus be read as a symbolic act ending his part in the expedition 
and at the same time marking a new, prosperous phase of his life's path. 
 
It happens then that in Lampsakos, another soothsayer, Eukleides the 
Phliasian, reveals that Xenophon has been an obstacle to himself by failing to 
sacrifice to one of his family's customary deities, Zeus Meilichios. Taking the 
counsel of this soothsayer, he 'sacrificed and burnt whole piglets, according to 
his father's custom' (7.8.5), and hence a series of beneficial events follow which 
provide him and his closest companions with ample resources. In the broader 
scheme we see that the gods have been true and that Xenophon's piety has 
brought him due benefit (cf. 'Skillous' in Chapter 2.1.2). The reference to Athens 
at this juncture may be significant, at the same time looking back to his training 
with Socrates one last time and ahead to his exile from the city. 
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5.3.4-9. In the Peloponnese. 
 
Xenophon pointedly emphasises that his piety is not the kind that only flourishes 
in times of difficulty by relating in a flash-forward how he later used his share of 
booty from the sale of captives to honour pledges made by the army to both 
Apollo and Artemis. It is implied that the offering he makes to Apollo at Delphi 
does not take place until his return to Greece (5.3.5), which is probably not until 
several years after the conclusion of the expedition; while the pledge to Artemis, 
fulfilled by his purchase of land and building thereon of a temple and altar, 
happens only after he has been settled in an estate in the Peloponnese (5.3.6-
9). These substantial gaps in time, the latter obligation discharged in time of 
personal peace, highlight the enduring quality of his piety. 
  
CHARGE 2. THE DEFENCE AGAINST CORRUPTION OF THE YOUTH 
 
As remarked in Part 2 the paths followed by several of Socrates' followers, 
Kritias and Alkibiades notably among them, would seem to have provided 
grounds for claims that he had misled them through his teaching.52 Caricatures 
in works such as those of Aristophanes will have served to fuel, if not indeed to 
create, popular suspicion about the influence of Socrates on those around him, 
especially the younger members of his circle (cf. Clouds), while after his death, 
accusations such as those made by Polykrates perpetuated these enduring 
suspicions. Giving substance to the charge, Socratesx himself admitted to one 
claim, namely, that he persuaded young men to obey him instead of their 
parents; however, he justified this action by arguing that he had some expertise 
in the field and so it was sensible for him to be the one to offer guidance 
(Apologia 20-21). Xenophon confronts the prejudice against him in the 
Memorabilia (1.2.12-16), arguing that in the case of both Kritias and Alkibiades, 
                                            
52 Morrison (2010: 196) asserts that the Athenians did not suspect Socrates of 
promoting evil or of instilling a taste for greed and ambition in those following him; 
however his point, finished below, is surely only safely applicable to the educated strata 
of society, and perhaps not everybody in this group subscribed to this sentiment: 'the 
thought was either that Socrates' probing, critical spirit had a kind of nihilistic influence 
on the young, relaxing the hold that traditional values might have on them and thus 
allowing the baser human impulses to take over, or that quite apart from the question of 
moral influence, Socrates gave his young associates a mental training that amounted 
to a powerful tool or weapon that they could then use for the good or ill of the society 
around them'. 
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it was fierce personal ambition that drove each to join Socrates, for they 
believed that from him they would acquire skills in speech and action that would 
advance them in politics. 'For my part I believe that, had heaven granted them 
the choice between the life they saw Socrates leading and death, they would 
have chosen rather to die' (Mem. 1.2.16; cf. 1.2.47). 
 
Xenophon himself was another young man who had chosen to follow Socrates, 
and he too earned the disapproval of the city, some action(s) of his leading to 
the passing of a decree of exile against him in the 390s.53 As has been 
demonstrated, in his Anabasis he goes to lengths to show himself to be a 
responsible and upstanding citizen, and, as is argued in this chapter, in this 
work he also seeks to defend the memory of Socrates. At 3.1.5 Socrates' 
concern for his welfare, manifested in his advice to him to go to Delphi for 
counsel, shows his individual responsibility and directly confronts the charge of 
corrupting youth. In informing us that he disregarded Socrates' advice, 
Xenophon removes any grounds of suspicion that the teacher was behind his 
decision to leave Athens and join the rebellious Cyrus the Younger. The 
episode also carries larger implications about the attitude of Socrates toward 
those whom he is in a relationship of trust with (cf. Mem. 1.1.6). In actual fact, 
as Xenophon demonstrates through his own conduct on the retreat, Socrates' 
education is an invaluable ingredient in the making of truly effective leaders. 
Thus the same polity which deprived Socrates of his life and exiled Xenophon is 
revealed to have acted not only unjustly, but contrary to its own interests. By 
extension Xenophon is indicating that he too is a victim of injustice. 
 
In his idealised self-representation in Anabasis, Xenophon embodies the 
qualities which he regarded as key tenets of the Socratic life, chief among these 
being self-control (ἐγθξάηεηα) and self-sufficiency (αὐηάξθεηα).54 As these form 
                                            
53 On Xenophon's age see Chapter 1.1.3. At An. 3.1.25, addressing the captains of 
Proxenos, he writes: 'if you assign me to lead, I will not cite my young age as an 
excuse' (εἰ δ' ὑκεῖο ηάηηεη' ἐκὲ ἡγεῖζζαη, νὐδὲλ πξνθαζίδνκαη ηὴλ ἡιηθίαλ). On the exile 
decree see Chapter 1.5.2. 
54 Dorion (2006: 97) speaks of a triad of Socratic virtues, adding as the third karteria, 
'endurance'. I have chosen to include this as a part of enkrateia, considering the 
concept to share as much in common as not with this virtue. Surprisingly, Dorion does 
not include Anabasis in his list of other Xenophontic works - Kyroupaideia, Hiero, 
Agesilaos, Lak. - in which the author attributes to the lead protagonists (Cyrus, 
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the foundation of his successful leadership, the usefulness of his education is 
brought into sharp relief. Several examples of these virtues are provided below 
so as to illustrate as well the persistence and rigour of his defence. Other 
Socratic qualities which Xenophon displays prominently on the retreat include 
piety, as shown above, courage, justice, and the ability to effectively deploy 
analytical speech (cf. Mem. 3.6.15, and generally 3.1-5). The power and charm 
of Xenophon's speeches was put forward as a key distinguishing feature of his 
leadership earlier in the dissertation. 
 
1. Self-control. Enkrateia. 
 
In the Memorabilia (1.5.1) Xenophon posits self-control as a virtue and invites 
his readers to judge for themselves whether or not Socrates led men up to that 
virtue through his discourse.55 He concludes his presentation with Socrates 
declaring: 
 
'Should not every man hold self-control to be the foundation of 
all virtue, and first lay this foundation firmly in his soul? For who 
without this can learn any good or practise it worthily? Or what 
man that is the slave of his pleasures is not in an evil plight 
body and soul alike?'...Such were his words; but his own self-
control was shown yet more clearly by his deeds than by his 
words (1.5.4-6).56 
 
Xenophon, too, by his actions, displays this virtue on numerous occasions 
through the retreat, so time and again demonstrating the value of his Socratic 
training. 
 
                                                                                                                                
Simonides, Agesilaos, and Lykourgos respectively) 'the same characteristics, virtues, 
and doctrines which Socrates incarnates in the four logoi Sokratikoi' (105). 
55 Εἰ δὲ δὴ θαὶ ἐγθξάηεηα θαιόλ ηε θἀγαζὸλ ἀλδξὶ θηῆκά ἐζηηλ, ἐπηζθεςώκεζα εἴ ηη 
πξνπβίβαδε ιέγσλ εἰο ηαύηελ ηνηάδε. Mem. 1.5.1. 
56 ἆξά γε νὐ ρξὴ πάληα ἄλδξα, ἡγεζάκελνλ ηὴλ ἐγθξάηεηαλ ἀξεηῆο εἶλαη θξεπῖδα, 
ηαύηελ πξῶηνλ ἐλ ηῇ ςπρῇ θαηαζθεπάζαζζαη; ηίο γὰξ ἄλεπ ηαύηεο ἢ κάζνη ηη ἂλ ἀγαζὸλ 
ἢ ειεηήζεηελ ἀμηνιόγσο; ἢ ηίο νὐθ ἂλ ηαῖο ἡδνλαῖο δνπιεύσλ αἰζρξῶο δηαηεζείε θαὶ ηὸ 
ζῶκα θαὶ ηὴλ ςπρήλ;…ηνηαῦηα δὲ ιέγσλ ἔηη ἐγθξαηέζηεξνλ ηνῖο ἔξγνηο ἢ ηνῖο ιόγνηο 
ἑαπηὸλ ἐπεδείθλπελ· Mem. 1.5.4-6. 
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An. 3.1.11, 5.7.3. Mastery of Self: Fear. 
 
During the night following the seizure of the Greek generals, Xenophon shows 
that he possesses the ability to be master of himself. Having been visited by a 
dream in which he sees his father's house burning (3.1.11), he gets up, and 
though extremely afraid (πεξίθνβνο), proceeds to take command of the severe 
crisis at hand. In these darkest hours by the Greater Zab River, by virtue of his 
self-control, Xenophon overcomes the fear and despair that has gripped the 
army. 
 
A second notable case where he conquers his fear is at Kotyora (5.7.3), when 
the army becomes volatile and threatens to vent its anger on him as the one 
supposedly attempting to lead them away from, rather than towards, home. In 
spite of the atmosphere and real danger to his life (he indicates this by 
reference to an earlier deadly episode at Kerasos: 'it was greatly to be feared 
that they would do the sort of things that they had done also to the heralds of 
the Kolchians and the market managers, for as many of these as did not flee 
into the sea were stoned to death', 5.7.2), he keeps his composure and, through 
a methodical speech (5.7.6-11), defuses the tension. 
 
An. 3.1.26-30, 4.1.17-22. Mastery of Self: Anger. 
 
In spite of the adverse circumstances, and the immense pressures which he 
bears as a leader of the retreating army, Xenophon does not display loss of 
self-control in frustrating or upsetting situations. At several points we see that he 
is angry, but that he checks this emotion so that he is not led into taking an 
action or decision that may subsequently prove to be detrimental to his own or 
the army's interests. So for example, at the Greater Zab River, as he attempts 
to lift morale, he patently becomes angry with a captain who accuses him of 
talking nonsense in maintaining that the Greeks could obtain safety 'in any other 
way than by persuading the King' (3.1.26). Nonetheless he manages to contain 
himself, and has the individual, whose opposition threatens the fragile belief he 
is resurrecting, relieved of his captaincy and sent to be a baggage carrier 
(3.1.30). 
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Later, in the Kardouchian hills, when the army comes under severe attack and 
the rear is left exposed, with the result that two of his best men are killed, 
Xenophon confronts Kheirisophos, the commander of the van. 'When they 
arrived at a stopping place, Xenophon went directly to Kheirisophos just as he 
was and began to blame him for not waiting, and for compelling them to fight at 
the same time they were trying to flee. "And now two noble and good men are 
lying dead, and we were not able either to take them up or to bury them"'.57 Yet 
in spite of his clear upset, he does not allow this to cloud his judgment, and 
immediately turns his attention to the challenge of moving forward through the 
enemy's territory (4.1.22). Nor, it is later revealed, does he allow the incident to 
spoil his relationship with his fellow leader (cf. 4.6.3). 
 
An. 4.4.11-12. Braving the elements. 
 
The harsh conditions of the Armenian winter made progress for the army slow 
and difficult. A heavy fall of snow one night covered the men where they slept; 
where it did not fall off it kept them warm, and there was a great reluctance to 
rise in the morning. Xenophon, however, got up undressed (γπκλόο) and began 
to chop wood for fire. This action encouraged others, who got to their feet and 
began to build fires.58 
 
An. 7.3.23-25. The Thracian banquet. 
 
The Greek generals and captains are invited to a dinner (ἐπὶ δεῖπλνλ) hosted by 
the Thracian dynast, Seuthes. Large quantities of food and wine are laid on, 
and Xenophon describes how one of the Greeks, an Arcadian by the name of 
Arystas, heaped bread and meat on his knees and continued to eat even when 
wine was brought round. Xenophon represents himself in almost a binary 
relation to Arystas, whom he has tell the wine bearer: 'Give it to him 
[Xenophon]. For he is already at leisure, but I am not yet' (7.3.24). By 
                                            
57 ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀθίθνλην ἐπὶ ζηαζκόλ, εὐζὺο ὥζπεξ εἶρελ ὁ Ξελνθῶλ ἐιζὼλ πξὸο ηὸλ 
Χεηξίζνθνλ ᾐηηᾶην αὐηὸλ ὅηη νὐρ ὑπέκελελ, ἀιι' ἠλαγθάδνλην θεύγνληεο ἅκα κάρεζζαη. 
θαὶ λῦλ δύν θαιώ ηε θαὶ ἀγαζὼ ἄλδξε ηέζλαηνλ θαὶ νὔηε ἀλειέζζαη νὔηε ζάςαη 
ἐδπλάκεζα. 4.1.19. 
58 On Socrates' endurance: Mem. 1.2.1, 1.6.2; Plato, Symp. 220b-c. 
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highlighting the gluttony of Arystas, he draws attention to his own modest eating 
habits. 
 
However, he subsequently reveals that he has allowed the taste for wine to 
trump his control of his appetites. Climbing to his feet when the drinking horn 
came to him again (7.3.29), he pledged himself and his companions to the 
service of Seuthes, boasting that they would bring great benefit to him. 'With 
their help, if the gods are willing, you will take back a great deal of land, that 
which was your father's, and you will also acquire land, and you will acquire 
many horses, many men, and beautiful women' (7.3.31). The moment seems 
benign enough, but in the later context of the tense relations between 
Xenophon and the army over suspicions about his dealings with Seuthes, it 
assumes distinct significance. As I have argued in the previous chapter (3.2.3), 
the declaration may have angered some in the army and been one of the 
causes of the serious accusation of corruption that was subsequently made 
against him (7.6.9-10). In choosing to use an instance of his own weakness as 
an example at this penultimate juncture, Xenophon makes a closing warning 
about the dangers of akrasia. 
 
An. passim. Absence of Enkrateia. 
 
The consequence of lack of enkrateia (akrasia) is a theme which has run 
through the work. Xenophon repeatedly underlines the indispensability of this 
quality by including incidents where its absence carries serious implications, if 
not for the individuals involved, then for the army as a whole. The case of 
Kheirisophos losing control and striking the guide, who then fled (4.6.2-3), has 
been examined in Chapter 2.2.3. Another marked episode occurs in the territory 
of the Mossynoikoi, between Trapezus and Kotyora on the Black Sea coast 
(5.4.14-21; see map, Appendix I). A number of the Greeks, 'not having been so 
ordered by the generals but for the sake of plunder' (θαὶ ηῶλ Ἑιιήλσλ ηηλέο, νὐ 
ηαρζέληεο ὑπὸ ηῶλ ζηξαηεγῶλ, ἀιιὰ ἁξπαγῆο ἕλεθελ, 5.4.16), followed one 
Mossynoikoian tribe in its attack against another; the defenders routed them 
and mutilated many of the bodies. 'After cutting off the heads of the dead,' 
Xenophon writes, 'they displayed them both to the Greeks and to their own 
enemies, and at the same time they sang a certain tune and danced to it' 
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(5.4.17). Xenophon's lesson is that the ill-discipline of these soldiers has cost 
them their lives and the hope of a dignified burial were they to fall in action. It 
has also, as he is at pains to stress, endangered the army because the enemy 
tribe has been emboldened by its brutal triumph (5.4.18). 
 
2. Self-sufficiency. Autarkeia. 
 
This virtue might be described as beginning in the ability to meet one's own 
needs by oneself. As Socrates teaches, the resources each individual 
consumes vary, but it is incumbent on the aspiring kalos kagathos to reduce his 
dependence on material goods until such point as his needs are minimal. In his 
Memorabilia Xenophon has Socrates put it in a more eloquent way: 
 
You seem, Antiphon, to imagine that happiness consists in 
luxury and extravagance. But my belief is that to have no wants 
is divine; to have as few as possible comes next to the divine; 
and as that which is divine is supreme, so that which 
approaches nearest to its nature is nearest to the supreme 
(Mem. 1.6.10).59 
 
The subject of self-sufficiency arises at other junctures in this work, for example, 
through Socrates' conviction that a man should do all he can for himself before 
turning to the gods for help (Mem. 1.1.9); it is also a feature in other works, for 
example in Oikonomikos, where Cyrus the Younger is praised for his gardening 
habit (4.20-24), and in Poroi, a composition which encourages Athens to seek 
economic recovery in moderation and self-sufficiency rather than imperial 
adventure. In Anabasis, Xenophon shows how he himself steadily progresses 
towards this Socratic ideal.60 Once more it is the benefit produced for the 
                                            
59 ἔνηθαο, ὦ Ἀληηθῶλ, ηὴλ εὐδαηκνλίαλ νἰνκέλῳ ηξπθὴλ θαὶ πνιπηέιεηαλ εἶλαη· ἐγὼ δ' 
ἐλνκίδνλ ηὸ κὲλ κεδελὸο δεῖζζαη ζεῖνλ εἶλαη, ηὸ δ' ὡο ἐιαρίζησλ ἐγγπηάησ ηνῦ ζείνπ, θαὶ 
ηὸ κὲλ ζεῖνλ θξάηηζηνλ, ηὸ δ' ἐγγπηάησ ηνῦ ζείνπ ἐγγπηάησ ηνῦ θξαηίζηνπ. Mem. 1.6.10. 
60 From Xenophon's perspective, arguably, the main result of attaining self-sufficiency 
is εὐδαηκνλία. In the Oikonomikos, following their dialogue in the paradeisos at Sardis, 
he has Lysander say to Cyrus the Younger: 'I think you deserve your happiness, Cyrus, 
for you earn it by your virtues' (Δηθαίσο κνη δνθεῖο, ὦ Κῦξε, εὐδαίκσλ εἶλαη· ἀγαζὸο γὰξ 
ὢλ ἀλὴξ εὐδαηκνλεῖο, 4.25). Dorion (2006: 105) claims that Plato's Socrates has no 
concern with autarkeia: 'This is doubtless because the only self-sufficiency that would 
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community as much as for the individual which stands as testimony to Socrates' 
usefulness. 
 
An. 3.2.7, 3.3.19, 4.2.20. Prepared for war. 
 
We know that Xenophon comes on the expedition well equipped for military 
adventure. He has several horses (3.3.19), a shield-bearer (4.2.20), and at least 
two panoplies (3.2.7). He has also brought enough money to last for a 
prolonged period, this evidenced by the fact that while Cyrus's first payment to 
the men only comes four months after they had set out (1.2.12), and is 
thereafter irregular, he does not suffer any want. Perhaps, indeed, he is too well 
prepared, or over-provisioned, for his journey. Soterides' attack on him as they 
ascend a height ('we are not contending on equal ground, Xenophon; for you 
are carried on a horse, but I am labouring hard, carrying this shield', 3.4.47) 
may hint at a sense of luxury on Xenophon's part. The depletion of his 
resources over the journey so that in the end he has only his horse (7.8.2), 
marks his arrival at a state close to the divine and corresponds with the 
maturing of his character which has taken place on the retreat. 
 
An. 1.5.1-3. Hunting. 
 
As the army marched through the Arabian Desert, Xenophon describes how the 
horsemen hunted native wildlife — wild asses, ostrich, bustards, antelopes — 
adopting as they did tactics suitable to the nature of beast and terrain. Given the 
environment and the remote location their success was self-evidently of benefit 
to the army; it is probably safe to suppose as well, with his interest and 
expertise in hunting and horsemanship, that Xenophon was to the fore among 
the riders. Perhaps it was on such forays that he earned the respect and 
admiration of Proxenos' officers, evident in their willingness to have him lead 
their contingent following the events by the Greater Zab River. 
 
                                                                                                                                
count in Plato's eyes is self-sufficiency with regard to knowledge and the good, not the 
self-sufficiency with regard to the material conditions of existence which Xenophon 
attributes to Socrates. And since Socratesp is ignorant and constantly in search of the 
knowledge and virtue which would finally satisfy his aspiration to the good, he cannot 
be self-sufficient'. 
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An. 4.1.12-14, 7.5.3, 7.7.56. Nothing in excess. 
 
At several points Xenophon indicates his own self-sufficiency by reference to 
the surplus needs of others. In the Kardouchian hills, when a decision is taken 
to shed excess baggage and people, Xenophon is not among the soldiers who 
conceals any goods out of desire to keep them (4.1.12-14). In Thrace he 
passes on his share of plunder to the other officers with him: 'For me it will 
suffice to take something on a later occasion, but give these things to these 
generals and captains who have followed with me' (7.5.3); again, when their 
employer is persuaded to pay up, Xenophon declines his share of the booty 
(7.7.56). 
 
An. 7.8.8-22. Raid in Mysia.  
 
Xenophon's decision to forgo what is due to him is shortly after revealed to have 
been less than prudent, for as remarked above he is forced to sell his horse at 
Lampsakos in order to fund his trip home (7.8.6). This could be seen as 
providential in placing him in yet closer proximity to the Socratic ideal of perfect 
autarkeia; however, instead of asceticism he turns to banditry, leading a 
plundering raid which is intended to enrich himself and his most trusted officers: 
'After having dinner, he marched [with the intent of capturing a wealthy Persian, 
Asidates, and his wife and children] while also taking the captains who were 
special friends and those who had become most trusted through it all, in order 
to benefit them' (7.8.11). On the other hand, his action, which notably has 
followed on from a specific sacrifice outside Lampsakos (see above), 
demonstrates his ability to supply his own needs and those of his friends when 
it is necessary and not opposed by the gods. At the end of his account, 
Xenophon may be quietly asserting the primacy of this virtue over other ones, 
while privileging the active over the contemplative life. 
 
An. 6. Absence of Autarkeia. 
 
As he does with enkrateia, Xenophon demonstrates the importance of autarkeia 
by showing the consequences of its absence. In Book 6 he carefully charts the 
self-destructive impact of the army's moving away from the ideal of self-
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sufficiency. At Harmene, a port beyond Sinope, he writes: 'Now since they 
seemed to be near Greece, it occurred to them to consider even more than 
before how they could return home with something in their possession' (ὡο δὲ 
ηῆο Ἑιιάδνο ἐδόθνπλ ἐγγὺο γίγλεζζαη, ἤδε κᾶιινλ ἢ πξόζζελ εἰζῄεη αὐηνὺο 
ὅπσο ἂλ θαὶ ἔρνληέο ηη νἴθαδε ἀθίθσληαη, 6.1.17). Although they elected a sole 
commander at Sinope, at Herakleia, dissatisfied with the gifts of hospitality 
(μέληα) provided by that city, they gather together and decide themselves to 
demand more. This ploy being unsuccessful, the Arcadians and Achaeans split 
away, believing they will fare better on their own (6.2.4-12). But in pursuing 
booty they lose coherence as a force and eventually are encircled by the 
Thracians (6.3.2-6). It is only Xenophon's willingness and ability to relieve them 
that averts a disastrous fate. The army's movement away on the parabasis from 
the high state of autarkeia it had attained on the geographical katabasis is thus 
shown simultaneously to mark its disintegration as a successful community. 
 
 
PART 4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
I have argued that Xenophon subtly but surely represents himself in Anabasis 
as a pupil of Socrates who is seeking to develop his character and learning. The 
high intensity of the events which form the backdrop to his dramatic introduction 
to the narrative oblige the reader to pay special attention to the circumstances: 
by involving Proxenos, the pupil of Gorgias, and then Socrates, he indicates a 
philosophical motive for his joining of Cyrus the Younger. The consultation with 
Socrates marks their close relationship and characterises it as one between 
teacher and pupil. The educational motive is reinforced shortly after by 
Xenophon's statement that he was 'fully deceived' (δὴ νὕησο ἐμαπαηεζείο) as to 
the purpose of Cyrus's campaign (3.1.10): in other words, he did not join Cyrus 
to participate in an adventurous expedition against the King.61 Immediately 
following this we are witnesses to his night of darkness, emerging from which 
                                            
61 This statement primarily serves Xenophon's personal defence. As argued in the last 
chapter (3.3.2.3), Cyrus's expedition was legally, morally, and politically suspect, and 
as such it would not be an ideal learning environment. Xenophon does not blame 
Proxenos for the deceit, for he was also ignorant of Cyrus's real purpose; when the true 
aim of the expedition became apparent, both men, and indeed the other Greeks, 
'followed along out of shame both before each other and before Cyrus' (3.1.10). 
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he steps up to take the responsibility of leadership (3.1.11-15). This moment is 
the critical juncture whereby his journey of self-development becomes a test of 
his character — and where he begins his defence of Socrates. 
 
The evidence for Anabasis as a Socratic defence is substantial, though 
Xenophon presents his material in a characteristically subtle fashion. His 
defence is set in train through the introduction of Socrates almost 
simultaneously with his own character at the key dramatic moment of the 
narrative, and by his rebuttal in the recollected episode of the charges of impiety 
and corrupting the youth made against the philosopher: by advising the young 
man to take counsel with the god, Socrates' innocence is indicated and the 
case against him implied to be motivated more by politics than justice. The 
question of Socrates' guilt, and indeed of the accuracy of Xenophon's portrait of 
him and his teachings, is not critical to this thesis. Regardless of how true 
Xenophon's representation of the philosopher is, he is defending the historical 
Socrates against the charges brought against him in 399. 
 
From the Greater Zab River, Xenophon and Socrates dominate the stage, the 
teacher's presence shadowing that of the pupil as he endures the trials of his 
anabasis. On occasion Socrates is made visible by way of an overt or implicit 
reference to his trial, but the principal means of keeping the philosopher to the 
fore is the substance and style of Xenophon's leadership: almost every action, 
even his failures, few in number as they are, recall his ethical training and touch 
directly upon the charges made against Socrates. Through time and space 
Xenophon shows the vigour and extent of his piety, and his exceptional 
capacities for self-control and self-sufficiency — key elements of his leadership 
style — recall those of Socrates. The periodic absence of these qualities in 
other leaders serves as well to emphasise the value of his teacher. In the 
literary account the successful retreat of the Ten Thousand Greeks is owed to 
Xenophon in his exemplary form of model student of Socrates, and so by 
extension to the Socratic training, which is thus demonstrated to have had real 
benefit to a community. 
 
There is a danger with the sort of interpretation offered here that it reads too 
much between the lines, or overstates the subtlety and complexity of the 
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narrative. How do we know this is what Xenophon intended? One answer to this 
is that Anabasis must be read as a part of the author's oeuvre and not simply as 
an isolated work. In this way the themes and concerns that recur throughout the 
oeuvre and root it in a common writing agenda become apparent, as too does 
the particular way they inform each of his writings. A second answer lies in the 
evidence of the text itself; for instance, in the ratio between what might be 
termed the march narrative and what is not obviously relevant to it. Xenophon's 
speeches alone constitute a notable portion of the entire work, while the attempt 
of Cyrus, the ostensible cause of the book, covers just one of its seven parts. 
The question could be answered in another way by pointing to the need for 
greater attention to be paid to the author and his writings; the effort, as is hoped 
has been demonstrated here, enhances understanding of the writer and his 
many subjects in equal measure. 
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Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
 
An enduring challenge for scholars of Xenophon's Anabasis has been to 
provide an explanation of the nature of the work. The challenge stems from 
uncertainty about Xenophon's purpose in writing, and from the unique nature of 
the text itself; the combined effect, as one writer has put it, is that the work has 
resisted a commonly agreed modern classification.1 The main conclusion of this 
dissertation is that Anabasis is first and foremost a work of apologetics: in a 
variety of ways, through the course of the text, Xenophon is defending himself, 
and his teacher, Socrates. The rich thematic and subject variety of the narrative, 
and its unique structure, defined by two distinct Xenophons and a 
pseudonymous author, can be explained by the special requirements of 
apologia — the author's need to attract and keep the interest of his audience in 
the face of a highly personalised agenda. 
  
Xenophon's oeuvre is marked by a strong apologetic tendency. His four 
Socratic works are concerned to defend the memory of the philosopher; 
Agesilaos and Kynegetikos are at an important level defences of their 
respective subjects, while in his other historiographical work, Hellenika, the 
author devotes substantial space (over 10% of the history) to the rule of the 
Thirty at Athens, subtly distancing himself in this from the harsher element of 
the regime. A further distinguishing feature of the oeuvre is a taste for 
didacticism. In some works, such as the technical treatises, this is explicit, in 
others it is less apparent but no less a force in the text. In Anabasis, for 
example, the subject of military leadership is pervasive, yet integrated into the 
storyline to such a degree that its presence might go unnoticed to those not 
                                            
1 LaForse (2005: 2), who cites as well Tuplin's comment that the work is 'generically-
speaking eccentric'. Tuplin elsewhere writes: 'it [Anabasis] is generally supposed to 
have had purposes less naïve than its external appearance might suggest, even if 
descriptions of that purpose certainly differ' (1993: 13). 
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interested in the subject; those who are interested can benefit from a range of 
situational lessons, and a thoughtful critique of variant leadership styles. 
Furthermore, important insight is provided into the problem of how to manage 
mercenary soldiers, a subject topical in the early and middle decades of the 
fourth century. 
 
Among the other concerns and themes incorporated into the narrative are 
Spartan hegemony of Greece, panhellenism, and military tactics. While 
Anabasis serves as a vehicle for the expression of these, they also constitute a 
means through which the author transforms his account from a record of 
parasangs and speeches into an engaging story. Far from weighing it down as 
some have maintained, his interweaving of these strands with events on the 
ground enriches the text, and make it ultimately, as Wencis has put it, 'pleasing 
and profitable to the reader'.2 
 
Perhaps the most remarkable achievement of Anabasis is the author's 
harnessing of the substantial didactic aspect of the work for his apologetic ends. 
By having his own character embody an ideal, philosophical form of leadership, 
he promotes the value of his Socratic training and defends his teacher; at the 
same time, the words and deeds of his character in turn reflect on the author 
and historical figure behind the book. The ambitious scheme is effected by way 
of the author's use of a pseudonym, which permits the creation of the character 
Xenophon and indicates that the story is not autobiographical. 
 
The literary accomplishment evident in Anabasis betrays the hand of a skilled 
and intelligent writer. The fact that many of the elements prominent in Anabasis 
recur throughout Xenophon's oeuvre suggests a common writing agenda. This 
probably evolved over the wide chronological span — perhaps the three 
decades before his death — of his publications, and it was almost certainly 
inspired by his association with the philosopher Socrates, whose teachings and 
spirit pervade the corpus. Following Socrates, Xenophon's ultimate aim was to 
bring benefit to his friends and countrymen; but although he followed, he did so 
in his own way, choosing to instruct through literature, a field in which he proved 
                                            
2 Wencis 1997: 44. 
247 
 
to be highly original and inventive. One mark of this is his defence of Socrates 
in Anabasis. Breaking from the traditional Socratic apologia, in which the 
subject is a main protagonist, in the work he powerfully undermines the charges 
brought against the philosopher by presenting the outstanding success and 
piety of one of his pupils. In this sense Anabasis may properly be added to the 
author's cycle of Socratic works, and a good case can be made for it being one 
of the most effective and original of these. A final remark, flowing from the 
apologetic character of the work, is that the decree of exile against Xenophon, 
strongly dated to 399 by arguments presented in the dissertation, had a 
profound impact on his subsequent thought and sense of identity. 
 
That Anabasis continues to attract diverse responses from its readers is a 
measure of its richness, a case in point for Calvino's maxim that a classic is a 
book that never finishes saying what it has to say. However, the range of 
engagements is, too, a measure of the distance still to be covered before an 
adequate understanding of the work and its author is reached. It is hoped that 
the present study has made some contribution to this process. Areas for 
profitable future research include: a systematic exploration of the author's usage 
of exemplars in his writing; further investigation of the march record's reliability 
in Anabasis, with particular reference to the use of parasangs and the question 
of a diary; the author's intended audience(s), approached perhaps by way of a 
comparative study of contemporary authors; a consideration of Anabasis in light 
of recent research into the 'ironic Xenophon'; and the problematic question of 
the author's relationship with Socrates and the extent of the influence of the 
philosopher's life and teaching on his work. 
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Appendix II 
 
Editions of Xenophon's Anabasis and English language translations 
 
 
MAJOR MODERN EDITIONS 
 
1825. L. Dindorf. Teubner. 1st edn. Leipzig. 
 
1904. E. Marchant. Oxford Classical Texts. Oxford. 
 
1909. W. Gemoll. Teubner. 2nd edn. Leipzig. 
 
1922. C.L. Brownson. Loeb. Cambridge, Mass. 
 
1931. C. Hude. Teubner. Leipzig. 
 
1930-31. P. Masqueray. Budé. Paris. 
 
1972. J. Peters. Teubner. Revision of Hude. 
 
1998. J. Dillery. Loeb. Revision of Brownson. 
 
 
ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS (19th century dates approximate only as some 
editions may be later printings) 
 
19th Century 
 
1817. Hutchinson. Glasgow.  
 
1821. Schneider. Oxford. 
 
1823. Townsend. London.  
 
1834. Balfoor. London.  
 
1837. Long. London. 
 
1839. Hickie. London. 
 
1839. Spellman. New York. 
 
1843. Owen. London. 
 
1848. Charles. New York. 
. 
1850. Macmichael. London. 
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1854. Watson. New York. 
 
1856. Boise. New York.  
 
1873. Kendrick. New York. 
 
1887. Clark. New York. 
 
1897. Daykns. London. 
 
 
20th Century 
 
1900. A.S. Walpole. Macmillan. London. (By book, not complete). 
 
1922. C.L. Brownson. Loeb: Cambridge, Mass. 
 
1947. W.H.D. Rouse. Thomas Nelson and Sons. Edinburgh. 
 
1948. R. Warner. Penguin. Harmondsworth. 
 
1998. J. Dillery. Loeb: Cambridge, Mass. 
 
 
21st Century 
 
2005. R. Waterfield. Oxford World's Classics. Oxford. 
 
2008. W. Ambler. Agora. Ithaca. 
 
Forthcoming: C. Tuplin. Penguin. Harmondsworth. 
 
Forthcoming: D. Thomas. Pantheon Books. New York. 
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